{"id":524,"date":"2019-06-25T04:05:20","date_gmt":"2019-06-25T03:05:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ensovoort.com\/?p=524"},"modified":"2019-06-25T04:05:20","modified_gmt":"2019-06-25T03:05:20","slug":"critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/","title":{"rendered":"Critical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)<br \/>\nGabriel P Louw<br \/>\niD orcid.org\/0000-0002-6190-8093<br \/>\nResearch Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).<br \/>\nCorresponding Author:<br \/>\nProf. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)<br \/>\nEmail: <a href=\"mailto:profgplouw@gmail.com\">profgplouw@gmail.com<\/a><br \/>\nKeywords: Badness, candidate, crookedness, delinquency, election, evaluation, expropriate, goodness, leadership, political party, responsibility, scenario, wrongdoings,<br \/>\n<i>Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 4<br \/>\n<\/i><\/p>\n<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_45_1 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\">Table of Contents | Inhoudsopgawe<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" area-label=\"ez-toc-toggle-icon-1\"><label for=\"item-69eb178c2c0ab\" aria-label=\"Table of Content\"><span style=\"display: flex;align-items: center;width: 35px;height: 30px;justify-content: center;direction:ltr;\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/label><input  type=\"checkbox\" id=\"item-69eb178c2c0ab\"><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#11_Introduction\" title=\"1.1. Introduction\">1.1. Introduction<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-4'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#12_Aims_of_Articles_9_to_11_Continued\" title=\"1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)\">1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#2_Method_Continued\" title=\"2. Method (Continued)\">2. Method (Continued)<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#3_Results_and_Discussion_Continued\" title=\"3. Results and Discussion (Continued)\">3. Results and Discussion (Continued)<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-4'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#31_Overview\" title=\"3.1. Overview\">3.1. Overview<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-5'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-5'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#311_Evaluation_guidelines_of_political_parties\" title=\"3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties\">3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#3111_The_Louw_Appraisal_Checklist_to_Assess_the_Leadership_Qualities_of_South_Africas_Executive_Political_Leaders_and_Regimes_1652_to_2018\" title=\"3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018\">3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32_The_manifestos_self-descriptions_and_public_references_of_the_three_parties_Continued\" title=\"3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)\">3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-5'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-5'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321_The_Democratic_Alliance\" title=\"3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance\">3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-6'><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-10\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#3211_Introduction\" title=\"3.2.1.1. Introduction\">3.2.1.1. Introduction<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-11\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32111_The_voter_outcome_at_the_ballot_box_on_May_8_2019_tells_much\" title=\"3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much\">3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-12\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#3212_The_DA_manifesto_of_2019\" title=\"3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019\">3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-13\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#3213_The_pre-2019_road-mapping_of_the_DA\" title=\"3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA\">3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-14\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32131_The_DAs_original_birth-certificate_in_perspective\" title=\"3.2.1.3.1. The DA\u2019s original birth-certificate in perspective\">3.2.1.3.1. The DA\u2019s original birth-certificate in perspective<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-15\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32132_The_DAs_policy_not_to_subsidise_and_enrich_the_poor\" title=\"3.2.1.3.2. The DA\u2019s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor\">3.2.1.3.2. The DA\u2019s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-16\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32133_BBBEE_and_its_vehicles_of_land_expropriation\" title=\"3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation\">3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-17\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32134_The_DAs_policy_of_land_expropriation_without_compensation\" title=\"3.2.1.3.4. The DA\u2019s policy of land expropriation without compensation\">3.2.1.3.4. The DA\u2019s policy of land expropriation without compensation<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-18\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32135_The_proof_of_the_DA_pudding_is_not_always_in_the_eating\" title=\"3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating\">3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-19\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321351_The_DAs_seemingly_ongoing_own_internal_strife\" title=\"3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA\u2019s seemingly ongoing own internal strife\">3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA\u2019s seemingly ongoing own internal strife<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-20\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321352_The_DAs_merry_men_and_their_alleged_hands_in_the_cookie_jar\" title=\"3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA\u2019s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar\">3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA\u2019s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-21\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321353_The_Marrian_test_case_of_the_DA_as_an_effective_ruler_in_metros\" title=\"3.2.1.3.5.3. The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros\">3.2.1.3.5.3. The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-22\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32136_The_DAs_horse-trading_with_extreme_oppositions_as_partners\" title=\"3.2.1.3.6. The DA\u2019s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners\">3.2.1.3.6. The DA\u2019s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-23\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32138_The_DAs_use_of_the_Malloch-Brown_model_for_provincial_and_municipal_political_empowerment\" title=\"3.2.1.3.8. The DA\u2019s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment\">3.2.1.3.8. The DA\u2019s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-24\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32139_The_DA_as_a_party_of_everything_for_everyone_pre-and_post-2019\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019\">3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-25\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321391_The_DAs_White_dilemma\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA\u2019s White dilemma\">3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA\u2019s White dilemma<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-26\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321392_A_Black_ex-ANC_as_the_present_leader_of_the_DA\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA\">3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-27\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321393_The_DA_present-day_leadership_saturation_by_right-wing_Old_Guards\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards\">3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-28\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321394_Good_management_for_change_politics\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics\">3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-29\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321395_The_DA_is_finally_at_the_centre_of_politics_and_is_laying_out_its_stall\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall\">3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-30\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#32139_Pastor_Mmusi_Maimane_a_perspective\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective\">3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-31\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321391_The_Poor_leader\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.1. The \u201cPoor\u201d leader\">3.2.1.3.9.1. The \u201cPoor\u201d leader<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-32\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321392_The_who_is_who_of_Mmusi_Maimane\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane\">3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-33\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321393_The_good_Graaff_characteristics_of_Maimane\" title=\"3.2.1.3.9.3. The good \u201cGraaff characteristics\u201d of Maimane\">3.2.1.3.9.3. The good \u201cGraaff characteristics\u201d of Maimane<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-6'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-34\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#321310_Louw_Appraisal_Checklist_to_Assess_the_Leadership_Qualities_of_South_Africas_Executive_Political_Leaders_and_Regimes_1652_to_2018\" title=\"3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018\">3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-35\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#5_Conclusions\" title=\"5. Conclusions\">5. Conclusions<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-36\" href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/#6_References\" title=\"6. References\">6. References<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"11_Introduction\"><\/span>1.1. Introduction<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>This study is a continuation of the previous article (Article 9, entitled: <i>\u201cCritical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 1-The EFF in perspective (9)\u201d<\/i>. This article (Article 10, entitled: <i>\u201cCritical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)\u201d<\/i>], is, as previously mentioned, the second part in the sequence of three articles on the roles of the three main political parties at the moment in the country, namely the EFF, the DA and the ANC. It intends to analyse and further discuss the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity and the ability of the DA to be able to effect land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its<i> CVs<\/i> and <i>attestations.<\/i><\/p>\n<h4><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"12_Aims_of_Articles_9_to_11_Continued\"><\/span>1.2. Aims of Articles 9 to 11 (Continued)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 10) in the sequence of three articles is thus to continue the reflection upon the profile of the DA on the same basis as was done with the previous article (Part One: Article 9). Prominent here is the ability of the DA to be able to take care of the land expropriation matter, should it have been elected on May 8, 2019 into government. At the same time, its ability and integrity is evaluated, in order to see how it is positioned, as an opposition party, to be able to successfully handle the land matter until 2024. This also includes the capability of the DA as a partner of the ruler, the ANC, should such an outcome manifest. Important here is the saying: <i>the test of the pudding is in the eating thereof.<\/i><br \/>\nIn the context of much manipulation and misleading around the South African land expropriation matter by political parties in terms of how they are going to execute it should they become the ruler, is it important to note that Chomsky<sup>1<\/sup> points out that modern politics is often hampered by the parties\u2019 leadership\u2019s poor personal and political integrity. This unfortunate contaminated political setup of parties in the end blocks the pursuit of their previously agreed on mandate with the voters, who have given them permission to take decisions upon their behalves, as well as the development of the critical role of leaders of integrity and the independent creative actions of the party as a whole. This notion is applicable to the thinking, planning and action of South Africa\u2019s land ownership matter. Central here is the intention of the researcher to unmask a political party as a failure.<sup>1<\/sup><br \/>\nFor Chomsky<sup>1<\/sup> it goes much further and deeper: politically mandated people in terms of the Constitution, for instance those who are MPS and MPLs and chief executives at state enterprises, must at all times reflect integrity, goodwill and the intention of order in their thinking, planning and action. He postulates that it is not enough for these political and executive leaders to be able to think \u201ccleanly\u201d and critically, but that ethnic imagination and an immense sense of social responsibility and accountability are characteristics that are imperative for them. Undoubtably the main intention of many delinquent politicians is to exploit the South Africans who are fighting with regard to land ownership. The lack of knowledge and cognitive understanding of many of the ordinary Black and White South Africans on the land matter, is absolutely misused by these delinquent politicians in steering the country\u2019s demanding land ownership issue in such a way that it exclusively benefits the interests of the top brass of their party.<sup>1<\/sup><br \/>\nBy the critical evaluation of the CVs and attestations of political parties and their leaders, the mass of political crooks and gangsters are shaken out, leaving the few political knights standing out clearly. Such a shake-out of possible masked crooks and gangsters amongst leaders in the DA is the primary intention of the undertaking of an evaluation and conclusion in this article. It will be in line with the intention of the evaluation and conclusion of the previous article (Article 9) on the EFF.<br \/>\nThe single aim in this context of evaluation and conclusion is to accept or to reject the DA as a potential candidate (political party) to be able to successfully effect land reform as part of its political mandate in post-2019 South Africa.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"2_Method_Continued\"><\/span>2. Method (Continued)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The research was been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case about the abilities of political parties to successfully effect land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted in order to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us so as to steer successful land reform from 2019 in South Africa.<br \/>\nThe research findings are presented in narrative format.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"3_Results_and_Discussion_Continued\"><\/span>3. Results and Discussion (Continued)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<h4><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"31_Overview\"><\/span>3.1. Overview<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The successful execution of the post-2019 land reform issue is undoubtedly dependent on the abilities, integrity and sound cognitive thinking, planning and action of a so-called \u201cgood\u201d government. This means a regime that is not blindly on a \u201cpath of try and come to\u201d to be able to reach an end result on the matter, notwithstanding whether it is a success or a failure. This requires a regime that honestly serves the interests of all its people by its use of a good road map on an orderly land reform initiative so as to steer it into reality.<br \/>\nThe essential question here is thus whether the DA can theoretically be a candidate to be shortlisted due to its potential to assure the successful implementation and completion of the post-2019 plan on land expropriation.<\/p>\n<h5><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"311_Evaluation_guidelines_of_political_parties\"><\/span>3.1.1. Evaluation guidelines of political parties<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>The evaluation guidelines of political parties, as were already used in the previous Article 9, will be precisely replicated in order to evaluate the DA as national, provincial and municipal rulers. These guidelines for the DA are:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Its general policies, as well as specific standpoints on aspects such as the respect of law and order, the fighting of corruption and state capture, the behavioural delinquency of its MPs, MPLs and its top brass leaders, as well as the party\u2019s and its leaders\u2019 views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as put in perspective through its manifesto for the 2019-election.<\/li>\n<li>The public critics for the period 1994 to 2019 in newspapers, etc. These include evaluations and reflections by political analysts, strategists and commentators on the party as a political organisation, its members\u2019 and leaders\u2019 behaviour and action such as corruption, state capture, as well as the behavioural delinquency of MPs, MPLs and top brass leaders, and their views on land expropriation without compensation, etc., as well as the party\u2019s internal organisational conflicts, and controversial political, economic and social views and opinions.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"3111_The_Louw_Appraisal_Checklist_to_Assess_the_Leadership_Qualities_of_South_Africas_Executive_Political_Leaders_and_Regimes_1652_to_2018\"><\/span>3.1.1.1. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>For the quantitative classification and measurment of the political records of the DA, the <i>Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<\/i>,<sup>2<\/sup> was used again . The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was again applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party\u2019s\u2019 manifesto and to the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable. For guiding the gathering of the information on the DA, the approach used with the EFF, is again as follows reflected for better understanding, namely:<br \/>\n1) The <i>Curriculum Vitae (CV)<\/i> in order to obtain insight into the candidates\u2019 qualifications, experiences, extraordinary skills, etc; and<br \/>\n2) The letters of the referees, the <i>attestations<\/i>, to offer firstly further insight into the qualifications, experiences, etc. of the candidate; and secondly, at the same time, to tell us confidentially about good versus bad habits, customs, characteristics, etc., of the candidate, that were well-masked in or absent from the CV. This referee data mostly informs us of the \u201cgoodness\u201d and \u201cbadness\u201d of a candidate, which in the end can make him a failure or a success in the execution of the responsibilities of the post.<br \/>\nIn this research the manifesto and self-description offered by the DA and its leaders will be seen as their CVs. The public reporting by journalists and other sources will be seen as the letters of referees\/reference or attestations.<sup>2<\/sup><\/p>\n<h4><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32_The_manifestos_self-descriptions_and_public_references_of_the_three_parties_Continued\"><\/span>3.2. The manifestos, self-descriptions and public references of the three parties (Continued)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The manifesto, self-descriptions and public referees of the <i>Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)<\/i> were already reflected upon in the previous Article 9 (Part 1 of three articles) under the title: <i>\u201cCritical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa\u201d.<\/i> This article (Article 10: Part 2) will reflected specifically on the <i>Democratic Alliance (DA)<\/i> under the title of <i>\u201cCritical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa\u201d<\/i>. In the next article (Article 11: Part 3) reflection on the <i>African National Congress (ANC) will take place<\/i>.<\/p>\n<h5><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321_The_Democratic_Alliance\"><\/span>3.2.1. The Democratic Alliance<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"3211_Introduction\"><\/span>3.2.1.1. Introduction<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>In his post mortem of the DA\u2019s so-called successes versus its so-called failures in the recent May election, and how the party must be rated in the post-2019 South African politics, the editor of Beeld, Barnard Beukman, on the 17th May 2019 offered an in-depth and critical analysis on the present day DA. This is far removed from those of some of the populist political commentators who ignore long term politics and suffer cognitive clear-sightedness away from the propaganda of the ANC. An in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the dynamic and important role that the DA can play in the mainstream politics of post-2019 is offered by Beukman<sup>3<\/sup> when he writes<sup>3\u201d11<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Met net vier LP\u2019s minder \u2013 85 pleks van 89 \u2013 en \u2018n stemdaling van minder as 2 persentasiepunte, moet die DA beslis voel hy word onbillik behandel deur ontleders wat hom op die daad as die \u201cgroot verloorder\u201d van die verkiesing brandmerk.<br \/>\nHy kan tereg so voel as hy sy uitslag met byvoorbeeld die ANC s\u2019n vergelyk word. Alles in ag geneem, is die DA se verkiesingsuitslag eindelik heel redelik en voel hy oorwegend sekerlik verligting. As sommige meningspeilings reg was \u2013 dat hy net \u2018n maand voor die verkiesing minder as 20%-steun gehad het \u2013 het hy beslis in die pylvak steun teruggekry of onseker kiesers oorreed.<br \/>\nDie groot teleurstelling is eerder met sy vertoning in vergelyking met die wat hy wou en moontlik kon reggekry het en dat hy nie gewys het dat hy minstens die 30%-vlak aanval nie, want \u2018n tweede party met meer as 30%-steun sou die eerste tasbare bewys van \u2018n komende politieke herskikking gewees het.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32111_The_voter_outcome_at_the_ballot_box_on_May_8_2019_tells_much\"><\/span>3.2.1.1.1. The voter outcome at the ballot box on May 8, 2019 tells much<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Beukman\u2019s<sup>3<\/sup> profile on the post-2019 DA firstly forces us to look critically at the facts pinpointing the May elections\u2019 outcome in terms of voter participation. Of particular importance is his reference to a so-called necessary 30% vote count for the DA, to enable it to be a possibly dominant role-player in South Africa. This was seemingly the minimum requirement for it to successfully participate in the country\u2019s ruling in the near future. This needs attention. It again brings us to the playing off of myths and lies versus facts and truths in South African politics and the absolute need of the Solomon wisdom approach to get myths and lies refuted. Thus, before any further evaluation of the DA as a political party with the assumed potential to be able to be the ruler in terms of its <i>CV<\/i> and <i>attestations <\/i>can proceed, is it necessary to look at the legitimacy of the May 2019 election in terms of a democratic voter mandate which truly represents the total contingent of legal voters.<br \/>\nFirstly, of paramount importance is the number of voters who gave the parties their support at the ballot box. This consideration is also fully applicable to the ANC, the EFF, as well as the eleven dwarf parties that arrived in Parliament at the end of May 2019 to take their seats.<sup>3<\/sup><br \/>\nSecondly, also of importance is the total number of voters who participated in the election versus the total number of registered voters who stayed away from the ballot box.<br \/>\nThirdly, and probably the most ignored fact by most of the so-called political wise men on the so-called \u201ctrue politics\u201d of present day South Africa, is the amount of citizens who qualified to be voters, but refused to register as such for specific reasons.<br \/>\nAn analysis of the May voting shows the seats of the 14 parties which made it, as follows<sup>4<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>ANC: 230<\/li>\n<li>DA: 84<\/li>\n<li>EFF: 44<\/li>\n<li>IFP: 14<\/li>\n<li>FF+: 10<\/li>\n<li>ACDP: 4<\/li>\n<li>NFP: 2<\/li>\n<li>UDM: 2<\/li>\n<li>Good:2<\/li>\n<li>Cope: 2<\/li>\n<li>ATM: 2<\/li>\n<li>AIC: 2<\/li>\n<li>PAC: 1<\/li>\n<li>Aljama: 1<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>It is also reflected by statistics that there were 35.9 million South Africans who were eligible to register as voters for the May 2019 election, but that only 26 756 649 had formally registered. This means that only 74.5% of those who could register had registered (thus leaving \u00b19 million outside the voting system). From the 26.7 million formally registered voters, only 17 671 616 actually voted (again leaving \u00b19.3 million eligible voters further out of the system). This means that the 17.6 million voters active at the ballot box, only represent 49% of the total eligible voters in South Africa, while 51% of potential voters (\u00b118.2 million) did not bring out a vote (consisting of \u00b19.1 million non-registered voters and \u00b19.1 million stay-away voters). Although it was the 18.2 million abstaining voters own choice not to vote, this comprehensive passivity places in the first place a question mark on the applicability of the legal status of 14 parties which were selected to Parliament by a \u201cpassive no-voting\u201d (which is nothing else than a rejection choice by 51% of the voting population).<sup>4-7<\/sup><br \/>\nWhat is worrying is that these 14 parties are going to be with South Africans as the so-called \u201cchosen law-makers\u2019, notwithstanding their rejection or at least being ignored by at least 51% of the voters-corp. Furthermore, seeing the overall decline since 2014 of trust in and support for political parties selected into Parliament, the chances are good that this decline is going to continue after 2019, leaving a far higher rejection than the present 51% by the voters. The outcome can with time become an immense resistance to the empowerment of the ruling party, the ANC, up to 2024. This will not only make its reign impossible, but in the process of the rejection of the ANC, the situation can activate immense unrest, anarchy and revolution as a final outcome.<sup>4-7<\/sup><br \/>\nIt is not without good reason that Mthombothi<sup>8<\/sup>, eleven days after the May election, put his finger directly on the sore of this voting passivity when he wrote<sup>8:19<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe outcome of the elections will be debated and analysed for some time to come, but what is clear is that many South Africans were not particularly impressed or satisfied with what was on offer. After 25 years of democracy, many voters are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they\u2019re comfortable.<\/i>\u201d He continues further<sup>8:19<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe menu [parties] on the table is obviously not appetising for the voter. The prevailing conditions are therefore probably ripe for a realignment of political forces or a new political party altogether. We may have reached a typical Gramscian interregnum where \u201cthe old is dying and the new cannot be born\u201d. We are at a standstill, and rot tends to set in if there is no movement.\u201d <\/i><br \/>\nHowever, in second place, is the question of Beukman\u2019s<sup>3<\/sup> when he referred to the \u201cideal of the collection of 30% votes for the DA to make it a party to notice in the South African politics\u201d. Here emerges the next question, namely on the <i>presence of true democracy<\/i> under which the ANC rules the country at the moment up until 2024.<sup>3<\/sup><br \/>\nOnce again on democracy and the constitutional rights of its citizens (and thus eligible voters), Mthombothi<sup>8<\/sup> reflects a warning when he writes<sup>8:19<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWe may still be cock-a-hoop about our democracy \u2013 best constitution in the world and all that! \u2013 But the enthusiasm is apparently no longer widely shared. Voter turnout has shown a calamitous decline in recent years, from 88% in 1999 to 65% this year \u2013 a drop of more than 20 percentage points in 20 years. Such figures should jolt us out of our complacency. Our democracy is not at all in rude health.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nBut, when Mthombothi<sup>8 <\/sup>speaks of a \u201c65% voter turnout for the 2019 election\u201d, he failed to say how this percentage was reached. The answer is that it was the 17.6 million voters who had voted out of a possible 26.7 million voters on the voter role. This 65% is a political myth: the fact is that the turnout should be calculated in terms of the 17.6 million voters who had voted versus the 35.9 million South Africans <i>who were eligible to vote<\/i>. This gives a turnout of only 49% (which is 16% lower than the \u201cofficial\u201d voting account. This means that South Africans\u2019 democratic interests are politically and statutorily managed by 386 law-makers in Parliament who were sent to it by the minority (49%) of eligible voters. This is not democracy! Mthombothi<sup>8<\/sup> would be jolted himself if he knew that the 65% voter turnout is an complete myth. The hard truth is that it is only 49%. But this truth has another more sinister outcome for the ANC\u2019s so-called democratic empowerment via the May election, and their ability to rule South Africa from 2019 to 2024: the ANC\u2019s 10 026 475 votes at the ballot box (out of a possible 35.9-million) means that <i>it only received approval from 28% of the eligible voters to be the government of the day<\/i>. For the ANC and its leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa and his cronies to claim that they have the peoples\u2019 mandate to effect land expropriation without compensation, is a falsity. It is a myth and a great one!<sup>4-8<\/sup><br \/>\nThis is not democracy and it is an excellent example of a well-masked illegal reign of South Africa by the ANC.<sup>4-8<\/sup><br \/>\nTaking into perspective the true voter support of the DA and the EFF, in terms of the total eligible voters of 35.9-million, their factorial support is only 10% and 5% respectively.4-8|<br \/>\nIt must thus be clear that the ANC is faultily observed as a strong and untouchable political force, which seems to represent (but falsely) 57.5% of the population in terms of its more or less 60% formal voting count. In reality, the ANC is a minority and a hung regime (legally put into Parliament as the ruler by a 28% voters mandate out of a 100% voter population) when we are looking to the indirect suppression of the democratic right of the individual citizens\u2019 passive votes. In this environment, South Africa\u2019s present inauspicious political setup (and thus its political ruling-system based on democracy where the so-called \u201cmajority\u201d became the ruler on a minority vote), is excellently described by Labuschagne when he posits<sup>9:6<\/sup>: <i>\u201cSuid-Afrika kan in wese, de jure en de facto, as \u2018n eenpartystaat bestempel word\u201d<\/i>.<br \/>\nThe abovementioned outcome is a situation that can and must only be accepted firstly as a temporary situation, which can change dramatically overnight when the \u00b118-million (51% unrepresented) passive voters take a stand at the ballot box or in an alternative way which may be unconstitutional. The DA and the other opposition parties know that this unreal setup provides the possibility that they can at the right time bite away the ANC\u2019s Achilles heel.<sup>9<\/sup><br \/>\nThe decline in empowerment of the ANC and its possible phasing out of the mainstream of politics is a reality, even in the mindsets of the ANC\u2019s top brass. It was already before the May election echoed by the Head of the ANC Election, Fikile Mbalula<sup>10<\/sup> when he admitted<sup>10:4<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230;the ANC is not going to regain all the lost ground overnight, with its image having suffered immensely in the previous decade.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nMthombothi<sup>8<\/sup> is with good reason worried about the outcome after 2019 of the Mandela-democracy of 1994. The reality is that South Africa is going to be governed from 2019 to 2024 by an illegal autocratic regime with mostly no respect for the voters, while there is also no respect for them by 51% of the voters who did not vote for them. The ANC\u2019s politics are driven and practised exclusively for the ANCs top brass\u2019 interests: it was so in the past and it will be so in the future. The abovementioned reality not only declares the arrogance and political recklessness of the ANC in its practice of delinquent politics since 1994, but also the arrogance and political recklessness of the EFF (See Article 9). The EFF knows very well that they will never, in a true democracy with only their 5% voter mandate, be of importance or receive the attention as a so-called third party in the top rank of parties. In a true democracy their political and personal antics, as well as their extreme irresponsibility and delinquency would not be endured: they would long ago have been put into permanent safe-care.<sup>4,6,7,10<\/sup><br \/>\nLooking from another perspective at the very unstable South African politics \u2013 which intensely contaminated its democracy \u2013 it must it be clear that things can change \u2013 also sometimes very fast &#8211; in the post-2019 politics, to end for instance the ANC regime\u2019s formation of new political groupings overnight. Marriam<sup>11<\/sup> quotes the view of the CSIR on the profiles of the various parties\u2019 vote receiving in the past elections and the unknown future around politics. She reports, from another perspective to that of the traditional political analysis<sup>11:4<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The CSIR does say things could change before 2021 [local elections]: \u201cIt should be kept in mind that the quantitative patterns cannot be counted on to capture all the sentiment behind the votes [2019 elections], it may just provide some warning signs for parties as to what could happen if nothing changes. Many things could change between 2019 and 2021 \u2013 there could be changes in the general economics and political climate, but a difference in voter turnout rates could also affect changes in the patterns.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Johnston<sup>12<\/sup>, on this fast-changing post-2019 political climate writes<sup>12:4-5<\/sup>: <i>\u201cTen spyte van die o\u00ebnskynlike stabiliteit van die ANC se oorheersing, vind groot verskuiwings plaaas. Die kieserskorps word baie meer vloeibaar en minder partyvas. Ons he gevind dat meer as 25% van al ons respondent \u00f3f van party verander het \u00f3f besluit hey om nie te stem nie. Die grootste vloei vloeibaarheid is onder swart kiesers gevind, waar 17.1% van party verander het.\u201d<\/i> Johnson<sup>12<\/sup>, in this context of change, also writes<sup>12:4-5<\/sup>: <i>\u201cDaarbenewens is die ANC-stem toenemend broos. Onder alle swart kiesers het slegs een derde ges\u00ea hulle sal ANC stem ongeag wie die leier was. 27,3% het ges\u00ea hulle sal nooit ANC stem nie terwyl 19,4% ges\u00ea het sal ANC stem omdat hulle vetroue in Ramaphosa het, alhoewel daar baie skelms op die ANC-lys is.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThe question, in light of the abovementioned information, is how has the DA in terms of its true voter mandate of only 10% handled its politics in the past, is handling it at present and can be expected to handle it in future in our much quoted \u201ccountry of milk and honey\u201d. The primary counter-question is: is it similarly irresponsible and arrogant, with the same signs of autocratic and delinquent actions, as the EFF? This question will be evaluated further in this article. [In the next article (Article 11) the same evaluation approach will be followed with regard to the ANC].<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"3212_The_DA_manifesto_of_2019\"><\/span>3.2.1.2. The DA manifesto of 2019<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Reading the DA manifesto, it is clear that it differs from the previous one of the EFF, as it avoids ridiculous promises and \u201cnonsense-speaking\u201d. It is totally focused on concrete action during the pre-2019 years and undertakes in terms of this good record (strongly confirmed by its CV and attestations) to make a constructive input to post-2019 South Africa. Reality is taken into account and examples of good political management on provincial and local levels are offered. Looking at the DA\u2019s track record, it stands head and shoulders above those of the EFF which was previously evaluated.<br \/>\nIn terms of the DA manifesto, the leader of the DA, Mmusi Maimane<sup>13<\/sup>, in his writings to the public, reflects as follows<sup>13:18<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Election 2019 is our chance to effect real change. And when deciding on a new bus, the only thing that matters is a party\u2019s track record.<br \/>\nThirteen years in Cape Town, 10 years in the Western Cape and two years in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have given the DA a chance to demonstrate the DA difference, and not just to talk about it. The results \u2013 the ones that really matter when it comes to closing the gap between economic insiders and outsiders \u2013 speak for themselves. On all the objective indicators, the DA runs the best government in the country.<br \/>\nThe DA-run Western Cape leads on every measure of good provincial governance. Over the past year, over half the jobs created in SA were in the Western Cape, thanks to an obsessive focus on attracting investment, growing tourism and supporting a farm sector hard hit by drought.<br \/>\nThe Western Cape Government got 83% clean audits in the last Auditor-General Report. Our track record says that we don\u2019t tolerate corruption and mismanagement of public funds.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Maimane continues<sup>14:22<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The DA can deliver to the whole country what we have delivered in the Western Cape, which accounted for half of net job creation in the past year (95,000 out of 188,000 jobs, Q3 2017 &#8211; Q3 2018) and where broad unemployment (23%) is 14 percentage points lower than the national average (37%).<br \/>\nThe DA strives to provide everyone with access to opportunities. For example, the Western Cape has the highest percentage of households living within 30 minutes of a health facility and we retain by far the most children in school between Grades 10 and Matric (64%), whereas no other province retains the abovementioned.<br \/>\nYou will find solutions to getting the basics right, such as our action steps to provide schoolchildren with teachers who can actually teach them to read and do arithmetic. The SACMEQ 4 Report showed that the Western Cape achieved 72.7% in advanced reading, compared to 36.1% nationally.<br \/>\nWe don\u2019t tolerate corruption. The Western Cape achieved 83% clean audits in the last financial year, well ahead of second placed Gauteng at 52%. The DA-led Coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro took it from the second least to second most trusted city in SA (after Cape Town). In the DA-run Johannesburg, the value of investigations into corrupt tenders under the former ANC administration is R23.6bn.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"3213_The_pre-2019_road-mapping_of_the_DA\"><\/span>3.2.1.3. The pre-2019 road-mapping of the DA<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32131_The_DAs_original_birth-certificate_in_perspective\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.1. The DA\u2019s original birth-certificate in perspective<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The answer to the question as to why the DA did not overtake the ANC in the last election and is still in a gradual process to win votes from the ANC and the other smaller parties, must be seen to be cemented in its many foundations. Professor Pieter Labuschagne<sup>9<\/sup> guides us hereunder to understand why opposition against the ANC reflects a low voter outcome for all those opposing parties since 1994. This can be likened to the previous mighty NP\u2019s only 20.4% in 1994 and the 22.3% and 20% of the DA respectively in 2014 and 2019.<sup>9<\/sup><br \/>\nFirstly, the founding model of the ANC stands out here, namely its anti-Apartheid ideology, through which it initially became an inclusive \u201ccatch-up\u201d party for all those pre-1994 suppressed persons and groups who opposed the wrongful politics of the NP (and the Afrikaners\/Whites). All types gathered in this potpourri-ANC from before 1994. It varied from hard core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, as well as hard-core terrorists, etc. These were persons and groups mostly seeing the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gains and to satisfy their ambitions. Most of the ambition and opportunism have stayed on until 2019 in some way within some of these groupings, such as the communists and the unionists.<sup>12<\/sup><br \/>\nIn its start-up process, the DA was in the first place an exclusively White-orientated party with a political ideology based on a narrow liberal-democracy, but with roots still entrenched in White-supremacy. The immense hard-line stand of the maintainence of exclusive White capitalism was prominent, and the mass of poor and landless Blacks would never get entrance thereto. For the Blacks, their inequality and poverty (\u00b130 million out of a population of \u00b160 million) is a direct result of the White supremacy of pre-1994. The DA as a cum Black-cum White political party became from day-one an easy target for the Black revolutionaries in the ANC, who labelled it as anti-Black with the intention to promote and uphold only White interests. This is a process that is ongoing and will only be eroded if the DA becomes overwhelmingly Black in members and in leadership.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32132_The_DAs_policy_not_to_subsidise_and_enrich_the_poor\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.2. The DA\u2019s policy not to subsidise and enrich the poor<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Entrenched in the ANC\u2019s revolutionary ideology of uplifting the people and freeing them from oppression, is its policy of <i>taking from the rich and giving to the poor,<\/i> which the DA opposes. This characteristic of the ANC is well reflected by its actions such as state capture, the mismanagement of finance and the botched-up 1994 to 2019 land redistribution, the obtaining of \u201ccompensations, gratifications and bait\u201d through the misuse of BEE and other instruments under the propaganda of \u201cenriching\u201d the people (Black). Here the ANC\u2019s top brass and their cronies stand out as priority beneficiaries. The ANC\u2019s actions, when compared to those of the DA, are a complete contradiction in terms of the \u201ccase of the constant and ongoing illegal compensation\u201d of the so-called \u201cfreedom fighters\u201d and those who \u201csuffered under Apartheid\u201d, directly and indirectly in every possible way from the state coffers.<br \/>\nWithin this exclusive ideology of uplifting of the ANC, the immense group of poor and landless Black people were kept in embargo by the ANC, without progress or improvement of their circumstances. This setup of continuous, immense poverty and financial dependence of the mass of poor Blacks, fast became a handle for the ANC\u2019s top brass to keep a large contingent of dependent voters, who were daily in need of the ANC\u2019s help, on its list of supporters. This was firstly obtained by keeping these Black voters without training and work opportunities, so as to create not only further poverty and unemployment, but to enlarge this sector constantly, in order to ensure political empowerment via the \u201cANC\u2019s helping hand of the poor Blacks\u201d.<sup>12,13-22<\/sup><br \/>\nSecondly, this \u201cBlack question\u201d was in-depth and broadly propagated by the ANC as a sole White outcome from Apartheid: not only to establish sympathy for them in the minds of the poor, in that the ANC \u201cknew\u201d of their immense, constant needs and was doing as much as possible for them, but at the same time to create ongoing hostility against any White presence in the post-2019 politics. Prominent in this regard was Apartheid\u2019s wrongdoings and the reflection by the ANC of a repeat of such suffering at the hands of Whites in future politics; a process wherein the \u201cWhite\u201d DA was pertinently positioned as the main culprit. With regard to the needs of the mass of poor Blacks, reflected as the so-called exclusive sufferers of Apartheid, the ANC effectively responded through the state coffers by paying mass contributions to them. These financial contributions are still growing. The ANC, as the ruler and the holder of the state\u2019s purse, entrenched itself within the \u201cgreater and higher\u201d tasks of doing good by the hand-out of free awards, grants and other subsidies from the tax-payers\u2019 hard earned money.<br \/>\nThis made these \u201cdependent\u201d voters work shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC\u2019s so-called goodness, while the vicious circle of growing poverty and joblessness was aggressively upheld. At the same time a policy of fear was created in this mass of poor and jobless minds that any regime change, such as the coming to power of the DA, would lead to the recall of these comprehensive free awards, grants and subsidies paid from the taxpayers.<br \/>\nThe DA\u2019s vague policy on the doubtful existence in future of these awards, grants and subsidies, if they come into power, only strengthened the ANC\u2019s political mesmerising of this mass of poor people with misleading falsehoods. This served as an excellent empowerment vehicle for the ANC to block votes away from the DA. Johnson\u2018s<sup>12<\/sup> recent research confirms this well, as he found that 40% of the Black respondents indeed believe this rumour of the ANC of the DA as a \u201cdanger\u201d to their subsidies.<sup>12<\/sup><br \/>\nThe DA and the ANC both know that this unlimited system of subsidising the poor without the simultaneous development of a mass of jobs and good training to replace it, cannot be upheld for much longer into the future. This has so far been ignored by the ANC\u2019s top elite, notwithstanding that the continuation of the scheme will bankrupt the country\u2019s funds and spells out a human disaster in waiting. The outright failure of the DA on the other hand to immediately put an alternative in place to this immense politically opportunistic subsidising scheme, besides saying that they <i>will create jobs in time and offer training<\/i>, has totally isolated them from the mass of poor people, who constantly and immediately need these subsidies. It does not matter for the poor if the system is wrong or unsustainable \u2013 for them it is about immediate survival and voting for the party that upholds and improves this subsidy system.<sup>10,12,23-25<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32133_BBBEE_and_its_vehicles_of_land_expropriation\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.3. BBBEE and its vehicles of land expropriation<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>As mentioned above, the ANC\u2019s policy on BBBEE also forced the DA into reverse. This is due to the portrayal of the DA as White capitalists and the safe-guarding of their immediate interests. This obvious hostility to Black upliftment pushed the DA away from the mass of poor and landless Blacks.<br \/>\nIt is evident that the DA\u2019s dislike for BBBEE must be changed in some way with regard to its solid rejection policy thereof. What is urgently needed is the implementation of an acceptable change to the DA\u2019s present model of outright rejection, in order to bring about balanced nation-building and to improve the already tense racial relations. It is necessary to create an environment to support a reasonable form of BBBEE. The DA\u2019s clear policy of a racially free society must reflect Black upliftment as a primary principle. BBBEE is unavoidable and was implemented in many countries to benefit the unprivileged and the poor. It was not an extraordinary action in South Africa by the ANC, but so far the DA under its White right-wing blindly rejects it. There must be some confirmation of support of BBBEE as fast as possible by the DA. Maimane\u2019s reference to the DA pushing for the tabling of a private members\u2019 bill on intelligence-related matters and jobs may be the first constructive step, but it is doubtful whether this is enough, and it is far from the BBBEE offered by the ANC.<sup>21,26,27<\/sup><br \/>\nBBBEE is seen by most Whites as extreme discrimination after 25 years of so-called \u201cdemocracy\u201d, as Bachtis<sup>26<\/sup> writes with justification<sup>26:13<\/sup>: <i>\u201cBEE is a racist, exclusionary mechanism designed to destroy any vestiges of whiteness.\u201d<\/i> BBBEE, in contrast to its primary aims, was undoubtedly applied by the ANC with outmost dishonesty and corruption in order to benefit mostly the ANC top brass, bringing riches to them and their cronies between 1994 and 2019. Billions of rand were also stolen via state capture and other crooked schemes by politicians, government officials and private citizens under the ANC regime, which was in value far more than the total collected by BBBEE for the so-called upliftment of the so-called poor Blacks\u2019 suffering under Apartheid. This confirms that there are many other acceptable ways (besides corruption and dishonesty) to uplift the mass of poor Blacks.<br \/>\nThe misuse of BBBEE is furthermore seen by many Whites as pure revenge-taking on Whites for the past.<br \/>\nOther, better ways must be found by the DA to get involved in BBBEE and to directly uplift the poor. Firstly, the present experience by Whites of BBBEE as a punishment to impoverish Whites, especially the White youth, must be counteracted by the DA with reasoned actions. Whites must be allowed to compete freely within the South African business and employment environment, without the direct and indirect \u201cpunishment\u201d. As policy, the DA must firstly support an ongoing strictly managed BBBEE system for at most the duration of another term, after which it must be totally erased from the statute books. Secondly, the planned land redistribution scheme, wherein the transferring of state-owned land and buildings, etc., is central, must be a direct replacement for BBBEE inside the DA\u2019s policy of a \u201chelping hand to the Blacks in the post-2019 politics\u201d. Included in this BBBEE scheme must be the free training of Black farmers and the free provision of equipment and produce such as cattle and grain for the mass of incoming Black farmers to make a living on the farms.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32134_The_DAs_policy_of_land_expropriation_without_compensation\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.4. The DA\u2019s policy of land expropriation without compensation<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The policy standpoint of the DA was until now to reject the ANC\u2019s land reform of expropriation without compensation. Prominent therein is the the DA\u2019s perception of the ANC\u2019s foundation of confused political radicalism, beset by neo-Marxism, specifically as part of the ANC\u2019s opportunistic elite\u2019s driving of the ANC\u2019s land expropriation policy. In addition, the failed 1994 to 2019 land redistribution programme of the ANC is an indication for the DA of how unplanned, undemocratic and populist land reform can get. This has lead to the passivity of the DA to in any way, either on its own or with the ANC, get involved in constructive land redistribution. The fact that the DA is not shying away from even going to the highest court in South Africa to nullify any ANC legislation on land transformation if needed, does not sit well with the mass of landless Blacks.<br \/>\nThe DA believes that there is not a need to tamper with the present Constitution, because the state\u2019s land is available in large amounts, waiting for redistribution directly to the mass of poor and landless people. Indeed, for the DA, this state land is so massive in size and its redistribution potential so overwhelming, that any initiative with private land cannot be addressed successfully before 2025, if not later. The DA notes in this concern that the state at present has a property portfolio of more than 93 000 buildings and more than 1.9 million hectares of land. Just to create an orderly official institution to oversee the handing out and assurance of legal rights of the land and buildings to new private owners, would take up to three to five years to complete by a well managed government. Then there is a further timetable to stretch over another three to five years to establish the infrastructure and award the property to the applicants in waiting, to do training and to supply finance to the mass of incoming farmers. The so-called \u201cWhite land expropriation\u201d, even with compensation, can only take place after twenty or more years from 2019.<sup>10,16,20,28<\/sup><br \/>\nBut, from a critical statutory as well as political and socio-economic point, is it clear that the DA\u2019s land redistribution policy is vague and clearly practised in terms of White interests. It is window dressing and empty rhetoric. It is unavoidable for the DA to get directly involved in the land ownership matter in the post-2019 politics. The DA\u2019s leadership must stop allowing the right-wing of Whites in the DA, who are guided effectively with great political contamination by the so-called Afrikaners\/Whites rescuers and saviours, to handle the matter in public and with the government. The DA did shed most of these white hardliners and their sympathisers successfully in the May election \u2013 possibly not only at the ballot box, but also on their list of membership. This is now allowing the true DA to come out of the closet with its Black members\u2019 wishes, thinking, planning and action on balancing land redistribution for Blacks.<br \/>\nFirstly, the FF+ must openly be confronted with a public stand by the DA, demonstrating the falsity of the empowerment that the FF+ can help the Whites farmers to hang onto their land. The reality must be delivered to White farmers and the White community that if not enough land is peacefully redistributed fast to the mass of Blacks, land will physically be confiscated from them in a revolution which can happen very soon.<sup>29,30<\/sup> The DA must find a declaration, matching fully and effectively the following declaration by the FF+-leader in Kwazulu-Natal, Duncan Du Bois, which reads<sup>30:7<\/sup>: <i>\u201cI think they [FF+] were beneficiaries of people dumping the DA because of the DA\u2019s policy on affirmative action and BEE and also because the FF Plus is very clear on its land policy and the DA is not quite as sharp on that.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThe DA urgently needs a public reference, reading: <i>\u201cThe DA is a beneficiary of votes because it is clear on its land policy, with the Freedom Charter declaration as its manifesto on land ownership that all South Africans have the right to own land and that land must be owned racially proportionally before 2024.\u201d <\/i><sup><i>29,30<\/i><\/sup><br \/>\nFor Maimane, such a change would be easy and a small step, especially in light of the pronouncement by Johnson<sup>12<\/sup> of him \u201c<i>as a previous ANC supporter who still thinks in terms of the politics of the ANC<\/i>.\u201d The fact that Maimane, as alluded to by Johnson<sup>12<\/sup>, had already estranged the Brown and White Afrikaans speakers, as well as his failure to defend the Afrikaans language and culture rights, forced thousand of angry and dissatisfied Afrikaans and White people out of the DA, makes this step easy if true.<sup>12,29,30<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32135_The_proof_of_the_DA_pudding_is_not_always_in_the_eating\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.5. The proof of the DA pudding is not always in the eating<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The DA is mostly worried about present day South Africa. It developed, where in charge, styles and approaches, in an effort to fix most of the enormous failures created by the ANC reign. Where the DA was put in to govern, it did not panic and has addressed immense challenges with duty, pride and success.<sup>15<\/sup><br \/>\nThe actions of the DA were sometimes deliberately blown up by the press and their political opposition. The ANC propagandists used this to distract attention from their own serious and comprehensive delinquency. In some cases, however, alleged activities of the DA made them no better than the ANC and need the same condemnation.<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nSeeing that political oversight by the broad public and media is a priority for all public figures and parties, and the fact that it is the criteria on which a mandate to rule has been issued, these accusations need to be highlightened and evaluated. It is important to see if there is proof in the DA pudding after eating it. This will be done hereunder.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321351_The_DAs_seemingly_ongoing_own_internal_strife\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.5.1. The DA\u2019s seemingly ongoing own internal strife<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Prominent for instance, but indeed a small matter in the end, was the allegation that Helen Zille of the DA leadership had in 2014 contravened the Constitution and the Ethical Code for Members of the Executive due to an alleged tablet issued to her son who worked as a teacher for the Western Cape Education Department in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This action against her, brought onto the books by the controversial Public Protector (PP) Busiswe Mkhwebane, in an attempt to prosecute her, failed. (This PP action was nullified by an interdict against the PP in the Johannesburg high court. The PP was also shown to be wrong by the courts in two other cases).<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nThen there was Helen Zille\u2019s so-called #taxrevolt-plan, which attracted critics from the ANC and some sectors of the public. But, in light of the failed prosecution for theft, corrupt ANC politicians and state officials, racketeers, crooks and tax-avoiders in the ANC, this actually attracted much strong support from law-abiding citizens as an instrument to punish the useless ANC regime.<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nFurthermore, there was the so-called Patricia De Lille saga wherein the DA was initially accused of racism, etc., because De Lille was allegedly forced out of DA politics by its leadership. This criticism seems to have been contradicted by an independent investigation which alleged that De Lille deliberately misled the Cape Town City Council and triggered a further allegation against her, namely to have interfered with and manipulated city tenders, reports Malatsi<sup>31<\/sup>. In nullifying the DA\u2019s and Maimane\u2019s so-called \u201crecord of wrongdoing\u201d against De Lille, Malatsi<sup>31<\/sup> writes<sup>31:18<\/sup>: <i>\u201cDe Lille and her chief lieutenant, Brett Herron, are facing criminal charges for their involvement in these instances of serious maladministration or worse.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nBut the De Lille case\u2019s handling by the DA cost them much honour in the eyes of the general voting public and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the exodus of a strong contingent of votes from the DA to Good. Nyatsumba<sup>32<\/sup> foregrounds the immense negative impact on the DA and the idea of a flawed leadership left by the De Lille case, when he writes that many inside the party in the Western Cape had their daggers drawn at her and wanted her out summarily, ignoring, in his opinion, the right firing process. After a vote of no confidence in the Cape Town City Council failed, the process of her ousting continues, writes Nyatsumba<sup>32<\/sup>. He further reflects<sup>32:25<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230;they continued to manufacture lies about her and to throw mud at her in the hope that some of it would stick. To their chagrin, De Lille emerged victorious each time and they ended up with bloodied noses. And yet, still they continued to lie to the public, right until the elections, that they fired De Lille as a member when, in fact, she had resigned.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThen there were two other controversial recent cases in the DA household before the May election. Both were fully described in the Sunday Times of the 17th March 2019. From the reports it seems that the DA was in the accused box. In the one a woman member was left off the party\u2019s parliamentary list after accusing a colleague of sexual harassment, while in the other case a senior woman member accused of racism and xenophobia was kept on the list of the DA\u2019s candidates for the sixth Parliament.<sup>33<\/sup><br \/>\nIn the first case a DA councillor in Ekurhuleni, a said Thina Bambeni, was alleged to be delisted on the recommendation of the party\u2019s Gauteng leader, John Moodey, after she accused the council\u2019s caucus chair, Shadow Shabangu, of sexual harassment. A provincial disciplinary committee cleared Shabangu due to a lack of evidence and advised the provincial executive to charge Bambeni instead, as reported by Mvumvu and Makinana<sup>33<\/sup>. (<i>Note<\/i>: It is the same said Shabangu who is alleged further on in this reflection to have contravened Section 4 of the <i>Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act<\/i> because it is alleged that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall<i>)<\/i>. In the end Bambeni was removed from the list of candidates, together with Siphesihle Dube (a spokesperson for the MEC of Transport in the Western Cape, due to posting pictures which he took with Patrica De Lille). Dube and Bambeni\u2019s exclusions from the candidate list led to court actions against the DA.<sup>33<\/sup><br \/>\nRegarding the second case within the DA\u2019s inner circle, it was reported by Mvumvu and Makinana<sup>33 <\/sup>that Louw Nel, the DA\u2019s parliamentary operations director, had taken legal action against Kohler Barnard after the party bosses allegedly failed to act against her. This is an outcome that follows after Barnard allegedly made racist remarks at a strategy meeting of the DA. It is also alleged that Barnard made offensive statements against Zimbabweans in South Africa (<i>Note<\/i>: Kohler Barnard was accused of racist behaviour in 2015 and her DA membership terminated in 2015 over a Facebook posting calling for the Apartheid president PW Botha\u2019s \u201ccomeback\u201d. Her expulsion was overturned and the DA retained her as an MP on condition that she was not found guilty of a similar offence, according to Mvumvu and Makinana<sup>33)<\/sup>. It is further reported by Mvumvu and Makinana<sup>33<\/sup> that Louw Nel had been suspended after taking the matter to the Equality Court (because he allegedly did not follow the party\u2019s so-called \u201cprocedures\u201d to call Barnard to book). He was however then reinstated.<br \/>\nIt seems as though the DA is frequently characterised by unnecessary and doubtful senior level conflicts. Many seem to be unclear about the reasons and motives, while others contend that this is due to much self-empowerment and self-love by individuals inside the party\u2019s structure. The racial factor seems to frequently also to be a culprit. For instance, the exit of the policy head, Gwen Ngwenya, of the DA from the leadership before the May election seems to reflect such a political struggle around the leadership. Professor Kotze<sup>22<\/sup> claimed that the resignation of Ngwenya, who is alleged to have become disillusioned with the DA\u2019s unsteady stance on a pro-Black policy, contributed further to existing uncertainty in the DA as a future political home for Blacks. This is seen as one of the various possible catalysts for Black voters moving from the DA in the past election. There were and are still also sagas around the persons of Helen Zille, Patricia de Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko &#8211; wherein the \u201cBlack colour\u201d factor seems not always so very innocent.<sup>16,17,19,22,24,31,34<\/sup><br \/>\nFor the DA to qualify as \u201cgood\u201d in terms of the referees\u2019 letters of reference, it must undoubtedly settle these kinds of internal leadership issues effectively, without negative roots of doubt. However, it would have been best if they were totally avoided from day-one by the appointment of the correct persons in its leadership. The De Lille saga for instance could have been avoided if sound selection principles were applied and she was never allowed into the DA as a member nor promoted to a leader\u2019s position.<sup>16,17,19,22,24,31,34<\/sup><br \/>\nThe writings of the political analyst Muzi Kuzwayo<sup>35 <\/sup>in April 2019 on Patricia de Lille\u2019s politics, including her present-day party named Good, and her appointment as an honourable minister in the Ramaphosa regime of post-2019, seems to be a good guideline to follow and to use before making an appointment. Kuzwayo writes<sup>35:2<\/sup>: <i>\u201cShe first cashed in a few years after she started her party which became defunct and moved over to the DA and became Mayor of Cape Town in return \u2013 good deal. Who knows what loot Good will brings her.\u201d<\/i> Indeed, the loot is there! As a minister in the Ramphosa regime, facing the post-2019 politics, she is receiving a salary of R2.4-million yearly (besides many other allowances such as free flights, subsidised luxury cars, etc.)!<sup>35<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321352_The_DAs_merry_men_and_their_alleged_hands_in_the_cookie_jar\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.5.2. The DA\u2019s merry men and their alleged hands in the cookie jar<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Although it seems that the DA prides itself to not hesitate to call political, economic and social delinquents in the party to book, notwithstanding their seniority or empowerment in the party, it seems that this is not always the true case, as alleged by critics. Looking critically at the DA\u2019s attestations, it seems that although the amount, level and intensity of the delinquencies in the DA are far less than those characterising the ANC, it must be noted on the other hand that when it comes to any wrongdoing and the required appropriate handling thereof, the criteria of punishment must be on an equal level required in public from the ANC to act against its delinquents. The basis cannot and must not be the allowing of any kind of wrongdoing. A single case is as evil as one hundred delinquencies. This, it seems, the DA has missed out on sometimes.<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nProminent here are the allegations that the DA lacks fast and decisive actions on the expulsion of delinquents in its executive circle. The so-called Shadow Shabangu case, which echoes seemingly the same failing of the ANC to act against its culprits, is noteable. Shadow Shabangu, the DA\u2019s caucus chair of the Ekurhuleni Council, was before the end of the fifth Parliament accused that he received a R1 220 000 kickback from the developers of the Springs Mall. Immense data was offered in the case.<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nOn the alleged wrongdoing by Shabangu, as specifically spelled out by a report of the Ekurhuleni Council, Mvumvu writes<sup>19:4<\/sup>: \u201c<i>The contract required him [Shabangu] to protect the interests of the developer instead of those of the municipality and those of his constituents, which is a direct conflict of interest. Furthermore, it was found that there might be an existence of a corrupt relationship between the developer and Shabangu, under the veil of the so-called facilitation agreement.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThe report alleged that Shabangu\u2019s actions were in contravention of Section 4 of the <i>Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act<\/i>. It has also been alleged that Shabangu received a gift of a hotel payment worth about R1 720 \u2013 R2 290 from a friend of the developers of the mall that he did not declare to the council. So far the accused is alleged to still be active in DA party politics, equalling the Ace Magashule and others\u2019 \u201cnot guilty till sentenced\u201d stand-off.<sup>15-20<\/sup><br \/>\nThe failure of the DA to act decisively and strictly on the allegations against Shabangu undoubtedly made them in the eyes of potential voters in the recent May elections not an acceptable and a good ruler, empowered to be able to take on rumours of corruption in its own circle and respond with criminal prosecution. It seems for the critical voter as though the DA follows the same kind of \u201cstretched\u201d policy as the ANC, notwithstanding their preaching of a so-called \u201cclean character\u201d of the party and its leaders.<br \/>\nIt is old news of the DA\u2019s co-operation at three metros with the controversial EFF. It has been alleged that this \u201cDA-EFF-brotherhood\u201d has led thereto that the EFF\u2019s practice of politics has become part of the DA\u2019s thinking, planning and action. This \u201cDA-EFF-brotherhood\u201d is alleged to be driven inside an alleged opportunistic way of functioning and surviving for the DA. It is alleged in a report that the recent support for Moeketsi Mosolo of the EFF, to be an ongoing member of the Tshwane Council, notwithstanding serious allegations, was the outcome of this contaminated DA-EFF-brotherhood. The allegation is that alleged misconduct by Mosolo was ignored by the DA, primarily to bolster and to assure the DA\u2019s empowerment in the council. The perception by the broad public of the good ethics of the DA and their strong showing up of the alleged corruption of the ANC elite, was thereby nullified. On the Mosolo case it is evident that the DA indeed recently wanted him ousted from the council, due to his alleged part in the awarding of a contract valued at R12 billion by the Tshwane Metro Council to the construction group GladAfrica, to manage all the Metro Council\u2019s infrastructure projects. Hereafter, it is alleged, the DA suddenly made a fast turnaround on Mosolo to keep him on the council. The basis for this, it is alluded, was not to offend the EFF because the DA needed the EFF\u2019s support in the council against the ANC at a time when the DA\u2019s empowerment may have been erased. On Mosolo\u2019s alleged wrongdoing, the Auditor-General\u2019s Report alleged that Mosola took unauthorised control as a council member of the appointment of GladAfrica as a service provider, which was is in the first place in conflict with municipal legislation. Secondly, there was the allegation of the presence of corruption via the contract of the City of Tshwane with GladAfrica. As recently as 25 January 2019 the then DA Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, alleged that a payment of R317 million to GladAfrica was \u201cirregular\u201d under the management of Mosolo. The existence of a damaging formal report on Mosolo by the firm Bowmans, seemingly reflecting extremely negatively on the R12 billion contract, is alleged to have been ignored by the DA in their continued support of Mosolo in the council.<sup>9,36-38<\/sup><br \/>\nIn this context of an allegedly contaminated \u201cDA-EFF-brotherhood\u201d, it has also been alleged that Solly Msimanga, representing the DA as Executive Mayor in Tshwane, was pushed out of the mayoral post by his own DA party, because his efforts to oust Mosolo had angered the EFF and endangered the empowerment environment in the council for the DA with the EFF.<sup>9,36-38<\/sup><br \/>\nThe investigative journalist Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> also took the GladAfrica scandal to the door of Solly Msimanga, the DA\u2019s previous mayor, by recently alleging that he is now facing investigation with Moeketsi Mosolo over the multi-billion rand contract which the Auditor General found was awarded irregularly. She further alleged that he had jumped ship at Tshwane City and failed to see through his first mayoral term after he was seemingly \u201cselected\u201d by the DA to be its premier candidate and the face of its campaign to win Gauteng (which did not help the DA much). Marriam<sup>39<\/sup> also alleged that Msimanga faced allegations of nepotism and that his brother had allegedly stolen 100 computers from the City of Tshwane.<sup>39<\/sup><br \/>\nMarrian,<sup>39,<\/sup> as well as the political commentator Peter Bruce,<sup>40<\/sup> focused on the actions of the DA\u2019s Johannesburg Mayor, Herman Mashaba. Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> alleged that shortly after he was elected and had formed a government, allegations emerged that a member of his mayoral committee, a said Sharon Peetz, had taken her mother along on an official trip to Spain. Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> reports that this alleged wrongdoing was met with profuse denials by Mashaba and the city council, and that Mashaba even provided evidence that the trip was legal. But he then suddenly fired Peetz some months later after alleged irrefutable evidence of wrongdoing in the case surfaced. Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> also showed the presence of failed service delivery under the mayoral oversight of Mashaba. She alludes that this happened after the city failed to renew a contract with Avis SA for vehicles to collect street rubbish. According to a report by the investigative journalism unit amaBhungane, Marrian reports that the Avis contract was cancelled and the fleet management deal was handed to Afrirent which allegedly in return paid kickbacks to an account belonging to the EFF. Bruce<sup>40<\/sup> further reports that many of Mashaba\u2019s DA causus members insist that he is closer to the EFF than he is to the DA. These members alleged that he allowed the EFF to influence contracts and appointments. This allegation, reading Marrian\u2019s earlier allegations on the Afrirent contract, seem to can make some sense somewhere.<sup>39-40<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321353_The_Marrian_test_case_of_the_DA_as_an_effective_ruler_in_metros\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.5.3<i>. <\/i>The Marrian test case of the DA as an effective ruler in metros<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>There are other prominent critics that the DA\u2019s political planning and action on the metro-level reflect widespread lack of constructive and dynamic action and that it does not offer its voters and the inhabitants of the metros where it is in charge, any better services than its opponents, the ANC or the EFF. It seems thus to be a prerequisite to see if the DA pudding has taste.<sup>16,17,20<\/sup><br \/>\nAn article by Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> on the 17th May 2019 about the DA reflects it as a party that is unsuccessfully executing its municipal mandate. This requires a frame of reference. A short analysis and description to measure the article\u2019s value in political standing is offered to get some insight as to whether the allegations hold water. The article\u2019s introduction title reads<sup>39:32<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe Democratic Alliance\u2019s unsatisfactory performance in the 2019 general elections reflects its poor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election.\u201d <\/i><br \/>\nLooking firstly at her reference to the DA\u2019s so-called<i> \u201cunsatisfactory performance in the 2019 elections\u201d,<\/i> Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> is clearly missing out on all of the primary reasons for the decline of 2% in votes for the DA. Political analysts posit that the 2% decline was clearly a normal and long overdue shedding of the White ultra-conservatives. These drop-outs are now starting to run away because land expropriation is going to be a reality that the DA has to face from 2019 and must constructively handle in reality politics (other than these DA drop-outs\u2019 seemingly new political home, the FF+, which blindly refuses to recognise this reality and promises them false land security). Nullifying Marrian\u2019s <sup>39 <\/sup>postulation is the well-defined and -reasoned opinion of the editor of the Beeld<sup>3<\/sup> offered earlier, which put it clearly that the DA indeed did well in the election with its 20% voter outcome.<sup>3,39<\/sup><br \/>\nRegarding her reference to the DA\u2019s so-called<i> \u201cpoor governance record in the metros it took control of in the 2016 local government election\u201d, <\/i>it is a postulation without roots: the only way to make an analysis of poor performance, is to compare it with the ruling ANC\u2019s outputs in the various municipalities since 2016 (and the EFF which is basically missing in this context). In this context of governance it must be noted that not a single municipality under the DA management failed to obtain a clean audit, while most of the municipalities run by the ANC are contaminated by the lack of clean audits and the presence of constant corruption, fraud and theft, etc.<sup>9,16,17,20,39<\/sup><br \/>\nThe chaos in some of these ANC run metros is echoed by the recent arrest of the ANC Durban Mayor Zandile Gumede, chair of the powerful eThekwini region. Together with her, 62 ANC councillors of the eThekwini region stand accused of R208 million tender fraud. (For the record: she has already appeared in court and is out on R50 000 bail).<sup>41,42<\/sup><br \/>\nFor Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> to speak vaguely as follows39:32: <i>\u201c&#8230;the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016. There are ample examples in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg of a party out of its depth in governing complex cities\u201d,<\/i> is plain mischief-making. Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> failed to offer facts besides generalisations, meaning that her evidence is missing to put the DA in the dog box. As it has been offered it is fake news! Firstly, it needs to be noted that the DA only took over these entities three years ago and they had been messed up before by the ANC. The DA\u2019s first tasks were to put remedial actions in place to get them working once again. This was mostly achieved in the three years, as the overall successes in these municipalities confirm.<sup>9,16,17,20,39<\/sup><br \/>\nMarrian<sup>39<\/sup> remarks that the DA had taken over the crown jewels of South Africa\u2019s city scape, namely the big budget Johannesburg, the administrative capital of Pretoria in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay in coalition deals and informal agreements with the EFF. She simplified the outcomes of these three metro\u2019s complex management, which is prominently reflected by her unconvincing focus on Nelson Mandela Bay, with a specific outcome which she describes in political jargon as<sup>39:23<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThree years later, two of the three DA mayors have been removed and the party lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay\u201d<\/i>. Her \u201cfocus\u201d clearly reflects a lack of understanding of the pre-2016 contaminations in all three of the metros which the DA has been trying to rectify since 2016 with the EFF. Secondly, which she knows well, but failed to pinpoint, is the political instability of the EFF as a co-partner and the party\u2019s extreme customs and habits of mischief-making. This mischief-making intention and inclination by the EFF is evident where there is the opportunity for it, where it can scurrilously deviate from normal and orderly politics, even with the other mischief-maker, the ANC, in order to obstruct good governance. The constant change of DA mayors in PE was such an outcome and was not a public rejection of the DA\u2019s mayor.<sup>39<\/sup><br \/>\nTo associate the DA\u2019s Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba\u2019s so-called popularity with the decline in DA votes there in the May elections, does not hold water: Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> herself states that the DA\u2019s decline was all over the country, and not only located in Johannesburg; so where does Mashaba really come into the picture, besides his random and subjective selection as a so-called \u201cculprit\u201d? Her postulations<sup>39:32<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230;that last<\/i> year <i>bins in Johannesburg\u2019s streets overflowed with rubbish\u201d<\/i>, and that: <i>\u201cJohannesburg entities, from City Power to Pikitup, degenerated under Mashaba\u2019s watch<\/i>&#8230;\u201d, do not hold any specific evidence of outright and continuous political failure or misdoing by the DA or Mashaba. Marrian, as a salted political analyst, must know this. Her remarks are primarily nothing more than generalised political allegations, failing to bring the DA or Mashaba to book with specific and confirmatory evidence on the specific story of rubbish bins. Furthermore, these claims, if they should be true, are seemingly the extraordinary to the ordinary of every day. Strikes, which are a general phenomenon in all the metros and lead unavoidably to streets overflowing with rubbish, are mostly run by Cosatu and its affiliates, which are alliance members to the ANC regime. Furthermore, the country-wide daily road blocks of burning tyres and unrest, etc., are basically due to the municipalities under the ANC\u2019s management\u2019s constant and ongoing failures for the delivery of services. In the failed service delivery at ANC-run municipalities, the presence of rubbish which overflows the streets is only one problem of many more serious failures to the inhabitants, of which Marrian seems oblivious or prefers not to mention.<sup>39<\/sup><br \/>\nMarrian\u2019s<sup>39<\/sup> overview of the DA\u2019s so-called fight with the then Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille, seemingly lacks an understanding of the background to the alleged matter, which forced the DA to react with serious steps against her. It seems to be a matter that the DA is still investigating although she has left the party. Her remark<sup>39:23<\/sup>: \u201c<i>The electorate clearly turned up their noses at the DA\u2019s antics in the metros over the past three years&#8230;\u201d<\/i>, is an effort by Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> to pinpoint the story behind the so-called \u201cnoses-up\u201d of the electorate.. However, it lacks any evidence or political commentator\u2019s depth. In perspective, it seems to be a reflection of a kind of political mischief against the DA. Again, on the \u201cantics\u201d of the DA &#8211; as done in all her other reflections on the DA\u2019s so-called many failures in her article &#8211; she failed to offer a comparison of the DA\u2019s \u201cbad\u201d antics with the ANC\u2019s \u201cgood\u201d antics in all the metros where it is active, knowing that the DA would come first as the best ruler.<sup>39<\/sup><br \/>\nIn conclusion, many critics are inclined to say \u201cwhere there is smoke there is fire\u201d. <sup>39<\/sup> Viewpoints must be lent an ear. The evidence of poor management and corruption in municipalities all over the country is plentiful: from the smallest village to the biggest metro. What really is needed is that the Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay municipalities must be scrutinised for corruption, theft and nepotism, etc., by commissions such as those of Zondo and Mpati. This will show not only possible wrongdoings by the ANC\u2019s cronies, but also possibly those of the DA\u2019s cronies. Such an outcome may put flesh to Marrian\u2019s<sup>39<\/sup> present vague and unconvincing allegations on the failures of the DA. It will also test the DA\u2019s manifesto for truth and see whether its promises are going to hold water. South Africa needs to see which of the three dominant political parties and their leaders are sufficiently capable and skilled to solve the demanding land redistribution issue. Most of all, we must ascertain which of the three parties\u2019 politics are characterised by poor governance and serious delinquencies.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32136_The_DAs_horse-trading_with_extreme_oppositions_as_partners\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.6. The DA\u2019s horse-trading with extreme oppositions as partners<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>A prominent critic, which could have also played a role in the loss of voters in the 2019 elections, is the opposition of conservative voters (mostly Whites) of the DA\u2019s association with the EFF. Indeed any association with a radical opposition, even the ANC, seems unacceptable for this sector.<sup>39,40,43<\/sup><br \/>\nNo-one can escape the hard fact that the DA\u2019s coalition and informal co-operation with the EFF has cost them support. The fiasco in their loss of control of Nelson Mandela Bay and the removal of the DA\u2019s mayors there, has become more than a black mark on the DA\u2019s record of integrity and good governance.<sup>39,40,43<\/sup><br \/>\nThis kind of DA-EFF cooperation is seen as nothing more than horse-trading, to use the excellent coining of a phrase by Bruce. It seems for some critics to be extreme opportunism by the DA\u2019s leadership to stay in power and to reap benefits, instead of truly putting the country and its voters\u2019 interests as a priority.<sup>39,40,43<\/sup><br \/>\nAt the moment there are a lot of rumours of a repeated coalition with the EFF in the metro councils of Tshwane and Johannesburg. The EFF alleged that such consultations and discussions with the DA are ongoing. But on this outcome, as with the DA\u2019s pre-2019 politics, Maimane<sup>43<\/sup> has thrown cold water by stating<sup>43:1-2<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8230;the DA would co-operate only with parties that shared its values of non-racialism, a capable state, eradication of corruption and a market-based economy that was inclusive of those who were left out.<br \/>\nThis discussion on co-operation with the EFF must be based on those principles, and if ultimately parties do not agree on the principles we will not sell those out. We will stand firm and move on from there.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The DA\u2019s pre-2019 association with the EFF and its leaders has, as mentioned, with good reason placed a question mark on the DA\u2019s integrity.<sup>34,39,43<\/sup> Further contamination of the DA\u2019s character by the EFF can make Marrian\u2019s<sup>39<\/sup> remark that<sup>39:32<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230;the DA did not live up to its own promise of better and clean governance in the metros it won in 2016\u201d, <\/i>suddenly and irrevocably meaningful<i>.<\/i> In addition here is Marrian\u2019s request that the DA must do some introspection. It seems to be necessary, not only with regard to its association with the EFF, but also on many of the other so-called \u201cdelinquencies\u201d of the DA, of which Marrian<sup>39<\/sup> has spoken many times with a tongue in her cheek.<br \/>\nA fact which cannot be ignored: as a result of its initial construction as a party, the DA has many times been characterised by outright opportunism which has nurtured the party\u2019s unfortunate \u201cEFF-love\u201d. It must be phased out, together with the EFF contamination.<sup>27,39,43,44<\/sup><br \/>\nThe DA cannot honestly call itself a unique party: a party free from racism, corruption, state capture, revolutionary politics, etc., as long the EFF is part of its inner circle. The past EFF association has cost the DA as many Black right-wing votes as it did to drive its White right-wing\u2019s departure. Selisho<sup>34<\/sup> quoted the political commentator Leeto Nthoba who said that the DA\u2019s initial loss of voters to the FF+ in the May elections was strongly driven by the DA\u2019s previous association with the EFF. The loss of more Whites from the DA will further be speeded up by a new alliance with the EFF. There is not a single good principle to support the DA to again be involved with the EFF in a future co-operation.<sup>34<\/sup><br \/>\nIn this context is it clear that Maimane has started (seemingly for the moment) to cold shoulder the EFF and confirms that the DA\u2019s intention is only that of a positive co-operation with \u201cequal-value\u201d parties to the DA in the post-2019 politics. Maimane reflects further that the DA wants to establish a \u201ccaucus of the opposition\u201d with parties that share their values and are identified with the centre of politics. In this context the DA already has a kind of \u201calliance\u201d with the FF+, the ACDP, the IFP and the UDM, while the EFF is not a member, but is seemingly supported sometimes.<sup>27,44-46<\/sup><br \/>\nHowever, for the DA to come clean in the post-2019 politics from their previous serious EFF-contamination, remains to be seen. The first prerequisite to be clean is integrity; something that no-one can cheer about in the DA if the EFF is its bed-partner. If the stream goes against Maimane\u2019s cold shouldering of the EFF, the DA is sleeping at the same time with the right-wing FF+ and underwriting the dominant voice of the aggrieved, conservative White and Coloured minorities, while at the same time sleeping with the left-wing EFF and underwriting the voice of the discontented, impatient and even angry Black majority. This is not what is called middle-ground politics: it is political schizophrenia and political psychopathy, two serious psychoses, intertwined in one single party. The end result will be the DA\u2019s ongoing Black-versus-White conflict, but in extreme form. This would also confirm the views of many critics that it lacks a sound political policy in any area of politics. As a party it will fit in nowhere, because it is not positively repositioned. Most of all, it will be without supporters and its rich funders.<sup>32,47<\/sup><br \/>\nFor the DA to argue that the previous backing of the DA by the EFF and vice versa has not been without benefit, for instance in Johannesburg, holds no water. There is no fact to contradict the statement that all the inhabitants of Johannesburg would benefit if the ANC alone was the boss, possibly more than the DA-EFF alliance. One thing is clear (and a great concern for a corruption free DA) and that is the enormous benefit for the DA-EFF councillors in pay and their political empowerment. When John Mendelsohn<sup>46<\/sup>, a DA councillor, postulates that the DA alliance with the EFF was a \u201c<i>precariously positioned one wich required skilful management by Mashaba\u201d<\/i> it seems as though both Bruce<sup>40<\/sup> and Marrion,<sup>39<\/sup> seemingly with good reason, frowned on it. The DA would benefit from a little introspection, as Marrian advises.<sup>39,40,46<\/sup><br \/>\nThe public have the right to be sceptical on any DA-EFF brotherhood. Mendelsohn\u2019s<sup>46 <\/sup>reflection on Bruce\u2019s<sup>40<\/sup> critique on the DA\u2019s actions in the Johannesburg City Council, with specifically the EFF as a prominent empowered partner, read<sup>46:18<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe message to Bruce is that the arrangement with the EFF was not entered into simply as a \u201cgreedy decision\u201d. It was done for the best of reasons, namely to rid the city of corruption and get some growth going in the local economy.\u201dThis <\/i>has just too much reference to the words \u201c<i>greedy, corruption, best of reasons\u201d<\/i>, as if coming directly from the Zuma period. It is not convincing. <sup>39,40,46<\/sup><br \/>\n<i>Postscript<\/i>: On the 29th May 2019 the Citizen reports that the DA had given the ANC the Chair-position of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa)<sup>4 <\/sup>in the Western Cape Provincial Legislature. As motivation for this offering the DA said it was done in the interests of transparency, accountability, cooperative governance and good democratic practice (characteristics the DA constantly accuses the ANC of lacking!). Notwithstanding the DA\u2019s argument that the chair is given traditionally to a member of the strongest opposition party in the government (which the ANC is in the stern Cape), it is in conflict with Maimane\u2019s earlier promises that the DA would stay away from any future cooperation with doubtful partners.<sup>49<\/sup><br \/>\nThe advent of post-2019 Malema cooperation with the DA in metros can steer the DA back to its practice of dishonourable horse trading. This does not seem impossible. On the 28th May the Star<sup>48<\/sup> reported that it looks set that the DA is going to do a power-sharing deal again with the EFF in Tshwane and Johannesburg.<sup>48<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32138_The_DAs_use_of_the_Malloch-Brown_model_for_provincial_and_municipal_political_empowerment\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.8. The DA\u2019s use of the Malloch-Brown model for provincial and municipal political empowerment<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>There are some serious critics of the opinion that to speak of the DA as a national regime, to in any way be able to govern South Africa after the May election 2019, must be handled with care. The DA, it was felt, just could not brag of doing so, because this experience is totally missing from their CV. There are even critics that believe that on provincial and local level the DA seems to falter. The emergence of various small political groupings and so-called community parties in the Western Cape, the DA\u2019s stronghold, is offered as dissatisfaction with the DA by communities and the inhabitants of regions where the DA is strongly active. Given that these groupings did not make much inroad into the DA\u2019s domain in the Western Cape or Cape Town in the past elections, this contradicts a general indication of poor DA ruling or unpopularity with the broad society of the DA on specific municipal level.<sup>22,25,36,50<\/sup><br \/>\nThis outcome erases the critique that the DA does not have the ability or will to be the national ruler in the post-2019 politics. The results of the May election contradict thus firstly the lack of interest of the DA in national politics, and secondly that the DA has neglected the national issue. What most of the critics have missed is that the DA, with very good reason, is focusing its political intentions and role-playing on provincial level to tackle local issues, instead of over-addressing the national issues of South Africa.<sup>22,25,36,50<\/sup><br \/>\nLooking to the arguments and modus operandi of the DA\u2019s leadership since 2014, it becomes clear that there exists cognition inside the party that the first step to be able to move into national government successfully requires the pre-step of a well established provincial level involvement and empowerment by the DA all over the country. Included here is the local level of governmental occupation by the DA in an effort to firstly repair the integrity of municipalities and to again obtain clean audits, and secondly to serve the inhabitants\u2019 needs and demands through this improved system. This will allow them to obtain and establish a foundation to move into provincial and then on into national levels of government. Only after this double stage has successfully been mastered, based on a sound governance foundation, experience and empowerment, can the DA move aggressively into the national sphere from 2024 onward .<sup>22,25,36,50<\/sup><br \/>\nThis double stage intention and approach on provincial and local levels of government establishment was evident from the words of Makashule Gana<sup>50<\/sup> of the DA national campaign team for the recent May 2019 election, when he pinpointed that the party was primarily and specifically campaigning on community issues that were close to the ordinary peoples\u2019 daily lives<sup>50:15<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWe stand more chance of being in government if we pour our hearts into the provinces and grow our votes there.\u201d<\/i> Prominent here are the constructive efforts of the DA to explain on local level major national issues in such terms that help voters to understand how bad or good decisions taken in the top echelons of government affect their day-to-day lives, write Matiwane and Deklerk<sup>25<\/sup>.<br \/>\nHow much the quality of the DA\u2019s political structure and know-how are on the standard of international politics, and how intensively they apply the principles of good governance on all levels of their strategy and planning, is especially reflected and confirmed by their insight to go as an opposition in the first place for local and domestic politics. Their aim is mostly, other than some of the ANC top brass like Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, to find an international solution for local problems. No-one can reject the important role of international politics, but if a local policy of management is absent and the basic grievances of the local people on village level are ignored and fail to be addressed &#8211; as the ANC mostly did for over 25 years with their minds occupied by national government &#8211; international politics not only fails to have an impact, but, where it is applied randomly, brings in most cases only further chaos to an existing local problem. Their exclusive local focus with the use of local approaches, is working positively where the DA is strongly involved in the local level of government. This is not only to repair the local mess at municipalities previously run by the ANC, but at the same time to start to bring about the much needed basic facilities and contacts that are prominently lacking on local level and whereto international solutions mostly are not applicable.<br \/>\nIn this context, wherein the DA\u2019s local orientation to politics is correctly focusing on the single aim to altruistically serve the individuals\u2019 needs above personal gains and self-empowerment, an inclination that is at the moment negatively overwhelming the country\u2019s politics on national level, is the supportive narrative of Mark Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup> with regard to the DA\u2019s initiative on local level politics. For the record, Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup> is undoubtedly one of the most qualified internationally recognised persons to understand and evaluate the actions and qualities of political parties and governments worldwide. The insight of Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup>, an experienced political correspondent for the Economist, the Vice-President of External Affairs of the World Bank, Head of the United Nations Development Programme, the UN Deputy Secretary-General under Koffi Annan, and later Minister of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who worked closely within the Middle East and African political turmoil, is fully echoing the DA\u2019s practise of politics. He can speak of successes and failures and hard lessons to learn from local to national governance, especially on the British environment.<sup>51<\/sup><br \/>\nMalloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup>, writes about Gordon Brown\u2019s hard lesson to learn on the importance of local politics when he became the UK Prime-Minister<sup>51:221<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Hit in his early months in office by credit, food and energy crises that were clearly international in origin, he publicly sought international solutions, only to be confronted&#8230;with complaints that he was not sensitive enough to people and their problems. Why, the British people asked, was he talking about all these irrelevant international matters?<br \/>\nThe dilemma of the modern politician is that the answers are abroad but the votes at home. And so Brown, like Blair before him, had to find a language and narrative of politics that is deeply rooted in the at-home. Among political leaders, neither the natural globalisers nor the nationalists are able to cut themselves free from the strings of domestic politics. That is the forum to which they all remain beholden.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup> also writes in this context of the importance of local government about his own experience (and another hard lesson to learn) as a UK minister. He reports<sup>51:221<\/sup>: <i>\u201cAnd local is a tough taskmaster. Coming back to the U.K. as a minister to help Brown drive his internationalist agenda, I was brought down to earth by the weekend\u2019s newspaper headlines that blamed the government for uncollected garbage in London\u2019s streets. It does not get much more local than that.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nHow sensitive the DA is in its encircling of good politics and its following every letter of the principles to obtain the best empowerment through addressing the local issue, is clear in their aim to take over city metros as a first step to a later national takeover. Noteworthy here is the DA\u2019s insight to put forward strong leaders of quality in order to lead excellent cities and by doing so, to win the hearts of the local people. Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup>, on the empowerment of local government through the installation of persons of integrity in care of these municipalities, writes<sup>51:221<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230; mayors solve problems that are close to home: violent crime, drugs, public infrastructure. They have to care about schools, social services, police and public investment.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nOn the immense empowerment of the local entities and their empowering energy-streaming, not only into the provincial and national levels of a country, but also into the international sphere, because their excellence and know-how can be exported, Malloch-Brown<sup>51<\/sup> writes further<sup>51:222<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe world looks good for mayors and other local leaders. The fortunes of cities like Moscow, Cape Town, and Chicago have often been countercyclical to those of their region or country, often due to the leadership of strong mayors.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThe DA\u2019s successful pre-2019 occupation and management of Cape Town (as well as the Western Cape region in which it is anchored) reflects such counter action to erase poor governance and leadership, standing out from the ANC\u2019s failed South African state and its municipalities where they reign.<sup>51<\/sup><br \/>\nIn addition, the DA\u2019s political successes, again at the provincial level, especially in the Western Cape in the May election, are a confirmation of their ongoing political manifesto of an orderly taking of power in South Africa, even if it must wait until the 2024 election.<sup>22<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32139_The_DA_as_a_party_of_everything_for_everyone_pre-and_post-2019\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9. The DA as a party of everything for everyone, pre-and post-2019<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321391_The_DAs_White_dilemma\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.1. The DA\u2019s White dilemma<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Post-election critics bring various reasons to the door of the DA as to why it did not make a dramatic inroad on the voters. Prominent here is its seeming inability to properly handle the various forces, both positive and negative, active in the DA\u2019s own dynamics. It is often suggested that it tries to be <i>a party of everything for everybody<\/i>. This is an approach which is seemingly not working anymore. The party\u2019s open kind of politics in which they try to satisfy both the Black interests as well as the White interests seem not to work in 2019 and are not going to work in future. This is damaging to both sides. The basis here is a policy ambiguity, mostly activated by the conservative NP remnants of the White sector of the DA. This opposition, and fear by the doves in the DA of losing White support if they took them on, led to not only a vague but many times an absolute lack of a clearly declared policy on Black empowerment and affirmative action, driving away the middle class and even the lower economic classes of Blacks. On the other hand, there is the suspicion by White DA members of Maimane to have sympathy for dramatic land reform, which echos in many aspects that of the ANC doves. This is a direct reason for a DA internal power struggle. This was also well-reflected by critics as the so-called driving out of Whites as members and supporters in the May elections. This in-house power struggle is immense, although well hidden. It frequently equals the present in-fighting in the ANC on the self-empowerment of individuals. The Black racism within a certain sector of the ANC is in reverse echoed by White racism in the DA.<sup>28,32<\/sup> Nyatsumba writes<sup>25:25<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe harder Mmusi Maimane tried to position the DA as a social democratic party that would appeal to black voters, the more conservatives \u201cfought back\u201d against him and his ideals.<\/i><br \/>\nNaki, in quoting Professor Dirk Kotze<sup>22<\/sup> of Unisa on this conflicting context and the fight for the soul of the DA, reports<sup>22:4<\/sup>: \u201c<i>Blacks wanted reform, but conservative whites opposed liberal policies, which put the DA in a dilemma. Both the constituencies abandoned the party at the polls in favour of the ANC and the FF+.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThis indication is undoubtedly true: as many as 470 396 voters left their DA home and contributed undoubtedly to the FF+ gaining 249 093 votes since the 2014 election. These DA voters who absconded to the ANC also helped the ANC to limit its\u2019 loss to only 1 410 446 votes in the May election.<sup>5-8<\/sup><br \/>\nThe post-2019 politics make it clear that the DA has reached its peak of White voters and supporters, but the loss of more or less 249 093 White DA voters to the FF+ was an unavoidable outcome. It was part of the ultra-conservative Whites\u2019 build-up against Black empowerment that could never be solved reasonably inside the DA of the future. Most of these ultra-conservative Whites, a political mix between NPs, ABs and Herstigte-NPs, have opportunistically hung on to the DA for years after losing their own political homes, doing more harm than good to the DA\u2019s political soul.<sup>28,52<\/sup> Mokone, Deklerk and Hunter<sup>52<\/sup>, quoting a DA insider on these seemingly politically confused and estranged Whites in the DA, write<sup>52:22<\/sup>: <i>\u201cYes, we have lost support to the Freedom Front Plus, but perhaps it\u2019s about time we lost the right-wing conservatives in the party because we are trying to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Perhaps that will also help us to continue increasing support in black areas, which is what we did in this election.\u201d <\/i><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321392_A_Black_ex-ANC_as_the_present_leader_of_the_DA\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.2. A Black ex-ANC as the present leader of the DA<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>How much these right-wing conservatives have penetrated the soul of the DA with their White racial contamination, was clearly reflected by their efforts to sack Maimane for what they see as his \u201cBlack liberation\u201d inside the DA. Other DA right-wingers allude that he is an ex-ANC walking around with the ANC manifesto under his right arm. The intention to oust him at present is very clear. Indeed, it seems that they tried to do this at the DA\u2019s Federal Executive (Fedex) on the 13th May, without success. It seems that they are also gearing up to try to oust him later in June at the DA\u2019s Federal Council\u2019s meeting. (The FC is the DA\u2019s highest decision-making structure between conferences). There are also rumours of a call for an early national congress next year, instead of the scheduled congress of 2021, to muster enough votes to be able to topple Maimane<sup>12,52<\/sup><br \/>\nMokone, Deklerk and Hunter<sup>52<\/sup> describe these detractors of Maimane to include current and former MPs and MPLs from the DA\u2019s neo-conservative grouping, known in the DA\u2019s circles as the <i>\u201cold guard\u201d,<\/i> which does not agree with the DA\u2019s \u201cblacking\u201d politics and a more responsible view on true democracy, as opposed to the one catering exclusively to White privilege. A spokesperson on the inside of the DA says<sup>52:6<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThey are gloating. Even before the results started coming in, there were so many of them that were waiting for Mmusi to fail.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nHow focused and poisonous these attacks are on Maimane, especially from the Afrikaner right-wing, is well reflected by Pelser<sup>53<\/sup> when he, without a factual base, writes<sup>53:6<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Danksy Maimane se oorhaastige kantkiesery in rassetwiste wat gewissel het van Ashwin Willemse tot Schweizer-Reneke, kry die DA 472 000 stemme minder op 8 Mei, want hoewel sy party se prestasie in regering gerespekteer word, verstaan veral wit kiesers ook wat Maimane wil doen, naamlik om klokslag op sosiale media sy eie onberispelike bona fides wat betref ant-swart rassisme ten toon te stel nog voordat hy al die feite het.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The double standards of these White right-wingers applied to the correctness and indeed the prescribed duty of Maimane to punish deviant behaviour of party members, especially of the top brass of the DA, knowing it is inappropriate and delinquent &#8211; is again reflected by Pelser\u2019s<sup>53<\/sup> public down-playing (seemingly because their political antics fit him) of the seriousness of the deviances of three DA seniors who Maimane (after consultation with his top brass) recently called to book for contravening the party\u2019s media rules and for getting involved in racial politics. Pelser writes<sup>53:6<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Die DA-LP Ghaleb Cachalia, seun van die struggle-ikone Amina en Yusuf Cachalia, is weer onder \u2018n tipe sensuur geplaas as \u2018n ongedissiplineerde kader omdat hy dit gedurf waag het het om die uitgesproke Radio 702\u2013aanbieder Eusebius McKaiser te belg.<br \/>\nOok Helen Zille, wat as premier die doeltreffendste regering gebou het wat Suid-Afrika in 25 jaar gesien het, en wat nou \u2018n gewone DA-lid is, sal na die DA se federale uitvoerende raad verwys word nadat sy op Twitter geskryf het dat daar ook deesdae iets soos \u201cblack privileges\u201d is (sy stel dit onder meer gelyk aan grootskeepse geplunder sonder gevolge). <i> <\/i><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>These growing and well-planned attacks on the \u201cBlack priest\u201d Maimane as DA leader, are not done alone by single persons or a small group of White right-wing-went-off-DAs, but are also as mentioned done from inside by the mostly White \u201cold guard\u201d of the DA top brass where these attacks are less expected. These attacks are spreading to all the intimate members of Maimane\u2019s team. Important to note is the focus on the DA\u2019s head of elections Jonathan Moakes, and the chief executive Paul Boughey, seemingly also with the intention to oust them for the \u201calleged\u201d poor performance of the DA in the 2019 elections<sup>12,39,53<\/sup><br \/>\nMoakes did indeed resign recently and referred to the internal fights in the DA, wherein seemingly the detractors of Maimane are central, as:<i> \u201c&#8230;\u2019toksiese, abnormal omgewing\u2019 waar \u2018interne gevegte, vertrouensbreuk, (en) onenigheid &#8230;die norm geword het\u2019,\u201d<\/i> reports Boonzaaier.<sup>54:1<\/sup><br \/>\nBringing the fight closer to Maimane and his intimate cronies, Marrian writes<sup>39:4<\/sup>: <i>\u201cKnives are said to be out for the young leader, despite him getting \u2018a round of applause; as he entered the Fedex meeting on Monday.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321393_The_DA_present-day_leadership_saturation_by_right-wing_Old_Guards\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.3. The DA present-day leadership saturation by right-wing Old Guards<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The knives of the \u201cold guard\u201d are out for the wrong \u201cemperor\u201d and these detractors of Maimane, similar to those who stabbed Julius Ceasar, learned later that a hefty price needs to be paid in the end.<br \/>\nFrom a political analysis point of view, it seems more and more that the DA\u2019s drop in share in the national votes from the 22.23% under Helen Zille to 20.77% in 2019, bringing a decrease from 89 to 84 MPs in the National Assembly, was to a great extent directly as a result of the negative impact of these \u201cold guard\u2019\u201d \u201cwhite-politics\u201d inside the DA, specifically about Maimane\u2019s \u201cBlack\u201d presence as its leader. One prominent root of these DA neo-conservatives\u2019 ultra-politics, is their association with the so-called antagonists against land expropriation in any form &#8211; and the fighting off of any form of upliftment for the mass of the poor and landless. They are clearly aligned to the so-called and mostly self-styled \u201cAfrikaners\/White rescuers and saviours\u201d, such as the FF+, AfriForum, AgriSA, Solidarity and other obstructionists of the unavoidable and much needed land reform plan. The future planning and political model of this \u201cold guard\u201d for the DA does not include the intention to build a party that represents the interests of all South Africans. Prominent here is their exclusive safe-guarding of an imbalanced White land ownership and exclusive White capital at the cost of \u00b130 million poor and landless Blacks.<sup> 21,28,47,52<\/sup><br \/>\nCritically considered, is it clear that they do not represent the view of most of the \u00b15 million White South Africans. Moreover, they do not have the majority support of these Whites for their racial politics inside or outside the DA. They can cost the DA a split, but, as said, this split needs to occur as fast as possible under the leadership of Maimane, in order to make the DA a party of the people of South Africa.<sup>21,28,47,52<\/sup><br \/>\nBut political analyst Ralph Mathekgo<sup>55<\/sup>, quoted by Naki<sup>55<\/sup>, contends that the flight of White voters from the DA must also be interpreted from another angle and not outright because they are all against the DA\u2019s so-called activation of a process of \u201cblacking\u201d itself. They were forced out by fear of the EFF\u2019s extreme anti-White and land grabbing policy (and their own selfishness to be rich, empowered and to have unlimited White privilege), and thus ran to the FF+ as their only rescuer in this unfortunate setup. This opinion is confirmed by various other political analysts.<sup>21,28,32,47,52,55<\/sup><br \/>\nMathekgo55, in line with the above findings, writes<sup>55:5<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe EFF helped the Freedom Front Plus to consolidate the white voters. It positioned itself as an opponent of the EFF policies, including the expropriation of land without compensation.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThe exit of the White antagonists (who, as mentioned, did not really belong from day one to the DA\u2019s Black orientated political culture), has undoubtedly on the other hand opened the door in reverse for the influx of the middle and lower classes of Black supporters. This positive and growing process will start to erase the White shortfall in members and the White funding of the party (which also seems to have become a leverage of how these right-wing Whites, especially the White capitalists, have manipulated and captured the DA\u2019s soul for a long time).<sup> 21,28,32,47,52,55<\/sup><br \/>\nTo be a party of the future, the DA will need to increase their drive for the collection into the DA of Blacks to make it an overwhelmingly moderate Black party. This is a dramatic move away from the contaminated presence of the (mostly departed) right-wing Whites which have so far blocked any \u201cblack-liberalism\u201d. This was done in-house by them, at the cost of the status of Maimane\u2019s leadership, by their internal propaganda to profile him as a poor leader. In this process the media was thoroughly used, especially the Afrikaans media.<sup>21,28,32,47,52,55<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321394_Good_management_for_change_politics\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.4. Good management for change politics<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The abovementioned change in politics of the DA from White to Black can bring about enormous winnings for the DA in the next local urban elections of 2021. This political acceptance could be extended to the rural areas wherein the DA so far has been under-performing against the ANC and the EFF. (In the 2019 elections, of the 3.6 million votes which the DA received, 2.9 million came from urban areas, with 152 000 from rural areas, 500 000 from farm areas and 9 000 from mixed areas). This means that the DA has to be progressive in order to improve its position locally.<sup>22,56<\/sup> Marrian<sup>56<\/sup> is correct when she says that the DA\u2019s results in the metros in 2019 show that it will have to work hard to retain control of them in 2021, particularly in the Tshwane and Johannesburg metros which it now governs through unstable coalitions. This includes their sole governing in Cape Town, where their support has dropped from 67% to 56%. However, on the other side, the decrease in votes for the ANC is much more significant, confirming the presence of various negative determinants and not a sole one such as leadership per se.56<br \/>\nWith regard to the future politics of the FF+ in the post-2019 politics (which has enlarged its presence in Parliament from 4 to 10 MPs) \u2013 it is the party to which the DA shed an assumend \u00b1250 000 voters &#8211; there is, besides obstruction together with the various White\/Afrikaner rescuers and savers such as Solidarity, AfriForum, the IRR, etc., very little hope. The FF+ is an artificial political setup, still saturated in racism, and as the election outcome reflects, it is not popular with the majority of South Africans who stand strongly against racism. Also for the 250 000 DA members, fleeing the ship to the FF+, the future looks doomed there and they knew very well that the DA is the only party that can bring about ordered and balanced land reform. The failed Pieter Mulder escapade as deputy minister of the FF+ in the Zuma cabinet was an expensive lesson to learn for Whites who tried to channel their politics and interests exclusively through the FF+.<sup>5-8<\/sup><br \/>\nThe chance is good that many of these disloyal (and many times displaced) DA supporters, who turned to the FF+ as voters, are going to return to the DA. Kotze<sup>22<\/sup> reflects<sup>22:4<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe FF+ support is artificial, caused by DA supporters upset with the way the party was managed at the top.\u201d<\/i> The question must be asked as to whether the DA wants them back? To argue that the DA is stripped of its White voters\/supporters with the departure of the 250 000 right-wing jumpers to the EFF+, is a myth. It must be noted that most of the DA members\/supporters are still White and are undoubtedly satisfied. Moreover: the fact is that the Whites (including Afrikaners), especially the youth, have very little sympathy for right-wing Whites and their opportunistic Afrikaner\/White saviours and rescuers. The same passivity against the right-wing is present within the 5 million Whites with regard to the political trouble-making of the \u00b135 000 White farmers and their farms. Although it is impossible to calculate precisely the number of White supporters of the DA, the voting totals of the 2019 statics of the eligible voters (\u00b136 miilion) as well as the total voters (\u00b118 million) at the ballot box out of a total population of \u00b158 million, can be brought into calculation with the White population of \u00b15 million. If the eligible White voters are calculated, as many as 3 miilion Whites can support the DA. If the passive vote, as reflected in the 2019 voting, is brought into calculation, as many as 1.5 million Whites can still be supporters of the DA. (The total vote for the DA in 2019 was 3.6 million). This calculation means that the loss of \u00b1250 000 White votes reflects basically a loss of between \u00b18% and 17% Whites by the DA, which can easily be replaced with Black votes.<sup>5-8<\/sup><br \/>\nIt can be expected that many of the Black and Brown voters who jumped ship will return as soon as the ANC restarts its tricks. The politics of the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu, are still bordering on radicalism with regard to race, economics and land reform, etc. This politically radical thinking just does not fit into the mindset of established DAs.<sup> 22,63<\/sup><br \/>\nFor South African politics in general, which includes the DA\u2019s future planning, thinking and action, there lurk serious consequences as a result of the right-wing FF+ successes in the May election (a warning also applicable to the EFF\u2019s danger). This holds political dangers, which somewhere in the future, the government of the day may be forced to curb, even by dramatic intervention. On this racial polarisation and risky outcome, Mondi Makhanya,<sup>64<\/sup> the editor of City Press, writes a clear warning<sup>64:11<\/sup>: <i>\u201cPieter Groenewald, VF Plus-leier, het n\u00e1 die verkiesing in \u2018n onderhoud hieroor gekraai. \u201cMense begin nou besef dat jy toegelaat word om wit te wees, \u2018n minderheidsgroep, \u2018n Afrikaner, sonder om \u2018n rassis te wees.\u201d <\/i><br \/>\nOn the above response of Groenewald, Makhanya<sup>64:11<\/sup>continues:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Deur dit te s\u00ea, het hy die terugtrek van \u2018n aansienlike deel van die wit bevolking \u2013 meestal Afrikaanssprekendes &#8211; in \u2018n rasse-laer van waar hulle hulself as afsonderlik van hul medeburgers beskou, as lofwaardig beskou.<br \/>\nDie ongelukkige aspek van demokrasie is dat dit elke nou en dan uitslae soos di\u00e9 bewerkstellig. As demokrasie moet ons dit respekteer.<br \/>\nSuid-Afrikaners moet egter nou reeds die realiteit konfronteer dat \u2018n giftige nasionalisme aan die regterkant van ons politieke spektrum herrys. Die goeie ding is dat dit binne die grense van ons grondwetlike bedeling geskied.<br \/>\nDit kan steeds op demokraties wyse ontman word \u2013 mits diegene wat ons republiek lei dit herken en dit met breinkrag eerder as spierkrag beveg.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It is now the duty of the DA to rid itself of the Groenewalds, the racial AfriForums and its associated organisations. There is no place to fire up White resistance and poisonous ultra-White nationalism in the DA. The opportunity is now there for the DA to rid itself of racial domination and contamination. This can be done fast and successfully. For that the DA needs a tough, but balanced Black leader.<sup>64<\/sup><br \/>\nIt is clear that Maimane and his intimate cronies are very sure of themselves in the post-2019 DA with their future \u201cblacking\u201d. He is not hesitating to take on the White ultra-conservatives in the party\u2019s top brass. It seems Maimane successfully bottled them together with persons such as Helen Zille and \u201cher regrets of promoted Black leaders in the DA\u201d.<sup>43,53,65,66<\/sup><br \/>\nMaimane<sup>43<\/sup>, on this future path of DA politics, said<sup>43:1-2<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWe have set the direction of the organisation and that is the route we will go\u201d<\/i>.<br \/>\nHis growing success was seen with the recent appointment of his preferred candidate Jacques Julius as deputy chief whip in the place of Mike Waters, who is regarded by Maimane and his cronies as part of the conservatives who obstruct the change of the DA. It shows strong support for Maimane from senior DA MPs. This direct vote within the party\u2019s caucus was undoubtedly the victory Maimane needed to continue fast with his diversity of the racial composition of the DA\u2019s higher echelons. It is also clear that the DA MP Phumzile van Damme is successfully leading a progressive group to dislodge many of Maimane\u2019s detractors.<sup>65<\/sup><br \/>\nMokone and Deklerk<sup>65<\/sup>, quoting DA inside sources, say that Julius not only strengthened Maimane\u2019s empowerment on the DA\u2019s Fedex, but that the support of the senior DA MPs show<sup>65:4<\/sup>: <i>\u201c&#8230; that there are people in the party who support the vision he\u2019s laid out, who want to continue with the vision of our SA for all.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThis clear and decisive policy finality arriving at last, the previous lack of which cost the DA votes in the recent elections, was concretely demonstrated on the 21st May 2019 when Maimane took on Helen Zille in public (an action long overdue). This clearly reflects his assertion of power in the post-2019 DA politics. He has at last obtained his grip on the party. His undermentioned public speaking shows this clearly.<sup>43<\/sup><br \/>\nFirstly, he recommitted the DA to being the South African party of the centre, with the sole intention to serve every citizen<sup>43:1-2<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWe will not pander to the right or pander to the left. That is not the space we want to occupy. We are in the centre of politics and we must lay out that stall. Populism and nationalism are on the rise. It doesn\u2019t change the fact that our historical mission to get all South Africans working together is an ideal worth fighting for.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nSecondly, in fighting off the attacks on him as leader, as driven by the ill-disciplined comments of some high profile DA members on Twitter, he initiated disciplinary actions against three prominent DA members, namely Helen Zille and the two DA MPs Galeb Cachalia and Michael Cardo.<sup>43,67<\/sup><br \/>\nMaimane<sup>43,67<\/sup> taking a clear position on the DA\u201ds centre politics and how this will be driven, as well as how he is going to erase the right-wing Whites, has responded as follows<sup>43:9 and 67:1-2<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I do not agree with the views that have been put forward by the former premier of the Western Cape.<br \/>\nThe discussion about privilege in this country is a function not only of our history which advantaged a particular race over another, but it\u2019s also that in the last number of years in government here, we have failed to create access to opportunities for South Africans and ensure that more can be included in our economy .<br \/>\nWhite South Africans needed to be \u201ccognisant of the fact that the majority of people who are left out are black South Africans.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>On the conflicting racial matter, also prominent in the DA and which was clearly put into the foreground by the Zille tweets, Maimane<sup>67<\/sup> comments as follows<sup>67:9<\/sup>: <i>\u201cAny view that seeks to polarise South Africans on the basis of race is not a view I will support. Our focus must be working together as South Africans, black and white, to recognise those injustices and work to address them.\u201d <\/i><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321395_The_DA_is_finally_at_the_centre_of_politics_and_is_laying_out_its_stall\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.5. The DA is finally at the centre of politics and is laying out its stall<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>To be honest, the DA was before and still is after the election (as shown by the arrogance of Zille\u2019s tweets), undoubtedly saturated in the belief capture of some right-wing Whites seeing themselves as the sole rescuers of the party (undoubtedly true in terms of funding) when it seems to be in trouble. The pertinent use of Helen Zille and Tony Leon to collect votes, but surely only White votes, was an excellent example of this mistaken perception of these right-wing Whites of their future importance in the DA. The presence of people such as Zille and Leon activated immense Black anger. It was planned belittlement. It was for White empowerment.<sup>64,66,68 <\/sup>A DA member of the party\u2019s campaign team reflects<sup>68:7<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWhy in the dying days were the fossils rolled out? Because they wanted to focus on the white vote. That vote was already gone, it was clear even in by-elections.\u201d <\/i><br \/>\nThere is a false belief that a Black DA is doomed, which may be true if it is solely entrusted to a future of White voters and putting them first. But the intention is clear to keep only those Whites who are committed to an open society, free from the present DA racial undertones. For Johnson<sup>12<\/sup> to write as follows on this White remedy of the post-2019 DA is pie in the sky<sup>12:4-5<\/sup>: <i>\u201cDaar is eise dat die koppe van al die topleiers moet rol en vrese dat, tensy die skip vinnig omgedraai word, verdere verliese in 2021 se munisipale verkiesing die party in die gesig staar.\u201d<\/i> Firstly, it is doubtful whether people such as Johnston are welcome on the post-2019 DA ship. Secondly, if the Black top leaders of the party are now fired, the White racial DA will in 2019 already face losses and be diminished to the FF+\u2019s status (into which its White right-wing fits very well with their extreme racial ideology). <i> <\/i><br \/>\nThe immense presence of doubt on the so-called \u201cexpert leadership\u201d of Whites in the DA\u2019s top echelons and with good reason the growing rejection of persons (who Malema called the <i>pensioner<\/i>-politicians) such as Helen Zille, who totally overstayed her welcome in formal DA politics, and her present actions of enormous damage to the DA and to Maimane, is confirmed by her growing anti-DA writings and recent utterances. Specific in this respect were her recent admissions of her seemingly \u201cown fault\u201d as the previous DA leader to \u201cblacken\u201d the DA. Even the DA\u2019s top brass intended to crash her \u201cpolitical profile\u201d to get rid of its White image before the May election (which she named \u201cvernietige Zille-stategie). Zille<sup>66<\/sup>, on the 26th May 2019 in the Rapport on these \u201cfacts and others\u201d, reflecting back to her so-called ousting in 2017 about her \u201ccolonialism-tweets\u201d, writes as follows<sup>66:7<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Diegene verantwoordelik vir die DA se verkiesingstrategie (ironies genoeg, die meeste van hulle wit) het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat as hulle my in die openbaar sou verpletter, die DA uitendelik sy beeld as \u2018n \u201cwit party\u201d sou verloor. Dit is nie \u2018n samesweringsteorie nie. Ek het \u2018n dokument wat na die party se federale uitvoerende raad gestuur is, wat dit verduidelik.<br \/>\nEk is tydelik geskors, en toe dit nog nie werk nie, het hulle my prober aanmoedig om Suid-Afrika te verlaat. Die DA het selfs \u2018n skenker gevind om hul strategie te financier. As ek verdwyn, so het hul gereken, sal die party uiteindelik as \u201cgetransformeer\u201d beskou word.Toe ek beleef weier om as premier van die Wes-Kaap te bedank en die land te verlaat, is ek verbied uit alle party-aktiwiteite.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>With regard to the above \u2013 which sounds like pages from the chronicles of the FBI and the KGB! &#8211; the DA top brass offers some contradictory facts, such as that they never offered her a job overseas, but that the job offer was made independently by two British universities, and that she was indeed asked to leave the premiership due to the damage done by her view on colonialism and race (as she is doing again). To make her an eminent exile to St Helena, similar to Napoleon, seems to be in her dreams. What is clear is that Zille has her own agenda to do the DA as much harm as possible. She has become her own destroyer in the DA\u2019s politics, as well as the county\u2019s politics. Thankfully for her there is a place and sympathy for a pensioned joker in politics, even world-wide.<sup>54<\/sup><br \/>\nFor Maimane the above, namely the possible presence still today of a small but strong empowered group of right-wing mischief-makers in the DA who not only can oust him, but can also send him overseas in the near future or to St Helena! Be aware!<br \/>\nWhat is clear, Maimane and also the DA\u2019s other leaders learned well from the recent elections, is that a party cannot be<i> unlimited everything for everyone<\/i>: you can be a party for everyone, but one based on clear moral principles, free from racism and free from the sheltering of politically contaminated opportunists whose foundations rest in pre-1994 racial and self-centred South Africa. A centre party or a social democratic party requires clear borders to the left as well as to the right, far away from the vague bordering on political policy of the present DA. Furthermore, there are signs of stagnation in the DA, as its election results in the May elections reflect. This is due, again as abovementioned, to a certain extent because of the DA\u2019s circling around its middle ground position in politics wherein its\u2019 fine, clear value proposition to voters, after their years of exposure to the ANC\u2019s rude politics, did not always come through correctly or was appreciated.<sup>32,45,67<\/sup><br \/>\nTo be a winner in the post-2019 politics, the DA\u2019s ideal composition of members must be proportionally 10 Blacks to 1 White. This ideal is also appropriate for its leadership. In its Constitution the Freedom Charter must be central.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"32139_Pastor_Mmusi_Maimane_a_perspective\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9. Pastor Mmusi Maimane: a perspective<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321391_The_Poor_leader\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.1. The \u201cPoor\u201d leader<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>There are some very strong critics of the leadership of Mmusi Maimane of the DA. Pivotal here is the allegation of his lack of a so-called \u201cZille-driving motivation-politics\u201d. Many see him as another failed so-called \u201cTony Leon with his fight-back-strategy\u201d, without bringing constructive politics to the table, other than constantly showing up Jacob Zuma\u2019s and Cyril Ramaphosa\u2019s failures and their empty promises.<sup>36<\/sup><br \/>\nDescriptions of Maimane as a kind of <i>sub-standard<\/i> leader, a <i>directionless<\/i> leader, a <i>powerless<\/i> leader, a <i>poor<\/i> leader, etc., became prominent references since 2018 by some journalistic sectors. Included in this \u201cMaimane-bashing\u201d, frequently ignoring the modus operandi of Maimane and the present 2019 politics of the DA, is it important to note that the DA underwent a dramatic metamorphosis since 2014, writes Tabane.<sup>77<\/sup> Maimane undoubtedly inherited a sometimes confused party, one leg in Black politics as well as one leg in White politics. It is still undergoing change today. It is a process wherein White empowerment was shifted to Black empowerment to a certain, but limited, extent. This was a shift that angered many of the White-NP-remnants in the DA, who has moved over to it when the NP passed away. This ongoing change in the DA\u2019s identity brought the much needed activation into its foundation (as well as conflict) of more Black rights. Prominent here was also the erosion of exclusive White capitalism and the activation of inclusive capital, the fighting in some ways of Black inequality, poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks, the effort to phase out White supremacy in the party\u2019s structure and policy, etc. This has so far not really been successfully done in terms of a clear one-White-citizen versus one-Black-citizen plan. This outcome is not a result of Maimane\u2019s failure, but of White DA obstructionists and underminers trying to torpedo the party\u2019s unity, potential and growth, and to make Maimane the scapegoat for everything that is wrong in the DA.<sup>12,22,36<\/sup><br \/>\nMaimane, to make the DA a viable and sustainable party, undoubtedly tried in the past and is trying presently to challenge the upholding of White privilege and empowerment inside the DA\u2019s structure, although not always openly and with the aggression so characteristic of persons such as Julius Malema, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. He is starting to eye the shortcomings of the 1994 Dispensation, which was forced down on all Black South Africans. This intention is aimed at resettling the stagnant situation of the DA, coming from 1994. This gradual, but dramatic activation, Maimane handled and is still handling with grace. But it seems that there is not only outside the DA, but also inside the DA much dislike for his so-called \u201cmild\u201d approach to politics. Inside the DA both its left wing (Blacks) and its right wing (Whites) reflect hostility: the Blacks feel that his efforts to reform the DA are political diminutives while the Whites see his reforms as a threat to their \u201ccitizens\u2019 rights\u201d and this is in line with the so-called \u201cdiscrimination\u201d they have experienced since 1994 under the ANC. This \u201cconfused and projected anger\u201d by the DA\u2019s opposing groups seemingly activated their decision not to vote for the DA in the May 2019 election (470 396), but instead voted either for the FF+ (mostly Whites) and the ANC (mostly Blacks).<sup>12,24<\/sup><br \/>\nThe fact that the DA was doing to a certain extent better on the provincial level than on the national level has nothing to do with the leadership of Maimane, as some journalists tried to reflect. In declaring this tendency they must first look at the intention of the DA to go firstly for the provincial and municipality levels, before they aim for the national level. The differentiation in votes on national and provincial levels &#8212; wherein the DA did less well on the national level than on the provincial level and where the poor national outcome is blamed on Maimane as leader, is far fetched. The truth lies in the fact that two different kind of leaders were standing for the DA and two different political setups present for the DA in the recent elections. Kotze<sup>24<\/sup> puts this misleading by mischief of political commentators to \u201clabel\u201d Maimane a poor leader in terms of the post 2019 elections results in perspective when he writes<sup>24:11<\/sup>: <i>\u201cDA supporters might have voted for the party at provincial level and for someone else at national level.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nWhat most of the critics of Maimane ignore in their constant attacks on his \u201cpoor\u201d leadership, is their own faulty mindsets, which became contaminated by the ANC top brass\u2019 character and leadership and what is meant by a \u201cpoor\u201d and \u201cgood\u201d leader. Prominent here is some of the ANC leaders\u2019 alleged involvement with stealing, bribery, corruption, state capture, mismanagement, nepotism, crookery, self-enrichment, hostile and aggressive behaviour against anyone opposing their actions and murder, etc., which have it seems become \u201caccepted\u201d and \u201ccorrect\u201d characteristics of the present-day leadership politics (the so-called \u201cgood\u201d leaders) of South Africa. These are delinquent leaders, many of which would be locked up in other so-called \u201cdemocracies\u201d and indeed would end their lives before a firing squad in China or North Korea if they committed the same crimes there. The intense moral and political degeneration of the executive leadership of South Africa since 1994 wherein the \u201cbad\u201d instead of the \u201cgood\u201d became the criteria, is confirmed by the election as parliamentarians and top brass leaders of the ANC with serious allegations against them to the sixth Parliament. Maimane, in this environment, stands out for his integrity, but at the same time, his extraordinary difference makes him a clear target for vicious attacks.<sup>24<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321392_The_who_is_who_of_Mmusi_Maimane\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.2. The who is who of Mmusi Maimane<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Maimane comes from a totally different culture of moral cleanliness, leaving the impression indeed of Maimane as the reluctant politician in the present South African politics. This may be true to a certain extent, but this contaminated political setup undoubtedly also already caused other would-be-politicians of his moral quality and character to shy away, unwilling to get involved in such a political mess which seems incurable. But Pastor Maimane undoubtedly sees a call to provide an example of better quality than the political leadership examples of the ANC which the country\u2019s citizens have been forced to endure since 1994. Undoubtedly, South Africans need him, as they needed the late Sir De Villiers Graaff as leader of the opposition to counter the political evils and actions of the leaders of the NP and the AB from 1948 to 1994. Maimane\u2019s political maturity, vision, leadership, focused strategy and balanced planning for the country\u2019s future, are not only found in his good upbringing and cultural lifestyle, his career as a reverend and years on the pulpit, but are also evident in his advanced studies and training in theology and psychology (he holds masters degrees in both disciplines). Furthermore, his mindset is free from the murderous contamination of the revolutionary setup and the disorder of grabbing and plundering which seems to have become a permanent fixture in many of the ANC\u2019s top brass, especially those coming from pre-1994.<sup>12,24<\/sup><br \/>\nMaimane\u2019s leadership is undoubtedly not characterised by the so-called <i>weakness<\/i> and <i>shortcomings<\/i>, as Jason Lloyd<sup>24<\/sup> has tried to reflect in his undermentioned writing on Maimane before the May 2019 election. It seems as though Lloyd has a limited understanding of quality executive leadership (outside that of the EFF and the BLF). He wrote in February 2019 without fact as follows<sup>24:35<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe Democratic Alliance (DA) has had a very incompetent and weak leader in Mmusi Maimane.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nIn this context Lloyd continues<sup>24:35<\/sup>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The DA is currently rudderless and without any useable ideas or policy to provide answers to the complex post-apartheid political, social and economic challenges.<br \/>\nThe latest Ipsos opinion survey indicates that the DA will receive only 14% of votes in the upcoming elections \u2013 compared with 22.23% in 2014 \u2013 which is possible proof of Maimane\u2019s inadequate leadership.<br \/>\nMaimane has also failed to command authority and respect from mainstream black political parties such as the ANC and the EFF. Worse, he has failed to maintain authority in the DA itself. Against this background, it is probably not difficult or unfair to conclude that this must be at least partly because Maimane is black.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It is very important to look in depth at Lloyd\u2019s myth writing. When studying Lloyds\u2019s article<sup>24:35<\/sup>: <i>\u201cThe rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane<\/i>,\u201d it seems to be saturated with political subjectivity wherein White supremacy seems to have a strong founding and driving force. On what the characteristics are of the ideal executive political leader (here seemingly a Black one), there is a total lack of description to use to make comparisons. The only leadership guideline offered by Lloyd seems to be an indirect comparison of Maimane with Ramaphosa and Zuma, who both failed the test of the ideal executive political leader. To contradict Lloyd\u2019s postulation that the DA would only receive 14% of the votes in the May election due to Maimane\u2019s presence as leader, the DA received 20% with Maimane as leader! On the indirect assumtion that Ramaphosa as number one would save the ANC and would bring it a 70% vote outcome in the election, only an ANC outcome of 57.7% arrived! (This outcome that was far worse than that under Jacob Zuma in 2014!) To hint that the DA lost 2% or 470 396 votes in the election under Maimane, he missed that the ANC under their \u201cwonder boy\u201d and messianic leader Ramaphosa, shed three times more votes, namely 1 410 446 votes! So from whence did Lloyd\u2019s condemning classification of Maimane as a poor leader come?<sup>1-8,21,56-62<\/sup><br \/>\nWith regard to the reference to the \u201ccommand of the ANC\u2019s leadership\u201d by Lloyd<sup>24<\/sup> &#8212; undoubtedly a hint by Lloyd<sup>24<\/sup> of the presence of a \u201crespected ANC leadership from 1994 to 2019\u201d&#8211; which disrespects Maimane, is it important in the first place to point out that such a characteristic of goodness, activating respect to the outside world by the ANC top brass, was absolutely absent from 1994 to 2019. (Forget that he further speaks of a \u201crespected\u201d EFF leadership, as a comparison with that of Maimane. Such respect has not for one day been present in the EFF since its foundation, as was well reflected by the only 10% of voters who supported the EFF at the ballot box). With reference to the so-called absence of \u201cideas\u201d of Maimane (and the DA) versus the assumed ideas of the ANC and the EFF on ruling, these ideas of the ANC are saturated in political opportunism, anarchy and revolution, while the present-day ideas of the ANC were already present in its terrorist days. Thus: when Lloyd remarked on a lack of credible leaders in the DA, the question is: who is credible in the ANC or the EFF? What are his criteria of credibility? Since 1994 the ruling party\u2019s leaders had only one, including the credibility of Nelson Mandela, as a credible leader, and that was Motlanthe. Ramaphosa is now trying his best, but it seems that since 2017 that success is missing out on him. Where did the chaos in the ANC as a ruler start?: In 1994 with Mandela and the introduction of corruption by a sector of the ANC top brass that forced the late Nelson Mandela to pinpoint it when he was president. Just listen to the witnesses at the Zondo- and Mpati- (and the other) commissions now underway, to see that there are very few of the ANC top brass that are \u201cclean\u201d and who\u2019s respect Maimane longs for. The complex post-1994 political, social and economic problems were created and are today still further created exclusively by the ANC elite, not the DA or Maimane. To measure or compare Maimane\u2019s leadership in terms of the ANC\u2019s or EFF\u2019s sick leaderships is extreme foolishness.<sup>16,17,20,24,70,71<\/sup><br \/>\nThe accusation that Maimane \u201cis not respected by the black parties such as the ANC and the EFF\u201d is incorrect or better yet, it is political confusion as to what respect, leadership and politics, per se mean. Firstly, neither the ANC\u2019s or the EFF\u2019s leadership are a criteria of status for Maimane against which to evaluate his leadership, or for the public to evaluate Maimane. Maimane, in absolute contrast to many of the ANC top brass, is free from extra-marital affairs, stealing, state capture, murder or terrorism, etc. The article by Lloyd<sup>24<\/sup> is, as is much of the critique against him, seemingly intended and designed to personally take on Maimane, specifically before the May election. Studying it critically, it seems to be driven and orchestrated by the intention of character assasination, instead of an honest personal and leadership evaluation. Undoubtedly before the election there was a well orchestrated intention to curb the power of Maimane and the DA, for fear of their positive impact on the then upcoming election by way of demoralising possible DA supporters. These kinds of \u201cattacks\u201d are well reflected before the election by the execution of reports such as <i>\u201cCyril\u2019s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions\u201d<\/i>, <i>\u201c DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions\u201d,<\/i> <i>\u201cThe rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane\u201d<\/i>, and <i>\u201cCyril more popular than ANC \u2013 poll\u201d<\/i>. Another political clich\u00e9 in the Afrikaanspress reads: <i>\u201cMmusi Maimane is nie juis baie gewild onder DA-lede in Gauteng nie. Tog pryk sy foto op die meeste DA-straatplakkate in die provinsie.\u201d <\/i>Another one reads<i> \u201c\u2019n netto syfer van [net] 19% [IRR-poll] van DA -lede het boonop aangedui Maimane kom die mas op as opposieleier.\u201d<\/i> <sup>16,1720,24,69-71,73-75<\/sup><br \/>\nIt seems as though the intention of some of these critical anti-Maimane journalists (especially Whites), with specific advice that Whites must vote for the ANC and Ramaphosa instead of the DA and Maimane, is centred in White self-interest. Some of them are seemingly deeply politically confused (and highly frightened) by their own position in post-2019 South Africa. <sup>16,17,20,24,69-71,73-74<\/sup><br \/>\nWith the criticism of Maimane as leader of the DA, it is clear that most of the fight is specifically because Maimane is Black and that the DA\u2019s continuation must be stopped at all costs. The White Zilles and White Leons must come back to be the boss of the DA. These White supremacists seem to believe that there are still going to be 5 million Whites (more: even 30 million!!) living in South Africa in a century\u2019s time and thus that Whites still have \u201cto be catered for as extraordinary\u201d at present (together with their White capital and traditional rights to drive and steer the DA) at their will. The reality is that the Whites, by their lack of breeding and natural dying out, will be between 10 000 and 30 000 left in a century\u2019s time. Maimane knows this well and is in the process not only of bringing the mass of poor and landless Blacks a better life, but also to assure the Whites a part in the country\u2019s future by his transformation of the ultra-White politics inside the DA to equality politics.<sup>16,17,20,24,69-71,73-76<\/sup><br \/>\nIt is true that in the South African voting context the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party\u2019s policy and popularity. The intention with the \u201cpopular giant Ramaphosa\u201d was to take the \u201cdying\u201d ANC in the election away from the brink of death. But Ramaphosa\u2019s magic did not work, as evidenced by the ANC\u2019s 57.7% in the May election. It must be remembered that Nelson Mandela, far more popular even than the so-called popularity of Ramaphosa, and his ANC party of 1994 could not get beyond 63% of the votes. Ramaphosa failed to make it higher than 57.7%. It is important to note that Ramaphosa\u2019s popularity declined in three month\u2019s time from 73% to only 58% in April 2019, losing 15% in weight. This 58% popularity of Ramaphosa seems to be in line with the 57.7% of votes which the ANC received in the election, making the Ramaphosa factor as an exclusive \u201celection-power\u201d basically zero. It also confirms and emphasises Motlanthe\u2019s view that Ramaphosa is not a political or messianic leader, nor that he can improve an ailing ANC. The blind hero-position constantly awarded to Ramaphosa above Maimane in most of the anti-Maimane rhetoric, as well as the comparison of bad (Maimane) versus good (Ramaphosa), with the view that Ramaphosa is the messianic leader of South Africa, is the evidence that firstly, Ramaphosa is not such a gifted messianic leader, and secondly that his name will be remembered as outstanding in the South African political history. Maimane\u2019s chances are excellent to become a formidable leader in the near future. The phrase: <i>\u201cIn South Africa\u2019s voting setup the personality of the leader counts sometimes more than his party\u2019s policy and popularity\u201d<\/i>, can await Maimane in post-2019.<sup>70,77<\/sup><br \/>\nTo describe Maimane as<sup>24:35<\/sup>: \u201c&#8230;<i>inexperienced in politics, a reluctant political participant who has never really had a well-seasoned political strategy and vision, operating (like most clergymen) from a theological reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences\u201d <\/i>against the \u201c<i>credible modern technocrat Ramaphosa who is getting rid of the Zuma baggage and building a new ANC<\/i>\u201d, is nonsense. It reflects not only political \u201cshort-sightedness\u201d, but the inability to read future politics. For a political commentator, this is a serious defect in his or her political dynamics. <sup>24,76<\/sup><br \/>\nIn line with the above clich\u00e9s or allegations of \u201cpoor leadership\u201d around Maimane, is it not a surprise when RW Johnson<sup>12<\/sup> also rates him low. But what is a surprise, is his personal attack, perhaps not so extreme as the one reflected by Lloyd. But what needs to be reported, is the religious foundation of the attack. It needs to be reflected, specifically because it can border on the introduction of religious intolerance in South Africa.<sup>12,24<\/sup> Johnston writes<sup>12:4-5<\/sup>: <i>\u201cDie feit dat die 38-jarige Maimane jonk en onervare is, \u2018n voormalige ANC-ondersteuner wat steeds in ANC-terme dink en \u2018n prediker in \u2018n fundamentalistiese kerk wat evolusie verwerp, het ook nie gehelp onder die DA se tradisionele liberale Engelse basis nie.\u201d<\/i> What on earth Maimane\u2019s Christian religious preferences and church-affiliation in a Christian society, as well as a secular state, have to do which his leadership, without reflecting on it with the seeming intention of mischief, is totally unclear. Also the unasked \u201cEnglish contamination\u201d in Maimane\u2019s leadership is neither fish nor flesh. It seems to reflect back to Johnston\u2019s long stay in Britain and the internalising of unfit cognition there which he now applies here. It only brings us back to one clear fact and that is how intensely the \u201cChristian Black\u201d Maimane is under attack, because he accepted the leadership of the till now exclusively pro-White DA.<sup>12,24<\/sup><\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321393_The_good_Graaff_characteristics_of_Maimane\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.9.3. The good \u201cGraaff characteristics\u201d of Maimane<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>Maimane has the \u201cGraaff characteristics\u201d to pull the DA and the social democrats into the government of the day. Not so much immediately post-May 2019, but before the 2021 local elections. Maimane, similar to Sir de Villiers Graaff, is also one of the few top politician-gentlemen ever to sit in Parliament. Moreover, other than Graaff who could not bring down the despotic NP in his life, Maimane and his political grouping can be successful in bringing down the ANC.<sup>24,78-82<\/sup><br \/>\nTo bring the (poor) leadership of Maimane in line with the DA\u2019s (poor) performance in the past election, as done by many political analysts in the postmortem of the May elections, is absolutely unscientific and nothing but mischief-making speculation. The chair of the DA\u2019s Fedex, Athol Trollip, explains that the reason that the ANC won the election over the DA with 57.5% versus 20%, is the fact that the South Africans will vote ANC come hell or high water. It is seated in the revolutionary background of the ANC. The DA is still a White party for them, hostile to Black interests. The fault is not with the DA, requiring them to soul-search with regard to their performance under Maimane and their future in post-2019 politics, but with these South Africans who support the ANC and who blindly vote for such a corrupt bunch and who are prepared to accept mediocrity and maladministration over and over. Closely aligned herewith is the outdated Apartheid ticket which is still used by the hypocratic ANC who swims together with radicals such as the EFF in a tide of racial nationalism and populism. With regard to the critique that the DA under Maimane did not made inroads for instance in the Eastern Cape with only a 15% voter outcome, it is clear that none of the other parties made an inroad there either. Indeed, the DA increased its votes in Soweto from 5% to 13%. The DA under Maimane is still the second largest party, twice the size of the EFF.<sup>28,83<\/sup><br \/>\nOn the foolish efforts and suggestions of the removal of Maimane, various political commentators and analysts, such as Sefara<sup>86<\/sup>, Nyuatsamba<sup>32<\/sup>, Beukman<sup>3,84<\/sup> and Essop<sup>85<\/sup> are much more direct when guiding us than most political commentators, who are used to sit on two chairs. Their statements are uniform: he must stay on.<sup>3,84-86<\/sup><br \/>\nFirstly, Sefara<sup>86<\/sup> reflects on the loss in votes for the DA in the recent election, by showing that, as many other commentators have already indicated, it was to a great extent indeed a direct outcome after Mainane started to draw the line on greater Black empowerment in the DA that some right-wingers fled to the FF+. There is indeed an incomplete spelling out of strong affirmative action and the land ownership matter in the DA. But Maimane\u2019s activation of a clear policy on land ownership and speaking out as a Black on the DA\u2019s critical affairs was limited by the right-wing in the DA. Their internal mischief in the DA\u2019s racial politics led to the flow of right-wing Whites to the FF+ (\u00b1150 000 votes) and not Maimane\u2019s inability as leader. The public missed that the right-wingers assured that Maimane was not fully in charge of the DA\u2019s leadership and the party\u2019s politics, to be able to take much needed significant and sometimes dramatic decisions on Black interests. This was an identity crisis which the DA, as well as Maimane, innocently as the new appointed head, ran into before the May election, costing the DA both Black and White voters.<br \/>\nSecondly, pinpointing this present crisis wherein the DA is still functioning two months after the election, Sefara writes<sup>86:26<\/sup>: <i>\u201cAnd therein lies the DA\u2019s existential question: will the removal of Maimane and his replacement by a white leader help the DA grow beyond 22% in the next polls? Is the loss of conservative white voters to the FF+ a necessary catharsis for the DA to start positioning itself as a genuine alternative \u2013 not a party of right-wingers with a black leader at the top?<\/i><br \/>\nSefara<sup>86<\/sup> and Beukman<sup>3,84<\/sup> are fully correct in their opinion that to remove Maimane, without firstly addressing the DA\u2019s policy incoherence, will hurt the DA and can spell its end. It will be a statement of impatience with its first Black leader, as well as the reflection of an unchangeable White party and a party which lacks internal dynamics, either as an opposition or as a ruler, to be able to constructively change South Africa. Maimane, for Sefara86 as for Beukman<sup>3,84<\/sup> and Essop<sup>85<\/sup>, must be retained as the party\u2019s top leader with the full power to reposition the party further and where necessary, dramatically. He must be allowed to unrestrictedly sell his vision to the broad public.3,<sup>84-86<\/sup><br \/>\nOn Maimane in future politics, Beukman<sup>3,84<\/sup> contends that he is not long in the post and was forced to address the immense growing pains of the last five years. He is not a light-weight and learned a lot and is clearly focused not only on making the DA a better party, but also contributing to a better post-2019 South Africa. Beukman concludes<sup>84:11<\/sup>:<i> \u201cBaie meer ervare leiers w\u00eareldwyd het al slegter as hy daarvan afgekom.\u201d<\/i><br \/>\nThombothi<sup>87<\/sup> puts his finger possibly best on Pastor Mmusi Maimane\u2019s leadership dilemma in South African society, where since 1994, bad became gradually intertwined with good to overwhelm it fully in the end, making bad ultimately good. Secondly, bad became the norm. The phasing out of the traditional bi-polar division of good versus bad lead to the evaluation of all behaviour in terms of the grading of bad, worse and worst, with bad the most reflected and acceptable behaviour. On Maimane\u2019s leadership dilemma, he was caught up in this normalised bad culture of the South African politics wherein corruption, theft, murder and specifically land expropriation without compensation, are central and have became the rule of the day. Thombothi writes<sup>87:11<\/sup>: <i>\u201cMaybe Mmusi Maimane, in his opposition to expropriation, was judged not to have been sufficiently gung-ho. But Maimane is a pastor. He can\u2019t preach compassion on Sunday and hatred every other day. He also doesn\u2019t seem to have a nasty bone in his body, which appears to be a prerequisite in politics these days. <\/i><sup><i>Slaan terug<\/i><\/sup><i> would not sit well in his studio.\u201d <\/i><br \/>\nBut, it must be emphasised, this dilemma is not unique to Maimane as leader of the DA. It is also part of the dilemma of the DA as a centrist party, which cannot reflect hatred to one of its factions while at the same time bathing another faction in compassion. Not the best and most god-begging prayer can really help Maimane or his DA in this dilemma. Thankfully we have still the Solomon wisdom approach to cognitively handle our immediate crises in the New Dawn South Africa, until goodness is reborn somewhere in the future.<\/p>\n<h6><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"321310_Louw_Appraisal_Checklist_to_Assess_the_Leadership_Qualities_of_South_Africas_Executive_Political_Leaders_and_Regimes_1652_to_2018\"><\/span>3.2.1.3.10. Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h6>\n<p>The count awarded to the DA and its leadership in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the <i>Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa\u2019s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018<\/i>, is 59 (72%) out of a possible maximum of 82.<sup> 3,79<\/sup><br \/>\nOur initial decision to allow the application of the DA onto the list to be considered as a possible candidate to be able to rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019 was correct and appropriate. Its application qualifies to be allowed onto the shortlist of candidates.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"5_Conclusions\"><\/span>5. Conclusions<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Looking in retrospect at the DA\u2019s political history, it is clear that millions of South Africans have seen their communities improved under the DA\u2019s good governance. They have also watched the DA take up the fight in Parliament and hold the ANC government to account for every community which has had their rights denied by the ANC government. The people have appreciated the DA\u2019s fight for justice.<br \/>\nThe DA and its leaders\u2019 overall evaluation shows that they are still short of 23 (28%) points out of a possible 82 to be the ideal candidate for appointment as the capable ruler to execute land redistribution. Although their CV shows that their qualifications are excellent and comprehensively obtained from top accredited institutions, and their attestations show that they are trustworthy, with immense integrity and that their leader, Mmusi Maimane, has the character and overall potential to run as president of the land, are there shortcomings in their experience due to their youth in politics. Important here is their lack of experience on land reform \u2013 and specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA\u2019s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests, rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. There seems here to be strong signs of a White-stan mentality, very much like the dreadful Bantustans which were run from the Cape Parliament by the National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists.<sup>21,57-62,79-91<\/sup><br \/>\nThe critics\u2019 mention of the country having been poorly served on the land ownership matter by the DA and that the party over the past two to three years has frequently stumbled is true. This allowed the ANC a free pass again in the May elections to without obstruction redeliver its past mischief up to 2024. The critics\u2019 view is that the DA\u2019s inclination to oppose the government by any means in some instances stopped progress in the country. The issue of land expropriation, with or without compensation, is an inappropriate fight by the DA. The failure by the DA to write a mandate to serve the citizens of South Africa on just and balanced land ownership within a democratic plan for instance with the ANC as a partner, has lead to the present conflict around land ownership and the possibility of immediate land expropriation that can spell land grabbing and revolution.<br \/>\nThe DA must take some advice and criticism to heart: South Africans are looking for a change in a social, economic and political direction, not just public relations branding or window-dressing. In this hopefully new direction, the DA must not mind about its right flank streaming to the confused FF+, which since 1994 has been travelling in circles in the desert, or that its left flank is running to a temporary revitalized ANC, which is trying hard to climb back from its deathbed. There are enough good people at the centre &#8212; people who can go nowhere else and who do not want to go anywhere else &#8212; to change and to build up the DA.<br \/>\nIt is time for the DA to accept that the landownership matter has been exaggerated for a long time by the \u00b135 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 really contribute to the country\u2019s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the \u00b130 000 White farmers, with their self-appointed White rescuers and saviours, represent less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. If the mesmerised White sympathisers with the White rescuers and saviours movement are taken into account, the number is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 million, representing at most 6%. It is time for the DA to purify itself from this 300 000 White individuals\u2019 contamination. They must be repositioned to where they belong: outside the DA. The other nearly 5-million Whites also have citizen-interests but are sidelined and ignored outside the 35 000 White farmers\u2019 priority-interests. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and there land led also to the ignoring of the interests of nearly 30-million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy. It just can go on this way.<sup>4-8<\/sup><br \/>\nAlthough the DA was allowed onto the shortlist of candidates, it needs still 28% (a lack of nearly 30%) to reach the maximum points of 100% for the final evaluation of the next national election in 2024. It is up to the DA to improve its experience and know-how, and to reposition its attestations to reach the 100% mark. A clear policy on land redistribution must be formulated. The ability to effect land redistribution with justice and balance needs to be improved by the DA.<br \/>\nIn this context the DA must take note of three important facts. First the words of Mthombothi\u2019s<sup>8<\/sup> when he said many South Africans are not particularly impressed or satisfied with the present political parties and that they, after 25 years of democracy, are still scouring the wilderness for a political home with which they\u2019re comfortable. The second is the fact that 18.2-million potential voters (51% of the total voters\u2019 population) stayed away from the ballot box in the 8th May 2019 elections.<sup>4-8<\/sup> They are waiting and hungry to support and to vote for the correct party. The third, enclosing to the second fact, is that most South Africans are looking sincere for that <i>extraordinary<\/i> party of goodness, as Mthombothi said<sup>8:19<\/sup>: <i>\u201cregardless of race, want the same thing \u2013 a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for themselves and their families. They\u2019ll support a party with a unifying message that will make a genuine stab at it.<\/i> <i>Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate.\u201d <\/i>Why can this party not be the reformed DA?<br \/>\nMaimane can be just too optimistic about the future soul of the DA when he said<sup>92:4<\/sup>: <i>\u201cWe must occupy the centre. We cannot pursue the left or the right. This election has confirmed more than ever that the centre is where we need to be. We just need to be clearer about who we are and what we are about.\u201d<\/i> But to be the future ruler it goes far beyond the centre of politics in present-day South Africa. It requires an understanding of existential politics to can make sense of centric politics. It goes thus far beyond left or right politics versus central politics. It is about the life-long permanent fused-in of Black and White conflict-politics, like the issue of land-grabbing and -terrorism coming from 1671. It means far more than just the practice of adapt or die politics to can survive for a party. It can mean the \u201ckilling\u201d of a nation\u2019s personality.<br \/>\nIn its present form the DA does not exhibit the ability to be able immediately to affect successfully land reform on its own. It has the potential to do it with an experienced and seasoned political partner, within an orderly framework. Otherwise it must change itself immediately to a basically new party; one that can, as a dynamic party, brings at last the peace, security and prosperity for what South Africans are longing for so much<br \/>\nThe journey to the 2024 elections for the DA may be easy, but it can also never be reached without an immediate and dramatic turnaround in its politics. Time will tell.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"6_References\"><\/span>6. References<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li>Chomsky N. Occupy. Parktown: Penguin; 2012.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. The development background of a basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes. For published checklist see: 79: Louw, GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38 (2018): 7(2): 1-36: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes.<\/li>\n<li>Beukman B. Dit sal \u2018n fout wees om Mmusi te pos. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 May 17; p. 11.<\/li>\n<li>Election results announced.[Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from <a href=\"https:\/\/rekordeast.co.za\/election-results-announced\/\">https:\/\/rekordeast.co.za\/election-results-announced\/<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Bigalke L. Twee \u2018groot\u2019 verloorders. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 May 17; p. 11.<\/li>\n<li>Quick read of South Africa\u2019s 2019 election numbers[Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from <a href=\"https:\/\/africacheck.org\/reportd\/quick-read-south-africas-2019-election-in%20numbers\/\">https:\/\/Africacheck.org\/reportd\/quick-read-south-africas-2019-election-in numbers\/<\/a><\/li>\n<li>2019 versus 2014: What the numbers tell us about the general elections.[Cited 2018 Apr. 10]. Available from https:\/\/ <a href=\"http:\/\/www.news24com\/elections\/news\/2019-vs-2014-what-the-numbers-tell-us-about-the-general-elections-2019512%20\/\">www.news24com\/elections\/news\/2019-vs-2014-what-the-numbers-tell-us-about-the-general-elections-2019512 \/<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Mthombothi B. Time may have come for a new party that will inspire fresh hope in a disillusioned electorate. Sunday Time. 2019 May 19; p. 19.<\/li>\n<li>Labuschagne P. S\u00f3 kan ANC ontroon word. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 April 2; p. 6.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z. Cyril more popular than ANC \u2013poll. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Marrian N. &amp; M&amp;G Data Desk.ANC, DA could lose metros. Mail &amp; Guardian. 2019 May 17 to May 23; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Johnston RW. Weet Cyril hoe benard dinge is? Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 May 26; pp. 4-5.<\/li>\n<li>Maimane M. DA has already shown how to fix SA, while ANC trots out same old hollow promises. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 10; p. 18.<\/li>\n<li>Maimane M. DA\u2019s record in Western Cape proves it can deliver a better national government. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb. 24; p. 22.<\/li>\n<li>It\u2019s time to panic, quickly. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 14; p. 6.<\/li>\n<li>Helen Zille se #taxrevolt-plan sal boomerang. Beeld (Kommentaar). 2019 Jan. 30; p. 18.<\/li>\n<li>Makinana A. Top DA man out after race fracas. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 14; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Meyer W. Hooggeregshof s\u00ea ja vir Zille se interdik teen OB. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 Jan. 30; p. 2.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z. DA man\u2019s mystery mall payoff. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 24; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z. DA probes charges against Shabangu. Business Day. 2019 Feb. 14; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. The crisis of the Afrikaners. Beau Bassin, Mauritius: Lambert; 2018.<\/li>\n<li>Naki E. Vague DA \u2018its downfall\u2019. The Citizen (News). 2019 May 16; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Bruce P. DA kneejerk antipathy to ANC is, frankly, sad. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Feb.24; p. 20.<\/li>\n<li>Lloyd J. The rise and fall of Mmusi Maimane. Mail &amp;Guardian. 2019 Febr. 8-14 ; p. 35.<\/li>\n<li>Matiwane Z, Deklerk A. Cyril\u2019s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March.24; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Bachtis P. Scrap BEE to attract international investment. The Citizen. 2019 May 16; p. 13.<\/li>\n<li>Maqhina MS Zille in hot water over \u2018black privilege\u2019 rant. The Star. 2019 May 22; p. 9.<\/li>\n<li>Ndaba B, Koko K, Smillie S. \u201cRadicals reason for ANC, DA dip. Saturday Star, 2019 May 11; p.1.<\/li>\n<li>Calland R. A hard-won victory. Saturday Star. 2019 May 11; p. 8.<\/li>\n<li>FF+ results due to voters \u2018dumping\u201d DA. Saturday Star. 2019 May 11; p. 7.<\/li>\n<li>Malatsi S. DA stands tall in contrast to corrupt ANC, populist EFF and De Lille\u2019s vanity project. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 18.<\/li>\n<li>Nyatsumba K. Why the DA must rebuild itself as a modern social democratic party. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 25.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z, Makinana A. New race row rocks DA. Sunday Times 2019 March 17; pp. 1, 4.<\/li>\n<li>Selisho K. A litmus test for ANC, EFF and DA. Saturday Citizen. 2019 May 11; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Kuzwayo M. Alphabet soup on the menu in this election. City Press (Business). 2019 April 21; p. 2.<\/li>\n<li>Maarman J. Het die DA van Zille vergeet? Beeld (Kommentaar). 2019 Jan. 28; p. 8.<\/li>\n<li>Matiwane Z, Kgosana C. Solly given DA push before he jumped. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Jan. 20; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Slabbert A. Ommeswaai oor Tshwane se bestuurder, Beeld (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Marrian N. The DA would benefit from a little introspection. Mail &amp; Guardian. 2019 May 17 to May 23; p. 32.<\/li>\n<li>Bruce P. A pause for a little horse trading and greedy decisions. Sunday Times. (Opinion). 2019 May 19; p. 18.<\/li>\n<li>Harper P. Hawks to move on 62 KZN councillors. Mail &amp; Guardian. 2019 May 17 to May 23; p. 14.<\/li>\n<li>Harper P. Durban mayor\u2019 a law unto herself\u2019. Mail &amp; Guardian (News). 2019 May 24 to May 30; p. 19.<\/li>\n<li>Paton C. Maimane in bid to keep Zille in check. Business Day. 2019 May 22; pp. 1-2.<\/li>\n<li>Selebano B. EFF aan stuur in Pretoria? Beeld May 17; p. 1.<\/li>\n<li>Callard R. Cyril must seize moment. The Saturday Citizen. 2019 May 11; p. 4\/ \/<\/li>\n<li>Mendelsohn J. Attack on DA shows ignorance of Joburg politics. Saturday Star. 2019 May 26; p.18.<\/li>\n<li>Saunderson-Meyer W. The real state of the nation. Saturday Citizen. 2019 May 11; p.12.<\/li>\n<li>Koko K. EFF, DA look set to do city power-sharing deal. The Star. 2019 May 28; pp.1-2.<\/li>\n<li>DA gives ANC Scopa chair. The Citizen (News). 2019 May 29; p. 7.<\/li>\n<li>Kiewiet L. Province\u2019s rainmakers threaten DA. Mail &amp; Guardian. 2019 March 29 \u2013 April 4; p. 15.<\/li>\n<li>Malloch-Brown M. The Unfinished Global Revolution. The limits of nations and the pursuit of a new politics. New York: Penguin; 2012.<\/li>\n<li>Mokone D, Deklerk A, Hunter Q .DA \u2018old guard\u2019 bay for Mmusi\u2019s blood. Sunday Times (News). 2019 May 12; p. 6.<\/li>\n<li>Pelser W. Mmusi: Twitter pla hom meer as stemme. Rapport (Weekliks) 2019 May 26; p. 6<\/li>\n<li>Boonzaaier D. Zille: DA wou my uitwerk. Rapport. 2019 May 26; p. 1.<\/li>\n<li>Naki E. \u2018Failed new dawn to blame\u2019. Saturday Citizen. 2019 May 11; p. 5.<\/li>\n<li>Marrian N, M &amp;G Data Desk. Mail &amp; Guardian. 2019 May17 to May 23; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2019. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 40: 2(4): 1-70: The propagandists\u2019 arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25(2)(b) of the South African Constitution (6).<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2019. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 40: 2(3): 1-59: The propagandists\u2019 arguments, opinions and viewpoints for changing Section 25(2)(b) of the South African Constitution (5).<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2019. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 40: 2(2): 1-61: The antagonists\u2019 arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25(2)(b) of the South African Constitution (4).<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2019. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 40: 2(1): 1-70: The antagonists\u2019 arguments, opinions and viewpoints against changing Section 25(2)(b) of the South African Constitution (3).<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2019. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 39: 1(1): 1-61: Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2).<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38: 12(1): 1-25: Who are colonists and who are indigenous people in South Africa (1).<\/li>\n<li>Sokutu B. Socialism fails to appeals at the polls. The Citizen (News). 2019 May 16; p. 8.<\/li>\n<li>Makhanya M. SA gee (regse) stappie agteruit. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 May 26; p. 11.<\/li>\n<li>Mokone \u010e, Deklerk A. Mmusi cracks whip on DA old guard. Sunday Times (News). 2019 May 2; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Zille H. D\u00edt was my fout. Rapport (Weekliks). 2019 May 26; p. 7.<\/li>\n<li>Maqhina M. Zille in hot water over \u2018black privilege\u2019 rant. The Star (Nation). 2019 May 22; p. 9.<\/li>\n<li>Kgosana C, Deklerk A. Zuma legacy, E-tolls give ANC a shock in Gauteng Sunday Times (News). 2019 May 12; p. 7.<\/li>\n<li>Maimane M. Would Peter Bruce rather promotes elitism or builds one SA for all? Sunday Times (Opinion). 2019 March 17; p.18.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z. Cyril more popular than ANC -poll. Sunday Times (News). 2019 Febr. 24; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Matiwane Z, Deklerk A. Cyril\u2019s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March.24; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Mkhondo R. Let\u2019s put it to a vote \u2013 referendums would rejuvenate our jaded democracy. Sunday Times (Opinion). 2018 June 3; p. 18.<\/li>\n<li>Mvumvu Z, Makinana A. New race row rocks DA. Sunday Times 2019 March 17; pp. 1, 4.<\/li>\n<li>Ed-EFF as koalisievennoot skrik minderheidskiesers af \u2013 peilong. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 March 17; p. 10.<\/li>\n<li>Matiwane Z, Deklerk A. Cyril\u2019s appeal prompts DA to lower its poll ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March.24; p. 4<\/li>\n<li>De Lange J. Gewilde Cyril het knou weg \u2013 peiling. Rapport (Nuus). 2019 April 14; p. 2<\/li>\n<li>Tabane R. Straf swak party met jou kruisie. Beeld (Kommentaar). 2019 Feb 1; p. 10.<\/li>\n<li>Deklerk A. DA poll a setback to coalition ambitions. Sunday Times (News). 2019 March 17; p. 4.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38 (2018): 7(2): 1-36: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 4: A basic checklist for the appraisal of executive political leaders and regimes.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38 (2018): 7(1): 1-54: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of the South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 3: Factors that influence the development of executive political leaders.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38: 6(2): 1-44: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652 to 2018. Part 2: The entities in government and society that executive political leaders used to aid their political behaviour.<\/li>\n<li>Louw GP. 2018. <i>Ensovoort<\/i>, 38: 6(1): 1-31: An appraisal of the executive political leaders and regimes of South Africa: 1652-2018. Part 1: Leadership characteristics in perspective.<\/li>\n<li>Trollip A. Question &amp; Answer. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 25.<\/li>\n<li>Beukman B. Twee \u2018groot verloorders. Beeld (Middelblad). 2019 May 17; p. 11.<\/li>\n<li>Essop P. Maimane \u2018verdien nog \u2018n termyn\u2019. Beeld (Nuus). 2019 May 15; p. 2.<\/li>\n<li>Sefara M. A stern electorate gives the major parties one more chance to do what they promised. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 26.<\/li>\n<li>Mthomboti B. Ramaphosa\u2019s hand has been strengthened, now he must use it to slap down corruption. Sunday Times. 2019 May 12; p. 25.<\/li>\n<li>South Africa. Kommissie vir die Sosio-ekonomiese Ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede binne die Unie van Suid-Afrika (Tomlinson Commission \u2013 U.G. 61\/1955). Pretoria: Government Press; 1955.<\/li>\n<li>Van der Walt AJ. Die Eeu van die Veeboer-pionier. <i>In<\/i>: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Cape Town: NASOU; Anon.<\/li>\n<li>Afrikaners are Black. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 July 8]. Available from <a href=\"http:\/\/www.news24\/Afrikaners-are-black-20130223\">http:\/\/www.news24\/Afrikaners-are-black-20130223<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Greeff J. Deconstructing Jaco: Genetic Heritage of one Afrikaner. Annals of Human Genetics, 2007:71(5); 674-688. [Internet]. [Cited 2018 Dec. 5]. Available from <a href=\"about:blank\">https:\/\/DOI:10.1111\/j.1469-1809.2007.00363.X<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Mokone T. Adapt or die. Sunday Times (News). 2019 June 9; p. 4.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>PEER REVIEW<br \/>\nNot commissioned; External peer-reviewed.<br \/>\nCONFLICT OF INTEREST<br \/>\nThe author declares that he has no competing interest.<br \/>\nFUNDING<br \/>\nThe research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.<br \/>\nUNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS<br \/>\nPlease note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentots and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa. (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanisation and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan or Khois (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10) Gabriel P Louw iD orcid.org\/0000-0002-6190-8093 Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics). Corresponding Author: Prof. &hellip; <a href=\"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/2019\/06\/25\/critical-evaluation-of-the-three-main-political-parties-capability-to-steer-successful-land-expropriation-in-post-2019-south-africa-part-2-the-da-in-perspective-10\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Critical evaluation of the three main political parties\u2019 capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 2-The DA in perspective (10)&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3,4],"tags":[52,66,94,109,138,150,155,172,238,297,337,352,425],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/524"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=524"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/524\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=524"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=524"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/ensovoort.co.za\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=524"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}