Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8)

Land-ownership and -grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting: Part 2 (8)
Gabriel P Louw
Research Associate, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Health, History and Politics).
Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr. GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)
Keywords: Age-old custom, colonist, frontiersman, humanity, impoverishment, indigenous people, land grabbing, landless, land ownership, land redistribution, political history, radicalism, terrorism, unemployment
Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 6: 2

Table of Contents | Inhoudsopgawe

1. Background

1.1. Introduction

This study, a continuation of the previous article: Land-ownership and -grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting: Part 1 (7), analyses and discussses further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists against, as well as those of the propagandists for, land expropriation. The focus is again, as in Article 7, on a comparison and an analysis of the information with the intention to separate facts and truths from lies and myths that have became intertwined into the fight around landownership. Prominent is once more the use of the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach central to the selection of the facts and the disregard of fallacies. Sound cognition, outside, personal, emotional, political, judicial and religious contamination, is also the central the guide here, in order to bust unfounded and foolish arguments, opinions and viewpoints of both the antagonists and the propagandists, enabling us to project a profile on the facts that must drive the process of land reform in all its facets, from land expropriation with compensation, to expropriation without compensation.

1.2. Aims of articles 7 and 8 (continued)

The primary aim of this article (Part Two: Article 8) is thus to continue the reflection on these various elements and role players as already described in the previous article (Part One: Article 7). In this context of manipulation and misrepresentation around the South African land expropriation matter, it is important to note that Chomsky1 points out that modern politics often hampers rational thought: It allows the practice of freedom, but limits the pursuit of truth, thus creating ignorance among a large percentage of the population in many countries. This notion is very much applicable to the thinking of South Africans on the landownership matter and its concomitant drivers of indigenousness and poor political and personal integrity. This contaminated paradigm limited the pursuit of truth and blocked the development of a critical role for leaders of integrity and independent thinking in the country’s skewed political system. This vacuum caused a lack of responsibility to provide students, individuals, citizens, politicians, and the wider public, with the knowledge and skills they need to be able to learn how to think rigorously, to be self-reflective and to develop the capacity to govern rather than be governed.
For Chomsky1 it goes much further and deeper. He postulates that it is not enough for the voter to learn how to think critically, but that engaged intellectuals must also develop an ethnic imagination and sense of social responsibility necessary to overcoming the politicians’ blocking of the truth, as well as to make power accountable to the drivers of politics around demanding matters tending towards conflict. It is for Chomsky the intellectuals’ duty to deepen the possibilities for everyone to live dignified lives infused with freedom, liberty, decency, care and justice. It is in this emptiness that the antagonists and propagandists, together with opportunistic and delinquent politicians, exploited the South African fight around landownership. The lack of knowledge and understanding, absolutely needed for sound cognitive thinking, created the opportunity to propagate lies and myths around the country’s critical landownership issue. These widely propagated fallacies bring us nowhere besides the creation of racial and political unrest, with the potential for revolution.1
The aim in this context is to evaluate further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of both the antagonists and propagandists and to bust their unfounded and foolish arguments, opinions and viewpoints where applicable, in order to project a profile on the facts that must drive the post-2019 process of land reform in all its facets, from land expropriation with compensation, to expropriation without compensation.

2. Method (continued)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case with the ownership of South African soil for the period 1652 to 2018. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in steering successful land reform from in South Africa from 2019 onwards.
The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion (continued)

3.1. Overview

As illustrated in the previous article, Landownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7), there is again a determined and focussed intention to bring clarity to the current conflict and uncertainty around landownership. The various kinds of arbitrary sociopolitical ideologies and delinquent actions by role players to damage a future land-redistribution policy and programme must be noted and unmasked.

3.2. Myth and lies busting: a retrospective (continued from article 7)

In the previous seven articles there was an in-depth analysis that showed not only the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and propagandists for a change to or against Section 25 of the Constitution to make land expropriation with or without compensation possible, but also that both the antagonists and the propagandists represent many lies and myths in their presentations, and an intention to falsify the truth. These myths and lies (as was previously done in Article 7: 3.2.1 to 3.2.11) will be revisited in this subdivision (see understanding 3.2.12 to 3.2.23) with a retrospective to bust this falsification, as guided by the King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach.

3.2.12. Various statements by the antagonistic White group against the ANC’s land reform are free from comprehensive misrepresentations and suspicion mongering

The present generalising writings in newspapers by various journalists, especially those coming from the antagonistic White group, constantly point out how ill-conceived the planned land expropriation of the ANC is, the wrong way the expropriation is going to be implemented and the evil outcomes to be expected from the land-redistribution program. These generalisations are mostly absolutely misleading and consist of unnecessary suspicion mongering. Specifically the allegation of the inflated political scores that the ANC as a party and its leaders such as Ramaphosa, had allegedly gained through the recruiting of so-called unruly and indecisive Black voters during the past 2019 election with the inclusion of comprehensive land expropriation without compensation as a vote magnet, is without foundation and ill-disposed. On the contrary, the ANC, notwithstanding its propagation of “land grabbing”, performed worse than in the 2014 National Election.
The plethora of ongoing orchestrated false allegations and propaganda regarding the total nationalision of the White farming sector and the redistribution of land away from Whites are plainly foolish and baseless. It lacks evidence. What the antagonistic White group successfully did with their false allegations was to create hostility within the White population against not only the ANC as a regime, but also against Black people in general. Specifically the mass of poor and landless Blacks were fingered. Many ordinary Afrikaners/Whites, even those outside the farming sector and the capitalistic business sector, became fearful of their future in the country. This placed Black and White on a collision course, with the Afrikaners/Whites mistakenly seeing the poor and landless Blacks as the “takers” of their property, forcing the country into a dangerous face-off between “haves” and” have-nots”.1-26
These misreprsentations and suspicion mongering seem to be anchored in the mindsets of some Afrikaners/Whites; essentially because they selfishly want more attention, privileges and benefits than the rest of the South African races and ethnic groups. It reflects a limited understanding and honesty on their part about the true and good intentions of land reform by the ANC regime. Such intentions are blindly and bluntly ignored, together with the exclusive and immense wrongdoing of the proto-Afrikaners and nationalist Afrikaners between 1652 and 1994, which is politically calculated to put the ANC regime under suspicion.1-26
There is conclusive evidence that it is not the post-1994 ANC which is responsible for today’s mass of poor and landless Blacks, but a failed racial-political setup, directly linked to the pre-1994 White rulers’ monopoly on political power, creating almost exclusively White wealth. In reality, it is the Afrikaners/Whites and their ancestors who had robbed millions of Blacks over centuries not only of their self-respect, but plunged them into poverty. This led to a social structure in which millions of Blacks are still today lacking self-respect and dignity, while inequality, poverty, unemployment and landlessness are dominant features of the present South African Black lifestyle.1-26
The present misrepresentations and suspicion mongering, specifically against the person and leadership of Ramaphosa, is cemented in the contaminated mindset of those Whites who wantonly create false allegations against Black rule and politics in post-1994 South Africa. This is a malicious attitude that is directed against any other Black in a leadership position, as Nelson Mandela also quickly came to experience in South Africa after 1994 at the hands of the so-called Afrikaner/White rescuers and saviours, just because he was a Black ruler of the country.1-26
Most of the various statements by the antagonistic White group against the ANC’s land reform is undoubtedly comprehensively misleading and based on suspicion mongering. In general they are false and cannot be taken seriously.

3.2.13. Alleged crookery, corruption and other crimes are uncommon to the South African Black and White executive political leaderships from 1652 up to 2019

The present-day ANC’s alleged corruption and immense political delinquency from 1994 to 2019, thought to be unique to South African political history, is a myth. The presence of crookery, corruption and state capture under the Zuma regime, which the Ramaphosa regime fully inherited in 2018, cannot be disputed. However, various pre-1994 White regimes also clearly stand out as immensely affected. This is a process that commenced in 1652.3,11,15,20,27-44
The early political history of the country’s corruption statistics and records reflect large-scale evidence of corruption and theft of state assets. Prominent are the delinquent actions by Simon and Willem van der Stel. There is further the evidence that the various White regimes under the NP between 1948 and 1994 were also saturated with serious political and socio-economic misdemeanours in which state money played a central role. It indeed cost John Vorster his prime-ministership.3,11,15,20,27-44
It is wrong to assume that South Africa since 1652 has not been betrayed by many of its executive political leaders through their crookery, corruption and other crimes.

3.2.14. The role of terrorism, autocracy, fascism and undemocratic actions in the obtaining of South African landownership is unique to the ANC

The accusation that the ANC is a terrorist organisation which, as a result, is alleged to lack the integrity and ability as a legal government to make constructive social, economic and political contributions to improve South Africa for every citizen but has failed since 1994 to uplift the mass of poor Blacks, may also be levelled at the various White regimes since 1652. The process of terrorism, specifically around land grabbing by the Whites had just played itself out more slowely and over a longer period, namely 1652 to 1910, 1910 to 1948 and 1948 to 1994. This stretched time-frame makes it less obvious than the alleged delinquent actions of the ANC between 1994 and 2019. The various White regimes were also unable to run passable governments or to improve the quality of life of all South African people, beyond their provision of handouts mainly to Whites. Especially prominent among such handouts were those received by the Afrikaners from 1948. The Blacks’ as well as the Whites’ historical and modern land grabbing, have thus been founded on liberation actions and the committing of terrorism alike.3,11,30,31,39,45-47
Evidence contradicts outright the allegations of the ANC as an autocratic, fascist and undemocratic regime in terms of the governmental rules agreed on by the 1994 Political Dispensation and embodied in the Constitution. The labels of racial discrimination, autocracy and fascism are more applicable to the Whites’ various regimes stretching from 1652 to 1994. Democracy as practised in the politics of South Africa under the various White regimes from 1652, especially those from 1913 to 1994, was an exclusive “Whites-only democracy”. This was one which was enjoyed solely by the Whites occupying and owning 93% of the country known as South Africa. It was executed with an exclusive policy of White one-man-one-vote, based on absolute autocracy and fascism predominating during this White era, subjecting the voiceless majority of the Black population to the status of second-class citizenship.3,11,30,31,39,45-47
Terrorism, autocracy, fascism and undemocratic behaviour in the obtention of landownership for Blacks exclusively are at this stage absent from the ANC. It is indeed characteristic of the various White regimes during the period from 1652 to 1994.

3.2.15. Political and racial radicalisms associated with the present-day ANC are early manifestations of land grabbing within Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-horrors

The prospect of the horrors of land grabbing as reflected by Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Stalin’s anti-landowners inclination or Robert Mugabe’s land-grabbing policy in Zimbabwe, to establish and uplift the poor via agriculture, features prominently in the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists against any form of land reform. The antagonists offer Mao’s, Stalin’s and Mugabe’s delinquency as examples of how bad the present-day South African land expropriation can or will turn out. Such representations represent planned malevolent distractions from South Africa’s present economic and political realities by the White antagonists for opportunistic reasons. The so-called sudden rise in and presence of farm-murders as indicators of a Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-scenario-in-waiting are part of a well-planned false-news media system, consisting of manipulated information which is sent out constantly and continuously to the world by the antagonists. It is the use of “stretched statistics” by a section of the Whites from within their constant supply of outright “false news” and their ongoing White supremacy. It is totally contradicted by true hard statistics.11,15,48-59
The racial factor is undoubtedly present in some of the post-1994 South African incidence of murder (primarily with Whites as the victims), but it is insignificant as a cause of murder in general in South Africa. The average Black’s inclination and attitude are very positive towards Whites and absolute lacking murderous intent based on the landownership of Whites or as a form of revenge because of Apartheid.11,15,48-59
Political and racial radicalism, associated with the present-day ANC, as early manifestations of land grabbing within Mao-Stalin-Mugabe-horrors, are falsities.

3.2.16. The probability of racial genocide, driven by revenge and counter-revenge in the future political history of South Africa, is absent or minimal

Racial and ethnic genocide had started in 1652 at the Cape Settlement. It was executed in time by Whites as well as Blacks all over South Africa. It was first practised by the Dutch and the British authorities at the Cape. This is evidenced by the Dutch and the British authorities’ extreme suppression and abuse of the indigenous inhabitants at the early Cape and of the proto-Boers, as well as the British genocide during the Second Anglo Boer War (1899–1902) against the Boers and their families (as well as a contingent of non-Whites). The proto-Afrikaners’ and later Afrikaners’ political delinquency against the non-Whites equals these earlier genocides. Also the political crimes of the Black tribes against each other during the first and second Black colonisations of South Africa between 1810 and 1840 (which represent South Africa’s first known full-scale genocides), had led to brutal ethnic wars and the murder of Blacks by Blacks for landownership. Many of these various genocides were anchored in revenge and counter-revenge.7,47,60-81
It is a myth to accept the statement that genocide in some form is not a general phenomenon in the South African political history. It was indeed practised by most of its people. Thus we have to reject the statement that some of the radical racial groups will not get involved again in revenge or counter-revenge in an effort to rectify what they see as the wrongs of the past. Prominent in this regard are the poverty and inequality of more than 60% of the Black population who can retaliate against the failure of the ANC regime to improve their situation dramatically now after it won a mandate to rule for the sixth time.7,47,60-81
The probability of racial genocide, driven by revenge and counter-revenge in the future political history of South Africa, is not absent or minimal.

3.2.17. Anarchy, revolution and political coups are not specific future outcomes of the Black masses’ poverty, landlessness and inequality

In many of the bloody civil wars, the availability and ownership of water, food, accommodation and land played central roles when these essential shortcomings occur for long periods in the greater community. In the pre-1994, as well as in the post-1994 periods, all-out revolutions and coups, prominently driven by the poor and landless Blacks, have been absent from South Africa.48,52-54,82-85
Chronic anarchy has shown up the last decade in some form or another. The landownership issue has played a prominent role here. This is an outcome which has been driven by the poverty, human indignity and inequality of the mass of neglected Blacks. This conflicting and unstable situation was created over many centuries by the delinquent actions of White regimes. This outcome is not because the mass of landless and poor people are Black (meaning any group can reacts with this kind of behaviour under circumstances of political, social and economic stress, as the Boers reacted at the early Cape against the British), or because Blacks have an inborn characteristic to commit anarchy and revolution (If it was an inborn characteristic, the Blacks would long ago have reacted against their wrongdoers).48,52-54,82-85
It must also be noted that there are no political intentions to derail by military or other physical means the present-day land reform by the ± 4-million modern thinking and politically-orientated Afrikaners/Whites. These ± 4-million Whites clearly dissociate themselves from the at most ± 300 000 so-called White antagonists who undoubtedly show serious hostility against Blacks.48,52-54,82-85
But, taking certain indicators into consideration, it must be acknowledged that revolution seems undoubtedly a strong possibility if the poverty and landlessness of the mass of Blacks are not sufficiently and immediately addressed, meaning that human deprivation and misery can be the primary drivers. The chances for a coup in terms of political ideologies and party-political interests are minimal at this stage in South Africa. Although there are clear links between the Zimbabwe’s politics, the Arab Spring and the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe in 1989 and present-day South Africa, the current South African situation differs far more from those examples, than it shows any similarities. Prominent here is the country’s sound democracy since 1994, which the present ANC regime underwrites and will respect if they lose any National Election. In addition, the South African Defence Force is not much connected to domestic policies, and will probably not participate in a coup favouring the ANC or an opposition group. Land expropriation as a primary driver of revolution because of the Whites’ enormous holdings of land and thus bringing death to White land owners, is out.48,52-54,82-85
Anarchy, revolution and political coups are not natural outcomes of the personal and political characters of South Africa’s poor and landless Blacks. But those could be specific future outcomes if the South African poor and landless Blacks’ immense poverty, landlessness and inequality, accumulated over many years, are not rapidly addressed.48,52-54,82-85
The postulation that anarchy, revolution and political coups will not and cannot be specific future outcomes of the Blacks’ poverty, landlessness and inequality, is a myth.

3.2.18. The absence of Black poverty within present-day South Africa’s  wealth

It is a myth to accept that the years of isolation of the mass of Blacks in Black territories (areas representing in practice only 15% of the total South Africa geography), did not contribute directly to the present-day immense Black poverty and the Blacks’ political and economical disempowerment. A long-term programme of comprehensive land redistribution is an absolute must to rectify the economic condition of the poor and landless Blacks.11,86-110
The negative impact of poverty and inequality on the Black population is well described by the fact that out of the total population of South Africa (±55-million) who need some basic income to be able to live, only 15 million are working in some form of established job. Of the± 55-million the Blacks form ± 45-million with 29 million living in poverty. This immense Black poverty and discrepancy with the Whites’ wealth in general, shows up when comparing Whites versus Blacks: the ratio for Whites is ten in work against 13 unemployed (10:13 or 71:100), while the ratio of Blacks employed versus unemployed is 10:28 (36:100). Technically it reflects, in terms of numbers, a White unemployment of ±1.5 million persons against a Black unemployment of ±29 million persons. The official unemployment number, putting the unemployment of Whites at 7% versus 30% for Blacks, is untrue. The 30% for Blacks is more likely to be ±60%.11,86-110
Compared to the various White regimes’ official socio-economic uplifting of the so-called Poor Afrikaners (1830 -1939), as well as the uplifting after 1938 to 1960 of Whites by nationalist Afrikaner politics — especially with its extreme racial favouring of the remnants of the still poor and unsuccessful Afrikaners in the economically progressive South Africa — there was an absolute absence of financial uplifting of Blacks in the political history of the country. The post-1994 BBBEE and land redistribution policies have been totally insignificant and incomplete. They also came also too late after a period of more than 300 years of immense deprivation.11,86-110
The awarding of land through land expropriation to the poor and landless Blacks, using Majority Procurement (MP), after their suffering for many years under the extreme practice of Minority Empowerment (ME) of the Whites’ discriminatory politics, is a prerequisite in a balanced democracy.11,86-110
To posit that there is an absence of Black poverty within present-day South Africa’s wealth, is a wanton lie.

3.2.19. The increase of inclusive (social) capitalism will endanger exclusive (classic) capitalism and the economy stability of South Africa

The present condition of mass poverty and inequality needs a form of capitalism that seeks to put society rather than profit at the heart of decision-making, away from the manipulating actions of business bullies and the rich (which includes mostly the Whites) whose exclusive contemporary capitalism places profit in a central position. The postulation that society always has in the past, and will again benefit from exclusively capitalist instruments, is opportunistic and false.11,21,22,31,51,112-116
The model of exclusive (classic) capitalism in South Africa’s economic and political thinking, planning and doing, has been going on for ages — a model which imitates the economics of the Western world with outcomes that are not always good — has only resulted in the growth of a small group of super-rich and the growth of a mass of super-poor, bringing immense poverty to as much as ± 29 millions of poor and marginalised Black people in South Africa.11,21,22,31,51,112-116
The introduction of inclusive capitalism is not intended to erase exclusive capitalism or to change South Africa’s economic system to an exclusively socialist or Marxist model. It is a separate economic-financial model that is needed, parallel to the exclusive capitalistic model, but intertwined to form a progressive socio-economic system to benefit every citizen as well as the country as a whole. This model reflects the justified redistribution of the financial assets, including the redistribution of land to the poor masses, which have been discriminated against outright since 1652.11,21,22,31,51,112-116
The proposed implementation of inclusive capitalism, to drive and to establish land expropriation, is just an extension of the old existing inclusive capitalistic model emanating from the pre-1994 use of the South African state-owned enterprises (like today’s Transnet, SABC, Eskom, SAA), as well as primary and secondary education, etc. It is a financial policy which was also extensively used by the early White regimes to uplift the poor and landless Whites. It indeed reflects, notwithstanding the outcry of the antagonists, the country’s own socialistic-capitalistic governmental system, dating back to 1910.11,21,22,31,51,112-116
Inclusive capital must be seen as intertwined with exclusive capital. It is a supportive system to improve the present-day disadvantaged people as was done many times during the uplifting of the Poor Whites in South Africa.11,21,22,31,51,112-116
It is a myth that increasing inclusive (social) capitalism will endanger exclusive (classic) capitalism and the economy stability of South Africa.

3.2.20. The functioning par excellence of the 1994 Dispensation within the mandate of South Africa’s Bill of Rights

The South African Bill of Rights is not an internationally-lauded constitution which is premised on freedom, dignity, and equality, as it is described by the antagonists. Its most prominent shortcoming is its lack of understanding for the country’s indigenous problems, realities and challenges to make South Africans true Africans. It is a piece of legislation which exclusively favours Whites and has so far stood in the path of a totally South African Rehabilitation. It did not clear the immense backlog created by the centuries-old comprehensive deprivation of non-Whites and led to further financial imbalance after 1994.1,3,7,31,125,130-132
The 1994 Dispensation and the Constitution represent (and safeguard) a still self-appointed European supremacy, as in pre-1994 South Africa. Its premise is “to plan and to may think” for Blacks on democracy, human rights and other demanding and society-shaping realities, as well as to assure post-1994 benefits to the White minority and to safeguard their exclusive and permanent interests. Its incompleteness is well reflected by its inability to institute a balanced and just landownership.1,3,7,31,125,130-132
To say the 1994 Dispensation within South Africa’s Bill of Rights is functioning par excellence in the service of all citizens, especially the poor Blacks, is a misrepresenation and a farce.

3.2.21. The altering of Section 25 will cause a negative effect for South Africa’s local and foreign economics

South Africa can still develop immensely without foreign investment. Even in its most extreme land reform mode, the country’s economy will not necessarily be devastated as predicted. In this context, it must be noted that the intended land expropriation is not going to be radical in line with nationalisation and there is no intention to block foreigners from the ownership of land either. These foreigners’ opportunities will be left untouched. The present decline of radical political parties propagating land grabbing and the nationalision of public and private assets during the May 2019 election, such as Black First Land First, confirms the excellent prospects for a continuing democracy and individuals rights in future south Africa.117-129,137-142
On the availability of capital for development, is it important to note that there is more than enough South African capital internally available to help a start-up of large-scale Black farming without the so-called saviour’s help from foreigners.117-129,137-142
The argument that Section 25’s alteration would block the country’s so-called “flourishing economy” and that foreign investors for instance will not risk to have their land confiscated when they can pick any number of other nations that will protect their investments, is fake news par excellence. It is just not true.
The changing of Section 25 will not bring a negative effect for South Africa’s local and foreign economics.

3.2.22. Unnecessary to restructure South Africa’s colonial financial-political-structure and landownership in 2019

The political, social and economic — basically bankrupt — setup that the ANC regime unwillingly inherited from the NP regime is unfortunately part of a colonial financial structure and landownership that dates back to the White colonial years. It reflects the same centuries-old colonial-political “White privilege”, including their domination of the Black population, White landlordships and the benefits of an exclusive White farming economy, as well as the in-depth practice of exclusive capitalism by a few White rich who manipulate the country’s economics and politics in the background. Any change to the colonial financial-political structure and landownership structure means the end of their White empowerment.4,6,22,23,93,143-145
This present-day one-sided colonial financial-political structure and landownership structure make it possible that the country can still be governed by a self-serving White minority, who is mostly well-established in the White business and financial sectors, and includes a strong foreign component. Notwithstanding their so-called “awarded” political liberty in 1994, the majority of Blacks are still disenfranchised economically, socially and to be honest, even politically. This is essentially because of the faulty 1994 colonial Constitution in which the land matter was never clearly spelled out and truly addressed. This situation makes the comprehensive decolonisation of South Africa an absolute necessity. Prominent in this respect is the much-needed modernisation of the agricultural economy, in which the implementation of a comprehensive program of land reform and landownership is central. Included in this modernisation of the agricultural economy is the need to establish a large community of Black farmers that may compete with the present-day monopolised White colonial farming system and its models. On the other hand, there is the absolute need that they must take over the functions of the diminishing White farmers and White population to assure that South Africa stays economically effective.4,6,22,23,93,143-145
The ANC is in the process of addressing the exploitation inherent to the present-day one-sided wantonly-colonial financial-political structure and landownership system, such as the imbalance and injustice of landownership which is today still mostly located in White hands. The only solution is through the direct restructuring of these structures. This process, as activated by the ANC, is democratic and free from colonial autocracy; it is characterised by a politics that eschews the pre-1994 as well as the present financial and political structures. Their intention is to intertwine exclusive and inclusive capitalism.4,6,22,23,93,143-145
It is an utmost necessity to restructure South Africa’s colonial financial-political structure and the form of landownership that goes with it.

3.2.23. Land reform’s short and long-term upheavals will bring serious consequences

The truth is that land reform always brings some upheavals in which there is bad for some inhabitants and good for others. The key to doing this division is primarily to consider the numbers of the people to suffer versus the numbers to benefit. Secondly, the way in which the victims of the proposed land reform had come into possession of their wealth needs to be considered during this reform.11,15,55,86,91,96,101,103,106,111,146-165
Derby’s150 guideline in this context is more than clear when he writes150:2:

But of course, as part of land reform, some farmers will find themselves having to carve up their lands; one can’t ignore our shared history. Land reform comes with great upheaval as it involves taking land from those who have it and giving it to those who don’t. To unleash it, title deeds are necessary. Landowners, white farmers, the government and our chiefs and kings need to buy in so South Africa can reap the economic rewards.

Whites are the minority of inhabitants, benefiting immensely from landownership and wealth accumulated over many centuries, clearly at the cost of the majority of Blacks. The Blacks’ immense suffering before 1994 was not much of a concern to most of the Whites. There is undoubtedly a price to pay by the Whites in the land-transformation process.
Land reform and expropriation, where applicable, are needed to uplift the poor and landless Blacks and to make South Africa an effective and happy country for the majority of its people.
The good of the proposed land expropriation absolutely overshadows the bad of it.
The intended land reform does not hold serious short and long-term consequences and upheavals in broad terms for the country.

4. Conclusions

It is clear from studying the above subdivision “3.1. Myth and lies busting: a short retrospective, in this article (Part 2: Article 8)” as well as the previous article (Part1: Article 7), that myths and lies have so far played an enormous role in misleading and misinforming South Africans on the intended land expropriation and the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution. It is clear that only a limited number of the arguments, opinions and viewpoints as reflected in the previous four published Articles (Articles 3 to 6) on the land matter, can be trusted as true.166,167 Or, better, as Harari166 describes this mass of untrue information, hanging on in the mindsets of many South Africans: they are mindsets deluged by the posting of grossly irrelevant information by political opportunists to get exclusive political and economical empowerment and are in fact falsities.
In this article the antagonists’ and the propagandists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints against or for the changing of Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution to enable land expropriation without compensation or not, were brought directly into comparison with the exclusively used King-Solomon’s-wisdom approach to differentiate between the few truths/facts and the mass of lies/myths. This brings us to the existing few facts and truths, guiding us clearly to the truism that land expropriation is unavoidable in post-2019 South Africa.
There is clearly large-scale resistance to land reform, specifically among the White farmers. This resistance, which is turning more and more into hostility, has over time spread extensively to the general White population. This issue was wantonly generalised and politicised in the past by the various so-called saviours and rescuers of the Whites. Most of these persons and groups are purely driven by their own selfish and opportunistic interests, while many of them reflect political remnants of the old Apartheid ideology of the NP and the Broederbond. The hard fact is here that the majority of people in the country cannot be held back by false sentiment and the exclusive interests of an increasingly diminutive group, who were in the past the unjustified beneficiaries of the discriminatory political system from 1652 onwards. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present status of landownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.11
Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate activation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be part of the tools to rearrange the South African scene as to land ownership. In this respect, state property stands out prominently as the first stage in activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had became a lifestyle for nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated socially, economically and politically from their rights as South Africans and exposed to delinquencies equal to crimes against humanity — creates the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution, to flame up from the end of 2019, if not fully addressed. This makes land expropriation an absolute priority.168
The prominent question at this stage is: are there South African political parties to rapidly steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is a very complex question to answer, given that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability is put into power. The political analyst, Mamokgethi Molopyane169, writes that for all 48 of the parties that had taken part in the May 2019 election, there is the sign of a kind of “adapt or die” in the political outcomes of the past election. Indeed, seen from a critical focus, most of the 48 parties had already died silently on May 8, without pain or a being missed by the population. Even the three main contenders, the ANC, DA and EFF, are at a crossroads. There are immense weaknesses in their political bodies borne out by the election. Prominent among these is their disconnection from the people they assumed supported their ideologies and actions. Pertinent here, in their confusion, is to be found the issue of land expropriation without compensation and the negative racial context created by land grabbing and the nationalisation of Whites’ assets.169
Molopyane169 gives good insight into the three main political parties’ failure to live up to the standards required of a ruler of quality and their present political constitution. He writes as follows on them169:21:

“The coinciding decline of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), contrasted with the below-expectations growth of the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF), are unsurprising developments with far-reaching, unique consequences for each.”

Undoubtedly this puts my question, “…are there South African political parties to rapidly steer the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future?” directly in the foreground. In the context of doubt on the future abilities of the ANC, DA and EFF Molopyane posits169:21:

“The ANC’s support is waning. It’s proving to be devoid of freshness, with leaders who have been in politics for so long they may be reluctant to envision change. The party must undergo a makeover of its leaders and change the perceptions they’ve created. If a credible, attractive opposition emerged, its hold on power would fail. Its biggest hurdle is itself.”

On the DA he writes169:21:

“These elections have shown that having a black man in charge doesn’t translate into resonance with black voters. The DA’s crisis may not be as apparent as that of the ANC, but it’s similarly struggling to contemplate change. Worse, it’s riddled with the fear that it might alienate its white supporters.”

With reference to the EFF, he postulates169:21:

“We tend to forget the enthusiasm and political cult of youth doesn’t offer value for voters. Populism in the age of social media doesn’t mean the same in real life. The election showed the red party will have to come up with a new approach. Its change in direction must reflect the challenges faced by a society in an ever-changing globalised economy. Although appearing to make the right noises, voters denied the EFF that 15%. Was it a case of dislike, distrust or low turnout?”

The land expropriation issue, together with the question of the trustworthiness and the integrity of the three parties, not only to govern the country but also to successfully execute a comprehensive and justly balanced land expropriation programme, is important here. Where the DA successfully resists radical politics, its ultra-conservative land-reform policy is a loser for the mass of poor and landless Blacks. In contradistinction, both the EFF and the ANC show revolutionary thinking on the assets of the White population, while the ANC in its 25 years of rule has displayed an absolute lack of integrity and trustworthiness.
The ANC won with a national majority of 57,7% for a sixth term the right to be the country’s ruling party until 2024, and thus seems as if it is going to be the sole executor in terms of its promises on land expropriation (which seemingly includes expropriation without compensation in certain appropriate cases) in its political manifesto (its so-called “political CV”) for the May 8, 2019 election. However, there is also an absolute prerequisite for it to reflect on the strongest opposition parties’ political manifestos for the May 8, 2019, election regarding their promises and abilities to execute land expropriation successfully. It is necessary to see how these opposition parties in theory could be evaluated as good versus bad regimes should they have win the ruler’s throne in May 2019. (This approach would give also a preview of their potential as good versus bad opposition parties on the land matter, specificallly for the period up to 2024).170,171
Closely linked to these political manifestos in the description of the three parties’ “characters”, are also the public viewpoints as a further descriptive guide on the three parties’ “characters” up to May 8, 2019. These public viewpoints are best reflected by the reporting on them by investigative journalists (their so-called “political letters of reference”). These mentioned letters of reference are seen by many political commentators, strategists and analysts as the most (and only) decisive guide for the true description of a political party and its leaders’ quality and integrity; far more trustworthy than the so-called “trust for the party” brought out by the voters at the ballot box.
Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White landownership and Black landownership is rapidly found, without falling back into the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices done before 1994.
South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history that needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we liked it or not: it is a must. Angelo Fick172, the director of research at the Auwal Socio-economic Research Institute, guides us here par excellence when he writes172:29:

We have unfinished business from the distant past — questions of land dispossession unaddressed, issues of colonial and apartheid spatial dynamics in our towns and cities that affect the life chances of the majority, the poor, in the most unequal society in the world.
We have urgent business from the more recent past, the fetid pollution of corruption, maladministration, theft of state resources and non-delivery of services.

At this stage the most demanding question, in terms of Kgosana’s168, Molopyane’s169 and Fick’s172 pinpointing of the wrongs of our politics and the immediate demand to fix our past and our future, is: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed after more than three hundreds of years of failure — correctly and with justice?
In the next three successive articles (Articles 9 to 11) the political manifestos of the DA, EFF and the ANC for the May 8, 2019 election, together with the reporting of investigative journalists on these three parties’ political thinking, planning and actions, will be put into perspective in an effort to reflect on how the expected land expropriation will or may turn out.

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Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.
The author declares that he has no competing interest.
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.
Please note that I, the author, am aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.