South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18)
Gabriel P Louw
iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093
Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).
Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)
Email: profgplouw@gmail.com
Keywords: Background, discriminative, expropriation, injustice, myth, ownership, redistribution, revenge, troubled, unconstitutional.
Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 1

1. Background

Do what is right, not what is easy nor what is popular.¹
To implement South Africa’s proposed land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It should represent a righteous and a just outcome to all South Africans.
Is it possible for us to fulfil the above requirements? The prominent question is here, firstly: how did we arrive at this problematic situation, what story is there to tell regarding the present motivation to effect land expropriation in which the Whites and their current land holdings occupy a central position, and what is needed to launch the process of land expropriation?
Ela Gandhi², a well-known South African activist and granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi, provides to some extent an answer to these questions and what we need to do to rectify the mess, when she writes in the Sunday Times of the 18th March 2019^2:21:

I believe that we can only understand what is happening in South Africa if we acknowledge our racist history. Racist education and unbridled racial discrimination were entrenched in the various apartheid laws. Today, although most racist laws are rooted out, racist attitudes, prejudices, misconceptions and judgments remain with us.
We still use racial terms to describe South Africans. Almost all official documents require people to indicate their race. I understand the need for this – we still have a highly unequal society based on race, class and gender, and we need to know these demographics in order to bring about the needed changes. But hopefully there will be a day, sooner rather than later, when we can discard all these tags and be proudly South African.
We still have townships which are predominantly occupied by particular race groups, as was designated historically. Even though there is no law that entrenches these divisions, we are left with the separation legacies of apartheid days.
Schools have had to adjust to having children from different race groups, but racism is still encountered in schools, perhaps because not enough conscious effort has been made to train educators and the communities to think differently, to recognise and root out the racism within us.
Besides dividing South Africans into different race groups, apartheid discrimination impoverished black people by denying them occupational opportunities through job reservation policies and pass laws.
The 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act dispossessed many black people of their land and live hood.
We need to acknowledge the injustice and unfairness of apartheid, and we need to engage with the huge economic divide apartheid created between the rich, largely white, and the poor, largely black. A result of no acknowledgment and no sharing is that we have a large majority of people living in wealth and privileged access to resources. Racism is linked to this privilege.
There is a reluctance to rectify the injustices of the past through constructive programmes and voluntary sharing of wealth gained through apartheid privilege. Instead, there is agitation for the protection of individual rights and privileges at the expense of the common.

1.1. Introduction

The land redistribution matter — or land expropriation, as it has been many times announced to the public, in which the sensitive issue of compensation versus non-compensation features prominently — seems to have recently become a central way for the Ramaphosa regime of diverting attention away from its failure to deliver growth-boosting reforms, to curb its elite’s ongoing rent-seeking, their inability to clean up corruption and governance at state-owned enterprises and to do something to the dysfunctional state created by the ANC regime over 25 years. In this context of utter failure, Joffe³ writes^3:2:

This was the year of the reality check. We began 2019 with forecasts that economic growth would lift to 1.7% and a state of the nation speech in which President Cyril  promised long-awited reforms to boost the economy and fix ailing state-owned enterprises, especially Eskom. We have ended the year flirting with recession and stage 6 load-shedding – to the “surprise and the shock” of Ramaphosa, whose economic reforms have been delivered excruciatingly slowly, if at all.
The latest GDP figures showed the economy turned negative in the third quarter; a week or more of load-shedding could see that repeated in the fourth quarter; and it’s now possible the full-year 2019 number will be negative — for the first time since 2009. SA had become a 1% economy over the past five years. Now it’s falling even below that; 2019 has driven home just how stuck we are in the low-growth trap and how hard it’s proving to get out of it, despite oft-repeated promises of reform.

The esteem and personal standing of the ANC, the Ramaphosa regime, Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule with the ordinary man on the street have never been as low as in December 2019. Ramaphosa and the ANC elite know well that they have not been ablot to generate wealth for the poor since 1994 and cannot do it post-2019. Their failed Marxist-Leninist model in economics does not allow for it. They are more and more forced to do something extraordinary to make themselves popular again. Secondly, they must find immediate wealth to get the economy going and to satisfy the poor people’s hunger and other needs to avoid unrest and revolution, and to receive support to be able to stay in power until 2024. Three clear outcomes are easily available for them to regain power and to get money on the table: land grabbing, the nationaliation of the Reserve Bank and looting the public and private pension funds. The easiest to launch and the most popular choice inside the ANC radicals’ RET (radical economic transformation) is land grabbing from Whites.^3-9
The year 2020 seems to be the Year of Land Grabbing, especially because Ramaphosa must do something politically extraordinary to outlive the 2020 Mid-year Conference of the ANC. At this stage, inside South Africa’s troubled land ownership, some positive and constructive guidelines are needed to make the unavoidable, threatening land redistribution a reality and a success.

1.2. Aims of article 18

In this article (together with Article 19), the primary aim is to make conclusions, based on the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the matter of land expropriation and to offer a dictum on whether it may be successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019.
This is the semi-final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous seventeen articles of the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 11:7]. The short-titles of these seventeen published articles (numbered one to 17 in the series) are as follows:

1. Who are colonists and who are indigenous people? (1);
2. Perspectives on the background to the land ownership dispute (2);
3. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 1 (3);
4. The dysfunctional political and socioeconomic system of the ANC regime – Part 2 (4);
5. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 1 (5);
6. Age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system – Part 2 – (6);
7. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 1 (7);
8. 8. Land ownership and grabbing in South Africa: King Solomon’s wisdom approach in myth and lies busting – Part 2 (8);
9. The EFF in perspective (9);
10. The DA in perspective (10);
11. The ANC in perspective (11);
12. The ANC in perspective (12: Prosperity);
13. The ANC in perspective (13: Violence and Crime);
14. The ANC in perspective (14: Accountability);
15. The ANC in perspective (15: Opportunism);
16. The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC);
17. The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership).

2. Method

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully execute land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in order to effect successful land reform from 2019 onwards.
The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. South Africa’s troubled land ownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Overview (Articles 1 to 17)
The political dispensations of the Cape Colony of 1853 and 1872 and the Union of 1910 offered excellent opportunities to redistribute land and hand a justified part back to Blacks to create an open, just South African society. But White supremacy and its land-grabbing politics made it impossible. The later 1994 dispensation under the ANC failed again. Land redistribution from 2019 onwards will become a natural and unavoidable interference and intervention.
Land grabbing is an age-old custom in South Africa. It was practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years. It is thus of the utmost importance that this custom is not restarted again in 2019 and that a perfect solution to the present imbalance between White land ownership and Black land ownership is rapidly found, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices committed before 1994.
South Africa’s political history is far from completion. Also, there is an immense political history what needs to be retraced and to be rewritten, or at least to be corrected. It does not matter if we like it or not: it is a sine qua non.
For the antagonists (anti-land redistributors and mostly Whites), the period 1994 to 2019 under the ANC regime has been a dark period of criminality, state capture, confused violence, thuggery and race-baiting. It has gained a momentum that will not slow as long as the ANC is in power. The antagonists have an unshakable belief that the general public and the parliament itself will reject any change to the Constitution or would not allow land grabbing from Whites. They also believe that the South African courts, including the Constitutional Court, will denounce any illegal and unconstitutional actions by the ANC that could lead to a one-sided policy of land expropriation without full compensation. For the antagonists both Julius Malema and Cyril Ramaphosa are, as land redistributors of White land to the poor and landless Blacks, political bluffs that will soon disappear from the country’s politics.^7,10-24
When comparing the arguments, opinions and viewpoints of the antagonists and the propagandists, some are based on sound foundations while others are emotionally laden and lacking in depth.^7,10-24
Hereto is it clear for the propagandists (pro-land redistributors and mostly Blacks) that a mass of contaminating elements and role players, integrated and established during the age-old, unjust and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South Africa, are obstructing any change to Section 25 of the Consitution that would enable land expropriation without compensation. The propagandists believe that myths and lies are prominent in the antagonists’ arguments, opinions and viewpoints. They believe the antagonists’ present obstruction of the land expropriation initiative is temporary, unfounded and doomed to failure. The change to Section 25, to effect land expropriation without compensation, is for the propagandists the only path to uplift the mass of Blacks from their inequality, landlessness, poverty and unemployment, and to reverse the immense land grabbing by Whites of non-Whites’ land, starting in 1652. The undoing of the historical trajectory of the age-old injustice and discriminative White political and socio-economic system of South African society is one of the biggest challenges for the present or any future government. The overwhelming interests of the mass of Black poor and landless people can no longer be ignored. The present exclusive structure of White land ownership and economic empowerment is a recipe for revolution.^7,10-24
From a critical vantage point it must be noted that in general the perspective of the antagonists are not representative of the total White or Afrikaner population, but mostly of the contingent of White farm and land owners, White exclusive capitalist business groups with direct and indirect interests in agricultural economics, as well as self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” that claim to fight unselfishly for the interests of the White farming community and for the Constitution and dispensation of 1994. (The total number of these self-appointed White “saviours and rescuers” is far lower than 300 000 of the White population of 5 milion, representing 6% of the White population).  For the propagandists it is time for the White population to purge itself of this group of 300 000 White individuals’ contamination with fallacies and racism. The other nearly 5 million Whites (outside the antagonists’ and the 35 000 White farmers’ self-interest), also have citizen interests but are side-lined and ignored by the antagonists. The antagonists are a minority group, estimated to represent less than 10% of the White population which, in reality, is another minority group, more or less 8% of the total South African population.^7,10-24
For the propagandists the land-ownership matter has been well planned and blown up for a long time by ±35 000 White farmers (of which only between 5 000 and 7 000 farmers really contribute to the country’s essential daily food supply). The opportunistic group of the rest of the ±30 000 of White farmers represents less than 0.1% of the total South African population and less than 1% of the White population. This priority granted to 35 000 White farmers and their land has led to the interests of nearly 30 million poor and landless Blacks in the post-1994 Democracy being ignored. For the propagandists, it just cannot go on in this way.^7,10-24
The imbalance in land ownership, together with the inequality in the country between White and Black (as well as between Black and Black) means that redistribution should occur, but it should not be offered as a panacea for poverty or be based on arguments about who is indigenous and who is not. Redistribution of land is a good symbolic act for emotional relief and political catharsis as to Apartheid’s transgressions, but the fact it that it is not going to change the lives of the poor immediately and drastically as falsely claimed by radical politicians. Land expropriation so far has been saturated with corruption and state capture in which the ANC elite has played a central role. It is only one aspect of the political and socioeconomic delinquency of the ANC. The comprehensive dysfunction of the political and socioeconomic system of South Africa since 1994, with its corrupted elements and role players, may activate a poisonous element with the ability to kill the innocent and to bring devastation to South Africa. It can only aggravate the matter further, given the ANC’s present-day politics of corruption, criminality and extreme racism, planned and executed by a strong sector within the ANC elite.^7,10-24
The current problems around land redistribution are just too enormous for the current ANC political leadership to solve. When they do attend to the matter, they do it in an explosive and conflict-ridden way, creating more complex problems and crises. Indeed, the fact is that the radicals in the ANC and other political parties do not really know what they want to do with the expropriated land. They do not have a sound plan. There seems to be much revenge about the discriminative politics of the past and land grabbing, making Whites rightfully worried about their assets, as well as their personal future and safety in the country.
Land expropriation with reasonable compensation is a must that needs immediate implementation. But, where applicable, land expropriation without compensation should also be a tool to rearrange the South African scene regarding land ownership. In this the redistribution of state property should take a prominent position as the first stage of activating land expropriation. The mass of poverty, landlessness, indignity and inequality, which had become a lifestyle to nearly 30 million Blacks — people isolated from their social, economic and political rights as South Africans and exposed to immense delinquencies, that are equal to crimes against humanity — contains the potential for country-wide anarchy and revolution; which may ignite from 2020 if not fully addressed. This dangerous situation makes a just land expropriation an absolute priority.^7,10-24
Land redistribution is unavoidable. It needs a solution. Whites, mostly the Afrikaners, own most of the land that the Blacks want. The prominent question is how the transfer will take place: Will it be another land grab; or will there be a reasoned, balanced and just land transfer and redistribution? The last option has been absent from all of South African political history, creating doubt if land redistribution by Whites will ever be freely and willingly allowed.
The counts awarded in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018 25, is for the EFF a mere 8 points (9%) out of a possible maximum of 82 points (100%). This means that the EFF is an outright failure as a political institution of stature. It cannot be trusted in any way to be in charge of land expropriation. Moreover, they totally lack the experience to handle such a project.²⁵
The DA was awarded 59 points (72%) out of the maximum 82 points.The DA reflects immense shortcomings in their experience regarding land reform — specifically on land expropriation without compensation. Where the issue of the land matter emerges in the DA’s politics, it seems to be determined and driven by White interests rather than the interests of the poor and landless Blacks. The DA is clearly a slave of exclusive capitalism and its principle of a “stretched democracy”. Since the May 2019 election the DA has shown a movement towards White right-wing politics, making just land redistribution essentially impossible and the party an improper and inappropriate ruler to effect land redistribution.The DA does not show the ability to immediately handle successful land reform.²⁵
The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it is lacking capabilities and the general integrity as a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC failed the basic test to be the ruler of South Africa. Its Marxist-Leninist political ideology as to the economy, landownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and to execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the the living environment of its people has become saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and beset by extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to honestly effect well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring landownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further state capture, poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.²⁵
Looking at the evaluation of the three main political parties of South Africa in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018, all three are absolutely incapable of successfully implementing balanced and justified land redistribution in the next five to ten years. To put in in even stronger terms: none of the three will ever be successful to do land redistribution in any way. The evidence is there that all three will be part of the country’s political history for the next five years.²⁵
This leaves us with the prominent question at this stage: are there South African political parties or a political party that may fast-track the initiative of land expropriation with success into the future? This is very complex question to answer, seeing that popularity at the ballot box does not guarantee that a government of quality and ability comes to power, as the ANC regime of 25 years confirms. Defining the wrongs of our past and present politics and the immediate demand to plan and to fix our future, is the question: can land expropriation (with compensation or without compensation) be executed correctly and with justice after more than three hundred of years of failure?

3.1.2. Immediate and future negative outcomes and dangers

3.1.2.1. Unrest, anarchy and revolution

We already see from Article 13 (Violence and Crime) the extent to which chronic unrest has been established in the country. Looking critically at the uncontrollable murders in the Cape Town Area that necessitated the intervention of the SADF to curb the reign of criminal gangs, together with the burning of trucks on highways and the murder of truck drivers, South Africa has long ago moved from simple riots to chronic anarchy, bringing the country to the threshold of revolution. What is striking, is the hostility and aggressive behaviour of the mass of poor living in the growing shanty towns, also known as “informal settlements”. It initially started due to the lack of service delivery in these settlements, such as the absence of basic health care, education facilities, transport and security infrastructure, and basic accommodation. These shortcomings have been addressed in the past nor are they being tackled at the moment in any way by the ANC regime. The dramatic collapse of the economy since 2016 has led to an immense growth in unemployment, the influx of the poor from the rural areas into the cities, and a resulting lack of basic accommodation. A direct outcome of this migration, absent from the ANC elite’s as well as the broad public’s consciousness, is the significant presence of poverty among half of the South African population and the phenomenon of constant hunger experienced by the mass of poor.  In the past and worldwide, poverty and hunger have caused two opposing outcomes: Firstly, the start of revolution which has brought down regimes, leading to the large-scale killing of certain sectors of the population and radical long-term political changes within countries. Secondly, poverty and hunger in certain countries have brought a total collapse in the poor people’s intention and will to revolt against their tragic circumstances, causing them to lapse even futher and deeper into poverty and enslavement to a ruler’s oppression. We saw this negative enslavement outcome of passivity among the Black population in South Africa since 1652 and especially after 1910 with Apartheid. At the moment we are seeing it again in South Africa under the Black ANC regime, where the enslavement and oppression of the mass of poor Blacks is undoubtedly the highest ever since 1652 and where the mass of Blacks seemingly accept their poverty as their destiny. But actions cause reaction and we should not consider the ongoing unrest and anarchy as a chronic, permanent situation without any further serious outcomes. The truth is far from this, as the chronic ongoing unrest and anarchy in Algeria, Tunisia, Iraqi and Syria, which suddenly changed to deadly revolution, confirms. South Africa’s unrest and anarchy are starting to show the typical characteristics of the forerunners of a comprehensive revolution waiting to be enacted. The land-redistribution matter, together with unemployment, poverty and hunger, may be the imminent stimulant to set off revolution overnight.^3-30
The advent of revolution after 2020 is a high possibility that needs to be discussed. It will be dishonest not to warn the public on the negative impact of revolution on their lives. Prominently at risk are the minority of Whites and surely the Black BBEEE-empowered businessmen and politicians such as Ramaphosa and his cronies as possible victims.^3-30
Besides the element of revenge in revolution, it must be emphasised that revolution can activate blocked-up development that could not be reached normally inside the traditional political setup. The mass of Blacks (more than 30 million) stand to benefit from any South African revolution. On the virtue of revolution under certain circumstances, Mark Malloch-Brown²⁷, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General and a minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, in his book The Unfinished Global Revolution²⁷ gives us a guideline when he posits:

Since the book calls for a more comprehensive global democracy where we all have more say over our local, national, and our global affairs, the Arab Spring is evidently a step in the right direction. The Arab Human Development Reports, which I had sponsored at UNDP, pointed out that of the world’s seven regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom scores.

The question is: if the Arab Spring was an essential outcome, why can a post-2019 South African revolution not be an essential outcome and a “step in the right direction” either?
The 1994 political dispensation was undoubtedly a revolution, but a passive revolution; one which did not bring an extreme re-balancing of South Africa’s wealth and economics. It was only a false political democracy, meaning much on paper but nothing in practice. It was a continuation of Apartheid, with all its evil. It was a planned revolution by the ANC top brass and the NP-AB top brass to suite their own interests. Features that characterise most active revolutions — actions such as land grabbing without compensation, the prosecution of the Apartheid penetrators for human-rights violations, the activation of inclusive capitalism and job creation — were totally absent. The critical evaluation of the reports of the ANC’s referees (see Articles 12 to 17 of this series), shows that this passive revolution, launched in 1994, was essentially an outright failure. Firstly, it brought more poverty to the mass of Blacks, demolished certain established facilities such as healthcare and education while the landlessness of the poor Blacks stayed unchanged. The second outcome was that a repressive pre-1994 political-economic-social regime was merely replaced with a comprehensively economically repressive post-1994 regime.^3-24
The question is: if a radical, active revolution had indeed been implemented in 1994, would it have solved masse Black poverty, joblessness and their lack of landownership as we are experiencing now? The answers are a Yes as well as a No. These opposing two answers must be read in the political histories reflecting revolutions that have played out worldwide over many years. It would be foolish to say that revolution does not work and is an evil. It is not true. The Liberation War of the North American Colonies from Great Britain brought them, besides statutory independence, political, economic and social empowerment that have made the USA the most powerful nation in the world today. The French revolution brought for the lower and middle class, as well as the poor, emancipation from the domination of the rich aristocracy, but on the other hand it has left them to this day with a kind of political immaturity as reflected in their constant unrest which borders on anarchy. The Russian revolution also brought freedom to the poor, the lower and middle class from the domination of the nobility but led directly to the institution of another repressice regime, the Communists, with role players like Stalin up to Putin today. In Africa there were  many active revolutions, with essentially not a single one bringing long-term positive outcomes. Prominent examples in this regard are the Egyptian, Zimbabwean, and Ugandan revolutions.²⁷
Mark Malloch-Brown²⁷, on the phenomenon of positive revolutionary outcomes at certain times and in certain situations, bringing at last human rights to suppressed and discriminated-against people after centuries of suffering, gives good insight when he  writes^27:250: “First, that the power of the people, when right is on their side, is always unstoppable.” Prominent stands the fact that the potentials for revolutions are mostly observable, reflecting to the insiders and outsiders that anything in political setups is possible and must be accepted. Mostly is this “incoming revolution” not only ignored, but see as impossible to can and will spring-up. Malloch-Brown²⁷ emphasis that the Arab Spring revolution (to spring up in 2010-2011 in Tunisia and Egypt) was already observable in 2002 (eight years earlier), but ignored and laughed down as the impossible and not to be a serious concern by the authorities and experts. The corrupted leaders go on for nearly a decade to reign in Tunisia and Egypt before the social time bomb, that had been set over many years, had gone off.   But when a certain crisis hits – sometimes a small energy-stimulant is needed to activate it, like the Arab Spring — the surprise is great.²⁷ Malloch-Brown²⁷ writes^272:45-246:

The Arab spring began with an auspicious, if tragic, start: the self-immolation of a Tunisian street seller, Mohammed Bouazizi [who could be as well a said Andile Zuzile in South Africa]. On December 18, 2010, he set himself alight because he felt threatened and ignored by corrupt, bullying local police officers [who had, because of their corrupted empowerment coming over years under a corrupted regime, fall into a state of thinking to do what they want and to do this for ever unchallenged].The power of  his protest came from the fact that his desperate frustration was shared by so many others [same as the present-day 30-million ignored impoverished and landless Blacks of South Africa]. His act lit the dry timber of latent anger against a line of corruption and privilege that stretched from the local female police constable, who ignored his complains, to President Ben Ali, his wife and his family. By the time Bouazizi died from his burns on January 4, 2011, the region was catching fire.
The act was auspicious because such apparent futility and weakness brought down an apparently all powerfully political order. And, indeed this David and Goliath theme of weakness confronting strength and prevailing was a steady part of the early months of the Arab spring. Peaceful protestors, drawing courage from the links to each other and the outside world… saw off heavily armed government forces. Yet it took only from December 18, Bouazizi’s burning, to February 11, 2011 for… Ben Ali to be driven from office.

Does the above situation of Mohammed Bouazizi differ from that of the unknown South African Black Andile Zuzile? No, it does not differ an inch. Does the Tunisian political, social and economic disorder under the regime of Ben Ali differ from the disorder under the ANC regime between 1994 and 2019? Again, no, it does not differ an inch. Is the said Andile Zuzile (as was Mohammed Bouazizi seemingly seen at the beginning of his action) the only sufferer and victim of the corrupt 1994 to 2019 regime in South Africa? No, apart from him there are 29, 900, 999 other Black sufferers and victims in South Africa. Are the dissatisfactions and demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries different from the mass of South African Blacks’ dissatisfactions and demands? No: it was also primarily about the price of bread, demands for jobs, as well as affordable goods and services, etc. And, most of all, a say in politics regarding one’s own affairs. It was not so much about differences in social classes, religions or races. Is the mentioned Andile Zuzile at this stage insignificant for the ANC elite? Yes. It is true that the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime sees Andile Zuzile as an insignificant role player in their political thinking, revealing the ANC elite’s lack of in-depth contact with the masses. In this context Redi Tlhabi³⁰ refers to the book A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens in which he describes the circumstances of the poor and landless people which led to the French Revolution and the followeding reign of terror. She writes, comparing the two delinquent regimes and their leaderships^30:20:

Die kloof tussen die wat dié wat lei en dié wat gelei word, word groter en groter.
Dit het in Suid-Afrika gebeur.
Ons kan dalk nie die presiese tydstip aandui toe die kloof gevorm is nie, maar daaglikse uitsprake, besluite en optredes laat ons met geen twyfel nie dat die ANC – die party wat gevorm is deur eerbiedige mans soos John Dube, Pixley ka Isaka Seme en Sol Plaatje – sy vinger van die pols van die nasie gehaal het nie.
Hulle [ANC-topleiers] is besig om mense te “ontdek” en te paradeer wat geraak is deur hul latenskap van onbekwaamheid, korrupsie, swak dienslewering en ja, onbetrokkenheid.

What A Tale of Two Cities³⁰ also tells us is that when the fires of revolution start they are not easily stopped: in France it required a Napoleon Bonaparte, a blood-thirsty dictator, to remove the revolutionaries from politics and to clean up their mess. (This intervention must stand as a warning for revolutionaries such as Zuma, Magashule, Ramaphosa, Mabuza and Malema about a possible destiny awaiting them).
But, cautions Malloch-Brown²⁷, revolution does not always immediately bring success. He writes^27:244:

…the notion that the force of street protests that begins a revolution subsequently loses its way in the long, less glamorous, sequel of taking power will not be new. Indeed, in my experience, the completion of the shift from overthrow of the old to a more stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Much beyond the ballot box has to change. The old elite’s grip on absolute economic power has to be prized open, a culture of democratic openness and minority rights forged, a civil society given political oxygen to breathe and grow, a justice system people respect and trust established. Nearly always new governments struggle to make these changeas while also battling a legacy of economic failure and pent-up popular demands for job and basic services that they have inherited from their failed predecessors. In Egypt and Tunisia, all these conditions for a long, difficult journey to a “finished” revolution are present. Elsewhere the challenges are more difficult still.

It is significant that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, which started in 2010, are still in 2019  far from over. Moreover, true democratic stability has so far not been reached [in line with Malloch-Brown’s²⁷ estimation that the growth from an old order to a more (hopeful)  stable democratic order is on average a ten-year project. Especially in Egypt, there has been little improvementin the country’s autocratic politics up to 2019. It is also a fact that South Africa’s passive revolution, with its duration stretching over 25 years, is also far from over.²⁷
In South Africa the passive revolution, launched by the 1994 Political Dispensation, did not entail revenge on so-called Apartheid wrongdoers. There were some “emotional confessions” which were drowned in religious dogma offering the cleansing of the political sins of the culprits, mostly the Whites. Then there was the intended prosecution by the NPA of political wrongdoers, also mostly Whites. Again, a failure to fulfil the demands of revenge: jailing, confiscation of assets, the compensation of the Black sufferers under Apartheid. The “1994 revolution” was a soft revolution without real punishment of the obvious culprits: Whites. All that was realised was BBEEE as a punishment of Whites, and cadre deployment as a punishment of anti-ANC Blacks obstructing the ANC elite’s delinquencies.^3-24
The most recent revolution in the world, where one autocratic regime was replaced by yet another (more extreme) autocracy, is Iran. Iran’s past political structure had the same kind of basis as that of South Africa and needs some elaboration. One of the prominent outcomes in Iran, as during the French revolution, was revenge on the previous ruling class: the nobles and elite. Not only were they eliminqted from regime structures and their ownership of assets dismantled, but they were also physically killed.

3.1.2.1.1. The 1978 Iranian revolution

To understand what a “real” revolution and a “real” revenge mean, it is needed to look at Iran’s revolution which started in 1978 and is still going on today in the guise of various forms of instability. At the same time it gives it us some criteria to compare post-1994 South Africa under the Marxist-Leninist ANC regime with some of the characteristics of the Iranian post-1978 religious-extremist regime. The post-1978 setup in the end did not bring improvements to the Iranians, not even for the first group of revolutionaries. The well-known international writer and world-traveller, the late Sir VS Naipaul³¹, gives us a good description of the post-1978 failed Iran in his book, entitled: Beyond Belief: Islamic excursions among the converted peoples.³¹
In Iran the regime was run from the 1930s by Reza Shah, who was succeeded by his son, the last Shah. Both of the two rulers’ regimes’ were autocratic, repressive and much hated. Especially the last Shah’s SAVAK (secret police) was cruel. The Iranian revolution of 1978 did not come as a surprise — all the characteristics needed for an uprising were there, such as repression, food scarcity, lack of freedom, etc. But the identity of the role players who took power in the end, ignoring the true revolutionaries’ dreams, was indeed a surprise. The main role player, the opportunist and madman Khomeini first arrived on the scene after the revolution’s beginning, heading from there into his precisely planned direction of evil and murder by hijacking the whole exercise with his exclusive religious group. He embarked on the next phase, a religious-cultural revolution, intertwined with a political revolution. This outcome elicited the following response from one of the initial revolutionaries^31:183: “We may win the revolution, but culturally we will go back a thousand years”, and^31:183: “You will never gain anything following theses religious people. We have known them. We have seen them. These are the people who didn’t let me [female] learn reading and writing.”  On the further outcomes of the revolution Naipaul³¹, quoting the experience of the mentioned Iranian Ali just after the start of the revolution, reports^31:170:

Some people Ali knew, supporters of the revolution, turned against it after the first month. Ali thought he should give it a little more time. But then, about two months after the revolution, when the executions began, he had serious doubts. People who had done nothing were arrested and taken to jail. Many of them disappeared. Then they started charging into people’s houses, confiscating their properties. We had no security for our property our children or our wife.

Naipaul³¹ further recounts Ali’s experience^31:201: “He had his doubts about the drift of the revolution, and soon things began to be bad. There were religious regulations. Women had to wear the chador and the full headdress; music and cultural events were banned. There were restrictions on the press. There was a “cultural revolution,” as it was called; all the universities were closed.” But this was only the beginning, as Ayatollah Khalkhalli in 1979 said^31:201: “The mullahs are going to rule now [they still did in 2019]. We are going to have ten thousand years of the Islamic Republic. The Marxists [their initial partners in the revolution] are going to go on with their Lenin. We are going to go on in the way of Khomeini.” Inside Khalkhalli’s malcognition is to be found his own dream of blood, to equal what Stalin did in Russia. Naipaul³¹, quoting Khalkhalli, writes:^31:201 “What he did in Russia we have to do in Iran. We too have to do a lot of killing. A lot.”
Ali’s³¹ testimony goes further^31:173:

There was now, too, a constant harassment from the Revolutionary Guards [still fully governing Iran in 2019], jumping into the garden and looking through the windows to see whether anyone was looking at television or videos, or breaking into the house to search for alcohol or ham or women’s dresses or men’s neckties, all now forbidden things.
And if you were cleanly dressed, they didn’t like it. They would attack you. It was like Pol Pot, but not so extreme. Ten precent. It was a full revolution.
The reins of government went altogether out of the hands of government, out of control. It was anarchy and terror. The reason was Khomeini himself.

In this context Naipaul³¹ points out that, to make up for his lack of money to supply the mullahs’ immense needs, Khomeini³¹ said^31:173: “Go to your own towns. Find the first man who is rich or the first man who has a factory or a huge farm. And force him to pay.”
On this order by Khomeini to the mullahs in which theft is presented as “honest” and “morally correct”, Ali³¹ reports^31:175:

Khomeini has set a bad example. Every ayatollah now can claim necessity, as Khomeini often did, and break the law. And Iran was still living with his Islamic constitution, which gave him supreme power, and established the principle of leadership and obedience.

On the further consequences of Khomeini’s delinquency, Ali states^31:174-175:

The majority [people] wanted to loot. So, he [Khomeini] made disorder in the country and let them loot. He did what they wanted.
When he [Khomeini] said “follow the law, it wasn’t the law of the country. It was his law, the law in his own mind. Before the revolution he said it was un-Islamic to pay taxes to the government. After, he said it was Islamic to pay taxes to the government. He wanted complete chaos. That day in his house I realized this man is not a man of government. He was still a revolutionary. He couldn’t control himself. Until the very last day he was making disorder.
He had an instinctive brain. He was instinctively intelligent, an instinctive, animal intelligence. Because of this he could command the people. He did not have an educational intelligence. He did’nt become emotional. He was very cool.

Looked at from the viewpoint of clinical psychology, it seems as if Khomeini’ s brain function was one of psychopathy. This is borne out by his and his cronies’ undermentioned killing spree.
On the killing spree between 1978 and 1979 (it went on for many years), Naipaul³¹ writes^31:200:

When I went to Theran in August 1979, Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the hanging judge of the revolution, was a star. The Islamic Revolutionary Court [the shah’s old military court] in Shariati Street was sitting almost round the clock, as Ali had said. People were being killed all the time in Evin Prison and trucks were taking away the bodies through the blue gates at night.
There was nothing secretive or abashed about the killings. Some revolutionary official was keeping count, and regularly in the Theran Times there was an update. In the beginning the counting was to show how clement the revolution was; later, when the killing became too much, the counting stopped. In those early days official photographs were taken of people before they were killed and after they were killed — killed and, as it were, filed away, naked on the sliding mortuary slab, in the giant filing cabinet of the morgue. These pictures were on sale in the streets.
Ayatollah Khalkhalli, the ruler of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, was open to the press. He gave many boastful interviews.

Naipaul³¹ writes further^31:188:

Khalkhalli, in an interview [August 1979]  with the Theran Times…said that he “probably” sentenced three to four hundred people to death [in less than one year]. On some nights, he said, the trucks had taken thirty or fourty bodies out of the prison.

Comparing the above description of the Khomeini regime and his cronies’ actions with the letters of the referees on the delinquent actions of the ANC top brass between 1994 and 2019 (see: Articles 11 to 17), and the ANC’s pre-1994 political history, there seem to be immense similarities. Remember: both regimes and their leaders were committed to the revolutionary ethos, of taking without creating, as well as extremism in politics. In both of the two organisations, some of the leaders had blood on their hands,  both constantly broke the law during their rule and engaged in state capture. It gives us a warning what could happen after 2019 if things went wrong for the ANC elite’s grip on power.

3.1.2.1.2. Death mostly for the initial revolutionist

Revolution mostly brings death to the initial revolutionist, however noble his intention was to better his country. The recalcitrant holding on to power and actions of the old class whose regimes are challenged, as well as their tendency to turn to extreme repression to staunch the revolutions and their revolutionaries, are reflected by the counter-actions of Bashar al-Assad in Syria over many years. Most revolutions have gone down fast, unknown many times to the outsider, because suppression of the masses has been efficiently kept out of the public eye. The murdering spree of Bashar Assad’s father in 1982 of up to 20 000 people in Syria on a single occasion, was kept out of the news for long.²⁷
The question is here: was there a pre-1994 revolution by South African Blacks against their suffering? Yes, there was the 1960s Black Revolution which gradually, with the impact of other determinants, spelt the end of Apartheid and the elimination of the NP from political, emotional and cognitive mindsets (although only three decades later). In the 1960s South Africa’s Black Revolution (undoubtedly, in line with the same reasons why present-day unrest and anarchy are kept under wraps, but now possibly on a higher level of dissatisfaction and more broadly experienced), was kept away from the news, as well as the NP’s bloody actions to stamp out this revolution with its immense security force and the elimination of the Black revolutionaries.^27,28 The rapid phasing out of the 1960s Black Revolution was directly attributable to the absolute suppression of the Blacks by the security forces of the NP. As Malloch-Brown²⁷ writes^27:243: “Yet revolution is not easily sparked in a world where rulers govern with an iron hand. The examples of successful revolution in the Arab world were few and far between.’
South Africa’s 1960s Black Revolution went the same way as that of the many failed revolutions at the time in extreme authoritarian states. But today the ANC is a Black government where a racial guideline for the murder of the Black masses (we hope) is less defined than during the period 1652 to 1994. In addition, the ANC regime is thankfully not armed and trained to the same high level as that of the NP military of the 1960s. For the current South African revolutionaries to be gobbled up by the ANC regime and its incapable securirity forces is impossible. Read herewith the unionisation of the security forces and the presence of Black tribalism in the security forces, any significant bloodletting of Blacks by Blacks in the ANC regime, to avoid a revolution, will not easily be put into action. Neither must it be expected that if a revolution started, it would be quickly and effectively curtailed.²⁶

3.1.2.1.3. Extreme Islamic politics inside a South African revolution

But various African-Black revolutionary efforts since 1960s against the White NP regime and its forces were not the only attempted revolutions. The terrorist expert De Wet Potgieter²⁹ points out that during Apartheid repression a small group of Islamic extremists exploited low-intensity urban warfare in South Africa, after which this Islamic extremism started to flourish with a growing intensity.There was in the Western Cape the Qibla Mass Movement (Qibla), based on Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini doctrine. This group emerged as a militant pro-Shiite one, modelled on the Iranian Revolution, with the objective of implementing and establishing strict Islamic principles in South Africa. [This organisation also went under the names Muslims-Against-Global-Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims-Against-Illegimate-Leaders (MAIL)]. It paved the way for a more violent organisation, writes Potgieter²⁹, which came to the fore in 1996 as the violent organisation People against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad). Qibla was fast labelled as a terrorist organisation by the USA government. It had already started back then to send its members overseas for military training in Libya, later Pakistan, who were deployed in the 1990s to fight in South Libanon with Hezbollah. At the millennium more than 100 Qibla members were arrested for violence-related activities and murder in South Africa. Before that, in 1995, reports Potgieter, the Isamic Unity Convention emerged, representing more than 250 Muslim groups in South Africa. Qibla was the central body within the movement and before 9/11 Qibla had already crossed swords with the USA for its activities in that country.  After the 9/11 attack Qibla sent fighters to Afghanistan. Central to all of this, is a figure such as Achmad Cassiem, a radical Islamic cleric who joined the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at the age of 15 years and was later sent to Robben Island after having been sentenced for terrorism, attempted murder and the possession of arms and ammunition.²⁹
This build-up in the presence of Muslim revolutionists became clear in 1998 in South Africa with their attack on Planet Hollywood at the popular V&A Waterfront in Cape Town. This was after Pagad had started to target businesses in Cape Town, in response to the US retaliatory attacks in the Middle East after the 9/11 attack.²⁹ Potgieter²⁹ writes on this 1998 radical Muslim attack^29:31:

South Africans would never in their wildest dreams have believed that terror would return to the country a mere four years after the newfound freedom of a democratic society under Mandela’s Rainbow Nation. Unfortunately, this false sense of a peaceful transition to a new life of freedom and peace was short-lived with the global terror reaching our shores at the southern tip of Africa.

The above sets out the basic presence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa. Included would be the presence of ISIS in the country, exposing South Africa today to the threat of international terrorism. The country’s liberal foreign policy towards the Middle East and the ANC regime’s anti-American position do not safeguard it from Islamic terrorism. So far, the ANC regime has openly tolerated the existence of Islamic terrorists in South Africa, even it seems blind to the presence of these groups training all over the country, as well as their movements up into Africa. This empathy and passivity of the ANC regime is to a great extent (besides its long-established brotherhood with terrorist regimes of countries in Africa and South America) due to a fear of Islamic counter-actions if they were arrested and prevented from pursuing their terrorism from here to the outside world.²⁹ This fear and passivity of the ANC regime Potgieter²⁹ describes as follows^29:33:

The ‘war against terrorism’ is ultimately a chess game in which governments need to be aware that their actions will have consequences, and although counter-measures might be successful in the short term, that might not be the case in the medium to the long term. In other words: states, through their actions, might win a battle (the arrest or elimination of prominent suspects) but ultimately lose the war against terrorism — by driving individuals to extremism and terrorism.

This “unofficial peace agreement” of the ANC regime with the Islamic radicals does not assure a permanent outcome of brotherhood and peace, as well as the absence of attacks on the South Africa state and its system by the Islamic radicals. Especially not for the ultra-extremist Islamic terrorists who have since 1960s clearly wanted an Islamic state with all its principles established here, in contradistinction to the liberal Christian and exclusively capitalist setups that have been dominant since 1652. For the time being, the ANC regime’s sympathy and alliance with terrorism (extending to its pre-1994 years) fits the situation of the radical Islamics well here, while the present low profile and passivity of the radical Islamics within the ANC regime’s political, economic and cultural composition, is  also a temporary characteristic which can change overnight. In the aftermath of the Syrian and Iraq wars, their internal conflicts and political disfunction, the true role and planning of the radical Islamics for the first time emerged with a bloody capture of parts of the two countries. On the other hand, the so-called end of the ISIS caliphate does not spell the end of a theoretical ISIS Caliphate, the ideology of ISIS and the elimination of ISIS jihadists from geopolitics: they are permanent ‘war fixtures” in the world. The fact that many of these jihadists have returned to South Africa and to other Western countries, makes them nothing less as than “soldiers of fortune”. In this case there are many similarities with the “Christian Crusaders” who had fought under the banner of Christianity all over the Middle-East against Islam, and today’s Islamic jihadists. In both cases their self-enrichment and pursuit of power are prominent and their quest for new political, economic and cultural terrority, to which the politically unstable South Africa exposes itself for easy capturing.²⁹
3.1.2.1.4. Political radicalism-in-waiting
It seems in 2019 that South Africans, in terms of the political instability and lawlessness created by the ANC regime and its leadership, are foolishly naive regarding political radicalism (which is often practised in the guise of radical religiousness). The radicalism in the ANC and the EFF is not so innocent as the political term “Black Nationalism” might suggest. Potgieter, in this context, postulates^29:35: “Accepting that South African nationals might become involved in transnational terrorism is an unfortunate reality.” It is a fact that our borders have become lawless territories, ruled by marauding gangsters and human traffickers who allow the infiltration of well-trained and experienced jihadists. The issuing of South African identity and passport documents to international jihadists and allowing the stay of international jihadists, fleeing Western forces after the fall of their ISIS state, is an every-day fact. The use of South Africa as the springboard for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists has become a prominent issue. The passivity of the ANC regime allowed that Al-Qaeda-linked small training camps had not only been established since 2010, but had started to spread all over the country, alleges Potgieter²⁹. These small camps and their trained terrorists are waiting patiently to act when the time is right and the conditions in their favour.
The notion that the terrorists of Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram will not attack the South African state and its vulnerable political system because the ANC is an ex-terrorist organisation and is sympathic to the terrorists’ ideology, is foolish.  Potgieter²⁹ writes on the Kenyan Hotel attack^29:35:

Many will say that such groups have no reason to attack us. They will say that Kenya was attacked because its troops are in Somalia, where Al Shabaab operates. They are wrong.
Terror does not work that way. We are currently cooperating with the Kenyan authorities and a link as tenuous as that is enough to set off an attack on us.
Further, reason and logic are alien to such groups. Their tactics are to scare communities into submission. It does not matter who they attack. They seek  chaos and attention. They want to make a spectacle.

The patient waiting game by djihadists described above, seems to be in line with the more recent insurgency in Southern Africa — which the journalist Simon Allison³² describes as a” faceless insurgency”— that has started in October 2017 against a police station in the town of Mocimboa da Praia, Mozambique, to be followed in June 2018 by an attack in the Cabo Delgado province of northern Mozambique. Such attacks constitute a string of aimless assaults on the security forces and civilians without anyone claiming responsibility for it. In the June attack, 40 people were killed, some with extreme cruelty and at least 400 houses were burnt down, displacing more than 1 000 people. For such a significant conflict, out of the blue, there has been surprisingly little reliable information available, reports Allison.³² Until now, the situation has not changed, leaving the void as to information and understanding intact while the violence intensified in Mozambique. Allison³² reports there are now an average of two to three attacks a week while at least 120 persons have died. On this confusion and lack of knowledge regarding the assailants, Allison³² writes^32:20:

Even local journalists can’t talk about it because the culture of intimidation is there. Yeah, it’s confusing. It’s really confusing. Even the government is confused. How can you negotiate with people when you don’t know who they are?

This same initial confusion as to “what is going on” and “who is behind the unrest” had struck the governments of Syrya and Iraq at the start of their wars, before ISIS with its unique ideology, took off its mask. The editor³² of the idependent online newspaper @Verdade in Mozambique, Erik Charas³², said^32:20: “I have never come across something like this before. Never, not [even] during the Renamo war. It doesn’t even resemble the other Islamic State movements. This is completely different.”
There is no doubt that the South African djihadists’ début in politics will also take place in a unique way and possibly be associated with radicals in the EFF and the ANC who have already declared, in their intention to effect land grabbing from Whites, their participation in a revolution to come.

3.1.2.1.5. Political dissatisfaction-scoring  

To indicate how the dissatisfaction (during the Black Revolution) of the 1960s of the black masses under the white NP-regime compares with the 2019 dissatisfaction of the black masses under the black-ruled ANC-regime, is not easy, seeing that a kind of Malloch-Brown Arab Human Development Report²⁷ is absent here to reflect scores. The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,²⁵ can effectively be used in this instance to award, in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification, a single count of both South African regimes and executive political leadership between: a) 1652 and1994; and b) 1994 to 2019. The central hypothesis is that a low satisfaction rating (50% and lower) with their political rights for the periods: a) 1652 to 1994 and b) 1994 to 2019, respectively for all South African voters (as with the low Arab ratings on the existing freedoms reflect on their “readiness for revolution” by being regarded “as a step in the right direction”), will also reflect how ready South Africans are for “revolution as a step in the right direction.”^25,33
For the period 1652 to 1994 on Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction, a score of 42 (51%) out of a possible 82 points, was awarded. This means there was an average dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in pre-1994 South Africa. Revolutionary activities during that period contradict the opinion that pre-1994 South Africans had a strong tendency towards starting revolution. This low dissatisfaction score possibly also explains why the fomenting of a revolution in the 1960s was easily suppressed by the NP regime.^25,33
The count awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good-classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,²⁵ out of a possible maximum of 82, is 23 (26%). This means there is serious dissatisfaction reflected by South Africans in the post-1994 South Africa. The hypothesis is confirmed that the mass of South Africans can see (as did the Arabs low scores on freedom reflect that the “doing of revolution” by them “as a step in the right direction”), post-2019 as the correct time of “revolution as a step in the right direction”.^25,33
It is also important to reflect on General Jan Smuts’ words, now a true cliché after more than a century’s use, when he said that South Africa will never give it best but also never give its worst. As with many politicians and their statements, Smuts failed to offer a precise scale to ascertain his notions of “best” and “worst”, and thus the extremes of bad and good can be expected.³⁴ In terms of the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018²⁵ the challenge is to rate what Smuts³⁴ tried to say in 1910 and how in some way a measurement of the concepts of the “best” and “worst” for the period 1910 up to 2019 should be designed in a suitable way. The classification of the information was done in terms of a Black political history, meaning how blacks had experienced their situation historically speaking. Firstly, in terms of the worst versus the best, categorising was done in terms of: 1) political dissatisfaction versus political satisfaction; 2) keenness to start a revolution versus reluctance to start a revolution; and 3) ability to launch a revolution versus inability to start a revolution. Secondly, each of the above categories allocated ten points to quantifying values on the 1 on the scale as absolute low versus the 10 on the scale as absolute high. Thirdly, the period 1910 to 2019 was divided into four time frames: 1910; 1948, 1994 and 2019. All the calculations were done in terms of these particular time frames.^25,33
The scores were as follows^25,33:
Political dissatisfaction: 1910: 6; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Political satisfaction: 1910: 4; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.
Keenness to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 7; 1994: 9; 2019: 9.
Reluctance to start a revolution: 1910: 5; 1948: 3; 1994: 1; 2019: 1.
Ability to launch a revolution: 1910: 3; 1948: 3; 1994: 5; 2019: 9.
Inability to launch a revolution: 1910: 7; 1948: 7; 1994: 5; 2019: 1.
From the above results it is clear that the political dissatisfaction of 1994 and 2019 are similar and has attained the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, political satisfaction for 1994 and 2019 attained the lowest count with a score of 1). The rating for keenness to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 are at the highest level with a score of 9 (In contrast, the reluctance to start a revolution for 1994 and 2019 obtained the lowest level with a score of 1). The ability to launch a revolution in 1994 (possibly as a result of the NP’s strong and able security forces) was only 5 while in 2019 it has obtained a score of 9 (in a context in which blacks have become politically empowered and are actually manning the security forces, free from white dominance). It is obvious from the above outcome that 1994 was the year in which the Apartheid setup was experienced the most negatively since 1910 by blacks ( with a political dissatisfaction count: 9). In 1994, black rule and democracy were still absent. This explosive situation was one of the reasons why the NP regime had faced a strong push to “abdicate” or face a full-scale revolution in 1994. But also, as reflected in 2019, in a general climate in which blacks are supposed to be “free”, a score of 9 regarding political dissatisfaction has been registered. This result highlights the fact that the negative political outlook of blacks in 1994 has not not changed in any way in 2019, except that in 2019 the political scene has become far more volatile and potentially explosive than in 1994. It is confirmed by the ability of the masses of poor and landless people to foment revolution: Here the score of 9, is already four figures higher than 1994’s rating of 5.^25,33

3.1.2.1.6. Post-2019 revolution-in-waiting

On the issue of a possible post-2019 revolution heading for South Africa, it is important to emphasize that the political differences between the group of revolutionaries that is able to steer the revolution and unit of the ANC elite who is currently governing the country (coming from pre-1994 and continuing after post-1994), is zero. They are all revolutionaries, born from the same pre-1994 terrorist organisation, the Marxist-Leninist ANC. They are mostly individuals who underwrite the same political ideology, which has been varying from classic to neo-Marxism. So why will they revolt against their own organisation? The answer is found in the existing two ANC liberator identities today: the unscrupulous ANC-elite versus the impoverished masses of black people (30-million plus), which include the ANC-members (less than a million) and the ANC followers (less than 10 million).
The author and political analyst Redi Tlhabi³⁰ referred to the fact that although it has not been possible to identify the date of the above split, when the ANC-elite moved away from the South African people, the gap is enormous and is growing constantly.³⁰ The editor³⁵ of the Mail & Guardian, in an editorial in February 2019 under the heading^35:32: “The sad fact is the state is ripe for picking”, pinpointed the date of the divorce exactly however: 1994. He refers to the book of the late Sampie Terreblanche, tittled: Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s Search for a New Future since 1986. Terreblanche,³⁵ argues the editor³⁵, clearly pinpointed that the ANC’s leadership (from Nelson Mandela) bartered away its revolutionary ideals for the pragmatism and acceptance of big business. There was only one intention for this leadership: its own self-enrichment and personal financial empowerment. This was one side and a secret decision by the ANC elite (which includes Cyril Ramaphosa as a writer of the Constitution and supporter of the 1994 Dispensation) with their acceptance of the dishonest 1994 Political Dispensation. In the meantime this leadership, without batting an eyelid, went on to send out and to propagate the false ideology of the pre-1994 ANC, namely that its primary aim and intention is to enrich and uplift the masses of black people caught in the scourge of inequality, poverty and landlessness. This false ideology, which has been repeated for twenty-five years, was and still is signalled to every ordinary ANC supporter. It has now been unmasked, but it was not done by the Zuma-Magashule-Mabuza-Ramaphosa clan of racketeers who are marketing themselves as revolutionaries to save, as they allege, the post-2019 ANC and the country. These four marketeers’ intention is not to save and to restructure the present “sick” ANC, but to worsen the plight of the masses of blacks, their chaotic position in 2019 South Africa to assure a Marxist-Leninist government under a powerful politburo. It is the grassroots of the ANC, especially the dissatisfied black jobless and poor youth, who are now taking on the task of liberation and revolution to advance the masses of black people.³⁵
Reflecting the split in 1994 – and the ANC’s failure already then to rule with honesty and integrity to improve the lives the black masses – between the rich and the poor, which is based on the division between the ANC elite and the ANC’s ordinary members and followers, the editor³⁵ of the Mail & Guardian quotes Terreblanche’s³⁵ words^35:32:  “While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.” 
This sustained failure and inability evident within the small circle of the ANC regime, coming from 1994, goes even deeper: it is a function of the ANC’s elite seemingly extraordinary ability to mesmerise the ANC party and its millions of unsuspecting supporters till today with their ideology and promises of liberating the black masses.^30,35
The editorial³⁵ of the Mail & Guardian is correct when it postulates that the sad fact is that the South African state is ripe for picking: For many this picking – or more precisely: this revolution-in-waiting – is merely a reappropriation by the masses of poor and landless blacks of the ANC as a party, and possibly also the capturing of the state. Here the notion of being black is a central theme. Helen Zille³⁶ puts it in perspective on the 21st  April 2019 when she says^36:9: “We are seeing the resurrection of racial nationalism in our country. It is highly retrogressive and I think it will take South Africa down a cul-de-sac. We will eventually come to realise that but the cost will be high. And I am very sad we are going to have to go down that path, very sad, before we achieve the vision of our Constitution.”
Malloch-Brown’s²⁷ prerequisite for the activating of a revolution — and that such a happening can sometimes be a good event to better people’s tragic setup — fits well into the 2019 dysfunctional South Africa, and the seeming intention by the masses of blacks (ANC-supporters and non-supporters) to take back their so-called country from the mischievous ANC elite.  Tabane³⁷, quoting Azapo president StrikeThokoane’s view, reports on the 21st April 2019, on this disenchantment of supporters with the present-day ANC^37:9:

Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) president Strike Thokoane has an interesting analogy for explaining why many black people who supported the ANC for a long time are now turning to other parties 25 years since the dawn of democracy.
“I always liken this to a priest who tries to preach on Christmas Day or New Year eve when people are enjoying themselves at a party. He tries to say, ‘Jesus Christ saves’ but the noise of the entertainment is drowning him out.
But when they get sober, they want to go to the same person and say, ‘By the way, what were you saying about Jesus?”
He [Thokoane] says that, for a long time after 1994, black people were very complacent about democracy, thinking they had “arrived”.
“Our people were told that they have arrived and have nothing to do anymore. Everybody believed what they were told and promised. As a result , they were not even listening to the voice of Azapo. Others listened, but they thought we were rather too extreme and radical.”

The above view and the pleading of Strike Thokoane³⁶, reflect again on Zille’s warning of the resurrection of racial nationalism and the coming of the collapse of the South African state. It goes beyond these issues in 2019 when he says that Azapo stands for the reversing of the betrayal of promises to by the ANC to the people.^36,37 Tabane³⁷ writes^37:9:

We tell them, “Azapo stands for dignity of black people. Hence it is black consciousness roots. It is not anti white, but it is pro black. We love black people more.
The struggle had been sold. Black people have been sold for money and profit. Land has become fashionable but we have died for land. Our heroes have died for it. Land must be reconquered. So, we must repossess it so that we can redistribute it.
Unlike those who want to expropriate without compensation, we believe that, when you expropriate, you suggest it belongs to someone else and you are taking it by force. Repossession, however, means this belongs to us and we are taking it back.
Land needs to be possessed by black people after it was unlawfully stolen. We must reconquer.”

It must also be noted that there is the extreme radical standpoint of the Black First Land First (BLF) on land by its leader Andile Mngxitama^38:4:

“…the BLF, unlike the ANC and the EFF, is serious on its stance on the land issue. The FFPlus knows that if we get into Parliament, we will not drag our feet on the matter. The ANC and the EFF make up more than two thirds of parliament; why do you think they have not amended the Constitution by now? They are in the pockets of these landowners and are protecting their interests.
…should the party be removed from the ballot paper [May 8], “we will be left with no choice but to take up arms and fight for our freedom”.

It is not a surprise, in light of this “revolution” declaration by the BLF,  that Bell³⁹ refers with great reservation to the BLF’s leadership, as follows^39:2: “…the self-appointed collective imbongi of North Korea, Andile Mngxitama’s Black First Land (BLF)…”.
It must be highlighted that unrest and chronic anarchy are today inherent to the South African society: The Provinces of the North-West and KwaZulu-Natal reflect this state of affairs extremely well with so-called daily “service-delivery unhappiness” which is characterised by residents burning down state property to^40:8: “…announce to government that there is a protest going on…”; that^40:8: “…we are going to do worse things”; and^40:8: “We’re not benefiting from the advent of democracy. It’s as if we… residents are not South Africans. We are prepared to die to ensure we get basic services”. On the strength of this unrest-cum-anarchy, Lali,⁴⁰ on the recent extreme violent protest in Khayelitsha in Cape Town (which is only one of a growing mass of violent protests countrywide) and which shows all the signs of a failure by the SAPS to master crime there, writes^40:8: “Throughout the morning, the protesters blocked Japhta Masemola Road with burning tyres, various objects and a shipping container. The police tried unsuccessfully to disperse them, but they regrouped and set up more burning barricades, preventing traffic from moving along the normally busy roads.” 
Also, the preparation for unrest countrywide during the past May 2019 election and the ANC government’s decision to place the police and defense forces on readiness, reflect further the chronic presence of unrest-cum-anarchy in South Africa.  Van der Walt,⁴¹ quoting the minister of Police, Bheki Cele⁴¹, commented on the seriousness of this issue in May 2019^41:2: “Cele sê hoewel geweld in al nege provinsies moontlik is, hou Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal die grootste gevaar in. Geweldadige betogings kom al die afgelope jaar gereeld in Noordwes voor, terwyl politieke moorde in KwaZulu-Natal nie ’n vreemde verskynsel is nie.” This unrest-cum-anarchy – representing the growing and broadening collapse of law and order in South Africa – to which Cele³⁶ refers, is also confirmed by the Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba,⁴¹ the minister of State security. Van der Walt,⁴¹ on the past May election, writes^41:2: “…inligting wat deur haar department ingesamel is, dui daarop dat daar ‘bedrywighede’ is wat moontlik ten doel het om die verkiesing in Noordwes en KwaZulu-Natal omver te werp.”

3.1.2.1.7. Political racism’s role in revolution

It must be clear that these are also problems waiting to muddy black versus white race relations, which can be opportunistically be shifted onto a revolutionary project.  It must therefore be acknowledged that a part of the leadership of the ANC seems also to start to reflect racism on the same basis as reflected by the leaders of the EFF, Azania and the BLF. The ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule ponders this in April 2019 when in Philippi in the Western Cape he alleged^42:3: “to incite ANC supporters to exercise their vote in a racist way.” Maxon⁴² reports^42:3: “Magashule told residents in Philippi that they must not vote for an umlungu (a white person).” In addition it should be noted that the ANC veterans immediately condemned his racial utterance, seeing it as a sign of irresponsible leadership: a racial and political misstep which demanded the intervention of Ramaphosa to punish Magashule (which unsurprisingly has so far not happened). But this kind of racial outburst from the ANC’s top brass could eventually become more prominent in the wake May 2019, depending on how Ramaphosa squares off against Magashule in a leadership battle.^39,42
Maxon⁴² points out that this “mischievous” political behaviour of Magashule must be read in terms of the outcome of the Nasrec 2017 conference and the power play which has been an outcome of it.  Here his focus is on a contingent of old conservative ANC veterans (respecting the Freedom Charter as a prerequisite for non-racism), still clinging to their traditional Marxist-Leninist politics versus a new brigade of radical cadres (which Bell³⁹ has  described as the “self-appointed collective imbongis of North Korea” and which could become numerous in the ANC if Magashule gets a proper grasp on power). In practice it seems not to be a pure asymmetric leadership feature in the ANC, but more of an outcome of clear groupings around the two big men of the ANC: Ramaphosa versus Magashule. The issue is not so much a political or an ideology renewal or an age-factor, as it is around the grasp on political power in which the Magashule politics is far more radical than the politics prescribed to ANC cadres in terms of the Freedom Charter. Inherent to this is the presence of radicalism which could trigger racially-inspired aggressive behaviour against whites in the advent of of revolution. Maxon⁴² is correct when he says the ANC’s soul is in peril (which spells danger for the political stability of South Africa after 2019). Yonela Dipko⁴³ notices Magashule’s unflattering description of an umlungu (a white person) as the right of ANC cadres to call out specific white people who are alleged to be against the rights and interests of black persons (which seems in reality to be “ANC blacks”, and not “DA blacks”!). He clearly does not see white-listing by a black Magashule as racism as long as the black Magashule is categorical about a umlungu (white) who is, in his terms, a so-called “racist” particularly as defined by the ANC’s Diko⁴³ and Magashule. At the same time Diko⁴³ fails to describe the “characteristics and activities of the so-called 2019 White Western Cape racist” and falls back onto dangerous political clichés, which suggests taking revenge on and cleansing the opposition, which happens to be white too.^39,42,43
Dipko⁴³ reflects firstly on “soft politics”, the so-called “pity plea” by radical and dangerous blacks who, by their own misadventures and shortcomings, do not form part of able and skilled competitors, when he reflects^43:3:

Integration is still a one-way street, blacks assimilating to whites. After 400 years, white people can’t pronounce our names, can’t speak our languages, can’t identify with black people’s challenges, such as a lack of spaces. So, black people find themselves having to assimilate. If your name is Tinyiko you must let then call call you “tiny”; you find your black self assimilating to their language, tastes and culture because you are a minority of one, at every board meeting, every restaurant, every school play. It’s disheartening.”

The above plea is obviously one-sided, biased and without serious consideration, while Diko⁴³ also conveniently forgets who has ruled over South Africa since 2019: precisely the old garde and veterans of the ANC which have failed to give persons as Diko⁴ the required “spaces” and which have introduced English as the only “official” language, making the use of indigenous languages irrelevant. Furthermore, there are of course those who use colonial English first names willingly par excellence, ignoring their ethnic “black names”: the ANC top cadres are littered with such individuals such as Ace Magashule, Nelson Mandela  and Cyril Ramaphosa! It seems so far, from Diko’s⁴³ rhetoric, that the possible presence of a poor self-esteem harboured by some blacks in ANC politics has been ignored, contrary to the public boast and much-touted 2019 “sound black self-esteem”.
But, on the “victim-identity” Diko⁴³ quickly reveals his true intention (and unashamed racism) when he reveals his mindset regarding “hard politics”, as he writes^43:3:

The Western Cape is a fiefdom of the abelungu and to contend that, in the name of non-racialism, in fact of a racist government, they must continue to be given governing power is offensive in the extreme, particular to the black majority.
Success here has a white face and it starts in the corridors of the provincial government. While Cape Town is 80% black, the divisional directors of the provincial government alone are 70% white. That then informs everything else, from government policy to the conceptualisation of programmes.
Most experiences are anecdotal, which is why someone such as Premier Helen Zille can deny racism exists in Cape Town. She has no personal encounter with it. Until a black government takes over the Western Cape, sensitivity with racial victimisation will not exist.

Looking carefully at Diko’s⁴³ rhetoric, it seems to be an ANC creed, an organisation posing as a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing, especially as far as the last election is concerned. This is shown from the words used to describe the Western Cape and Cape Town (both basically the only governmental entities still functioning with qualified audits in the country) as a “racist government”, an “offensive governing power”, and “time that black government takes over Western Cape”, etc. Secondly, the fact that Diko⁴³ is a spokesperson of the ANC in the Western Cape, quite evidently rhymes with Magashule’s anti-abelungu politics, bringing to the foreground the undercurrent of post-2019 racism (and more: racial and political extreminism) prevalent in the ANC: clearly discrimination against blacks, Coloureds and whites who dare to criticise the ANC for its misadvetures and who do not support the ANC’s nefarious politics. Diko’s⁴³ opinions and thinking must be read as the same reflected in Sudan by the previous tyrant Omar al-Bashir specifically against women during his rule of 1998 to 2019.^39,42,43
The Guardian⁴⁴, as quoted by the Sunday Times, reflects^44:15: “In the Bashir era, women faced being jailed and were even threatened with physical torture for a variety of offences, such as wearing trousers or behaving in a way that deemed inappropriate.” 
If, so far, no concerns were evident in the minds of many South Africans about their future, especially whites, Coloureds, Indians and non-black ANC cadres, it is now time to start worrying. Diko’s and Magashule’s rhetorics are in line with the racism of the radicals of the EFF, Azano and the PAC. It is political cliches that echo Hitler and the Nazis’ racial policies of highlighting the “differences and evil nature of Jews” in their scapegoating of them as racial, economic, social culprits and saboteurs, and created the foundation for the Nazis to allow the genocide of Jews. In 2019, the insight into the mindsets of the leadership of the ANC, help to differentiate what is really bad and what is really good. It spells danger for the lives of the 15 million voters (out of the 25 million total voting individuals) who did not vote for the ANC and thus for 37 million people (out of a total 57 million population) who do not necessarily support the ANC.^{39, 42,43}
South Africans know well how a madman such as an Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan came to power and could stay in power for 30 years with the aid of their brand of extremism, contributing to racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, and murderous rule. For South Africans this should be a timeous warning and an indication what they can expect if the post-2019 politics go wrong and political power falls into the hands of characters like Julius Malema, Ace Magashule, Jacob Zuma and David Mabuza. During Apartheid, where the blacks were the victims, but it is important to note that they were also the victims in Sudan. Things can turn nasty quickly, even for the ANC elite, such as Diko, Magashule, Mabuza and Ramaphosa if they as the top cadres lost their grip on South Africa. On the power grab of Bashir in 1989 by means of a military coup and his corrupt rule up to 2019, the Sunday Times⁴⁵ of the 14th April 2019 notes as follows^45:15:

Labour unions were liquidated and dissenters detained without trial and tortured.
Life got even worse after South Sudan, home to the majority of Christians, seceded in 2011. Churches were bulldozed and burnt. In 2012 Bashir warned non-Muslims: “Nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia”.
Sudan turned into a playground for Islamic terrorist groups. Its’ harboured Osama bin Laden in the early years of his jihad movement that led to the creation of al-Qaeda, landing Sudan a spot on the US list of countries backing terrorism.
Bashir exploited ethnic and tribal tensions to consolidate power, with bloody ethnically targeted wars in Darfur and other parts of the country earning him an ICC indictment for war crimes and genocide in 2009, and making Sudan’s name synonymous with ethnic cleansing.
Refugees described the horror of racially targeted atrocities. Attackers would shout “Kill the slaves, kill the slaves!” and “We have orders to kill the blacks”. One refugee reported a militia member boasting, “We kill all blacks and even kill cattle when they have black calves.

3.1.2.1.8. Role of the youth in revolution

An aspect missed by political analysts is the possible role that the South African youth can play in a forthcoming revolution. Firstly, it seems that the efforts by the government to register the young voters have failed. Statistics show that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined by 9%. This reflects that only 341 236 of South Africa’s present registered voters are younger than 20 years against 646 313 in 2014 (In 2009 the number was even higher on 669 241). In the age-group 20 to 29 there is at present 5 299 297 voters (against 5 759 297 in 2014). In practice means it that only 1.3% of the registered voters are 20 years and younger, while only 21.1% is 30 years and younger. For formal politics and thus the various political parties mean this a loss of voter support. Firstly, the fact that only 35% of eligible voters participated in the 2014 election shows that the youth’s present apathy not a new kind of phenomenon. What is telling is that as with the 1960s black “revolution” against the Apartheid regime, the growing involvement of the youth in unrests all over the country currently could equally have a huge impact on the status quo. Although the widespread lack of service delivery is often mentioned as the main source of the unrest, unemployment is fast developing into a stronger driver for the widespread riots. Increasingly, it seems to be political indifference that has been playing a role in fomenting the unrest, since many youths are politically well-informed and driven by a political interest with the focus on their personal interests and problems instead of on a political party and the elite’s interests. Many of these non-party youths associated with the “rebellion” politics of the EFF and BLF, take to the streets without necessarily joining these parties as members or as supporters. At most, they see party politics only as a vehicle for self-promotion.^{38, 46-49}
The youth are no longer mesmerised by the ANC’s message of ^47:36: “…you should remember what the ANC did for you.” For the present youth the ANC as a party and as a regime have done absolutely nothing and they know it very well. A vote for the ANC by a black youngster simply means^47:36: “…to endorse the ANC’s position in power, while its members continue with corruption, the corporatisation of the state and unethical governance.”
They are willing to take on the ANC system, as #RhodesMustFall and the #FeesMustFall movements showed us. They are not shying away from the concept that democratic rule has mostly emerged through bloodshed, but are rather making it a second option.^27,46,47
The youth could soon become the real power to drive a revolution, in fact, sooner than most political analysts understand. As in Tunisia and Egypt, their South African revolution could be ignited too, quite suddenly by a small flame. And the various small fires burning already are manifold among the youth: hunger, poverty, abuse, indignity, dominance, discrimination, exploitation, and more.  The advise of Bruce in April 2019 to Ramaphosa in which he repeated Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil, sweat and tears” speech in 1938 to the South African youth, is nothing else than a threat on the one side to the youth to toe the line or else, and on the other side a further exploitation of them. These kinds of admonishments by Ramaphosa directed at the youth in the future may just be the single fire to start the revolution. It does not matter if it turns out to be a South Africa Youth Spring, South Africa Youth Winter, South Africa Youth Summer or South Africa Youth Autumn, the revolution is waiting. Where the politicians, especially the black ones of the ANC, celebrate April 27 as their Freedom Day of a 25-year old so-called New South Africa, most of the black youths can’t celebrate along with them. There is good reason for it, and also why they not have registered to vote on May 8 2019 and why they are becoming primed for revolution. They have never tasted Nelson Mandela’s promises of democracy and freedom. Mandela has become a stranger to them, a blurred, bitter memory.^27,47,50,51
A prominent example of the sudden explosion of violence by the youth, and that it is looming, ever-present in every-day life, was well-illustrated on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg. Here a peaceful march of hundreds of black pupils [all members of the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Students (Cosas) were so disillusioned by the failure of their political parent and mentor, the ANC, to stop violence at schools, that the whole march turned into violence and  looting. Their looting did not stop with the theft of only fruit, but included cellphones and alcohol. The young protesters left a trail of destruction and even injured a shopkeeper. It appears that the Number One of the ANC, Ace Magashule’s speech at Luthuli-house, failed to calm them down. This, it must be noted, can be the future awaiting South Africans exposed to an extreme and unpredictable violent uprising by these youths.^52,53
The youth of Cosas’s behaviour must not only be read in the poor example set by their peers in the ANC, but in their powerless situation and deprivation as a result of ignoring their rights in terms of the Constitution, specifically by their own people and group, namely the ANC. It is not a surprise that the secretary of the Young Communist League, Kgabo Moriti⁵⁴, viewed this with a critical eye, especially the turn of events in South African politics. He says^54:12: “We must ask ourselves if we have begun our descent into chaos.”
The seriousness of the misdemeanor by present-day South Africa youths, also caught the attention of the editor⁵³ of The Star forcing him to revisit the past of unrest, anarchy and violence, in order to make sense of our future. He posits^53:12:

For a moment it felt like 2002, when Cosas, then led by Jilius Malema , unleashed chaos in the Joburg CBD, leading to loses by pedestrians, vendors and shopkeepers who were mugged and robbed during the rowdy illegal march.
It should not surprise us that high-school children use violence and looting as part of protest. South Africa has an endemic culture of violence and looting in protest. During the days of the Struggle against apartheid, some elements among the protesters used to trash shops and loot during marches.

An editorial⁵⁰ of the Sunday Times (dated 21 April 2019) tells us the truth and more about the reality that awaits the country^50:2:

However, people born in 1994 may not share our joy – mainly because many are unemployed. These 25-year-olds are at the centre of the single biggest challenge SA has faced since 1994: unemployment. According to StatsSA, the youth unemployment rate is higher than any other age group, irrespective of education levels: 52.2% of people aged 15-24, and 35.5%of those aged 25-34, are unemployed – and these figures exclude the young people who have given up looking for work and become a burden on their parents and siblings, or have simply turned to criminal activity.

This brings us back to the sudden start-up of revolutions, especially those of the youth and the single match that usually lights it. For the ANC government to keep up the comprehensive suppression of these outbursts of youth violence, the editor⁵³ of The Star seemingly sees as a solution, the much-needed match to start up revolution, much more serious than the “Malema-2002-uprising” or the 1960s black revolt. He errs when he writes  10th April this year¹²: “Our government needs to seriously curb this culture, for many a time it undermines the rights to protest and deals a blow to issues that many concerned people protest over.”
He completely misses the point: since 1994, peaceful protests in the first place have brought only false promises given to the black youth from the ANC, as with Ace Magashule’s reassurance to them that^55:15: “…their grievances are being given attention”. Secondly, as already indicated, their (and their parents who voted for the ANC) needs, demands and ultimatums are laughed at by the autocratic Marxist ANC-regime, as Magashule’s insincere reaction on the 8th April 2019 in Johannesburg confirms: ongoing empty promises to the youth.
The political analysts like Barney Mthombothi⁵⁶ — although they despise unrest, riots and violence — understand and respect the drivers of unrest, riots and violence in terms of the mindset of the average South African. They contradict the false insight that South Africa’s psyche is stable after 25 years of “household abuse” by the ANC and that unrest, riots and violence, and thus revolution, is impossible. The “burning of things to show your anger as seemingly the last and only resort” for many are the staple of 2019 politics. The motto that there are no real winners in a strike, riot or revolution, don’t matter for the poor, deprived and rejected persons. Statistics that the South African growth for 2019 is expected only to be 1.3%, with a possible improvement in 2021 to 2%, are not part of their world, because when it was 6% plus, they didn’t benefit from economic growth either.^{26,50,52,53,56,57}
It must be noted that there are other contaminating elements which could play a role in any youth revolution. Firstly, there are the radicals that instrumentalize the unhappiness of the black youths, as we see from the allegations that the ANC youth movement has been behind serious unrest since March-April 2019 in places as Alexandria, Hammanskraal, Orange Grove, Pretoria and Soshanguwe in Gauteng, Khayelitsha, Blackheath, Eersterivier and the Strand in the Western Cape. Here also it seems to be an influx of adult trouble-makers who steer and incite the uprising. This we see too at the April 2019 meeting of Ace Magashule in Parys where the ANC Youth League’s war drums were heard loudly and the ANC seniors sided with the youthful radicals. Julius Malema’s legal and constitutional privilege to declare: “…we will not kill the whites for now” is not so innocent when the planning of anarchy and revolution is the ultimate goal. It must be remembered that Malema publicly said he would take part in a revolution when the situation arises. In addition the war-talk of the BLF is another feature of the political landscape that stands out. Secondly, South Africa is not built on a singular black unity and a singular non-black unity: The black unity is compiled of a very unstable black tribal composition, created by Apartheid, wherein the Zulus and Xhosas are still today regarded as the “superior” tribes. Cyril Ramaphosa and Mtolanthe maybe “Soweto-born”, but they are not of the Zulu- or Xhosa-tribes:  they are from the so-called “Northern tribes”. This “classification” is also applicable to Julius Malema. (note: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are Xhosas and Jacob Zuma is a Zulu). Azapo’s creed: “we are pro-black”, is starting to become an insignificant slogan beyond the racial classification and discrimination of the old ethnic reality. Also, the ANC’s erasing of ethnicity and tribalism from its politics is something of the past. When revolution flares up, the tribal reality can steer it to regard the white “tribe” and other “non-black” tribes with equal animosity, but it could well change direction quite quickly to become an extreme black-on-black tribal-driven revolution, like in Rwanda or as during the “First and Second Black Colonisations” of South Africa reflect only too well. The instigators and propagators of revolution can, as during the French Revolution, also unexpectedly become the victims of their fervour.^{27,34,35,37,38,39,48,52,58-60}
Malloch-Brown’s²⁷ notions on the advantages and inevitability of revolution, makes sense. It also makes sense for present-day South Africa.  Most black youth know that under another ANC regime their situation will never improve: Post-2019 could for them become the opportunity to settle and rectify the matter.²⁷
To think that a revolution can and will not ever happen in South Africa is wishful thinking. Above comprehensive and in-depth findings confirm that a post-2019 revolution is not far-fetched. Undoubtedly, the country stands on the brink of a revolution. It is ripe for picking, even overripe. It does not need not another Marikana to start up. And, as in Tunisia and Egypt, when it suddenly comes to an eruption,  will it not only cost the heads of the ANC top brass, but sadly thousands of other people, mostly innocent bystanders, who are unrelated to the 1994 to 2019 ANC’s and the 1948 to 1994 Apartheid regime. And such an outcome can be bloody and unstoppable as in Rwanda.^{27,35,36,37,39,42,43}

3.1.2.1.9. Immense presence of crime, violence, gender-violence and xenophobia in today’s South Africa

When we speak of the presence of unrest and anarchy in the country, is it important to point out that the foundations of it happening have been laid already (See also Article 13). What is important to note in this setup is the absence of a consciousness which is able to differentiate the transgressions of the ordinary citizen (This absence of a consciousness within the ANC elite was already covered in an in-depth study in Articles 11 to 17).
The basically permanent slide of law and order being eroded all over the country — reflected by immense, uncontrollable crime and violence present on the Cape Flats, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and many other places, as well as the presence of extreme highway and railway crime, violence and theft, together with gender- and xenophobic crimes and violence – show how near South Africa is on the path to a collapse into revolution. The basis for doing untold wrongs, as revolution and its murderous deeds often call for, is thus already well-established as a modus operandi with a large contingent of the population.^61-73

3.1.2.2. The joker-surprises of history

Louw³⁴ writes that history often brings about unexpected, even strange outcomes. He writes^34:239:

The fortunes and misfortunes of nations have in some instances changed even after they had fled or failed, totally contradicting the rules of trustworthy predictions (and even sound thinking!). The impact of extreme world disasters, like earthquakes, pests, new wars, immense famine, new mass migrations, just to mention a few, have in the past had quick and profound impacts on the power of mighty empires or have caused undervalued, small nations’ fate to take a turn for the better.

The possibility remains that the political history of South Africa after 2019 can be one that we never have expected or anticipated, making the issue of land ownership insignificant or at least one eventually resulting in a very successful outcome.  Some determinants which can be roleplayers acting as jokers, need to be enlightened.^74-82

3.1.2.2.1. Aids, mass illnesses and pests

The Christian Bible is full of stories of the sudden appearance of known and unknown illnesses and pests that killed off populations in large numbers. The outcomes were often that dynasties, despots and regimes collapsed under the weight of such events. Currently in Africa, Ebola is such a “pest” that, notwithstanding well-organised governmental and healthcare efforts to erase it, seems to have become an unstoppable plague.^74,75,80,82
Aids is an illness that has been causing ongoing havoc but it seems it can not be contained, let alone totally erased.  In some countries it has registered a constant increase, notwithstanding healthcare education and medicine to combat it. South Africa unfortunately is caught in a downward Aids spiral. Data shows that in 2002  so much as 4.6 million South Africans were Aids-sufferers. The number 7.97 million was cited in 2019. This represents an increase of 3.37 million in 17 years. The 2019 Aids sufferers form nearly 15% of the country’s total population of 57 million. What is evident is that it is the youth  – who should constitute the base of the future work force and should fuel the growth in GDP, and who must assure the continuation of the nation’s population – has been the most vulnerable in contract the deadly virus.⁸³
Illnesses such as Aids and others can dramatically change – when they become epidemics – a country’s socio-political and economic setup overnight with regard to the numbers of races and the traditional power that these numbers hold in terms of a majority-minority composition assured in a regime.

3.1.2.2.2. Impact of extreme poverty, unemployment and overpopulation

Many economic and political analysts and strategists underscore that there are more or less 30 million poor South Africans (out of a population of 58 million), while more than 17.5 million people, because of their utmost poverty and unemployment, are forced to live as beggars on social grants. This unfortunate poor contingent of people in need of social grants is constantly growing as a result of the growth in unemployment, rising living costs and population growth. The statistics reflect that social grants have grown from 2017 to 2018 by 8%, while the growth in cross tax revenue for the period was only 6%. It can be read from this growing poverty that for 2017/ 2018 there were officially 890 523 job seekers registered, but only 21 076 (2.3%) were placed in jobs or internships. Beyond this registered official jobless rate of 869 447 in 2018, is the mass of jobless people who are not registered. This social-economic chaos has been the result of the country’s high population growth of 1,43 % in 2019, worsening the already high unemployment and poverty.^83-88
Growth in official unemployment is confirmed by the data for the first quarter of 2019 at 29% (with some sources putting it near 30%), with the indication that it can further deteriorate. Between 2001 and 2018 the primary sector recorded 484,000 job losses.  The impact of growing poverty, which indicates the presence of hunger for even those with some permanent work too, is pinpointed by Speckman⁸⁹ when she writes^89:3: “…the Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice & Dignity Group’s Household Affordability Index for 2019 showed that a general worker earning the national minimum wage at the 10% exemption level and working full for a 23 days earned  R3,312 per month. Transport and electricity costs accounted for 57% of the wage, leaving R1,425.48 for all other expenses, including food.”
The direct impact of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation can bring about a total collapse of the South Africa economy on the one hand, but on the other hand a crisis of starvation and famine. Such outcomes with dire conditions is because of the total degradation that the poor population have to endure for the luxurious lifestyles of the ruler of the day in an effort to survive. An issue as land-ownership quickly becomes a non-starter for these impoverished masses.

3.1.2.2.3. South African climate changes and drought on food production, lifestyle viability and sustainability

The immense impact of climate change, such as extreme temperature fluctuations and droughts can firstly force the issue of land to become a vehicle to create a means of income; and secondly ignite the debate on the use of land to produce food but also question the viability of sustainable lifestyles. Both these issues could eventually lead to famine. The losing battle against hunger can already be read in the negative effect of the countrywide drought. Thus the importance of farm land per se as a means to sustain a living could become obsolete. This could result in waves of people from the rural population taking flight to cities for a living, bringing the need for urban land for homes into the bigger picture.^90-96
If recurring droughts are taken into account, especially as a seemingly permanent, natural  phenomenon in South Africa, the arrival of a water scarcity crisis as far as human consumption, agriculture and industrial use is concerned, becomes a given. This can bring about a dramatic change in geopolitics, accompanied by a devastating impact on the already existing mass poverty and unemployment. For an overpopulated country such as South Africa the consequences could be enormous, leaving in its wake an impoverished nation, in which most of the population will be enslaved to the ruler for survival. A water crisis will replace the present political and emotional land-ownership matter and become the population’s foremost concern.^90-96
The incoming drought has been confirmed by the SA Weather Service which indicates that the country has experienced drought since 2013 with a continuous uncertainty about when rains will fall. Patrick and Hosken⁹⁵ write^95:11 “This had put the jobs of about a million farm workers at risk, and made the country vulnerable to food and water insecurity, according to agricultural economists and farming associations”; and^95:11: “AgriSA said in its 2018/2019 drought report that 31, 000 farming jobs had been lost since January 2018 in the drought hotspots of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, North West, Limpopo and the Northern Cape.”
Patrick and Hosken⁹⁵ report further^95:11: “Water restrictions are in force in some provinces. In the Northern Cape,  water is shut off overnight in its main town, while Eastern Cape premier Oscar Mabuyane this week declared the province a disaster area. Water restrictions are in force in its two metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City.”
The spokesperson of Water Affairs, Sputnik Ratau⁹⁵, said^95:11: “SA is water scarce, so the reality of less than world-average rainfall, rapid urbanisation, climate change, desertification — especially from the west — and rapid population growth cannot be ignored.”
Professor Johan Willemse⁹⁵, on the effect of the 2019 drought in general on the country, especially on the cost of living which could worsen poverty and hunger, writes:^95:11 “We could see a 50% increase in the importing costs of white maize, which will rise from R3,000 per ton to R4,500 per ton. This will cause major meat price increases”.
Also, Patrick and Hosken⁹⁵, quoting Mervyn Abrahams⁹⁵ of the Economic Justice and Dignity Group,  report on the rising cost of living as a result of the drought as follows^95:11: “…drought was a factor in the cost of the household food basket. It increased by R146.14 (4.8%) from R3,038.50  in October 2018 to R3,184.63 this year.”
Makhosini Mgitywa⁹⁷, the head of Communication at the Ministry of Human Settlements, Water & Sanitation, writes in the Sunday Times of the 22nd September 2019^97:26:

The situation is dire and unless we do not do something, as the government and citizens, we will be left with a water shortage situation that will affect  us all, and to an extent never seen before.
SA is among the driest countries in the world but we go on as if we are among the wettest. It’s estimated that in five years’ time we will experience physical water scarcity. Our own department’s projection is that at that time the demand for water will outstrip supply.

Satgar⁹⁶ writes on the 15th December 2019 in the Sunday Times and Vavi and Lenferna write⁹⁸ on the 15th September 2019 in the Sunday Times that the climate crisis is already established as fact in the country. It is reflected in the form of sudden flash floods: killing more than 70 people at once and displacing more than 1 500 people, bringing damage at the cost of R1-billion at a time; leaving communities without drinking water or water for agriculture and posing a widespread threat to food security.^96,98
Vavi and Lenferna⁹⁸ reflect^98:20:

Studies show that as a result of human-case climate change, SA faces deepening inequality and is already 10%-20% poorer.
Climate change is worsening an already dire situation of deep inequality, poverty and unemployment. The outbreaks of xenophobia violence were the most recent expression of our multifaceted crisis.
The xenophobia attacks are also connected to the climate crisis, because increasing climate impacts are eroding traditional livelihoods and driving people from their homes and increasing migration.

Many wars and revolutions were started because of the need for the three basic resources: water, food and land. Also, on the other hand, it has collapsed wars and revolutions, together with empowering regimes. It has also erased nations from the international scene. Beyond that, the experience of hunger and shortages of water can dramatically change voters to blindly support their failed regime, while thirst and famine could directly lead to revolution.

3.1.2.2.4. Racial assimilation, miscegenation and dissolution

The assimilation and miscegenation of the various races, which started in the Cape in 1652 between whites, blacks, Malays, Indian and Khoi San people, are ongoing today. The 1994 dispensation and the freeing of blacks and Afrikaners from the Apartheid shackles, has  created the impetus for a much deeper assimilation between the South African races while miscegenation seems to be gaining ground. It is possible that full assimilation and miscegenation of races may occur in the next 10 to 20 years. The racial issue around the so-called colour of the land owner could become unimportant because of this miscegenation in which mixed families are created.³⁴
The fact also that the present dominant land owners, namely the whites and specifically the Afrikaners, have been since 1989 in a process of dissolution, could result in them numbering at most 30 000 in a century, and make it unnecessary to pursue land expropriation in the long term, taking farms they own.^{34,76-78,83,85}

3.1.2.2.5. The possible post-2020 democratising of the Electoral Act

For years the South African voters have been caught in an undemocratic voter system which gives the ANC’s party bosses and not the voters the right to select MPs and MPLs through an imbalanced proportional system. This resulted that at present the country is being governed by a very small minority, a powerful ANC clique.^{47, 99-103}
Looting and the appointments of shady figures in municipalities have restarted and is a direct result of this flaw of political accountability demanded from councillors and officials by the electors. Mthombothi¹⁰⁴ postulates^104:19:

In fact, it’s not even correct to talk about elected officials in our system because we vote for the party, not the individual. This decides which of its members should be elevated to higher office.
The party is given a blank cheque that it uses as it sees fit. That needs to change. Anybody wielding power — from the lowest councillor, to the mayor, to president — should do so by virtue of direct election by the voters.

The private legal action which was started up in 2019 to reform the electoral system and to do away with the present favourable climate for the ANC elite through the election system by means of the court application brought by the New Nation Movement (NNM), a KhoiSan organisation, to change the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998) could make provision for the direct election of MPs and MPLs by voters, and if it is at the end successful, it could have a dramatic anti-ANC voter outcome in 2024. So far, the Ramapohosa regime has not shown much support for the change.^{47,99,101-108}

3.1.2.2.6. Lingering impact of nineteen-million passive voters on the 2024-elections

The outcome of the past May 2019 elections highlighted only a participation on national level by 49% of the eligible voters in the elections, of which the ANC only received the votes of  28% of the eligible voters.^{47,102,109-111}
The Institute of Security Studies shows further, comparing the outcomes of the 2014 elections with the 2019 elections, that the ANC is in a permanent downward spiral.  In this free fall must be noted that the ANC has less than a million inscribed members against a total of registered voter population of ±27-million and an eligible voters population of ±37-million.^{47,99,101-108,112-115}
Further statistics show, that as a result of their passivity not to register as voters,  that the 18 to 19 years olds on the voter lists for 2019 is 47% lower than in 2014, while for the age group 20 to 29 the number declined with 9%. Clear dislike and aversion by the youth for the ANC have developed apace since 2014. The youth vote can be devastating for the ANC in 2024.⁴⁷
The above shows that if a party or a group of integrity can mobilise the 51% of passive voters, the ANC, as well as the DA, can be totally erased in 2024 from the political scene. Mthombothi¹⁰⁴, on this immensely positive outcome waiting to be implemented: That is to convince passive voters, writes^104:19:

Throughout the turmoil there’s on crucial element that nobody seems even bothered about. The voter is the rock, the foundation on which democracy is built. Yet no-one is talking about him or her. It’s almost as though the voter doesn’t exist or is immaterial to the entire setup. This whole circus therefore brings to the fore the need for electoral reform.

3.1.3. South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

The analysis and discussion of this article (see headings 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.) will continue in the final article (Article 19) of the series of 19 articles, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19). The analysis and discussions of Article 19 will be done under the following heading and subheadings:
3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government
3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining
3.1.3.1.1. ANC
3.1.3.1.2. DA
3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA
3.1.3.2. Cutting out the ANC and DA out as future rulers
3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence
3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal 
3.1.3.2.2.1. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the Constitution
3.1.3.2.2.1.1. The ANC-regime, the judiciary and the possibility of a care-taker administrator
3.1.3.2.3. Time for a new UDF 
3.1.3.2.3.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF
3.1.3.2.4. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution 

4. Conclusions

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC regime, together with the incompetent leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, has brought South Africa to the brink of disaster. Its economy is in a shambles. A short-term escape route is needed by the Ramaphosa regime. Land grabs are currently the most attractive solution for this ANC regime to deliver some form of capital or money easily to the masses of poor people, as well to give the Ramaphosa elite some credibility again as revolutionaries who are still “freeing” the masses of poor blacks from the shackles of white dominance and from capitalists.
It is clear that not one of the political parties which are active in present-day South Africa, is capable and trustworthy enough to run the country effectively. It is basically impossible for any one of them to deliver on a just and balanced land-redistribution policy.
The troubled land-ownership matter fits well into the many dissatisfactions of the masses of poor and landless people. It holds the potential to motivate them to become involved in immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution, in the immediate future. Furthermore the unbalanced and unjust land-ownership matter in the country is the single best reason available to radicals in the ANC and other political parties, under the cover of revenge on white supremacy and capitalism, to activate a Marxist-Leninist coup. The fact that the ANC is losing its autocratic grip on the country fast and could be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the probability of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already.
It is clear that an acceptable solution to the land-ownership matter must be found not later than 2020.
In the final article (Article 19), titled: “South Africa’s Troubled Land-ownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)”, the land-ownership matter will further be analysed and discussed. An approach and guideline on how the land expropriation process can be activated and steered in an effort to solve the matter, will be offered.

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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.
FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.
UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS
Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.