Title: Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (17: ANC’s troubled leadership)
Gabriel P Louw
iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093
Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).
Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)
Email: profgplouw@gmail.com
Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.
Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 11: 7
1. Background
In 2001, Prof Jim Collins1 and a group of academics, known as the Good-To-Great Research Team, published their findings on the eleven companies that made the list of so-called great American companies, in terms of strict and rigid selection prescriptions. This outcome follows a study of the records of 1435 well established and successful so-called good American companies that all appeared on the Fortune 500 list for at least 15 years. These studies show that leadership was the critical feature that distinguished ‘great companies’ from ‘good companies’: The type of leadership associated with transforming a good company into a great one, was their Level 5 leadership, or the highest level leaders. Collins reports:1:20,21,30,35
Compared to high-level leaders with big personalities who made head-lines and become celebrities, the good-to-great leaders seem to have come from Mars. Self-effacing, quiet, reserved, even shy – these leaders are a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will. They are more like a Lincoln and than Patton and Caesar. We expected that good-to-great leaders would begin by setting a new vision and strategy. We found instead that they first got the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats – and then figured out where to drive the bus.
Level 5 leaders channel their ego needs away from themselves and into the larger goal of building a great company. It’s not that the Level 5 leaders have no ego or self-interest. Indeed, they are incredibly ambitious – but their ambition is first and foremost for the institution, not themselves.
It is very important to grasp that Level 5 leadership is not just about humility and modesty. It is equally about ferocious resolve, an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to done to make the company great.
Level 5 leaders look out the window to apportion credit to factors outside themselves when things go well (and if they cannot find a specific person or event to give credit to, they credit good luck). At the same time, they look in the mirror to apportion responsibility, never blaming bad luck when things go poorly.
On the question if a lower level leader can develop to become Level 51, Collins’s answer is clear [which could also guide politicians in South Africa]1:36:
My hypothesis is that there are two categories of people: those who do not have the seed of Level 5 and those who do. The first category consists of people who could never in a million years bring themselves to subjugate their egoistic needs to the greater ambition of building something larger and more lasting than them selves. For these people, work will always be first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute.
Considering the slow death of the ANC party, as argued by my previous Article 16 (Outdated ANC) in which I discuss the direct impact of devastating group factions and leader infighting inside the regime and the party, it is clear that the ANC has lacked Level 5 leaders since 1994. First and foremost, the ANC’s leaders are working exclusively towards what they can get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, assets, and not what they can build, create, and contribute to the greater ANC and the people of South Africa.1
The above description by Collins1 is consistent with Thabo Mbeki’s2 warning in October 2017, during his OR Tambo memorial speech. Already then, Mbeki said that the ANC, as a political entity, is coming to an end. Their end is ascribed to the capturing of its’ elite by criminal and political thugs. To better understand the malfunctioning of the present-day ANC under the leadership of criminals, it is important to reconsider Mbeki’s2 message of October 2017 when he said2:23:
In his 1941 presidential address to that year’s ANC national conference, Dr [Alfred Bitini] Xuma said: “To Congress we must be loyal and true. For Congress, we must forget any personal or sectional interests or gain. We must put the cause and the interests of the people begore any expediency…To be true leaders, we must put the interests and welfare of our people above our own”.
Much later, in a December 1955 letter to the ANC, published in January 1956, Dr Xuma said: “Leadership means service for and not domination over others. True and genuine leaders serve the cause of the people and do not expect the cause to serve them or become a source of profit and honour for them”.
Earlier, I said that the ANC now faces the third threat of destruction since its foundation almost 106 years ago. This time that threat emanates from acts of commission originating from within the ANC itself.
As we all know, the ANC gained access to state power from 1994 onwards. It was inevitable that this would happen because of the place which the ANC occupied in the hearts and minds of the majority of our people as their true representative.
However, the challenge which arose with this access to stage power was and is that it could be abused, was and is being abused for purposes of self-enrichment. This means that the ANC contains within its ranks people who are absolutely contemptuous of the most fundamental values of the ANC, at whose centre is a commitment selflessly to serve the people.
These are people who only see the ANC as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of using that access for self-enrichment.
By definition these are people who are card-carrying members of the ANC but who have completely repudiated the value system which inspired Oliver Tambo throughout his life.
Part of the national tragedy in this regard is that the ANC recognised the emergence of this immensely negative phenomenon quite early after 1994.
The fact of the matter is that during the last two decades the ANC has failed to do the two things which Nelson Mandela mentioned in 1997 – to purge itself of the mercenaries who had joined its ranks and to make it difficult for such elements to join the movement.
This means that the historic value system of the ANC has become so corrupted that its replacement, that is unprincipled access to political power and the related corrupt self-enrichment, has in fact become the norm within the organisation.
Necessarily and logically, the qualitative change I have mentioned — arising from the failure to defeat the process of the increase in the numbers of those remained in the ranks of the ANC for selfish and corrupt reasons as described by Nelson Mandela – would in the end also affect the composition and quality of the very leadership of the movement.
I have sought to suggest that the negative situation currently affecting and characterising the ANC will, unless it is addressed correctly and immediately, sooner rather than later result in the destruction of the ANC.
The presence of the so-called Takers inside the ANC and their immense empowerment are prominent in Mbeki’s2 speech, such as the Arms Deal and other instances of the excessive state capture that transferred R1-trillion to the pockets of prominent ANC elite and their intimate cronies (which echoes Collins’s1 description of the defected characters of some leaders). Mike Boon3, in his book “The African Way”, has been skeptical of the ANC as long ago as 1996; he shows the derailing of morality of the ANC’s leaders and their values, principles and intentions, as well as their cognitive tilt towards corruption and criminality. Boon3 writes3:104: “Mature leadership dictates that we routinely and constantly attempt to employ people who are more capable than us or who, at the very least, have the potential to be. If this does not happen, the organization will, over the years, gradually slip into mediocrity and disappear”. Evidence of this negative outcome is the ANC’s incapable and crooked opportunistic leaders that have, since 1994, destroyed the soul of the ANC to promote their own corrupt interest.
The persons that Boon3 identifies as the “Takers” are well-positioned today in the ANC elite. Boon3 reflects3:48,50,51:
But there is a dark and utterly destructive cloud to the Third [developing] World: a massive movement of individuals turning their backs on their traditions and discipline and, in so doing, the closeness of community and ubuntu. They replace it, not with the best of the First [developed] World, but often with the very worst. They are self-serving and care nothing for the community other than what it can deliver to them personally. They seek to take, not to give or share. Many of these people have managed to educate themselves very well. They know how to manipulate Westerners and how to use, to their own ends, their once-upon-a-time tribe. They are part of the Third World but they also exist in the First World. We shall call this group the “Takers”. Takers have neither integrity nor discipline. They serve the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it.
Why have there been so many one-party states and coup after coup? The reason is that, in the past, many African leaders been totally and unapologetically self-serving. Yet the First World does not view Africa as different from itself for fear of discrimination. It is fundamentally different because Third World Africa, which is largely led by Takers, has no discipline. It is not governed according to the same ethics and values as either the First World or the tribal worlds, and therefor does not respond to them.
It is the blatant rape of these fragile societies by fellow Africans that makes the issue more repugnant. The Third World Takers are far more insidious and warped than the colonists ever were, yet this is exactly the behaviour and attitude for which colonial settlers were criticized and expelled. The Takers obviously learnt their appalling, self-serving lessons well!
The corruption of the politics of the ANC needs to be understood and reflected on. The activities and functioning of the four top leaders of the ANC will be reflected on in the next subdivision: 3.3.1: ANC’s troubled leadership.
1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 16)
Article 17 is a continuation of the previous article 16, titled: “Critical in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (16: Outdated ANC)”. This article is in sequence with articles 11 to 16, which were already published on the ANC. The intention is also to analyse and discuss further the arguments, opinions and viewpoints on the integrity the ANC and its ability to execute land expropriation successfully, as reflected by its CVs and Attestations.
1.2. Aims of article 17 (Continued from Article 16)
The primary intention of this project on the ANC is to continue the reflection on the three main political parties by specifically describing the profile of the ANC on the same basis as was done by Article 9 on the EFF and Article 10 on the DA.
In this article, the primary aim is to determine how the ANC leadership and organisation, as well as the ruling of the ANC regime as the mandated ruler of South Africa, has been affected by the corrupted ideas of some of the ANC elite.
2. Method (Continued from Article 16)
This research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence, as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often no established body of research, as is the case with a discussion on the abilities of political parties to successfully employ land reformation from 2019 onward. The sources include articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that may guide one in making an evaluation of the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa to successfully employ land-reform from 2019.
The research findings have been presented in narrative format.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Overview
In this article, the public referees of the African National Congress will further be reflected, evaluated and described in the division that follows, 3.3: The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019. The focus is to reflect on the leadership and organisation of the ANC.
3.2. Louw Appraisal Checklist
The Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 will be used once more, for the quantitative classification and measuring of the political records of the ANC. The 82 selective items of the checklist on leaders and governments, quantified in terms of its bad-versus-good-classification, was applied to all information collected in the literature review of the party’s’ manifesto and the writings of investigative journalists, political commentators and political analysts and interpreted as the researcher sees it applicable.
3.3. The African National Congress: Perspective 1994 to 2019 (Continued from article 16)
3.3.1. ANC’s troubled leadership
3.3.1.1. Post-2017 ANC top leaders
To make a conclusive decision on the integrity and quality of the contemporary leadership of the ANC is very difficult, as extremes manifest; in terms of the media’s profiling of some leaders as anointed, whilst others are labelled as crooks without an objective division. The lack of prosecution of a large portion of the ANC elite who were implicated by the various judicial commissions tells a story of a culture of criminality. These alleged culprits’ aggressive denial of all these testimonies against them, with the sole intent to besmirch the ANC leadership, makes it very problematic to profile its top leaders in terms of morality and virtue, etc.7-16
Perhaps an appropriate anecdote is the well-known American mobster, Vincent Teresa10, and the ease with which he describes another mobster in terms of virtuous acts versus evil acts. He writes on mobster habits, dressing, opportunism, thinking10:292:
If you’re on a plane sitting next to a mob guy, you’ll probably never know. Nine times out of ten, when a mob guy is travelling alone, he’ll sleep or just lay there with eyes closed, because he don’t want to bother with anybody. If he should happen to talk with you, he’ll talk about everything but the mob. He’ll say he’s in the food produce business. Unless he’s a clown, he’ll dress very conservatively, dark clothes, white shirt, hair well trimmed, like a businessman out of Wall Street except maybe his features might be a little tougher looking. His nails will be nice and manicured and polished.
The one way you can tell a mob guy is that his clothes will always match. His shoes will always match his socks, and his socks will always match his suit, and his tie and hat will always match the outfit he’s got on. In fact, the overcoat will probably be made from the same material the suit is made of. They dress very, very well. It’s not that they’re flashy; it’s just that everything they’re wearing is money.
There are a couple of mob peculiarities I’ve still got myself. Number One is big tipping. And Number Two is that you always want the best of everything. Like I always wanted the best seats in the house…
The NPA’s treatment of former state security minister Bongani Bongo can possibly brings us closer to a general understanding of the ANC’s leadership’s quality and integrity. Began on the 21st November 2019, the information around Bongo’s criminal prosecution may allow a deeper look into the life of a corrupt politician, or a Teresa-esque profile of a criminal. Notwithstanding the NPA’s action to prosecute Bongo, it must be clear that many of the corrupt ANC leaders, coming from 1994 and still very active in the ANC elite, will never sit in a cell or will even be suspected by the Hawks and the NPA. In contrast, they may only climb into higher positions inside the ANC.
The alleged Bongo-leadership fiasco can aid us in profiling leaders of the ANC in the future. Admittedly, though, the insight into a reliable criminal profile of the corrupt ANC elite is minimal; insofar that is it only an accusation against Bongo and not a conviction. The writing of the editor12 of the Sunday Times on the 24th November gives us at least some hope of the possibility to profile bad ANC leaders versus good ANC leaders somewhere in the future. The following information on the Bongo case must be noted in the context of the current chaos around the ANC leadership12:20:
When former state security minister Bongani Bongo stood in the dock on Thursday morning, his worst nightmare had come true. Two years after advocate Ntuthuzelo Vanara laid a charge of attempted bribery against him, Bongo was finally brought before court to answer to the allegation as that he tried to influence the outcome of the parliamentary probe into alleged corruption at Eskom. He was in Cuba when police summoned him, apparently receiving treatment for suspected poisoning. He was made to sit in a cell like a criminal suspect that he is.
Bongo and the rest of the corrupt elements in the radical economic transformation faction of the ANC have gotten away with so much that they never imagined the long arm of the law will ever reach them. It’s been a long, frustrating wait for those who want to see the law takes it course. Individuals with dark clouds of corruption over their heads continue to occupy positions of influence in the ANC and the government.
The lack of a trustworthy profile of the quality and integrity of the overall ANC elite forces this article to limit the evaluation and description of its top four leaders. In the next subdivision, the leaderships of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa discussed respectively.
3.3.1.1.1. Ace (ES) Magashule
Inside the current struggle for leadership in the ANC, it is important to note Ace Magashule’s unkind public comments on President Cyril Ramaphosa. These comments reflect a well-masked intention to erase Ramaphosa from the future of ANC politics, if the radical ANC members obtain the upper-hand in the greater ANC between 2019 and 2024 (in Article 16, under the subdivisions 3.3.1.3: Post-2019 ANC faction-infights and 3.3.1.4: ANC leadership-infights, the activities of Magashule in contemporary ANC politics are described and discussed in-depth, specifically those against Ramaphosa).5-11 This subdivision will therefore only shortly discuss Magashule as a top ANC leader.
Ideologically, it seems as if Magashule’s leadership is hindered by the unbroken principle within the ANC that the ANC is bigger than the country and certainly bigger than the individual. Cyril Ramaphosa, therefore, is less important to Magashule than the ANC at large. Leon5 writes on an unexpected insight here5:18: “…the direct and dangerous consequence of the Soviet idea that the ruling party is the vanguard of the people and its direct acts are cleansed by its immutable understanding of the needs of the masses”, is and was always part of Magashule’s promotion of the ANC’s aims. This is confirmed by his emphasis that the 2017 resolutions by the ANC’s national conference on land redistribution without compensation, and the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, are priorities that must be executed in 2019/2020.
The true socioeconomic and political dogma that inform Ace Magashule and the ANC’s politburo beliefs, actions and practices, seems to have never entered the greater part of the public consciousness, nor the ideologies of many political analysts and commentators. The ANC’s politics were and have always been dangerous for exclusive capitalism and Western ideas of democracy. Discussing Magashule’s ideas also clearly invalidates the belief held by most of the South African democrats and the white exclusive capitalists; that the current ANC-regime is well-functioning and well-disposed towards them. Promoting the standing of white people was never Magashule’s intention and will not be his as long he is in the ANC. Magashule’s main intention is to unabashedly continue the radical Freedom Charter’s nationalisation of land, mines and banks (an intention which was temporarily curbed by Nelson Mandela in order to begin the 1994 dispensation but is now ripe for Magashule to restart).6-11
If the ANC is successful in renewing their political power under Ace Magashule after 2024, serious problems await the public and private sector, the economy and specifically white people. The editor9 of the Sunday Times writes a warning on the 28th of July 20199:18: “…one gets the impression that while Ramaphosa and his ministers clean up the state and do their best to deliver a better life for all who live in SA, others in the ANC will not have any of it”.
In this context, the editor9 of the Sunday Times called Magashule and his delinquent cronies at Luthuli-house (captured by outdated soviet-communism) an “unelected cabal”. He writes9:18:
And at Luthuli House, a swelling band of malcontents, led by ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule, with little better to do than place booby traps in Ramaphosa’s path, seems happy to lay the groundwork for a dramatic reversal of the clean-up gains by removing him at the party’s national general council meeting next year.
All of which one wondering why we bother with democracy, elections, and even a constitution, when you have quasi-comical figures like Carl Niehaus and cronies running the political show in the background.
Unelected and accountable to no-one they would name in public, this band of malcontents erodes the small but steady gains that Ramaphosa may be making.
Magashule’s presence as a dominant leader in the ANC’s politburo after 2020 will potentially mean great problems for South African law and order.
3.3.1.1.2. David (DD) Mabuza
There are many other general initiatives that aim to isolate the leadership of Ramaphosa from the main stream of the ANC’s voters and supporters.10-16 David Mabuza has become a prominent example of a member that has begun to gain power as a third force inside the ANC. In this context, Marrian17 writes17:3: “To further complicate matters, Mabuza and ANC treasurer Paul Mashatile are being whispered about as a ‘third’ faction’ in the ANC, but the pair have thus far been adept at keeping in line with Ramaphosa’s vision.”
Mkokeli18 points out Mabuza as the “cat” in contemporary ANC politics, and with good reason: Mabuza is a dangerous political figure with a track record alleged to rival even Jacob Zuma’s criminal history. To Mkokeli18, Mabuza is in the same league as Ace Magashule and Supra Mahumapelo, specifically as they share the same brutal style of leadership and politics that quashes dissidence and is feared by opponents in and outside of the ANC. These three figures were the foundation on which Jacob Zuma had first begun to build his empire. Zuma won their loyalty by aiding them in their days as premiers of various Provinces to create their own corrupted network of political power, the so-called Premier League.18
Mabuza is, after Ace Magashule and Cyril Ramaphosa, the most powerful politician in the country. In reality, he is symptomatic of the greater malaise afflicting our politics. More precisely, he is an antithesis of the “New Dawn” associated with Ramaphosa. Political analysts indicate that it is not only Ace Magashule who can become the ANC’s candidate, post May 8 2019. Mabuza must not be under-estimated in Ramaphosa’s future downfall or in the further breakdown of the ANC from 2020 on.7,18,19
Mabuza’s political power play is difficult to approach, well-planned and has the potential to be devastating to the future positions of Magashule and Zuma. Ntyintyane20 warned readers about the impact of Mabuza in the future. In May 2019, he writes20:6:
The Cat lives on. Once again David Mabuza is trying to dictate the terms of Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency. He claims to have made him the president of the ANC.
It is not the first time The Cat has become the narrative. At the last ANC elective conference, Mabuza outwitted Sun Tzu himself – that is, former president Jacob Zuma’s camp. The same Zuma who toyed with Thabo Mbeki as if he was Lionel Messi.
You underestimate Mabuza at your peril. In Mpumalanga he made Mathews Phosa irrelevant and outdated.
Mabuza is undoubtedly waiting to take the presidency of South Africa. It must be noted that all the ANC state presidents were first deputy presidents of the ANC. This makes making Mabuza, as much as Magashule, the ANC crown-prince for the presidential inheritance in the post-May 2019 ANC regime.7,18
Although Mabuza denies any alliance with either the Ramaphosa or the Magashule factions, he is described as undoubtedly having ties to the Magashule faction for opportunistic reasons.7,18,19
Not only does Mabuza shows a kind of “Zupta-radicalism”, but his political preferences seems to be more or less the same as Magashule’s and Zuma’s: to disassociate from the rule of law and order, and to nullify the ANC’s top leaders’ criminality thus far in order to support the corrupt ANC’s unity and empowerment at the cost of the ordinary South African.7,18,19
On the 28th April 2019, the editor7 of Rapport reflects on Mabuza’s specific corrupt political affiliations with Zuma when it reports7:1: “Hy het te velde getrek teen die kommissie van ondersoek wat pres. Cyril Ramphosa aangewys het om ondersoek in te stel na staatskaping en die misbruik van staatsinstellings soos die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens en die nasionale vervolgingsgesag.”
Mabuza, other than Magashule and Zuma, does not openly attack Ramaphosa. Mabuza has been silent during the “Ramaphoria” of the last 19 months, or the public lauding of Ramaphosa. His silence has left him out of the immediate conflict inside the greater ANC and the country, with Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule being vocal in public. Mabuza, according to Mkokeli18, has only chosen the Ramaphosa-camp in order to avoid outright disorder in the ANC, leading up to 2024. This theory implies that his ties are temporary, before turning against Ramaphosa in time for the elections. In this estimation, Mabuza might see Ramaphosa as only a figurehead, running out of political power. Mkokeli, reflect on Mabuza’s temporary affiliation with Ramaphosa18:19: “Mabuza wanted someone who could give the ANC a longer shelf life so that at the right time, he will be able to claim his inheritance.”
At times, Mabuza openly differs from Ramaphosa, which seems to be a challenge and irreconcilable with his supposed loyalty. Mabuza’s public comments are often rife with disrespect, such as when replying to Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s opinions on serious issues such as the privatisation of SOEs, when he says22:2: “I don’t really take the minister of finance seriously when he makes comments”. Comments such as these seem to be political attacks. Furthermore, that Mabuza was not reprimanded by Ramaphosa, is telling. Some political analysts speculate that Ramaphosa is totally “gridlocked” by his fear for the slow growth of Mabuza’s support and his faction.21,22
As the ANC’s political landscape develops in the year 2020, Mabuza’s true intention may become clear and bring about a political re-positioning of the Magashule-Zuma camp and the so-called “rogues” of the ANC’s top members.18
3.3.1.1.3. Jacob Zuma
Upon reading contemporary political opinions in the media, one clear message emerges; that Jacob Zuma must be erased from the political sphere of South Africa entirely. His actions are often described as amoral, even evil. Dreyer23 writes23:1: “Zuma operated in this twilight zone of lies, danger and double lives. Psychologists have observed that agents can become subtly detached or separated from other people, even when they resume normal lives. Zuma’s appearance at the Zondo commission this week revealed the degree to which the murky sphere of espionage and counter-espionage has engulfed his world.”
Munusamy24 emphasises this presence of serious psychopathology in Zuma’s court, when she writes24:20: “…lunatics will continue to dictate the discourse and sabotage our country”.
On the 21st July 2019, the editor25 of Beeld writes that Zuma25:2: “…is ‘n ANC-karikatuur want sy gedrag is ‘n karikatuuragtige oordrywing van gedrag wat ook elders in die party goed gevestig is”.
The words of the former secretary-general of the ANC, Cheryl Carolus26, can possibly become dangerous to her political standing and safety in the future, after she labelled Zuma as follows26:4: “Zuma will do or say anything to protect himself. The man is an immoral, amoral, spineless thug.”
Contrary to the public removal of Zuma from the formal ANC politics, some evidence indicates that Zuma aims to not only recover political power behind the screens, but he that he also aims to regain the party loyalty that he lost to Ramaphosa and his cronies. Zuma seems to remain a treat to the fragile power of the current leaders of the ANC.26
Many political commentators argue that Jacob Zuma’s ousting from the formal ANC politics, after December 2017, means that his power was lost and that he is a figure of the ANC’s past. Evidence show that Zuma’s popularity has remained and even seems to be growing.25-35
The mounting tensions between the so-called “factions” of Zuma and Ramaphosa seem to manifest more and more often. The aim, it seems, is for Jacob Zuma’s loyal followers and cronies to nullify all of Ramaphosa’s political power no later than the end of 2020. Zuma’s large group of intimate and trusted cronies are people with unusual skills that have been following Zuma since the pre-May 2017 period, and are also still active and supporting him discreetly.36
Munusamy36 reflects on the Zuma loyalists’ heavy, problematic impact on contemporary South African politics. Munusamy writes36:20:
Former president Jacob Zuma also needed unusual skills set around him. He required ministers, key officials in the state, political allies and body men who were blindly faithful, who would readily implement the instructions of the Guptas, and who would defend him to the hilt even when he violated the constitution.
Evidence being reeled out at the Zondo commission shows how the state was “repurposed” and institutions paralysed so that Zuma’s various benefactors could plunder at will.
There is no doubt that many ANC MPs and MPLs that are aligned to the Zuma, Magashule and Mabuza factions, who have become entangled in corruption allegations, are now back in the Parliament. These same members, whose conduct show a shocking lack of integrity are also contributing to provincial legislatures for the sixth administration, as well. These tainted law-makers are clearly not invested in Ramaphosa’s success or in good politics.37-41
Besides the fact that Zuma was the previous secretary-general of the ANC (as was Ramaphosa), he was also the chief of the ANC’s external and internal security and intelligence, and head of Mbokodo, the intelligence centre of the ANC. With these credentials, Zuma is well-known to be highly informed on some of the contemporary ANC political leaders. Especially the information on these ANC member’s corrupt political associations with the Apartheid regime is highly valuable, as these members could have been paid blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. Zuma has allegedly already used this information to create suspicions around his opponents in the ANC, like ANC stalwarts and former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi, Siphiwe Nyanda and Derek Hanekom. Furthermore, Zuma allegedly has a list of spies that he is threatening to release at a strategic time. Ramaphosa may also be targeted, as Lekota was, in Parliament. Ramaphosites may face the choas of Zuma exposing more so-called “secrets” in the next five to six months, regarding the alleged traitors in the ANC. At this stage, Zuma can afford to wreak havoc in ANC with his information; it may gain him immense political power and give him a chance to, against all odds, reclaim his position as the ANC’s top leader.23,25,26,30,32,34,35,42-46
For many political analysts, the so-called “Zuma-cobra” has been hibernating since 2017 and is now beginning to lift its head to strike. It is public knowledge that Zuma intends to derail not only the Ramaphosa regime and Ramaphosa as a leader, but also the country as a whole, with the aim of committing another immense state capture.17,37-40
Many political analysts underestimate Jacob Zuma’s current political power, and thereby the ability to pose a threat to President Cyril Ramaphosa and to radically reform the South African political landscape before 2024. Although Zuma has lost his political power to call official press conferences at this stage, this does not means he is isolated from his contingency of loyal followers. Even after being publicly rejected from politics for the last nineteen months, new forms of media allow for direct attacks of the “Ramphosa ANC”. His effective use of Twitter since November 2018 confirms this; his handle, @PresJGZuma, and his widely read tweets might seem unimportant to some, but not to his cronies and his seemingly growing “crowd” of followers. This heightens the contrast between Ramaphosa’s unstable position and the Zuma-Magashule camp, inside the 2019 to 2024 South African and the greater ANC politics.48
Firstly, employing Twitter as a communication method has helped Zuma to overcome his initial isolation by the Ramaphosa faction. Secondly, Twitter offers him the opportunity to test his shifting popularity with the “Nation”. His first tweet in January 2018 was shared 10 000 times and was favourited 29 000 times. His total tweets thus far have amassed more than 222 000 followers in 15 months. Of the 64 tweets Zuma posted, he has an average of 1 720 re-tweets and 6 567 favourites. If Twitter can be read as indicative of follow interest, Ramaphosa’s twitter activity does not compare well with Zuma’s. Ramaphosa, who joined Twitter in January 2015, has 450 000 followers over 38 months, until March 2019. These statistics reflect an average of only 11 841 followers per month for Ramaphosa against Zuma’s average of 14 800 followers per month. Taking into account Zuma’s immense political and social isolation, thoroughly implemented by the Ramaphosa clan, his twitter support seems to indicate that he is still a strong contender for the top leadership position of the greater ANC in post-2019 South Africa.40,48-52
The fact that Zuma has 2 958 followers per month more than Ramaphosa, confirms that Zuma is still very popular with the ordinary public; if not more so than Ramaphosa. This “measure of popularity” was a very important indicator for Jacob Zuma and his cronies when they returned to politics after May 2019. Zuma is aware of his popularity and the accompanying Zuma populism, as he reflects in his first interview48:8: “Hello, everyone. I have decided to move the times – to join this important area of conversation. Because I hear that many people are talking about me and many other calling themselves Zuma in many ways”.
A prominent example of Zuma’s clear tweets on important political issues, as opposed to Ramaphosa’s vague and indecisive political policy, was his clear political stand in January 2019. In a two-part video on land expropriation (a topic that he had rarely addressed in his nine years as president), Zuma lays out his ideas. The videos intended to influence the large group of poor and landless black people to develop the belief that Zuma is “their only saviour and a president of integrity”, and that he will follow through on the land that was promised, taken from white people after May 2019. Coetzee48, after analysing Zuma’s speech in the video, discusses the radical political intentions of Zuma and how different this approach is from Ramaphosa’s insecure politics. Coetzee48 writes48:8: “With a view seemingly more aligned to the nationalisation policies of the Economics Freedom Fighters, Zuma referred to ‘developed European countries’ where, he said, property is nationalised by the state and leased to the people.”
Zuma is still very active on Twitter. The recent attack on Zuma by Shoba130, where he writes on the phenomenon of Zuma’s presence in the media growing parallel to his ever-diminishing status in the ANC, seems to be incorrect. Zuma has not faced any consequences as serious as the alleged sacking of the eThekwini and Msunduzi mayors Zandile Gumede and Themba Njilo, or the difficulties of the Sihle Zikalala-led ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, for example. It is likely that Zuma will send out more cryptic Twitter posts and gain more attention around political developments that harm Ramaphosa’s reputation. In addition to Zuma overshadowing Ramaphosa on Twitter, Zuma’s following also seems to be very positive towards him. This may also indicate that Ramaphosa will be unprepared in 2020, during the ANC’s meeting that “looks back from 2019 to 2020”. Political commentators argue that it will likely be problematic for Ramaphosa if he is re-elected as the ANC’s president from 2022 to 2024, without taking note of Zuma’s influence. Some of the signs of this danger is the way in which the so-called combined Zuma-Magashule faction has easily neutralised the Ramaphosa faction in the Western Cape, since August 2019. The Zuma-Magashule faction has also been standing strong since May 2019, in the general ANC structures. With Zuma’s appointment of pro-Zuma-Magashule favourites in the Parliament and various parliamentary and provincial committees, it would seem as if Ramaphosa has taken a back seat in politics, whilst Zuma is in control.53,54
South Africans must be mindful of the intentions (as well as immense political power) of Jacob Zuma and his cronies’ future plans. Their singular strategy is to demolish Ramaphosa. In this context, it must be remembered that Jacob Zuma never does anything without a careful plan, or free from corruption, making the unstable and failed politics of pre-2019 a blue-print for post-2019 South Africa, especially if the Magashule-Zuma clan take over the Ramaphosa-regime.48,55,56
It is utmost correct to say that the combined Zuma-Magashule faction is preparing to take on Ramaphosa and to scheme him out of the presidency. The use of the politburo is the most obvious choice. The editor45 of the Sunday Times may be right when he writes on Jacob Zuma’s approach for the post-2019 politics, on the 23rd July 201945:18:
While he leads the theatrics from the front, it is those working in the shadows, behind the scenes, who we should most be worried about. Zuma and his fan club in the ANC never accepted defeat. When their candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma lost at Nasrec, they grudgingly conceded. But those in the know say instead of demobilising and rallying behind the newly elected leadership, they have regrouped in dark corners and are mapping a cunning way to recapture the ANC and, by extension, the state.
The political analyst Eric Naki’s57 detailed description of the “yet to be reborn” Jacob Zuma needs to be reflected on to understand his present day strength and seemingly “anointed” political “rebirth”, that has the potential to make Cyril Ramphosa’s presidency more and more unstable. Naki57 quotes Xolani Dube57, on the seemingly anointed political survivor Jacob Zuma and his political plans for post-2019 South Africa57:6:
The man creates not only a crisis but a catastrophe for the ANC and the entire country. But he manages to swim out of the net because he is no fool.”
The man is a chess game player, he is able to fool everybody who believes he is a fool. He is not a fool but is very smart.
Even the bruising legal wrangles between Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane and President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Public Minister Pravin Gordhan is seen as an extension of the infighting.
“Ramaphosites” like ANC chairperson Gwede Mantashe and SA Communist Party (SACP) deputy general secretary Solly Mapaila accused Mkhwebane of involving herself in ANC matters.
The SACP and civil society groups like the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation see a political agenda in Mkhwebane’s actions and as part of the Zuma group fightback.
Zuma created a catastrophe not only for the ANC but for SA. He is a man of the stage and on every stage that he stood, he has new supporters, he is a man who can incarnate himself.
Jacob Zuma has never strayed from Marxist-Leninist socialism. He grew up and developed in it; it remains his sole motivator. Indeed, the editor52 of Beeld describes Zuma’s behaviour, the ANC and Ramaphosa, and unintentionally acknowledges the rigid existence of democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism in the radical politics of Zuma and the ANC (which Ramaphosa also follows), over the last decades. This is prominent when he writes52:2: “Zuma se verdediging van se kaderontplooïngskomitee voor Zondo…het gewys dat Zuma bloot ANC-dogma korrek verwoord. Want ook die sogenaamde hervormingsgesindes in die party – insluitende pres. Cyril Ramaphosa self – onderskryf steeds die ANC se beleid dat lojale kaders in sleutelposte ontplooi moet word.”
For Zuma, the ANC cannot change: its ideology of yesteryear informs it today. Without its Marxist-Leninist ideology, there is no ANC, no Jacob Zuma and, most of all, no Cyril Ramaphosa. More so, without its corrupted and autocratic politburo (and its corrupted cadre-deployment committee) alone in charge of the Marxist-Leninist ANC and the country, is there no place for Zuma (and Ramaphosa) in the contemporary politics of South Africa. It is in this context that Zuma’s may turn the ANC away from Ramaphosa by smearing him as anti-Marxist-leninist.33,44
Many ANC MPs and MPLs are still aligned to Jacob Zuma, making him a strong partner in the Magashule and Mabuza factions. Ramaphosa can expect vicious attacks on all levels in 2020.37-41
3.3.1.1.4. Cyril Ramaphosa
Cyril Ramaphosa stand central in the current political climate of South Africa, as the state president and “Number One” of the ANC. The question remains if these positions of Ramaphosa are stable.
More so than Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma, an in-depth evaluation and discussion on Cyril Ramaphosa as the president of the ANC and of the South African State will be undertaken.
3.3.1.1.4.1. Introduction
The biggest mistake Cyril Ramaphosa, as president of the ANC, has made after his election in December 2017 (and which is rooted in his installment as President of South Africa), was not to do a comprehensive analysis of the preceded process and outcomes of his election. Taking the obstructions and resistance that Ramaphosa currently experiences into account, Ramaphosa is hindered not only as president of the country, but also as the president (leader) of the ANC. Majoko58 writes on this error58:12:
The biggest mistake that President Cyril Ramaphosa’s faction made on winning the ANC’s presidential campaign in December 2017 was to underestimate the size and viciousness of an already evident fightback campaign from those who benefitted from state capture.
But being astute to win a party election is no guarantee for long-term survival. And that is what is coming back to bite Ramaphosa now, the temporary friends that assured his ascendency to the highest office are not there backing him right now against the current fightback
The five questions that Ramaphosa should have asked himself before his inauguration as state president in 2019 are59-64:
1) Would his winning as the president of the ANC and South Africa had realised if the alleged R500-millions of donations were absent in his campaign, seeing that he won with a small majority of votes (179) out of the total of ±4 000 votes of the ANC representatives at the 2017 Nasrec-Conference, which leaves him a very insignificant and disempowered leader-figure in the greater ANC;
2) Was it not voting-buying with the deliberate separation of his so-called “voter-supporters” on his costs at hotels as well as his paying of their other costs?;
3) Is the ANC’s autocratic and despotic way of selection not only the president of the ANC but also that of the State by only ±4 000 (±2%) representatives out of a more and less 1-million ANC-members and a total of ±37-million eligible voters, not the direct reason for the ongoing failure of the post-May 2019 South African state under the ANC as a regime and the sole reason of the present bitterly conflict in the ANC?;
4) Would the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as presidents of the ANC and the State in 2017 not resulted in a much-better post-May 2019 ANC and South Africa;
5) Were the intrigues and plotting behind the doors in the steering of the votes for Ramaphosa and the fine foot-work by Cat Mabuza via his cronies to support Ramaphosa at the end of the voting, not responsible that the wrong leader for the ANC emerged after the 18th December 2019?
There is strong doubt that Ramaphosa, as a Marxist-Leninist, will honestly answer to any of these questions; it would not be in line with his politburo policy wherein he and his comrades at the top of the ANC have the exclusive power on behalf of the entire population [which implies a departure from democracy]. Basically, five honest answers by Ramaphosa could mean his downfall.
In short: Ramaphosa‘s CR 17 election campaign and his election in December 2017 were both controversial, making his present leadership of the ANC, as well as his presidency of South Africa, also controversial. Indeed, it seems as if the present disapproval by many ANC members and black people can be seen as similar to the conflicting views around HF Verwoerd, John Vorster and PW Botha.
To be frank, Ramaphosa’s popularity with the white population is also declining considerably. This is because they first mistook his political ideology as being positive towards Western democracy and capitalism. Instead he, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma, are all experienced Marxist-Leninists. For many political analysts and commentators to “beg” Ramaphosa in public and ask him to “to rid the ANC of Magashule in order to establish Ramaphosa politics”, is misguided, therefore. He cannot do it; if he removes Magashule, he endangers his own role as the main player in contemporary politics. Importantly, there does not seem to be a will to reform the party. Ramaphosa is not invested in finding a new political or economic order to make the country democratic and exclusively capitalistic. Neither is it Ramaphosa’s intention to bring inclusive capitalism into the ordinary public sphere; instead he is pitted against the hidden intentions of the ANC’s politburo in their strive to obtain and to keep riches and power exclusively for themselves. The Ramaphosa versus Magashule conflict stems from the desire for leadership in the ANC, and not a Marxist-Leninist ideological conflict. The conflict is also a personal one; they both strive for self-empowerment and are extremely ambitious, and certainly motivated and driven by their excessive, inflated egos. What both missed, however, is that the ANC is a horse that does not like an inexperienced and overweight rider on its back: both Ramaphosa and Magashule are such “riders” and both can fall off in the near future.65
The personal conflict over Ramaphosa or Magashule leadership is supported by various groups, factions and clans. Their support stem mostly from opportunistic reasons, such as seeing which one of the two shall become chief (and therefore their “ally”) of the ANC. Inside the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ANC, all kinds of foul play are present. The ever-present Marxist-Leninist idea remains: ANC principles are greater than Ramaphosa and Magashule, Zuma or Mabuza as personal figures. It seems that all of the individuals in the ANC, including the leaders, knows this well and respects it.
3.3.1.1.4.2. Anointed ANC and a messianic Ramaphosa as saviour of South Africa
The cliché in the media is that18:19 “Ramaphosa has a magic wand that will fix the moribund ANC and sort out all our problems, from economics to racial tension”, and has become central in the propaganda of the ANC’s populists when advocating for their so-called economic restructuring of post-2019 South Africa under Ramaphosa.18
Indeed, the persona of Cyril Ramaphosa is seen by many economic and political commentators, as well as a great part of the public, to be the saviour of the ANC that will drive the ANC into good governance. He is perceived as someone who is going to save South Africa, and sometimes discussed with strong religious undertones. This opinion is supported by many political analysts.13,18,59-64,66,67
Tabane68 refers to the so-called “Ramaphosa the saviour”, as follows68:1:
… the exceptional CR – the Ramaphosa that exists in the imagination of many. He’s the man who will clean up corruption, ensure that former president Jacob Zuma and his cronies are sent to jail, defeat secretary-general Ace Magashule, get Public Protector Busiswe Mkhwebane removed from office and yes, create millions of jobs for the millions of unemployed South Africans.
CR feels like someone who has just landed from Mars and is about to wave his magic wand and free us all from our collective misery, which includes the threefold challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.
The ANC’s corrupted elite has optimised the Ramaphosa leadership and regime to their benefit. For Mthombothi69, Ramaphosa became a handy tool for the contemporary greater ANC (and for Zuma’s future plans). In this context, Mthombothi reflects69:19: “The ANC had found its messiah in Ramaphosa, the magician who’nt play tricks with the electorate. He’d wave the magic wand. ‘I wanna lend a hand/send me,’ Ramaphosa crooned”.
The confusion and choas behind the scenes of government can be seen in the inner circle of the ANC’s decision-making. This is especially clear in the ANC’s “Roadmap” document which was deliberately leak to the public. In their efforts to do some damage control and reinstitute some flattering beliefs in their traditional voters, the ANC is clearly desperate after the elections in May 2019. Jacob Zuma’s criminal acts are understood as a decisive part of the ANC’s bad past (meaning the period pre-January 2018), which was stopped by the 1st January 2018’s so-called “unstoppable messianic” return of Cyril Ramaphosa and an “anointed, ameliorated ANC”. Once again, the ANC elite and their propagandists offer a narrative of a dramatic victory to the public, intended to show that the South African voters are still pro-ANC, based on Ramaphosa’s so-called popularity (57% votes for the ANC in the May elections). Some political analysts associated his so-called popularity in the election with the popularity of Nelson Mandela (who could never exceed more than 63% of the votes for the ANC, at any time during the various elections). Fikile Mbalula of the ANC equates the idea that the “ANC is still a strong brand” to the idea that “Hitler’s Nazi-party today is still a strong brand”, in the face of the ANC’s ongoing decline in support at the ballot box (from 62%: 2014 to 57%: 2019). Regarding Ramaphosa’s so-called “immense popularity” that may rescue the ANC, it must be noted that this image is constructed by his publicly propagated performance, and supported by the CR17 campaign that has allegedly cost R500 million. Pushing this image of Ramaphosa as the “Nation’s darling” has started to fail, as his lack of organisational and governing abilities become clear, and he fails to make a success of the future of South Africa.21,44
Seepe and Heller56 bring Cyril Ramaphosa’s public persona, as the only saviour of a nation, into the context of a country that oscillates between hope and hopelessness. This paints a picture of a nation in psychosis, where there is a cognitive inability to differentiate between reality and fiction, evil and virtue, and dishonesty and honesty. They write56:5: “This national psychosis is at the heart of the propagandist portrait of President Cyril Ramaphosa as the salve and salvation of South Africa. For his part, Ramaphosa has enthusiastically embraced this world of make-believe. He is as much complicit as he is an inevitable victim of this malady. But like all myths, the messianic Ramaphosa portrait is beginning to melt”.
Seepe and Heller56 continue56:5: “For those invested in the Ramaphosa presidency, the truth may just be too ghastly to contemplate. Truth is the supreme disruptor of both faith and fallacy, and right now, the truth is blowing the whistle on the make-believe of The New Dawn”. It seems that the pro-Ramaphosites and white capitalists are not going to allow negative views of Ramaphosa to infect and thus to create cognitive dissonance around the “Ramaphosa the saviour” idea, despite his many failures. On the other side, however, there is a growing portion of the public imagination that is seeing “Ramaphosa the saviour” as a myth and realising that his departure from politics will not mean the collapse of the country. As Seepe and Heller write55:5 “The sun will rise tomorrow, as surely as it did today”.
Tabane68 writes that it somehow remains unclear how South Africans arrived at the idea of “Ramaphosa the saviour”. A possibility is that a false hope – the contamination of the public mind by false expectations – forces people into believing that Ramaphosa will improve their living standards and ordinary lives. Indeed, it can be argued that the public are negatively affected by the Zuma regime and where it left off. Another possible origin of the myth may be because many people were left uninspired and confused by the phantom leadership of Ramaphosa; especially the people inside the ANC leadership and around the president, from David Mabuza to the younger ANC MPs, including the leaders of the DA and EFF.18,68 Clearly, the Ramaphosa-mania is a myth which was propagated to build support for the ANC in the May elections.
These initial projections of the “extraordinary qualities” of “Ramaphosa the leader” have overreached and this means that there is no energy left at the end of the Ramaphosa-mania, with no strategy to win at the ballot box. Neither is Ramaphosa himself enough to energise voters for the post-2019 campaign of the ANC. Ramaphosa’s “extraordinary qualities” as a leader is artificial and insignificant on every level.21,50
The various cognitive states or emotional conditions that suddenly manifested in 2017, like Ramaphoria and Ramaphomania, and the identity of “Ramaphosa the anointed saviour”, has lost its colloquial use and seems rather dated. Instead, Ramaphosa’s identity seems to be better described by “Ramaphosa the phantom”. It seems to indicate the possibility of Ramaphosa soon disappearing from the public imagination of many South Africans.59,60
Furthermore, the so-called 57% winning vote for the ANC in the May elections have been frowned upon by some financial institutions and many political commentators and analysts. For these skeptics, the spirit of triumph contradicts the hard fact that only 49% of the eligible voters voted in the May elections, and that the ANC only received a 28% vote selection by the total contingent of eligible voters. These numbers nullify the well-published glorification of Ramaphosa that assumes that the ANC’s 57% is because of his leadership.13,18,59-64,66,67
The political analyst Mcebisi Ndletyana agrees that Ramaphosa’s “popularity” and saviour-status, that was unduly awarded to him by the media and some political analysts, clearly did not function to win more votes for the ANC. The narrative inside the party, however, is that 57% of votes for the ANC in the May elections was predicted to be only 40% of votes if Ramaphosa was not the leader. This means that Ramaphosa’s faction and supporters claim an alleged 17% gain under Ramaphosa’s leadership. The research, however, does not substantiate their narrative.50,70
In this context of the supposed high levels of voter energy behind Ramaphosa and the presence of Ramaphosa’s so-called saviour-profile, one might overlook the fact that the traditional ANC members do not vote for the ANC’s top leader but instead they vote to maintain the ANC’s democratic centralism. Furthermore, the media and several political analysts have completely ignored the entry of the elderly and respected Thabo Mbeki into the election, as well as the numerous propaganda campaigns of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Mrs Dlamini-Zuma that claim their role in the election-manifesto of the ANC that brought the 57% voter win. When comparing the provincial votes with the national votes for the ANC, the national voters outcome (assumed and used by many political analysts to be reflective and representative of the leader’s personality and popularity in his party and the country) were 643 194 national votes more than the provincial votes for the ANC. Bringing this difference in calculation with the 10 026 475 votes the ANC received on national level, the so-called positive impact of leadership is ±7%. When divided through the six main propagandists/leaders’ contribution to ANC-manifesto (Ramaphosa, Magashule, Zuma, Mabusa, Mbeki, ANC), this 7% impact is an average of 1.1% per leader. These numbers makes the so-called Ramaphosa-saviour contribution to the 57% win of the ANC less than 2% and therefore insignificant. Ramaphosa’s minimal impact is further confirmed by Ramaphosa’s fluctuating performance leading up to November 2019. Whilst his image and persona sets high standards, no evidence suggest that Ramaphosa can live up to these expectations.13,18,40,49,50,67,71-76
3.3.1.1.4.3. Ramaphosa’s enslaving to Marxist-Leninist socialism
Ramaphosa is often portrayed as the virtuous ANC politician who fell victim to the dictators in the ANC. As part of this narrative, it is speculated that Ramaphosa was forced to address or partake in issues such as land grabbing, by the two “communist dictators”, Zuma and Magashule. In this view of the ANC’s schizophrenic politics, Ramaphosa’s leadership is affected and undone by radicals and revolutionaries in the ANC. Du Plessis77 agrees with this narrative when he writes77:6: “Bepaald moet hy [Ramaphosa] die twee gifbekers wat die Jacob Zuma-faksie hom in die doodsnikke van die Nasrec-konferensie in die hand gestop het [om grond te onteien met of sonder vergoeding], so drink dat hy nie daarvan sterf nie”. There is evidence to the contrary, however. Ramaphosa is an established ANC member, and has participated in the ANC since the days of the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter has always clearly indicated that land grabbing is a priority of the ANC. The reissuing of the resolution at Nasrec in 2017 was expected by the ANC at large, including Ramaphosa. If Ramaphosa was opposed to land grabbing, he had the option to withdraw from the race for leadership, instead of playing the victim.
To deny that Ramaphosa supports Marxist-Leninist socialism is dangerous and it is equally problematic to subjectively profile Ramaphosa as a Western caricature. FW de Klerk arguably made the same mistake in the 1990s as Du Plessis now77, when De Klerk, in his “political innocence” and impetuosity, understood the ANC and its corps of leaders without their DNA of true traditional democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist socialism. Instead, he believed them to be exclusively “good” political partners. De Klerk (and his NP) were quickly faced with the reality of their decision.25,78,79
Ramaphosa’s politics are rooted in the greater ANC’s venerable foundation of Marxist-Leninist socialism. This is a phenomenon that Du Plessis80, other than many political commentators, successfully identifies when he writes80:6: “Ramaphosa se ANC het in 2019 nog nie sy sentrale ideologie – rassenasionalisme en verknogtheid aan ras – dieselfde doodsteek gegee as wat die NP in die 1980’s met die Verwoerdiaanse apartheid gedoen het nie”, and80:6: “Die ANC sal dit nie maklik doen nie. Want al wat dan oorbly, nes in die 80’s, is naakte vasklou aan mag. Die ANC weet baie goed regimes wat inbeweeg in daardie dimensie – mag ter wille van mag alleen – val, vroeër eerder as later.”
This recognition that Ramaphosa and the ANC member’s concerns are saturated with selfishness, opportunism and the corrupt Marxist-Leninist ideology of self-enrichment, nullifies the misleading argument by the Ramaphosa propagandists that he is a democrat and “virtuous” politician (these same propagandists blindly argue for Ramaphosa’s “anointed” virtue and his successful politics). His current entanglement with the corrupted politics and actions of Zuma’s cronies and their so-called “rot” is clear by the fact Ramaphosa has allowed them into his cabinet and his inner-circle. Ramaphosa supporters argue that this is only because he has been forced accept criminals in his cabinet for the sake of keeping the ANC intact. This line of reasoning is dangerous, naive and misleading; it is politically illogical. Another argument by Ramaphosa’s supporters, in their ardent Ramaphoria, is that Ramaphosa could not speak out against state capture when he was Zuma’s deputy as Zuma would fire him. This argument is erased by the fact that Ramaphosa participates in Marxist-Leninist politics. Instead, he did not react against Zuma and his cronies, or speak out against state capture, because his Marxist-Leninist ideology prioritises the group above all. Secondly, if this argument of his compliance with state capture is true, it confirms that Ramaphosa was disrespectful to his oath as vice president to serve the people of South Africa fully at all times, with honestly and integrity, and to obey its Constitution. Furthermore, that he was unaware, as vice-president, of the Zuptas’ state capture, is unlikely. If he was truly unaware of the corrupt situation, he was a poor observer of politics and an ineffective player in the ANC’s inner-politics. His attention to these matters is required as an executive political leader. It is more likely that he is in compliance with Zuma’s state capture. This profile makes him incapable to be an effective president for South Africa. Moreover, if he was aware of the presence of state capture, but feared to act against Zuma, it indicates blatant self-interest above duty and a political fear that is highly inappropriate for a vice president. A role with responsibility to the people of South Africa should not be allowed to be dictated by fear, and this keeps Ramaphosa from making the right decisions, both officially and unofficially.69,81,82
To many critics, the failure of Ramaphosa to attack Zuma openly since the start of his campaign, and in his appointment as vice president, indicates a much deeper foundation of brotherhood of the ANC’s leadership. This brotherhood is prescribed and forced upon members by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist politics. The argument made by the pro-Ramphosa supporters – that Ramaphosa will act decisively and dramatically and kill the Zuma rot from 2019 to 2024 – is highly unlikely. An executive political leader of integrity – someone who acts with honesty and is trustworthy – never sits idly whilst his organisation falls deeper into corruption, or allows himself to be extorted by the demands of criminals.81,82
Evidence that Ramaphosa is deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninism and RET, can be found in his active practice of cadre-deployment. Cadre-deployment can be argued to be the primary cause of state capture since 1994. Ramaphosa, when he was vice president to President Zuma, was also the chair of the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee. The primary role of Ramaphosa in the ANC’s cadre-deployment committee, seen in terms of political contamination the country’s stature, was so excessive that he was recently asked to explain the matter before the Zondo-commission.79
Cadre-deployment, as evidenced by the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist political thinking, plans and actions, makes Ramaphosa part of the “brotherhood of communists” with Magashule and Zuma. Rooi writes79:8:
Vier jaar lank, terwyl hy tussen Mei 2014 en Februarie 2018 adjunkpresident was van die land, was Ramaphosa die voorsitter van dié omstrede ontplooiingskomitee. In dié jare is talle bedendenklike figure met ANC-bande in sleutelposte in die staatsdiens en by geruïneerded staatsbeheerde ondernemings aangestel.
Die kaderontplooiingskomitee bestaan nog steeds – die huidige voorsitter is adj.pres. David Mabuza, Jessie Duarte, die ANC se adjunk-sekretaris-generaal, is die koördineerder.
Die rol van die ANC se kaderontplooiingskomitee in staatskaping het in November voor die Zondo-kommissie ter sprake gekom toe Barbara Hogan, voormalige minister van openbare ondernemings, gesê het dat ‘n “handvol mense aangewys deur die ANC se nasionale uitvoerende komitee (NUK) [geskool op ‘n Marxisties-Leninisties politburo] – eenvoudig besluit wie is die voorkeurkandidaat” vir ‘n pos.
Ramaphosa’s support of the ANC’s outdated, 107-year old, communist value system is well reflected by his tainted cabinet and even his tainted chairpersons of the parliamentary portfolio committees. He is only a temporary and powerless role player in the greater ANC and their political narrative, especially its politburo’s intentions and rigid guidelines, as prescribed by its democratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist ideology.68
Tabane writes on the implications of an ANC president68:1:
When we expect him to fire Magashule, we are taking the ANC for granted and substituting our wishes for Ramaphosa’s agenda. And when we overlook his mistakes because we want him to emerge and be strengthened, we are kicking the can further down the road, postponing the solving of problems that are already there.
My fear is that those who portray him as the answer to all of South Africa’s problems – and spend time attacking his perceived enemies – will soon suffer an about-turn and turn against CR because he would have failed to meet their (unrealistic) expectations.
While hope has to spring eternal, investing such high hopes in one individual is unrealistic. Now that he is president of the country, of course we should expect only the highest standards from him, but we voted for an ANC president. It is the choice the majority made.
Ramaphosa’s so-called “conflict with the Magashule-Zuma clan” – increasingly breaking down his “saviour role” as the President of the South African nation – is not because they differ on the ANC’s contemporary politics and ideologies, but because of Ramaphosa’s personal conflict with Magashule (and Zuma, as well as any other opposing leader in the ANC) to hold the political power in the greater ANC68:1: “It is a well-masked leadership and personal revenge-fight coming from 1996 when Ramaphosa was side-lined in the ANC’s greater politics.” Ramaphosa’s belief in and his support of Marxist-Leninist socialism remains undisturbed by this conflict.
Tabane68 pertinently guides his readers through the rationale behind this personal conflict between Ramaphosa and Magashule-Zuma, and argues that it is outside of the ANC’s organisation and its ideology. In this small conflict, Ramaphosa is only a temporary figure and insignificant in the greater ANC psyche. She writes68:1: “The cold, hard fact is: Ramaphosa is the president of the country because of the ANC. To try to define him outside of the party with our imposed values is a mistake. He will always act within the value system and milieu of this 107-year old organisation”.
It is important to note, however, that Ramaphosa’s contradictory reactions to remarks (made by people such as Ace Magashule) on the nationalising of the Reserve Bank, sit well inside the ANC’s history of gradually and secretly nationalising important entities and land grabbing. The ANC’s greater ideological detraction breaks down the idea of Ramaphosa as the saviour of white land ownership and exclusive capitalism, against the Magashule faction as the criminal Marxist-Leninist threat that engages in land grabbing. The pretense of the “Ramaphosa-Magashule conflict” gives Magashule the opportunity to successfully and carefully construct a well-masked plan to gain power. The slow implementation of land reform by the ANC, from 1994 to 2017 (23 years), was fundamentally caused by the political environment and circumstances that limited the implementation of radical ANC politics. Since 2017, however, the circumstances seems to have been stimulating the aggressive, radical politics of nationalising and land grabbing. Both Ramaphosa and Magashule stand as central figures and as active supporters, role-players and partners in this sudden, aggressive behaviour. Both are familiar with the brand of the ANC, and support the activation and implementation of the 107 year old radical and revoltionary politics of the ANC.68,83,84
Understanding the aforementioned political strategy of the ANC, the editor85 of the Sunday Times, writes on the 5th 2019 how the current ANC party under Ramaphosa is problematic. He points out the fake leadership conflict, wherein Ramaphosa is reflected as the “virtuous” (capitalist/democratic) leader that will reform the ANC’s criminal culture. South Africa at large may be grappling with Western politics and democracy, but not ANC’s politics; the ANC is finally busy establishing communism in South Africa. The editor85 of the Sunday Times writes85:18:
The party has a new leader, President Cyril Ramaphosa, who has presented himself as a new broom that will sweep clean all the rot. So far, he has said all the right things, for which he has been endorsed even by the global community.
But as former president Kgalema Motlanthe said, Ramaphosa is no messiah. The rot in his party is so entrenched that it will require a massive purge, which could lead to its total collapse.
Ramaphosa’s clean-up campaign is facing strong resistance from within, with those accused of corruption working hard to weaken him. Until he firms up his grip on the party, he remains handicapped.
Makhanya83 also writes on the brotherhood of Ramaphosa and Magashule, as well as their relationship to the radical and revolutionary ANC. Ramaphosa, therefore, has no intention to establish a post-2019 democracy and unlimited exclusive capitalism, as Makhanya83 argues83:2: “Ramaphosa tinkered here and there, and thought we would all be bamboozled into the believing he had made a radical reduction [of the bad]. What actually happened was that he lost the battle to reform the state and rid it of the excesses of the Zuma era. The employment agency ethos remained largely undisturbed and little will happen in the next five years to change that. It showed that the Zuma zombies are alive and still very much in charge, Renewal is a myth”.
The ANC’s final establishment of communism in South Africa is executed through its trusted model of economic chaos. For Makhanya83 to declare that democratic renewal is a myth, is correct. Moveover, Marxist-Leninist renewal is a fact. There will likely be a reform of the South African state, but instead of positive reform, the ANC will keep radicalising. This means the ANC may bring a Marxist-Leninist reform if it rules post 2019.83,84
It must be taken into account that, historically, communists thrived on chaos; if it is not already present in a state, they create and cultivate chaos. A few instances of this encouragement of chaos has manifested the South African state since the ANC took power in 1994. Chaos is the norm of governing for the communists and the ANC elite. The present South African economy, having collapsed, is just one stage in establishing a vicious cycle of communism. In this context of a communist state, with its chaotic economy and human rights abuses, Scott86 reflects on the ANC’s affect on South Africa86:13: “The more one looks at the ANC, the more one can come to no other conclusion than that the only purpose it has is to complete the destruction of the country it claims to love. Everything it touches is destroyed.”
The overall chaos, and especially its impact on the economy, is confirmed by the fact that more African countries became less democratic since the 1990s. These countries are characterised by more autocratic political systems, wherein the communist model often starts to develop. This problematic type of political governance, together with unlimited population growth, contributed to the rapid growth of poverty in Africa. These factors led to number of impoverished people in Africa rising from 278 million to 416 million from 1990 to 2015. The means that 55% of the world’s poor is currently living in Africa. The World Bank estimates that the percentage of impoverished people in Africa is going to grow exponentially, and that in 2030, as much as 90% of the world’s poor will live in Africa. Since 1994, as many as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of autocracy, while in 2017, 24 countries became autocracies. In 2019, there were only 24 countries that showed positive consequences of democratisation, while only 53% out of all the countries in the world still qualify as democracies. Looking towards South Africa, 25 years under the chaotic reign of the Marxist-Leninist ANC has seen an immense growth in poverty; 60% of the population are impoverished, seemingly in line with the political chaos that characterise most African countries. If the ANC continues to hold power after 2024, the 30 million impoverished people in South Africa (out of a 57 million population) is estimated to grow to 52 million in 2030.86-88
3.3.1.1.4.4. Alleged intertwining of junior-Ramaphosa with senior-Zuma
Notwithstanding the reflection of two main opposing and hostile groups inside the greater ANC, namely the Ramaphosa clan versus the Zuma-Magashule clan, the main question is if there is really a difference in thinking and political ideology between senior Zuma and the junior Ramaphosa in terms of South African politics. The land reform issue has been a bonding factor for the comrades. Comparing the thinking and activities of some of the cadres represented in Ramaposa’s inner-circle with that of the cardres of the Zuma-Magashule faction, there are strong similarities signalling some form of connection. Munusamy89 reflects clearly on this anomaly in Ramaphosa’s apparent inertia since December 2017 in taking on the Zuma-Magashule cronies suspected of various transgressions. The lack of any action taken before the prosecution started against Zuma and his cronies, as well as the subsequent appointment of dubious Zuma cronies in high level positions in the Ramaphosa regime since May 2019, reflects some sort of bond between the two rather than two hostile, opposing factions. Munusamy89 reflects on this “political intransparency” evident in the actions and reactions of Cyril Ramaphosa, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma when she pertinently warns that the public has often overlooked the ANC’s “dark politics”. Shrouded in this darkness is often the strange and extreme relationship between Ramaphosa, Magashule and Zuma. She writes89:20:
Zondo should not be the only one concerned with safeguards to prevent the state from being captured by corrupt business interests again.
If President Cyril Ramaphosa is serious about building an efficient state that repels corruption, he needs to ensure that the people in his core team share his perspective and commitment.
The disgraced people and deadwood he retained in cabinet to keep the peace in the ANC need to be put out to pasture”.
Tabane90 also mentions this possible bond rather than a prevailing animosity between Ramaphosa and Zuma to the foreground with his reflection on the ease with which the Constitutional Assembly had fired McBride in March 2019 to prevent him to rattle further on the SAPS’s wrongdoings and his revelations about the greater ANC’s immense political transgressions inside the law-enforcement agencies. This was reflected for Tabane90 in how easily the Magashule-Zuma faction eventually got rid McBride, booting him out of the SAPS without Ramaphosa as much as lifting his presidential finger to stop this obvious political move by the greater ANC’s leadership. Tabane90, on this apparent tap-dancing routine of the junior Ramaphosa to the tune of his senior Zuma, posed exactly this question90:20: “Is Ramaphosa in on this…?”
More evidence of the alleged cosy actual relationship between Ramaphosa and Zuma is also the fact that Ramaphosa has so far not been able to or hesitant to step out of the leader’s grim shadow. Ramaphosa — or so the antagonists scrutinising the ANC’s politics and governance believe — has undoubtedly helped the ANC elite since his days as vice-president to dodge the bullet directed at their failed past and corrupt schemes. His political thrust was in the past and still is today to advance a doctrine in which black voters are repeatedly convinced of the “existence of white supremacy” while the whites must take the blame for being “the sole culprits of blacks poverty”. This puts Ramaphosa on par with the radical political outlook of Jacob Zuma as well as Julius Malema. Here, Ramaphosa’s willingness to allow of many of the ANC corrupt elite to continue, untouched in their old Zuma ways in post-May 2019 South Africa, is underscored. Mthombothi69 brings this reality in focus when he writes69”19: “All the looting, the corruption, the sheer greed and debauchery over which it had presided, the poverty it failed to address as its leaders feasted on the gravy train, the criminals who are running amok…”, is just continuing under Ramaphosa.
The present Ramaphosa regime has been characterised by the antagonists as similar to the past Zuma regime, namely a regime: “…that has done everything but govern”. The basis for this kind of remark is, as said, Ramaphosa’s subordinate position in relation to Zuma, which dates from before 1994 as being inextricably intertwined with the Zuma political culture and the Zuma guidelines on governance.69,81
In terms of the above reasoning, it is for certain political analysts not a case of President Cyril Ramaphosa who cannot step out of ex-President Zuma’s grim shadow: for them is it that Ramaphosa does not want to step out from there. Ramaphosa and Zuma have had too much of a cosy relationship regarding their revolutionary outlook to be able to break-up their close association. Zuma’s extraordinary reaction of denying the Zondo commission’s testimonies against him, is evidence of his political-cognitive incompetence and impaired response. But, for the political insider, knowing the ANC’s psyche, it seems to be part of an established ANC political pathological culture. Ramaphosa is seemingly also blinded by the same ANC political pathological culture with makes him beliefs he is not implicated in any political corruption and is purely cast by his enemies as a scapegoat. The constant allegations against him of having been an Apartheid spy, a Bosasa beneficiary, a Zuma mate, a BBBEE opportunist or part of a crime network while serving as vice-president in the nine years of Zuma regime’s misadventures, do not seem to concern him. The reference by Ramaphosa of Zuma’s reign as “nine wasted years” is seen by his critics as nothing more than opportunistic political window-dressing only for the sake of the greater ANC. In reality, it it is nothing else but “nine wasted years under the Zuma-Ramaphosa-duumvirate”.69,81
This kind of duumvirate inside a party’s leadership, with its parasitic roots smothering the nation’s heart, will not be terminated that easily. The ANC and its various leaders, have fallen prey to it. The principle is that if the one leader falls, the other leader also falls. The one needs the other, even if their well-hidden intentions and their rhetoric may seem to contradict each other in terms of political viewpoints. Moreover, these leaders need the ANC and the ANC needs them.69.81
Ramaphosa is for most true democrats and capitalists a Zuma remint — a political leader as dangerous and unpredictable as his mentor, the senior ANC Jacob Zuma. Mthombothi91 tells us the story behind this political danger, present in the pursuits of both Ramaphosa and his predecessor Jacob Zuma, as well as his fellow comrades Ace Magashule and David Mabuza, when he writes91:21:
But we have a political leadership which, because of years spent in Eastern Bloc countries, has inculcated an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture, if not hostility to every idea of an open society. They mouth catchphrases such as “national democratic revolution”, which ordinary people hardly understand or relate to. Out in the hustings, they refer to each other as comrade, but they are honourable members in parliament. There’s a tug of war between ideology and praxis.
Such people therefore cannot always be relied upon to protect the values enunciated in our constitution, especially when the chips are down.
The total encirclement of some of the ANC’s top leaders by political delinquency had shaped them into a lifelong political gang. It is not without a specific reason that Munusamy81 suggests the greater ANC leadership’s moral collapse and their failure to deal with reality. Their unity is upheld by the conspiratorial and nefarious behaviour of the leaders, in their like-minded planning and mal intended way of approaching issues. On the functioning of Zuma’s political mindset (an enquiry that can also be extended to many of the political mindsets present in the top structure of ANC) she posits81:20: “Or is Zuma so detached from his moral compass that he does not know that secretly receiving money from crooked business people while serving as the president of the republic amounts to crime and a breach of office?” In this context, in exposing Zuma’s seemingly mental and political confusion, it is reflected quite succinctly by his own admission when he says: “I do not fear exiting political office. However, I have only asked my party to articulate my transgressions and the reason for its immediate instruction that I vacate office.”
Both Ramaphosa and Zuma seem for some of their serious critics to be equally implicated in misguided moral and political endeavours; they need each other and they both need the corrupt ANC as a motherboard to continue to function.69,81,82 Bruce92 of all the political analysts, is possibly the closest in his apt description of how far the Ramaphosa-Zuma intertwinement has progressed already when he postulates92:16: “It is an apocalyptic scenario when taken to its logical extreme, but it’s also the double life Ramaphosa must lead. Only one of his shoes is his own. Ramaphosa will dance like this for as long as he leads the ANC. The only positive is that the longer he dances, the more discredit the old order becomes. That can’t all be bad.”
But there lurks a danger for Ramaphosa in his close embrace of certain comrades in the ANC to promote its interests. It could cost Ramaphosa his job as that of a subordinate pawn to the opportunistic and ambitious Jacob Zuma, Ace Magashule and David Mabuza. These three are unquestionably the ultimate representatives of the greater ANC: they are, as said, the soul of the ANC, with Ramaphosa the most willing enabler. A Zuma-Magashule-Ramaphosa embrace could render Ramaphosa politically impotent, lacking as Jacob Zuma does, political insight, good decision-making skills and sound principles. It could result in him being totally incapable of leading the country’s reform initiative. This intertwining can make result in a milder version of the programme of land expropriation falling apart. The land expropriation initiative does not augur well for another round of Zuma involved in capture of the first order.69,81,82,89
3.3.1.1.4.5. Ramaphosa the failed leader
The fact that Ramaphosa is a so-called classical communist (or, as Mthombothi describes his adherence to the ideology as being “comrades practising an outmoded Soviet-style undemocratic culture”) and is working with Magashule, Zuma and Mabuza in the realisation the ANC’s aims, does not safeguard him from opposition inside the ANC, leadership battles, serious criticism or eventually from being ousted from the party. His controversial victory of the ANC’s leadership contest in 2017 created many enemies, like Magashule and Zuma and their respective devoted groups. Furthermore, there are the ill-intended ambitions of Magashule, Mabuza and Zuma who all aspire to be the ANC’s leader. There are immense benefits and privileges that come with this position. It seems that especially Ramaphosa’s ongoing failure to activate the 2017 national conference resolutions has been is making him vulnerable to internal attacks in the greater ANC and could mean a possible ousting.91
3.3.1.1.4.5.1. Ramaphosa in the backseat and in reverse-gear
Ramaphosa, notwithstanding his so-called political importance and his lofty title as State President, has been running in reverse-gear from May 2019. His regime has so far totally failed to address the problems of South Africa. His failure has been to implement some of the main resolutions of the 2017 Nasrec conference, like the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and land grab policies aimed only at white constituents. The ongoing stuggling economy on his watch could soon deliver the final prick to the inflated political balloon, triggering his sudden downfall and speedy exit from the South African political scene.17,21,50,93-98
Evidence of his devalued position as the leader of the ANC is Ramaphosa’s poor grasp on power at Luthuli-house. Magashule and his faction are already advancing their own political views freely inside the greater ANC from Luthuli-house, in order to make up for Ramaphosa’s under-performance and inefficiency. They have taken control of the long-term command of the ANC at the headquarters of the party by the awarding the ex-ministers Malusi Gigaba and Nomvula Mokonyane with high-profile jobs, respectively as part of the ANC’s policy-making team and as head of organisation. The same empowerment of the Magashule-Zuma faction leading the party from Luthuli-house, is observable in the Parliament where they successfully appointed so-called anti-Ramphosa figures as chairs of various committees (Parliament committee chairs wield enormous legislative and oversight powers, controlling how parliamentary committees conduct oversight over ministers and senior government officials).55,99-101
The strength of the Magashule-Zuma group in all the ANC’s structures, especially in Parliament, is well-illustrated by the editor102 of the Beeld when he writes on the 22nd June 2019102:16:
Lojale trawante van oud-pres. Jacob Zuma wat ook nou by beweerde staatskaping betrek word, sal vir die volgende vyf jaar hoofde van strategiese parlementêre portefeulje-komitees wees.
Ace Magashule, sekretaris-generaal van die ANC, het Woensdag aangekondig dat Supra Mahumapelo, Faith Muthambi, Tina Joemat-Petterson, Mosebenzi Zwane and adv. Bongani Bongo die hoofde van portefeulje-komitees soos toerisme, begrotingstoewysings en vervoer sal wees.
Magashule het die aanstellings geregverdig deur te sê dat nie een van hulle nog in ‘n hof skuldig bevind is nie.
It is also clear that Luthuli-house’s corrupt relations with the security services are a cause for concern since it is used to isolate Ramaphosa more and more from the ANC’s active politics. The state security minister, Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba55, acknowledged that because of Zuma’s association with SSA, it has not been friendly towards Ramaphosa. Letsatsi-Duba55 recently said55:1-2: “Right now some politicians are happy with the status quo. Those intelligence officials serve them. There is no way they are going to say ‘we are not going to allow them to interface with us or interact with us’ because it benefits them anyways. Some [ANC] politicians used intelligence officers ‘for political reasons’ and ignored the law because it served their interests”.
Also, Hunter100 confirms this isolation of Ramaphosa via Luthuli-house, when Hunter100 writes100:2:
President Cyril Ramaphosa is facing a rebellion by senior spooks in the State Security Agency who are threatening to topple him over his plans to restructure the intelligence services.
This was confirmed by state security minister Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba in an interview with the Sunday Times.
Letsatsi-Duba said she feared that high-ranking officials were rebelling at Ramaphosa’s proposed overhaul of the agency following years of ‘lawlessness’”.
‘This is not an ordinary resistance, it has a bigger agenda which is to make the status qui remain, so people can do as they wish”.
The Mufamadi-report55, published in March 2019, reports as follows further on Ramaphosa’s growing threatening position in the intimate ANC- politics by the security environment55:1-2:
Spies loyal to Jacob Zuma ran an illegal and co-ordinated intelligence campaign and spent millions on dirty tricks in a failed bid to stop Cyril Ramaposa becoming president of the ANC [and South Africa], a shock new report on the state Security Agency (SSA) has revealed. The report exposes illegal activities in the service of Zuma, including:
Physically stopping CR17 supporters from distributing regalia;
Spying on civil society organisations that were critical of Zuma; and
Fake news in the form of a media campaign for the 2016 local government polls.
The Mufamadi report points out that the threat that spooks could “hit Ramaphosa” because of his intention to cleanse the state security agency from crooks and criminals who are obstructing law and order, as well as delinquent agents who endanger the lives of the innocent citizens. Hunter100 paints a bleak picture when he reports100:2: “Top intelligence operatives, speaking on condition of anonymity, have threatened to hit back. If Ramaphosa continued ‘agitating’ them, some of our guys will get involved and he will see it at the NGC”.
Also, the editor103 of the Sunday Times commented on the focused intention to undermine Ramaphosa, and writes on the 9TH June 2019 as follows103:18: “The Mufamadi report into the State Security Agency came to the shocking, if obvious, conclusion that there had been ‘serious politicisation…of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party’. This, it said, had resulted in ‘an almost complete disregard for the constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts’, and turned the intelligence community into ‘a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals.”
Two other negative factors are furthermore facing Ramaphosa inside the inner-circle of the ANC operating from Luthuli-house. One is the hostile positioning of the ANC stalwart Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (including her cronies) against Ramaphosa.55,104
Secondly, there are the Public Protector’s constant actions against Ramaphosa; allegedly continuing unabated because she is a kind of “agent” or “supporter” of Jacob Zuma. The allegation is moreover that she has been receiving illegal and co-ordinated information from so-called intelligence operatives, or Zuma spies, in her campaign against Ramaphosa and his cronies.103,105 Solly Mapaila105 of the SACP in this context warned her not to be105:6 “…pursuing comrades on the basis of information that she is allegedly been fed by rogue intelligence units.” On these pro-Zuma elements alleged influencing of the Public Protector’s office, Mapaila is quoted on the 27th June 2019 in the Sowetan as follows by Goba105:6: “They feed this office with rogue intelligence and information. If that information is not utilised, you see it coming through opposition parties…which are supplied information by these roué intelligence units.”
It is clear that Ramaphosa has been hampered in some of his decision-making tasks and executive actions by his opponents in the greater ANC, that he is not the assumed strongman who can turn around the ANC’s politics in 2019 and neither will he be able to deliver pots of gold to South Africans. He appears unable to cleanse the ANC from his opponents and its alleged crooks. Ramaphosa may perhaps and does sometimes speak up in public about his enemies in the greater ANC and his ability and intention ”to demolish” them. The writing of the editor9 of the Sunday Times on the 28th July 2019 is a well-illustrated example: it as follows9:18 “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s dramatic challenge to fellow leaders who oppose him, to remove him if they dare…”. But it is false bravado, with very little assertiveness and action. It is a misunderstanding to see Ramaphosa as the untouchable, empowered Messiah who will save the ANC and South Africa from Magashule and his faction: Emperor Ramaphosa is naked.9
Ramaphosa has been moved to the backseat, while under the ANC’s politburo’s rules Magashule is now driving the ANC bus exclusively. It is thus with good reason that the media postulates that Ramaphosa is heading for a difficult time in office.106
The intention by Ramaphosa’s opponents in the ANC to oust him must not be seen as an immediate action of retaliation in 2019. His opponents lie low and will only strike when they discern that Ramaphosa is at his most vulnerable.25,26,32,35
Although the appointment of Ramaphosa as President of the ANC will continue up to the national conference in 2022, the rumour is that there will be an effort to oust him in 2020 at the ANC’s National General Council (NGC). Hunter writes100:2: “There are suspicions that some Zuma backers plan to table a motion of no confidence in Ramaphosa at the gathering. A source close to Ramaphosa said his allies had been warned that some intelligence officials were ready to help ‘make life difficult’ for him”.
Matiwane142 reports also that the KwaZulu-Natal chair of the ANC Sihle Zikalala and his provincial executive recently quelled a brewing revolt against President Ramaphosa with great effort. Matiwane142 writes142:4: “The attempt comes amid talk of a plan to call for the president’s removal at the ANC’s next national general council (NGC), scheduled for next year”. He further writes142:4: “Zikalal confirmed raising the matter [ousting of Ramaphosa] at the PEC meeting, saying it was public knowledge that there were people discussing Ramaphosa’s possible dismissal”. Although Zikala said that the directive of the NGC is solely a process whereby the ANC takes stock of what had emerged in terms of successful implementations of the resolutions of the 2017 conference at Nasrec, and not a specific process to select leaders, the NGC-empowerment indeed offers the opportunity to intervene where the leadership failed because of bad intentions or ignoring these resolutions, making the selection of new leaders an immediate urgency.13,19,94-96,107
It is believed that there is going to be a full attack on Ramaphosa at the national conference in 2022. It is emphasised by political analysts that if the present leadership in-fighting and faction conflict in the ANC is not soon forced to deliver a clear outcome and in which one of the role-players is all but erased from the ANC politics, the outcome can be a constant, and ongoing fight for survival between Ramaphosa and Magashule and their factions leading up to 2022 or even 2024. The absence of a clear unified support fo a leadership to steer the greater ANC’s interests constructively, can make the ANC’s policies very confusing and conflicting, and disarms the ANC as the effective ruler of the country.13,19,107
About the Zuma/Magashule clan’s unwavering patience to wait before launching a full-scale attack in order to lay claim to the post-2019 to 2024 ANC-regime, Harper39 writes with specific reference and clarity39:31: “And, warm curled up as a fat cat waiting for an opportunity to eat the small, bewildered mouse, is of course Jacob Zuma and his list of crooks to take over the post May 2019 ANC and South Africa.” It is thus with good reason, undoubtedly after some glimpse into the ANC’s political future and the functioning of its revolutionary leadership, that Harper39 postulated39:31: “…Ace’s smug look is understandable, if the theory that his [the Magashule/Zuma] faction in the ANC is planning to call a vote of no confidence against Ramaphosa within the party and Parliament to cut short his term – and the clean-up of the state – is true.”
For the editor108 of the Sunday Times Ramaphosa is challenged daily for his leadership position in the ANC and as state president.
Labuschagne also doubts Ramaphosa’s ability to assure good governance post-2019. Labuschagne states that the ANC’s political setup is chaotic and can mean that Ramaphosa’s so-called plans to save the country could be ship-wrecked. This can directly end any improvement in the ANC itself; and neither will it advance Ramaphosa’s already precarious position.13,18,66,67,109
Hugo Pienaar66 of the Bureau for Economic Research also posits that the victory of the ANC during the May 2019 elections does not necessarily mean a totally free hand for Ramaphosa to get the country’s engine working again and resolving its problems. There are just too many complicated elements inside the battered soul of the present-day ANC, which are misread by economists and the media, and have the potential to block any positive input.66
Criticism of Ramaphosa is his under-performance as vice-President before 2017, his present-day powerlessness as ANC-leader, being encircled by hostile cadres from the Magashule-Zuma faction and the growing chaotic state of the South African economy in which he played a prominent role for a long time as Number Two in the country. Pertinent also are his inabilities as a leader to launch dynamic actions to prosecute the Zupta-clan and to cleanse the ANC of crooks on all levels since December 2017. The so-called “Ramaphosa vote” is seen as of little impact after the 8th May 2019 elections, and neither is it going to bring gains for the ANC in the future. He is short-circuited by the Magasgule-Zuma clan, making him, solely a figurehead in the ANC. A possible return to the Zuma era after 2019, is therefore quite feasilble.18,19,67,111
The above finding echoes Motlanthe’s and Mthombothi’s pre-May’s opinions that Ramaphosa is not the anointed messiah to save the post-May 2019 ANC, neither can he bring about any improvement to South Africa. It seems South Africa is far worse off in November 2019 than it had been in December 2017 with the departure of Jacob Zuma as president. This outcome alone, political analysts believe, tells a story of a new kind of political mishap that is about to unfold.59,60,67,76,108
Msimang112 writes that during Ramaphosa’s presidency are there few objective reasons to be optimistic or hopeful about South Africa’s future, although it does not mean at this stage that South Africa is a failed state or that our democracy has ended in tragedy. The fact that Ramaphosa’s failure so far has brought uncertainty as to whether he will be capable post-2019 of addressing corruption, poverty and inequality; outcomes which in turn have forced South Africans into a life of constant uncertainty. The intention of nation-building after 2000 is no longer a priority while the mechanisms that had been established during Apartheid to resolve social conflicts, were discarded or were hijacked by quasi-governmental associated bodies. This state of affairs resulted in the impunity of and abuse by the ANC and its leaders. Political analysts sense that it was in this ill-fated socio-economic and political setup that Ramaphosa had been able to cast himself as a new broom that arrived to sweep away the unwanted debris. His assumed position of “excellence, goodness and ability” was subjectively strengthened because he served as vice-president for the second half of Zuma’s term as president, painted by the media as the good leader versus Zuma the bad one.112
Ramaphosa’s silence on the chaos in the SOEs confirms his immense fear of antagonising the unions (especially his tripartite partners Cosatu and the SACP). If he dares to act against them, as is required by a true statesman, and launches the reform of Eskom, the SABB and SAA assuring their profitably by firing their masses of over-appointed and over-paid staff to lessen the taxpayer’s burden, he could revive the economy. In the meantime, however, he has been continuing his backroom dealings, and by doing so he has been putting the credit rating of the country at risk113-116.
The view of political analysts is that for the likes of Ace Magashule, David Mabuza and Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa is nothing else but a round peg inside the ANC square hole, making him unfit to deliver constructive results in the doomed ANC, not to mention the wider South Africa. Msimang112 continues in this context on Ramaphosa112:1-2: “His history in the last two decades – alongside that of his comrades – indicates that, at best, he will be able to promote incremental improvements to the economy. But where it matters the most, he will lack the courage and authority to rein in the worst impulses of a party that rewards the arrogant, the cruel and the callous. Ramaphosa and those who have accompanied him to power lack moral authority.”
Also, Mthombothi117 agrees with Msimang112 on the failure of Ramaphosa as the much lauded saviour, when he specifically reflects on Ramaphosa’s foolish Third Sona:117:21
Ramaphosa says he has heard the frustration of South Africans and his administration will focus on addressing these.
However, his speech showed there is still disconnect and failure to approve the level of restlessness in the country.
This was a political moment that required a defining address to the nation.
But our nation remains adrift, and clearly nobody, including our president, knows how to get us on course.
Notwithstanding the growing opposition against him, Ramaphosa, as a well-seasoned politician knows his present-day dilemma is demanding and dangerous, but he also knows how to profit from it. Contrary to the dying NP under FW de Klerk, which had little breath left in the 1990s, the ANC is still one phase away from terminal death, giving Ramaphosa enough time to establish his grasp on the greater ANC and enhance his standing in the presidency and South African politics. This short but safe time-frame also offers him the scope to plan his final revenge on the ANC’s leaders and the ANC as a party, similar to how De Klerk directed his revenge on the NP’s leaders and their party.59,80
The post-May 2019 ANC political landscape that Ramaphosa is facing require from him a dangerous journey, full of potholes, that can either make him the winner or the loser counting his final days in the presidency. Mirrian writes17:3:
It is going to be a long, hard slog. The key question he faces is how long will he continue to play the negotiator against his political opponents?
Eventually, doing so will culminate in paralysis – it is at this point that he will have to set his instincts for consensus and negotiation aside and make hard decisions, which could lead to the fraught political environment coming to a head.
Ramaphosa is a master at escaping political responsibilities and blame. His use of political dummies to do his dirty work and to hang the “culprit-identity” around their necks is obvious. He has been using for instance Minister Tito Mboweni to make fearless stands in public in order to do his dirty work, without allowing the Zuma-Magashule clan to get a grip on him, notably. Mthombothi21 writes21:21:
Instead of Ramaphosa dipping his own toe in the water, Mboweni can do so for him. A few months ago he wondered aloud why the government thought it wise to run an airline, the troublesome SAA, Ramaphosa didn’t make any attempt to correct him. Mboweni has used strong language against the ANC decision to nationalise the Reserve Bank. In his presentation this week, he took a swipe at the Road Accident Fund, and was forceful about the drastic measures that need to be taken at Eskom.
There are many other kinds of Mboweni-like saviours helping to bolster Ramaphosa’s image and grasp on the levers of power. Mboweni’s various controversial and fundamental public opinions, which are seen as outright unspeakable and untouchable issues for the ANC’s radicals (and for Ramaphosa if he wishes to stay on as leader). Examples are for instance the cutting back of the rising public sector payroll (saving R30 billion for instance by the shedding of 30 000 civil servants in the 55- to 59-year age group) and the stopping the bailing out of the many ineffective and ailing SOEs. Mboweni’s furthermore announced to the public that the ANC regime was borrowing R1.2 billion a day while it pays out R1 billion a day in interest on the country’s debts (leaving a surplus of only R0.2 billion for “grocery-spending”), was certainly not sweet music to the ears of some of the corrupt ANC top brass living off their state capture loot.21,118,119
Then is there Mboweni’s so-called insensitive intention to squeeze more tax money from the already over-taxed citizens, varying from “sin-taxes” to “emergency-taxes”, to the bailout of the “hungry dog” Eskom to the tune of yet another R59 billion. Mboweni’s Special Appropriation Bill to take more money from the unfortunate taxpayers for the ANC’s ongoing failures – while at the same time, the dear leader Ramaphosa silently hides in the background, so as not to appear as politically contaminated through the “tax-punishment” meted out to his voters.113-115
The writings of the editor113 of The Citizen on the 25th July 2019 reflects the political manoeuvring of Ramaphosa via Mboweni113:12:
It is clear that the ANC government, through Mboweni, is still unwilling to bite the bullet and privatise Eskom, which might – although there are no guarantees – help set it on its financial feet. And that is because, whoever takes over Eskom and tries to run it as a going concern business will have to retrench thousands of employees. And that does not sit well with the ANC’s union partners.
3.3.1.1.4.5.2. Ramaphosa and his third Sona’s wonderland-dreams
President Cyril Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address (Sona) on the 20th June 2019 reflects his complete lack of an in-depth understanding of the country’s present-day comprehensive social, financial, political and statutory problems. Firstly, the fact that these problems were mostly created by the ANC during their rule of 25 years is seemingly missed by Ramaphosa. Secondly, it reflects a glaring lack of insight by Ramaphosa on the know-how to address these problems constructively.120:21
Ramaphosa’s third Sona on the 20th June 2019 was a Walt Disneyland fantasy flight. More precisely: a collection of Alice in Wonderland’s daydreams. It was also just a continuation of the Wonderland dreams that were announced by Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma and offered to the masses of poverty-stricken blacks as another African Uhuru to come; denoting the coming of more chaos and hunger in post-1994 South.121,122
Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address or Sona (often mocked by opposition voters as Same old nothing address) illustrates this political confusion and naivety of Ramaphosa quite well. It gives us a clear view of the chaos of the post-2019 politics that is currently awaiting us under Ramaphosa. Saunderson-Meyer120 writes120:12:
Like psychological troubled patients decoding ambiguous inkblots, we earnest tried to discern in the president’s vaguely sketched air castles and careful non-specifics our national gestalt.
Unfortunately, CR’s dream skirts big, existential issues. Forget about addressing an increasingly divided nation tearing itself apart, what most fires the imagination of the president is a bullet train that will traverse the country. To be precise, from Musina to Cape Town, via Pretoria and Buffalo City.
Oh, and please Father Christmas, a new “smart city…founded on the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution.”
Crime will be halved within a decade. International tourism will be double by 2030. Eskom will be rescued. The Reserve Bank will remain independent. Very soon, every child “will be able to read for meaning”. Our economy will grow faster than our population.
Less ambitiously, the government will cut data costs and build digital hubs for innovating youngsters. It will also build fresh produces marketplaces for their old-fashioned parents.
On Ramaphosa’s foolish dream in his third Sona that 2 million jobs will be created before 2029, Julius Malema of the EFF offered a cold shower when he said123:2: “Daar is 9 miljoen werkloses. Dit beteken 7 miljoen mense gaan steeds werkloos wees.”
His Third Sona confirms that sound planning of short and long term economic policy are outside Ramaphosa’s political competence, his planning and activities. Myths, short-sightedness, ignorance and lack of political responsibility seem to be present in abundance in Ramaphosa’s political register.120-132
Much praise was showered on Ramaphosa for his so-called excellent Third Shona, while it clearly lacked real solutions. Ramaphosa stood central in the reigning the chaos.125,134-138
Ramaphosa’s precarious position highlights Calland’s cliché134:8: “Ramaphosa’s in control”, as empty words. For some political analysts to react to Ramaphosa’s many and increasing rhetorical flourishes in public speeches, such as the Third Sona, by saying that: “Ramaphosa knows what must be done”, “Ramaphosa is [a] brilliant economist”, “On Thursday night, though, Ramaphosa re-exerted his leadership over both the party and state…”, or “Ramaphosa’s in control”, reflect the outright foolish thinking, misleading and false postulations.
His Third Sona revealed that Ramaphosa remains unconcerned and disconnected from the problems of the country as the editor139 of The Citizen on the 20th June 2019 reflects139:10: “He should be in crisis mode. The country is in crisis. Things are getting worse, fast. Our finances are getting worse, look at the tax receipts. The liabilities of Eskom are in the hundreds of billions of rand. We need a crisis response.”
The immense problem of black poverty is has been shoved to the backburner. Ramaphosa is instead wallowing in his extravagant wealth and revolutionary education as part of the exclusive ANC elite. This mindset is underscored in an excellent manner by Pelser121 when he describes Ramaphosa’s personal appearance in Parliament while he had presented his foolish future dreams of South Africa in his Third Sona, as follows121:6: “Ramaphosa, geklee in sy pragtige House of Monatic-pak, vra ons moet plaaslike produkte koop terwyl die nuwe minimum loon die koste van plaaslike vervaardigers opstoot en goedkoop tekstielinvoer uit Xi se China klerefabrieke van Soutrivier tot Newcastle laat sluit”.
Can anyone disagree with Pelser121 when he concludes on the foolish dreams of Ramaphosa’s Third Sona, noting121:6: “Oppossie-LP’s het hardop vir hom gelag. Dit was tragies om te aanskou”.
The hard and tragic fact is that Ramaphosa’s third Sona confirmed that he as the president is not in command of his presidency, nor of the greater ANC, the SACP, Cosatu or the Magashule-Zuma clan. He has not been in the past and will not be in the future the ANC’s Commander One. Overall, the greater ANC is a lost case as a regime. Indeed, visible in many of his speeches, are the hands of the Magashule puppetmaster, together with that of the greater ANC politburo, pulling the strings on what is going to be done and what is not going to be done between 2019 and 2024 by Ramaphosa (and how and when the Magashule clan and the politburo will be giving permission or not to him to do whatever they want to have done).134-140
The editor130 of City Press reflects very succinctly on the 23rd June 2019 on Ramaphosa’s Third Sona speech as follows130:2: “This Sona ended up being one of his poorest speeches since December 2017. It was the worst possible start to his formal term as elected president of the republic.”
Bauer137 describe the “best” outstanding and extraordinary talent exhibited by Ramaphosa as his ability to avoid complex political problems by his masterly, well-manipulating of facts and the use of myths. Bauer137 offers in this context a useful insight when he says137:5: “There was a hell of a lot of rhetoric in his speech and we’ve all heard the same words being said about employment rates and committing to growth.”
Also, the editor85 of the Saturday Citizen on the 22nd of June 2019 elucidates Ramaphosa’s third Sona and the instability of the post-2019 South African state awaiting us, when he said85:12: “It’s true his address left more questions than answers. Over the next few years, he will have nowhere to hide when trying to fulfil these lofty plans.”
Ramaphosa, as President, again as he did as vice-President, refuses to face political realities. The consequences are immense.85
3.3.1.1.4.5.3. Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s doings: a small fry for Ramaphosa but a big racial issue
South Africa is heading for a cliff of unstoppable troubles, especially around the unaddressed remnants of Apartheid, the present and future position of whites in the South African state, the present-day uncritical adherence to the ANC’s revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology deeply rooted in the ANC governance, the ANC’s failed economic policy of land grab, void of economic stimulii and the ANC elite’s inclination to exclusively enrich themselves. Central in such matters too are the intrinsic value that white landowners hold and their full-status as citizens.
The many conflicting outcomes since December 2017 as evidenced daily is that the ANC is moving into the category of a failed and political bankrupt regime, led by a paramount chief who does not know how to handle even the smallest incident of racial conflict without allowing it to take root out in court cases and the continuous detonation of devastating black-on-white and vice versa political bombs. We see this in the present-day intolerance as reflected by Tweeters on social media who have unnecessarily been inflaming racial tensions. The presence of certain senior radical elements in the ANC (while elected and public salaried executives should know better) who are directly responsible of starting trouble by race-baiting while at the same time these elements within the ANC top brass are sheltered behind the law with enough money to ponder the legal ramifications of crimen injuria, human rights violations, etc., have charged the racial atmosphere. Some whites have begun to retaliate in tweets because they fear what they perceive as the intention to grab their assets or as direct threats to their persons. Of the wise King Solomon Ramaphosa, using well-reasoned cognitive solutions instead of the massively unrealistic dreams, speeches and judicial solutions he proposes to bring concrete and lasting racial harmony — there is sadly no sign on the horizon of any constructive trouble-shooting or simple damage-control. The absolute silence by Ramaphosa on these racial matters could in the near future be one of the reasons for him to wave the presidency farewell.141-144
Here the recent activities of the daughter of the late Nelson Mandela, Ambassador Zindzi Mandela’s (Mandela-Hlongwane) relating to her tweets on the issue of whites landownership and their future position in the country, are causes for concern. The deafening silence of her top boss, Cyril Ramaphosa, on her specifically delinquent political and racial behaviour, inappropriate for a high-level diplomat, rings out. It is not a case of whether or not she is entitled to act controversially as if she is speaking her mind as an individual, but that she, as a functioning ambassador, is undoubtedly not entitled to this kind of undiplomatic behaviour in public. The fact is that there were no serious consequences for her. Indeed, she was allowed to stay on in her diplomatic appointment. This is an outcome that had reflected very negatively on Ramaphosa. His inaction in addressing the issue and directly and immediately responding with a public and formal acceptable solution, was significant. The seriousness around Ambassador Mandela’s undiplomatic behaviour was of such a consequential and racial importance that ex-President Thabo Mbeki, in the absence of Ramaphosa’s constructive intervention as Number One, felt obliged to advise the Ramaphosa government that Ms Mandela should be recalled. What is again remarkable here is that Ramaphosa side-stepped any projection of him being pro- or anti-Mandela-Hlongwane, forcing his minister Dr Pandor to take the public rap in reprimanding the culprit.143-146
Zindzi Mandela-Hlongwane’s remarks may be a small matter for Cyril Ramaphosa, but the worsening racial issue is certainly not insignificant in the greater South Africa outside of the ANC regime’s dubious politics and delinquent activities. Especially the fact that comprehensive and extreme land expropriation without compensation of white-owned property is now seemingly a strong policy direction to be activated in the near future. This negative advance of the Mandela-Ramaphosa setup needs to be fully examined as an excellent example of Ramaphosa’s failure as the President of South Africa.143-146
Mandela’s expressions of racism as an individual and a senior state official was left without punishment by Ramaphosa, but this is in conflict with the recent cases where the alleged racism of four whites had officially led to their prosecution and sentencing, forcing them to either pay hefty fines or go to prison. The Mandela tweets, seen by opposition black and white politicians as well as whites in civil society as highly inappropriate for a diplomat and as a public attack on all whites in general in South Africa, read as follows146:2: “Dear Apartheid Apologists, your time is over. You will not rule again. We do not fear you. Finally # The Land Is Ours.”
How serious the Mandela tweets are, underscored by Makhanya.146 He writes as follows146:2: “The thing about Mandela’s tweets is that they were raw in their racism. Racism, not radicalism”.
Mkhwanazi,142 on the first official reaction by the ANC regime to the public critics on the Mandela tweets, points out a clear ANC intention of a further fire-up of the already explosive racial situation. He writes as follows142:7: “The ANC spokesperson Pule Mabe entered the fray and said this week Mandela was entitled to express her views”.
The Beeld reports that she also said in another tweet that141:4: “…wit Suid-Afrikaners is gronddiewe en apartheidsapologete wat nes ongenooide gaste ‘weier om te loop’.”
Ritchie,147 on the series of Mandela’s various ongoing tweets, describes the contents as follows: “…calling white South Africans land thieves and cowards to c#nts and a#seholes in almost as many tweets.”
The above kind of writing only contributes to the broad anti-white mood already pervasive to which Mandela seemingly also contributed with the misuse of her ambassador’s position and tweets under the ANC’s political protection and parliamentary privilege and mandate. It creates nothing less than planned racial conflict in a political setup in which Cyril Ramaphosa’s intervention and guidance as the wise state man, is absent.141,142,147-151
Ramaphosa’s passivity and uninvolved behaviour (as reflected in his usual way of political interactions) in above racism, becomes understandable in terms of the ANC’s growing extreme racism152,153 Jessie Duarte,153 the adjunct-secretary of the ANC said on the 21st of November 2019 that the ANC is attached to tribal- and racial-orientated politics. Boonzaaier153 reports in the Rapport of the 24th November 2019153:6:
In haar toespraak vir die jaarlikse Albertina Sisulu-gedenklesing in Soweto het Duarte gesê die ANC marginaliseer lede wat nie swart afrikane is nie. “Ons het amper stamgebonde geword in die manier waarop ons onsself voorhou”.
Ons is rassisties in die ANC, want ons marginaliseer mense nie swart Afrikane is nie; ons hou hulle ten alle koste uit die ANC. (En) sit een of twee kwotas daar om te kan sê Jessie verteenwoordig ons.
Ons kan nie aanvaar dat nierasssigheid een van die kernwaardes van die ANC is nie. Ons wild it nie aanvaar nie, selfs al hou ons aan om mites daaroor te skep.
How intense this racism of the ANC is, is confirmed when even people of colour are discriminated against because they are not perceived to be “black enough”. Boonzaaier153 describes Duarte’s153 response in this context as follows153:6:
Sy het bygevoeg dat party ANC-lede volhou met die retoriek dat bruin mense baat gevind het by apartheid.
Volgens Duarte vra ANC-lede gereeld wie bruin mense kwansuis gedurende apartheid gemaginaliseer het. Hulle sê dat bruin mense niks nodig het van die demokratiese staat nie.
Sy het ook verwys na ANC-WhatsApp-groepe waar daar rassistiese terme gebruik word as daar verwys word na bruin en Indiërmense.
***[Thankfully many South African studies show that the outright majority of blacks does not feel hatred towards whites over Apartheid and the harm doen to them, as well as that the May 2019 elections had showed that there is no place for future black racial-radicalism and the future incitement of racial animosity (a radicalism unfortunately still cemented in a small part of the ANC, the PAC, the ATM, the EFF, etc.)]141,142,147-151
3.3.1.1.4.6. Ramaphosa’s need to come clean as State President
In viewing Ramaphosa’s career critically, as a so-called “freedom-fighter, revolutionary, businessman, politician and State President, there are just too many loose ends and secrecies around all his activities from his pre-1994 days up to his post-1994 days. Three prominent issues need to be addressed urgently by Ramaphosa if he wants to continue his political career:
- His CR17 campaign’s funding and his in-fighting with the Public Protector;
- How he obtained his fortune;
- Lekota’s allegation of him as an Apartheid’s spy.
3.3.1.1.4.6.1. The case Cyril Ramaphosa versus Busisiwe Mkhwebane in the CR17 funding campaign
The CR 17 funding campaign and the ongoing legal battle between President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane, undoubtedly reflect some strange behavioural discrepancies by Ramaphosa. This behavioural manifestation is in conflict with the lifestyle of any politician, let alone that of a president of a country. The proceedings launched against Number One, with the Public Protector’s interest in the R500 000 which was donated by the firm Bosasa to Ramaphosa’s December 2017 CR17 campaign, is a central issue. The whole campaign ended up with alleged donations of between R300 million and R500 million, although it can be as much as R1 000-million.59,60,154-156
On the alleged wrongdoings of Ramaphosa that have been a concern to Mkhwebane, is firstly the alleged R500 000 Bosasa money for Ramaphosa’s campaign and the Public Protector’s opinion that Ramaphosa had violated the Constitution and the executive’s Code of Ethics. Wa Afrika and Rampedi write157:1-2:
Mkhwebane added that Ramaphosa may have been involved in money-laundering since Watson‘s donation had been made through several intermediaries.
The public protector’s findings indicate that the donation was transferred from Watson’s personal account into the account of Miotto Trading, a company owned by Margaret Longworth, a sister of Bosasa’s former auditor Peet Venter, and then into the CR17 Attorney Trust Account managed by Edelstein, Faber and Grobler (EFG) Attorneys.
Mkhawebane says Ramaphosa may have breached the executive code of ethics by exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position.
It does not matter whether the donation to the CR 17 is R500 000 or R500 million, because in the end allegations around Ramaphosa’s campaign financing hold the same negative implications for him, which Wa Africa and Rampedi157 highlight as157:1-2: …“exposing himself to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between his official responsibilities and private interests and he acted in a way inconsistent with his position”. Ramaphosa and his spokesperson Khusela Diko have since constantly been trying to sidestep the thorny issue. His eventual appointment to a public position, namely that of President of South Africa is underlined by the fact that he is being paid by the state, meaning by the taxpayers. The argument by Ramahosa that the Bosasa money, the R500 000157:1-2: “…was not for any benefit received by myself in my official capacity, nor was it in order to influence me in my duties, but to support an internal party election”, missed the fact that this donation may have helped him to win the national December 2017 ANC election. On the opinion and possible misconception of Ramaphosa157:1-2: “…of no direct befitting him through the R500 000”, the Public Protector found on the contrary157:1-2: “…that the campaign pledges were some form of direct financial sponsorship and therefore has benefits of a material nature for Ramaphosa.”
The donations of hundreds of millions of rand allegedly handed to him by outsiders to the CR17 campaign are undoubtedly a setup which (must) concern the Public Protector for various reasons, varying from the possibility of undue political influence to issues that can endanger the state’s security. Naki154 writes154:4: “Mathekga highlighted that his [Ramaphosa] campaign was run by outsiders. But the fact that he received a R390-million donation was indicative of his influence outside the party,” and154:4: “To me it remains a mystery because we know so little about it.”
The justified questions asked by all citizens were: Who were these donors or where do the donors come from? What are or were the relations between these donors and Ramaphosa? Were taxes declared?
Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write in the Rapport of 21st July 2019 on the alleged R440 miilion for Ramaphosa’s controversial election campaign158:1-2:
Pres. Cyril Ramaphosa weier om te aanvaar dat daar iets onbehoorliks was aan die R440 miljoen wat weldoeners geskenk het aan sy veldtog om ANC-president te word.
Sy het bevind daar is “meriete” in bewerings dat Ramaphosa ‘n reeks trustrekeninge en komplekse finasiële transaksies gebruik het om die oorsprong van miljoene rande se skenkings aan sy veldtog weg te steek.
Baie van die skenkersgeld is in die trustrekening van die regsfirma Edelstein, Faber en Grobler (wat sy in die verslag as die “EFG2-rekening” identifiseer) betaal vanwaar dit blykbaar na verskeie ander entiteie, insluitende die Ria Tenda Trust, Linked Environmental Services en die Cyril Ramaphosa Stigting, gevloei het.
Luidens die verslag is R191.5 miljoen tussen 6 Desember 2017 en I Januarie 2018 in die EFG2-trustrekening betaal terwyl R190 miljoen uitbetaal is aan ander entiteite.
Ander entiteite waardeur CR17-geld gevloei het sluit in:
-
R388.5 miljoen wat tussen 1Januarie 2017 en 20 Februarie 2019 in die Ria Tenda-trustrekening inbetaal is. R388.5 miljoen is uitbetaal.
-
R441.2 miljoen wat tussen 15 Desmber 2016 en 13 Februarie 2019 gedeponeer is in die FNB-rekening van Linked Environmental Services. R444.1 miljoen is uitbetaal.
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R336 000 wat tussen 20 Julie 2017 en 26 Maart 2018 van Linked Environmental Services aan die Cyril Ramaphosa-stigting betaal is.
Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write further158:1-2:
Uit die verslag blyk dit dat een enkele skenker R121.1 miljoen aan Ramaphosa se vedtog geskenk het. Die skenker word nie geídentifiseer nie. Hierdie geld is blykbaar in drie paaiemente betaal: R30 miljoen op 9 Maart 2017, nege maande voor die ANC se verkiesingskonferensie by Nasrec, en twee verdere bedrae van R39.6 miljoeon en R51.5 miljoen, albei op 29 September 2017.
Ramaphosa self het R37.2 miljoen van sy eie geld in sy veldtog gestoot. Hiervan was R31 miljoen as lening [wat terugbetaal aan hom moes word] en R6 miljoen is geskenk [wat dus die enigste koste inset aan sy kant was].
Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 report on the view of Mkhwebane as follows158:1-2: “Mkhwebane skryf dat in die lig van die groot bedrae geld wat betrokke sy ‘voorlopig die siening toegedaan is dat so ‘n scenario, as mens versigtig daarna kyk…die risiko skep van ‘n tipiese staatskaping deur diegene wat die geld aan die veldtog geskenk het’”; en dat158:1-2: “…’n skenking van R500 000 van Gavin Watson en die ander skenkings van R440 miljoen aan die sogenaamde CR17 –veldtog om hom tot die ANC-president verkies te kry, op geldwassery kan neerkom.”
Hunter and Munusamy159 report that the investigations followed [after Mkhwebane issued a subpoena to gain access to three bank accounts (among them Standard Bank and Absa, reflecting as the Cyril Ramaphosa Foundation, a company linked to Ramaphosa and the CR17 and linked to Ramaphosa’s campaign) because some members of Ramaphosa’s team declined to give details of the donors], as Mkhwebane analysed the inter-account transfers between January 2017 and February 2019. This analysis, report Hunter and Munusamy159 on the 23rd June 2019, led to the Public Protector’s suspicions159:1-2: “… that the president had used the accounts to launder money. She wants him to respond to her suspicions”.
Hunter and Munusamy159 report furthermore that Ramaphosa’s long-time friend, one James Motlatsi, alleged that it was he who had asked Gavin Watson [of Bosasa] for money (supposedly R500 000) and that Ramaphosa did not know about the donations. On the various other donations to which Mkhwebane made enquiries, Motlatsi said159:1-2: “… Mkhwebane asked him who the other donors were: ‘I said no, we have taken a decision that each and every donor will remain confidential’.” On the broad aim and final destination of the money raised for the Ramaphosa-campaign, a member of the Ramaphosa- team said159:1-2: “Not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. Some of it is money for the foundation”, while another team-member said about the transfer of the funds which were moved between accounts that159:1-2: “…movement of money was ‘purely for logistical purposes’.”
Wyngaard156 reports on the alleged R300 million to R500 million (Molatsi said that the amount of R400 million is incorrect but failed to give the correct amount) in donations for the CR17, that Molatsi and the CR17 managers said156:21: “…dat die geld’ wetlik’ aangewend is vir verblyf, toelaes (‘stipends’) en bemarkingsmateriaal.”
Wyngaard156 elaborates on a clear guideline on how the “correct” spending of the alleged R300 million to R500 million should have been done when he writes156:21:
Bemarkingsmateriaal’ sou seker T-hempde kon insluit, altyd ‘n gewilde item, of spesiale plakkate ter ondersteun van die kandidaat. Maar waarom sou ‘n kandidaat verblyf aan afgevaardigdes moet verskaf wanneer dit deur die organisaie self gedek word?
Wel, die verblyf wat die ANC aanbied, is dalk nie van die beste nie, dus skuif jy jou ondersteuners na “beter” verblyf – sonder dat hulle die rekening hoef te betaal.
En waarvoor sou die kandidaat se veldtog “toelaes” aan afgevaardigdes moet betaal? Die ANC dek immers self vervoer, etes én akkommodasie.
Of is hierdie toelae in werklikheid maar die “vergoeding” vir afgevaardigdes se lojaliteit, wat oornag kan verander na gelang van wat die belonging is en ten spyte van die “kandidaatmandaat” wat ‘n tak aan die afgevaardigdes gegee het.
Die WhatsApp-boodskappe wat ek gedurende die Nasrec-konferensie van ingeligtes ontvang het, het in die dae en ure vóórdat vir ‘n nuwe leierskap gestem is, vertel van aanbiedinge om afgevaardigdes se skuld af te betaal of beloftes van duisende rande om die familie oor Kersgety te bederf.
De Lange60 writes, specifically on the use of the campaign money to influence delegates, as follows60:13: “Die geld is gebruik om [Ramaphosagesindes] afgevaardigdes na die konferensie te vervoer en hulle te huisves in hotels waar hulle nie deur die teenkanting [skynbaar die Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma kamp] beïnvloed of geïntimideer kon word nie.”
***[It is mentioned by Butler59 and De Lange60 that the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp spent far more than R500 million in their fight for the presidency of the ANC: Butler59 places the total costs of the ANC’s National Conference of December 2017 on R2 billion, making the donations for the two camps more or less R1 000 million. The sum of this R2 billion and the more than R500 million spent by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma camp, seems so far not to have attracted the attention of the Public Protector for “possible money-laundering”. This leaves the impression that the Public Protector can be subjective in her focus on the CR17, making the allegation that she is seemingly a “Zuma-appointed, -orientated -and –driven” agent in her so-called “attacks” on Ramaphosa, very convincing].59,60,160-162
Wyngaard156 emphasises that the156:21: “…’koop’ van stemme op ANC-leierskapkonferensies lê aan die kern van pres. Cyril Ramaphosa se huidige probleme met die openbare beskermer”. Wyngaard156 states clearly that there is surely no evidence that the two candidates were aware of above kinds of “candidate-promotions”, but quoted the unpublished book of Dr Oscar van Heerden156 about the “problematic outcomes” of the Nasrec 2017 ANC election156:21: “Geen eerbaarheid meer onder ANC-leiers nie en enigiets is aanvaarbaar – solank as wat jy wen”.
The indication by Wyngaard156 that the Ramaphosa-team was far less organised and experienced in political manipulation than the one of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, made him a less probable winner, seems appropriate. On the end-result of the Nasrec-election, Wyngaard writes156:21: “Stemme op die ANC-konferensies kom immers teen ‘n prys. En dit was so hittette of Dlamini-Zuma het hom [Ramaphosa] by die stembus verslaan – ‘n skrale 179 afgevaardigdes het hom gehelp om die knoop deur te hak. Nou met die OB se ondersoek na hom kan met reg gevra word: Wat het dit hom gekos?
The editor163 of The Star, on the corrupt buying of votes by candidates at the Nasrec 2017, responds163:8: “The leaking on social media of bank statements, showing payments from an account linked to the CR17 campaign showed, in black and white, what many had for a long time suspected: those wishing to stand for the ANC’s top job need more than just slogans and songs – they need deep pockets”.
***[The imbalanced outcome of the Nasrec election reflects that Ramaphosa’s simultaneous occupying of the chairs of the president of the ANC and that of the President of South Africa which was the result of an insignificant voter mandate brought about by merely ±2 090 votes for Ramaphosa against ±1 910 votes for Dlamini-Zuma. (This majority of Ramaphosa represents only 4.5% of the 4 000 delegate-group, which in turn represent ±1-million ANC-members)]156,164.
The above alleged “buying of the leadership” in 2017 by Ramaphosa is openly condemned by Ace Magashule,164 when he posits164:12:
Every leader of the ANC has been very critical about us using money because leaders are identified. Leaders are elected. Leaders emerge out of struggle.
We have always condemned these foreign tendencies within the ANC. Those tendencies are foreign and we will condemn them forever because there are clear conference resolutions and decisions and we must all adhere to those resolutions.
Magashule164 continues164:12:
We have not changed our character. We won’t behave like a pure electoral party that goes to the electorate during elections – we have principles.
If you understand the ANC, you will never move away from ANC objectives and principles, culture and traditions.
If you want to move away from it you must go to conference and change. Persuade people to take certain resolutions. The highest decision-making body is the national conference, and the national conference has never changed the character of the ANC.
***[It seems that there is at the moment an effort to quash covert party funding after the controversial Ramaphosa CR17 campaign by a draft Bill, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to include provisions to get information on the funding of political parties. The Bill, if passed, will compel parties to keep detailed records of the identity of donors and the amounts paid by the donor if it is above R100 000.The Bill stipulates that records should be kept (for a minimum of five years and should be made public quarterly) of money lent to political parties, sponsorships, expenses and its assets. Regarding the R100 000 limit Cosatu already demanded that all donations be declared because this threshold again could be a loophole for unscrupulous politicians to continue to accept bribes as so-called gifts. The intention is to align the Act with the Political Party Funding Act (promulgated in January 2019, 14 months after the ANC’s Nasrec election of 2017). This Act compels parties to declare to the Electoral Commission of South Africa donors who give in excess of R100 000, while it states that parties may not accept donations that are suspected or known to be proceeds of crime].165,166
Many stories and allegations have emerged around the alleged R500 millions of donations to the CR17. One story is that not all this money was fundraised for the campaign. De Lange162 reports that the CR-17 fund was not emptied or closed down after the election, as the CR17 management alleged. So-called donors’ money was apparently being used still after the Nasrec 2017 election for other purposes, such as salaries unrelated to the 2017 Nasrec election and for the party’s affairs, as well as Ramaphosa’s own personal activities. It is alleged that the salaries of certain ANC cadres at Luthuli-house – persons out of ANC jobs and who had formed part of the nucleus of Ramaphosa’s present list of loyalists and supporters at the time – were seemingly paid. Specifically, alleged De Lange162, Zizi Kodwa is alleged to be such a person. De Lange162 reports that Kodwa stayed on at Luthuli-house after the election at the cost of Ramaphosa to exclusively promote Ramaphosa’s interests there and in the greater ANC. De Lange162 writes further162:2: “Sy salaris is uit die CR-17-bankrekening betaal. Die CR-17-geld is ook gebruik om Fikile Mbalula se salaris te betaal. Dit word egter nie regstreeks so weerspieël in die gelekte state nie omdat dit meesal ingesluit is in ander items.”
The CR17 seems to have snared more politicians than Fikile Mbalula (now paid by the taxpayers as Transport Minister) and Zizi Kodwa (also, now paid by the taxpayers as State Security Deputy Minister) in its payment network. It is alleged by Mavuso and Ndaba167 in The Star of 19th August 2019 that the EFF-MP Tebogo Mokwele’s family also benefited from a payment and that former EFF-MP Nkagisang Mokgosi equally received finance from the CR17 when she ran into difficulties.167 On the strange “donations” to the two EFFs, Mokgosi and Mokwele, Mavuso,168 quoting the political analyst Thabani Khumalo, writes168:7: “…the relationship that led to the soft financial bailout was not holy. Where there is a donation, there are always conditions attached”.
The above allegations together with other damning information stand out in the #CR17leaks, #RamaphosaLeaks and the #CR17BankStatements. These leaks, related to the persons named to have received or contributed funds to the presidential campaign and linked to bank statements of the CR17 campaign, were sealed from public knowledge by the North Gauteng High Court deputy judge president, Aubrey Ledwaba, at the beginning of August 2019 on a specific request by Ramaphosa.162,168,169
Other payments alleged by Mavuso168 is that a prominent KwaZulu-Natal-based black-owned firm, the said Ngweya and Zwane Attorneys, had also received R1.5-million from the CR17 campaign168.
On the so-called “excessive” amount of money paid to the CR17 and the alleged “streaming out” of such money during and after the Nasrec 2017-election, Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe write170:1: “President Cyril Ramaphosa’s supporters have accused the CR17 campaign managers, especially Small Business Development Minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, of having used them to enrich themselves from the R1 billion raised for his ANC leadership campaign in 2017”. It is alleged170:1: “…that Ntshavheni, who was the campaign co-ordinator in Limpopo, gave local ANC leaders only R1 500 of the R6 000 allocated per branch to sway members in Ramaphosa’s favour during the branch general meeting held before the Nasrec conference”. It is also alleged by Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe that Ntshavheni170:1: “…claimed CR17 had no funds because it was a ‘religious’ campaign aimed at stopping state capture”. In this context of alleged pay-outs from the CR17 Wa Africa, Rampedi and Ngoepe170 write170:1: “The Sunday Independent learnt this week that Ntshavheni allegedly used a portion of the more than R5 million she received from the CR17 campaign funds to buy a luxury vehicle and build a mansion in Thohoyando for her mother”. They also alleged that Ntshavheni built another mansion for her alleged lover, Risimati Hlongwane, a CR regional coordinator in Vhembe.170
Maughan,169 on the other alleged beneficiaries from the CR17, reports further169:5: “The Sunday Independent reported that the beneficiaries of the campaign funds included ANC leader Enoch Godongwana, Ramaphosa’s adviser Marion Sparg, small business development minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, deputy minister in the presidency Thembi Siweya, former Free State economic development MEC Mxolisi Dukwana, former DA politician Grant Pascoe, Cosatu and Western ANC, among others”.
Also, various other reports deal with the alleged funders.169,171 Regarding these alleged funders and their payments, Maughan169 reports169:5: “The records named some of the funders as billionaire Nicky Opperheimer (R10m), former Absa CEO Maria Ramos (R1m), Pick and Pick owner Raymond Ackerman who also contributed R1m. It also mentioned Absa Nation Building as one of the donors that contributed R10.5m”. Friedman171 reports the name of John Copelyn of Hosken Consolidated Investments with the amount of R2 million.
The presidential spokesperson Khusela Diko172 admits that there were more than 120 donors. She, in her and Ramaphosa’s fightback on the publishing of the names of the donors, states:172:4 “Part of the conditions of them donating to the campaign was that they should not expect any benefit to arise from their contribution. It was for that reason that the campaign, to the greatest extent, attempted to keep that information from the president”.
The above statements of Diko172 reflect many contradictions. Firstly, is it unclear why Ramaphosa would want to keep these donors unknown in the light of his “clean”-governance undertaking in his election promises. The fact that he was one of the most eager supporters of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 (promulgated post-January 2019), is now completely contradicted by his acknowledgement of his own secret political life, pre-January 2019. Secondly, any undertaking by a donor “not to expect benefits in exchange for their money” is not worth the paper on which the undertaking was signed: it seems some of the more than 120 donors were seasoned businessmen who are very active in White capitalism, while some seem not to be new-comers to associations with the ANC and to have had some previous dealings with and alleged benefits from the ANC regime.172-174
Two further contradictions here are prominent. Firstly, Ramaphosa maintains he knew very little about the donations made to his CR17 campaign (a standpoint reaffirmed by his spokesperson Diko), but then a batch of leaked e-mails arrived via the Public Protector’s report on Ramaphosa’s response to Parliament about the R500 000 Bosasa donation which suggested that he could indeed have known who the donors of the CR17 campaign were. These e-mails he successfully stopped from being released to the public by a court interdict because it was alleged that they, together with the financial records of his campaign, had been illegally obtained. Ramaphosa’s argument was not so much that it was untrue or fake news, which would mean that there could be more than just smoke, and a case that needs to be investigated by the NPA. What is important is that financial records and e-mails were indeed leaked, creating the possibility that serious mischief could be masked by the interdict.172-174
The above outcomes leave us with the question why Ramaphosa had interdicted genuine e-mails regarding his funding if he underwrites clean governance and has nothing to hide and is willing to take responsibility if there had been wrongdoing. On the integrity of the e-mails Dlamini172 states172:4: “News24 reported that the emails were shared among Ramaphosa’s political rivals and on Twitter and were apparently verified and found to be accurate”, while Rooi175 too states that175:2: “News24 het die e-posse …geverifisieer en bevind dit is eg”.
Based on reports from New24’s website, Dlamini172 as well as Rooi175 further state that the Public Enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan allegedly was central in raising funds for Ramaphosa. Dlamini172 writes172;4: “It further said the president was consulted by the managers of the campaign about plans to approach several donors, including a Greek shipping tycoon with links to the arms deal”. Prominent stands out the question why this Greek tycoon (alleged to have a local political connection, linked to a well-known “Afrikaner political figure” outside the ANC), and a person who should thus be seen by the CR17 managers to be part of state capture under the ANC regime coming from 1994 (and to can continue after 2017), was considered as a qualified donor. The editor108 of the Sowetan,172,175 S’thembiso Msomi, states:
Considering that Ramaphosa came into power promising clean governance and a break with the capturing of the state by business interests that South Africa experienced under his predecessor Jacob Zuma, it was worrying to see him keeping quiet over the weekend.
In addition, Rooi175 draws attention to another contradiction with seems to nullify Ramaphosa’s plea of a lack of knowledge on the intrigues surrounding the activities of the CR17. He writes175:2: “Daar is ook ‘n e-pos waarin Ramaphosa self opdrag gee dat R20 miljoen van een rekening na ‘n ander oorgeplaas word.”
Secondly, there seem to be many other contradictions to read in the responses of Diko172 on behalf of Ramaphosa when she vaguely reacted to the leaked e-mails172:4: “…the President could not comment on the substance of the emails or their veracity”. But in the same breath she said that Ramaphosa was perturbed by the narrative being built around these e-mails, which could be seen as an acknowledgment that the e-mails are all true, when she states172:4:
South Africans perhaps have a legitimate right to want to know who funded the campaign. But there was no obligation on the part of the president or the campaign to release that particular information.
There is no regulation that requires that information to be made public and a lot of those donors would have donated because it was also going to be confidential”.
Answering her statement that there is “no regulation forcing Ramaphosa to make the e-mails public”, is it important to state that there are now post–January 2019 regulations in terms of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 in place which could have forced Ramaphosa to make public his donors who gave money above R100 000 should the donations have taken place post-January 2019.172 What is important in all of Ramaphosa’s acts, is his paying lip service to good governance. The promulgation of the Political Party Funding Act of 2019 was promoted and endorsed by Ramaphosa, making the question now prominent: Should it not be politically correct for Ramaphosa as the Number One — after the nine Zuma years of deception and crooking — to freely oblige to the guideline of publishing all the names of the beneficiaries from and donors to his CR17 campaign and possible other funding-sources?172
Msomi,174 reflecting back on the names of the many donors and the e-mails allegedly “blackening” them enough to justify a court interdict for Ramaphosa, thrusting the president in the centre of the web of lies and myths versus facts and truths concerning his involvement in the CR17 when he174, in line with Dlamini’s172 conclusion, writes on the 6th August 2019174:1:
News24 at the weekend reported on a number of leaked e-mails, some between Ramaphosa and his CR17 campaign managers, showing that the then deputy president had more than just a cursory interest in the drive to attract donors for his bid to become ANC president, and therefore president of the country.
Previously he had claimed that the CR17 kept a deliberate wall between him and their fundraising efforts and he did not even know who the donors were.
But the e-mails, which appear to have been partly relied upon by Mkhwebane in her findings that Ramaphosa misled parliament about the donations, suggest otherwise.
Although it can be argued that the CR17 money was not state money and thus outside the authority of the Public Protector, it must be noted that Ramaphosa was still Vice President of the country at the 2017 Nasrec election and stood under the rules of the Executive Code as a civil servant. Also, the fact that the Nasrec election made him the State President with state pay and benefits, changes the private setup around the CR17 to a public one. The Public Protector is indeed obliged by this outcome to investigate it and to refer it to the Hawks156 if there is an indication of possible money laundering.
The argument that Cyril Ramaphosa did not benefit from the CR17 money and that he is under no obligation by Parliament to declare the money or the donors’ names, seems not to hold water at all times. Ramaphosa’s obtention of an interdict to seal off from the public eye the many names of the donors of the money and his actions, reactions and counter-actions against Mkhwebane on the CR17’s activities are starting to look very suspicious. The question is prominent and contstant in the minds of many political analysts: what does Ramaphosa try to hide with all his opposing actions against the Public Protector’s findings or her indications of possible problems to be address by her.158,161,176-182
Even Ramaphosa’s own supporters in the ANC’s NEC doubt his intentions and said the alleged amounts of R300 million (which can in reality be between R500 million and R1 000 million) of donations were overkill by Ramaphosa. About the so-called “humble” need to keep the donors’ names secret by Ramaphosa through an interdict, Cele, Masuabi and Rooi158 write158:1-2: “Dit kan korporatiewe Suid-Afrika met rooi gesigte laat.” This position of secrecy invokes once more the question primary question: why did these “good” but wealthy donors (undoubtedly with business and others interests mostly within the White-capitalist circles) joine the Ramaphosa group? Was it not again a planned state capture and why should the public stay uninformed about the private donors’ actions and motives, hiding possible long-term political and economic effects still awaiting us? Ramaphosa’s successful interdict against the Public Protector, forbidding the publishing of the names of the donors to the CR 17, is of great concern: it spells out already the possibility of future state capture, as well as the possibility for Ramaphosa’s donors – with his guarantee by the court of their anonymity – to hold the country to ransom. It is obvious that Ramaphosa’s “good position” as state president at the end of the South African rainbow was ensured for him by the secret donors through their private financial and political intentions and activities.158,161
The fact that Ramaphosa is involved in an increasingly hostile battle with the Public Protector, while the Ramaphosa faction undoubtedly successfully smeared her in the media as the sole troublemaker against the “good Ramaphosa” and his regime, is a worrying phenomenon. It seems there can be an organised effort to undermine law and order.183-190 How intense Ramaphosa is fighting back against the Public Protector on any “suspicious” activities against him or by her doubting of his politics, is confirmed by the fact of that he has appointed two of the top South African lawyers to take her on.183,184 On the 11th August 2019184 in his analysis of the situation, Hunter writes184:4: “President Cyril Ramaphosa has enlisted two top legal minds in what is expected to be an explosive legal fight against public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane this week”.
About Ramaphosa’s role-playing as a so-called victim of the Public Protector in her alleged constant investigations against him, it must be noted that until June 2019 there had been only one. That his case should have been investigated, given all the questions around the CR17 funding, was justified, at least on a prima facie level. On her output of cases investigated (and wherein Ramaphosa did not play a role), inmiddle-June 2019 Mkhwebane herself gave us some inside information of her 20 months in office and the massive amount of cases so far investigated by her. This output by her clearly contradicts the public media’s allegation that she is primarily focussed on Ramaphosa or Gordhan, when she states191:2: “In die 12 maande tot 31 Maart 2019 het ek 14 000 sake ondersoek. Slegs twee het verband gehou met min. Gordhan, terwyl een met die president verband gehou het.”
Support is little for her in the media and politics, as Sokutu reflects192:12: “The opposition, from the Democratic Alliance (DA) to the ruling ANC – except for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – have intensified the campaign to push for her firing.”
A well-organised anti–Busisiwe Mkhwebane movement has emerged, reflecting focussed efforts to remove the present Public Protector from her post. Ramaphosa, his clan and supporters, parliamentarians, as well as officially and pro-Black organisations such as the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, Freedom Under Law, the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse, Cosatu and the SACP, have all called for Mkhwebane’s resignation or firing.183-193
There is no doubt that a Public Protector’s task and person are always endangered when he/she dares to try to implicate powerful individuals in their various kinds of wrongdoing, hardly making the case of Busiswe Mkhwebane a unique one. There are well-orchestrated efforts to oust the present Public Protector as soon as possible and at all costs for spurious reasons, such as her alleged “enabling of state capture” and of being an “alleged failure”. There are even the outrageous allegations that she is apparently mentally ubalanced, suffering from “paranoia” which would explain why she is daring to take on high-status figures, such as the two media heroes and darlings, Gordhan and Ramaphosa. Some want to take her to court for alleged perjury, while other persons cry out to remove her as an advocate from the roll.183-193
The attacks on her seem at times to be well-planned and focussed, extremely rude and undoubtedly mostly without evidence. Many are calculated to cast suspicion where evidence is lacking.183-193 Calland194 writes194:23:
She [Mkhwebane] is not in fact exercising her powers without fear or favour, but in service of certain factional and other vested interests;
and194:23:
In the corridors of power, the most often stated rumour is that Mkhwebane is being ‘handled by The Farm’ – a faction in the base of the intelligence services. Mkhwebane once worked there, but that does not mean she is a spook. However, there has to be an explanation for her conduct.
She is subjectively described as a “one-woman show which has to go”; postulations that fail to reflect any evidence against her besides betraying subjective and unrelated arguments which fit well into the pro-Ramaphosa faction’s mindset. Much of the criticism is characterised by the same personal rejection of her as of Jacob Zuma.183-193
Calland’s194 tirade that Mkhwebane’s dismissal by a two-thirds majority will be blocked in Parliament, constructs a narrative of the alleged sheltering of the Public Protector by crooks in the Parliament when he writes194:23:
The scoundrels on the list [ANC election list] will fight hard to stop a move against Mkhwebane. They have common cause with her; there are common interests in halting the reforms that may lead to their own investigation, prosecution and imprisonment.
Micheal193 writes193:13:
This woman has been an abject failure from the day she took office and everything she has touched has turned into a disaster. The only thing she is concerned about is to be a bulwark and a safeguard for Zuma’s cronies and this is the reason she was put there in the first place. It is fairly obvious now that she is incapable and cannot do the job that she was appointed to do…She should be fired from her job…
Sokutu192 writes192:12:
Looking at the string of her bungles – the latest the disputed finding on the SA Reserve Bank and Absa [as well as the latest court findings on Gordhan and on the Gupta-linked Estina dairy farm project] for which she has been slapped by the Constitutional Court with a huge personal cost order for “being untruthful” – the embattled Mkhwebane finds herself besieged by sharks baying for her blood.
Essop191 reports her own experience of the attack on her191:2: “Sy het gesê sy is in die sowat 20 maande in die amp onder meer ‘n “spioen” en “Zuptoid” of “Zupta-beskermer” genoem, ‘n minister het haar “onbevoeg” genoem, ‘n direkteur-generaal het haar vir ‘n “idiot “uitgekryt en joernaliste het haar ‘n “moroon” genoem. Mkhwebane het ook ontken dat sy betrokke is by die ANC se faksiegevegte.”
There seems to be an outright attack on Mkhwebane’s abilities and integrity as reflected by Munusamy’s195 writing of the 4th August 2019 which reads195:13-14:
Busisiwe Mkhwebane has been savaged by the highest court in the land. She has been branded a liar who is also incompetent, devious irresponsible, sloppy and opaque.
Marrian196 warns on the 14th June 2019, on the alleged capturing by Jacob Zuma and his cronies of the present office of the public protector – specifically the person Busisiwe Mkhwebane, and that political honesty, wisdom and sense must prevail as to her actions and person – when she writes as follows196:2:
At the end of this battle, the office of the public protector has to remain intact and if removing Mkhwebane ensures that this is done, so be it. But it is critical that this is done fairly and within the ambit of the law.
That Ramaphosa is going to pay a price in the future inside the greater ANC but mostly with the voters for his Ledwaba interdict, no-one can doubt. Mavuso and Ndaba167 refer to the viewpoint of the Durban-based independent political analyst Thabani Khumalo who said that the CR17 funds revelations were deeply damaging to the reputation of Ramaphosa167:2: “…as a man who came to power to clean the image of the country after lurching from one scandal to another in the past nine years”.
Khumalo167 is very straight on Ramaphosa’s insecure position since June 2019, triggered by the CR17 controversy and his own political clowning around it from June, when he says167:2: “…there was little that Ramaphosa could do to cleanse his image, saying people would now start recalling that he was part of the previous leadership [as vice-President and righthand and supporter of Jacob Zuma] that was being questioned.”
Msomi174 writes that notwithstanding some South Africans having been sceptical on Ramaphosa’s New Dawn to come, they believed that he at least would bring and run a clean administration174:13:
At the very least, we expected Ramaphosa would not be allergic to truth, no matter how uncomfortable or embarrassing it might be. He is certainly no Zuma, but his handling of the donations saga so far has left a bitter taste in the mouth.
The editor176 of the Citizen is quite lucid, reminding us of legal objectivity and reality. This also forms the basis of the Public Protector’s approach to Ramaphosa, even if it might sink him in the end. Regarding the present-day fight between Ramaphosa and the Public Protector, the editor176 of The Citizen guides us well on the 23rd July 2019 when he writes176:12:
However, the fact remains that, whatever the dust stirred up by this judgement and by Mkhwebane’s report on Ramaphosa the president has serious questions to answer.
And whether we like her or not, Mkhwebane was asking them.
The fact that many people believe Ramaphosa is some sort of political saviour should not blind them to the fact that he does not appear squeaky clean himself.
People must, at all costs, avoid believing that the end justifies the means.
The former public prosecutor, Lawrence Mushwana197, warns us of an internalised unreality which can sometimes relegate objectivity and honesty into second place in the minds of all the parties involved in the cases investigated by the public prosecutor’s office, saying in June 2019197:9: “…stakes are high in the office of the public prosecutor with all interested parties trying to stake a claim.” It is about the power to rule via the Public Protector’s office by delinquent politicians: Here the actions of the Ramaphosa clan to stay in power are very prominent. This so-called “claim staking” can be for less noble reasons as Makhanya187,197 warns on the role-playing of the dangerous populists in ANC politics as well as those in the economic world which have since 1994 dominated politics.178,197
About the distracting and organised attack on the Public Protector, discerning at least some suggestions of impropriety in the “smoke” suggesting some fire in the activities of the pro-Ramaphosa faction, Wyngaard156, supported by many other journalists, states156:21: “Maar die koor van kritiek teen Mkhwebane en die gereelde luide bevraagtekening van haar kundigheid, kan maak dat ‘n mens nalaat om te vra: Het Ramaphosa dalk tog iets om weg te steek?
Brian Sokutu192 is very correct when he says192:12: “Cyril needs to come clean”: it does not mean a week by week cleansing through affidavits and court interdicts to silence critics, but a permanent cleansing by himself of his past if he dares to stay on in the presidency.
What is obvious in this context are the increasing signs of Ramaphosa’s duplicity and evasions as a president to save his skin. He started his down-fall by misleading the Parliament himself with his slipperiness and ambiguity around the R500 000 of Bosasa money for his CR17 as an alleged payment to his son Andile for “consultation work”.156
The country is now in what many say is a crisis. The constant fights and interdicts around the position of Ramaphosa’s presidency doesn’t smell good186:4: “…worse news follow bad news”. It is time that Ramaphosa’s acts are taken to the courts to see if he is capable and skilled enough for the presidency. It is the duty of the court to intervene and to interfere when it seems that political leaders, regimes and law-makers fail their mandates of integrity, honesty and good governance.
Mkhwebane’s alleged transgressions against Ramaphosa are even deemed to be driven by her jealousy, especially because it is alleged that she does not receive as much attention as the previous Public Protector had received. Such allegations seem to be based on her lack of also being seen as a “national hero” and “saviour of the nation” as Madonsela was eulogised because she “captured” the bad Zuma and his cronies! Munusamy195 reflects this cognitive disposition well when she postulates195:13-14:
Mkhwebane’s deep resentment of Madonsela would become obvious. It seemed to go beyond the fact that Madosela took the role of the ‘Makhadzi’ with her, robbing Mkhwebane of the public adoration she felt entitled to.
The previous position and role of Madonsela as an alleged hero in ANC politics needs to be analysed. It will be done in the section immediately following here.
3.3.1.1.4.6.1.1. The strange role of Thuli Madonsela in Jacob Zuma’s state-capture adventure
The deputy general secretary of the SACP, Solly Mapaila198, in his testimony before the Zondo-commission on state capture which lifted the lid on the process that set the stage for state capture, made the surprising allegation of the role of previous Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in this process. Madonsela became a kind of “national heroine” for her so-called “role of saviour of the nation” from Zuma and his cronies’ state capture. Copious was the praise for her alleged role in the “fall of Zuma” with her report on Nkandla and state capture. In the evidence before the Zondo Commission by Solly Mapaila and Robert McBride, Madonsela was suddenly and unexpectedly clothed in another role, that of a crony and understudy to Jacob Zuma, in helping to prepare him for the presidency. It is alleged that Zuma finally helped her to become the country’s all-powerful public protector.198
Their testimony suggests the alleged formation of an elite group, called the engine room, which was gathered and apparently led by Zuma himself to advise him on the running of his regime from 2009 onwards. This training and advisory activity took place quite apart from the tripartite-alliance’s team, which was, on the face of it, supposed to guide and prepare Zuma officially. Mapaila198 said that this engine room, later also described as the kitchen cabinet, gave extensive advice to Zuma about the structure and policy direction of his government ahead of the 2009 period, totally disregarding the official ANC alliance team’s advice and guidelines.198
Munusamy198 also states that in submissions to Zondo, as was argued by Mapaila and the former Ipid chief Robert McBride, the members of the engine room group were very close to Zuma’s planning and decision-making: far closer and with more power than the ANC’s alliance (transitional) team. The evidence held that many of these members of the kitchen cabinet were later appointed by Zuma to key positions within the state. The engine room (kitchen cabinet) members had included persons such as the filmmaker Duma Ndlovu, Thuli Madonsela, Independent Electoral Commissioner chairperson Glen Mashinini, the former national police commissioner Riah Phiyega, the former minister Nkosinathi Nhleko, while the former Sars commissioner Tom Moyane also attended the meetings.198
On the other hand, members of the alliance or transitional (official) team, that was established by the ANC, SACP and Cosatu to do the restructuring of the government and to determine its programme based on the outcome of the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane national conference, were sidelined by Zuma and his “kitchen cabinet”, Munusamy claimed198.[The members of this team consisted of the top six members of the ANC, as well as the secretary general of the SACP Blade Nzimande and the secretary general of Cosatu, Zwelinzima Vavi. The secretariat of the alliance team was headed by Collins Chabane (who later joined Zuma’s cabinet), with members Mapaila, Ayanda Dlodlo, Neil Coleman and Clifford Motsepe]198.
Mapaila198 said that when the transitional team was established Zuma had already activated his kitchen cabinet in secret without informing the alliance leadership. What was shocking for the alliance team was that when Zuma announced his cabinet, some of the kitchen cabinet’s proposals were implemented in conflict with the advice of the alliance team. It was clear that the alliance team had been short-circuited by Zuma and that the kitchen cabinet determined the policy directions of the future Zuma presidency. Prominent conflicting decisions taken by Zuma, in line with the kitchen cabinet’s advice and against the advice of the alliance team, were that the National Planning Commission and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation became two separate ministries.198
Munusamy198 reports that there is no suggestion that the kitchen cabinet has been linked to corrupt activities. But certain outcomes of the decision-making of the kitchen cabinet and its members’ later appointments around Zuma’s interests are very suspicious. Firstly, a prominent outcome of the direction taken by Zuma with the appointment of his “own”, unofficial advisory team was a first sign that he was quite prepared to outsource the ANC’s mandate on ruling the country and to ignore the resolutions of the national conference. This is also a significant characteristic of his later state-capture enterprise via his appointed cronies and the involvement of strangers, such as the Guptas, opening the state’s coffers to them. Secondly, it is both significant and very suspicious that most of the so-called “members of his kitchen cabinet” were appointed later by Jacob Zuma in high-ranking positions. The following appointments followed from the kitchen cabinet: Nhleko, a previous provincial-prisons boss, was appointed minister of police; Moyane became the Sars commissioner; Mashinini was first appointed as an adviser to Zuma and then chair of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); Phiyga was first appointed chair of the presidential state-owned enterprises review committee, before becoming police commissioner; Vincent Magwenya was appointed presidential spokesperson; Bonsile Makhene became legal adviser to Zuma; Yekani Monde Gadini (husband of Makhene) was a State Security Agency agent, redeployed to Sars; while Madonsela became the public protector.198
Thirdly, all these positions were politically very powerful. These posts provided for excellent opportunities for the abuse and manipulations of the political, economic and statutory system as part of steering state capture. (The appointees Moyane and Phiyga’s problematic behaviours are today well-known).198
In reaction to the above developments and outcomes, Mapaila198 said before his appearance before the Zondo Commission198:5: “When we go to the commission we will illustrate our point of view that this is how capture happened even before [Zuma] became president. Policymaking shifted from the ANC to an unknown secret system.” Here, in the launching of state capture from within an unknown secret system, seems to stand out in some way for Mapaila the corrupting role of Zuma’s kitchen cabinet.198
Madonsela’s alleged association with and appointment by Jacob Zuma in the 2009s versus her current elevated and prestigious figure, and a person known since 2017 as a so-called national saviour and somewhat of an idol, as well as a so-called “prominent” fighter against the “bad” Zuma and his “evil” state capture, is controversial. If these allegations are true, it spells trouble in some way. There are enough conspiracy bloodhounds to start sniffing her tracks in the life and politics of the ANC and that of Zuma, not only after 2009, but also before 2009. The question, somehow, is what went wrong between her and Uncle Jacob? What cooled down her initial loyalty to and friendship with Zuma? What awful interpersonal incident had caused her to nearly put him in jail as well as attempt to take away his much beloved Nklanda from him. There are also her strange acquaintances with Moyane and Phiyga in their days of the kitchen cabinet and after the appointments of the three to state positions. It requires some answers.198
Two questions will stay undoubtedly unanswered: did Zuma’s kitchen cabinet teach him his political delinquency or did some of these “cabinet members” learn crookedness from him? Or was the whole group, including Zuma, from day one a bunch of delinquents? It seems as if Mkhwebane’s biggest problem at the moment is that she was not appointed by Ramaphosa as a favoured follower and that she was not part of Ramphosa’s own “kitchen cabinet”. But her biggest sin, it seems, is that she dared to take on the “good, anointed saviour of the Nation”, Cyril Ramaphosa, while Madonsela took on the public’s much-hated “prime evil”, Jaco Zuma! The line between wrong and right is thin in the cesspit of South African politics, following on from 1994.
3.3.1.1.4.6.2. Where does Ramaphosa’s wealth come from?
The standpoint of President Cyril Ramaphosa that he wants to cleanse South African politics from corruption obliges him also as a politician to undergo a lifestyle audit. This seems to be an idea he supported strongly in the past in Parliament.81,200,201
At the moment it appears that he has not so far undergone a lifestyle audit, making it very difficult to determine how he had obtained his assets for the two periods, pre-1994 and post-1994. From media reports Ramaphosa seems to be a very rich man. For the mass of poor people his financial success, power and wealth are things to adore. It undoubtedly brings him hero status amid the Black population. But, without an official parliamentary lifestyle audit, we are left in the dark, without an idea of the size of his assets and how and when he established it: was it pre-1994 or post-1994, etc.? The research of Phapano Phasha202, published on the 8th January 2019, seems to give us some insight as to how Ramaphosa had obtained at least some of his wealth. To get a better insight into Ramaphosa the businessman and politician, his story is reflected below to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of the so-called “unique Ramaphosa lifestyle”.202
The report of the political analyst, commentator and spokesperson for the Progressive Professionals Forum (PPF), Phapano Phasha202, is of the opinion that Ramaphosa’s wealth could possibly have originated from support he had received from the PIC (Public Investment Commissioner).89,202
Note: The PIC is at the moment under scrutiny by the Zondo and Mpati commissions for possible state capture and other corruption by certain members of the ANC elite and their cronies. The alleged corruption unmasked by the inquiry is now starting to probe deeper and deeper into the integrity of the ANC elite, or lack thereof, stretching as far back as 1996. Indeed, it is suggested by forensic experts that the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC must be extended to investigate some of the ANC-elite members in depth.202-207
Phapano Phasha202 did a thorough study of the historical, economic and political occurrences from 1996 to 2005 at the PIC and its beneficiaries. Her comprehensive analysis of the data is very significant and needs to be noted here. In this research Phasha202 states having identified the presence of Cyril Ramaphosa as an alleged beneficiary.202
The use of Phapano Phasha’s202 article is to provide further insight into the present and future role of Cyril Ramaphosa in the politics of post-2019 South Africa. It also makes the remark of the columnist of the Tiso Blackstar Group’s, Tom Eaton208, more understandable when reflecting on the South African Political Theatre and his investigation of the ANC leaders under the title: A-Z of Droscars – from Agrizzi to Zondo, he writes207:8: “Few political actors have gone so far with so little…”
The seasoned political analyst and commentator Phapano Phasha’s202 article is of great importance, not only because it gives insight into the political heartbeat of the ANC, but especially because it can serve as a guideline how to do constructive thinking and planning in future regarding the land reform matter. In this context a full quotation is necessary. She writes202:
Between 1996 and 2005 Trevor Manual, in his capacity as Finance Minister, was the sole trustee and custodian of the Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) which at the time of inception had assets close to R200 billion. As a sole trustee of GEPF, Mr Trevor Manual did not report or account to anyone but himself. To this end there was no board or governance and therefore Mr Manual had the sole discretion of how employees’ pension funds would be invested.
However, in 2002 a tender for actuarial services was advertised and eventually awarded to Alexander Forbes by Trevor Manual in his capacity as the sole trustee of GEPF, which was now worth over R250 billion. Alexander Forbes then proceeded to sell 30% of its shares to an empowerment group that was called Millennium Consolidated Investments (MCI) which was incorporated in 2001, being a year before the invitation to tender came out. This company belonged to the current President of the African National Congress (ANC) and South Africa (SA), Cyril Ramaphosa.
Before ‘buying’ 30% of the Alexander Forbes shares and thus getting first-hand access to the funds of the GEPF, President Ramaphosa was just another Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) proxy from the governing party who subsequently managed to buy more than 27 companies post 2003 which turned him into an instant billionaire. To strengthen the argument, according to a 2006 article by the Mail & Guardian titled ‘Anatomy of Fast Money’, the sudden wealth which was concentrated amongst a few new colonial elites, like President Ramaphosa, was not due to hard work but to connections to the ANC, patronage and friends in government which in turn led to some of the following acquisitions by President Ramaphosa:
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April 2003: 16% of Alexander Forbes, now worth R1,1-billion.
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July 2003: 14,4% of Bidvest, worth R706-million.
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July 2004: 1,2% of Standard Bank, worth R1,1-billion.
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August 2004: 42% of Mondi Shanduka Newsprint and 40% of Mondi Packaging, worth about R980 million.
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November 2005: 11,74% of Assore, worth R394-million
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November 2005: 1,5% in Liberty Life, worth R299-million.
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May 2006: 25% of Downing, Reynard and Associates (unlisted)
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July 2006: 40% of Kangra Coal…Source (Mail & Guardian)
It is quite obvious to any student of geopolitics that the rise and rise of President Ramaphosa was sparked by his acquiring the shares at Alexander Forbes. This brings me to the rationale on why President Ramaphosa must extend the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which is the asset-management company that invests funds on behalf of the GEPF.
It will be an injustice if the current terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry into the PIC [Public Investment Corporation] are left as they are because for more than a decade Trevor Manual was God presiding over billions in hard-earned savings of government employees whilst President Ramaphosa became Deputy God. Hence to only focus on the investment decisions taken by the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the PIC, Dan Matjila, is quite frankly opportunistic and self-serving. South Africans have every right to know which companies and individuals benefitted during the tenures at the GEPF of Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, especially since there was no board or governance in place at that time.
Another factor is the conflict of interest regarding both President Ramaphosa and Mr Trevor Manual which necessitates an investigation to unpack if President Ramaphosa directly used his position as a shareholder at GEPF to get a capital injection into his own companies; the same applies to Trevor Manual, which also falls under the ambit of state capture. This, by the way, is no different to the conflict of interest associated with Nhlanhla Nene who opted to resign as the Minister of Finance.
The investment decisions by both Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa, each in their capacity as custodian of the GEPF, must also extend to the likes of Zanele Mbeki, Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, Frank Chikane, Jay Naidoo, Kelso Gordian, Cheryl Carolus et cetera. To this end the Commission of Inquiry must assess whether they received, or legitimately received, any capital injection through the GEPF. Moreover, the conduct of the likes of Johan Rupert, Christopher Wiese, Johannes Mouton, Stephen Koseff and Markus Jooste, who used the funds of the GEPF through their asset-management companies which sub-contract with the PIC, to inject capital into their own businesses, must be inquired into.
It is therefore not surprising that the post-1994 Afrikaners, especially the Stellenbosch and Paarl gang, have become richer than they were during apartheid. It is precisely because Trevor Manual and President Ramaphosa literally handed them the pension funds of black employees without any competition from black-owned asset management companies.
The PIC, which now controls trillions of pension-fund money, has literally become a piggy bank for the private sector and politically connected elite who don’t have to work hard to earn their wealth – but simply abuse and misuse money that belongs to workers, many of whom are living from hand to mouth. Unfortunately, unions like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), including the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), have never been vocal on this slave-trade transaction because they are part and parcel of the same private sector which has perfected monopolizing public funds to feed the private sector. This is what Dr Okechukwu C Iheduru defined as labour capitalism in a paper titled ‘Organised Labour, Globalisation and Economic Reform: union investment companies in South Africa’.
In essence, state capture and exchange of capital between the blue-eyed boys, the Broederbond and the new colonial elite, was very systematic and structural. What is quite obvious is that this gang has been very sophisticated whilst using all sorts of treacherous and deceitful means to gain proximity to government coffers in order to empower itself and its family whilst simultaneously taxing the working class and poor who literally sustain their wealth.
uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) prisoner Soko Ndukwana defined this grouping as “looters of the Nation and Gangster Capitalists” who today have become the paragon of truth and business experts in a country which is rated as the most unequal in the world. This is precisely because state resources have been misused and abused by those using their struggle credentials to benefit a few whilst the majority, who keep them in power and who are yet to see the rays of liberation, are burdened by squalor and degradation. This is sheer state capture which has taken centuries to perfect and in its collapse, we must never allow it to use Dan Matjila as collateral damage…
Conclusion: The above is not about dishonesty or fraud. Neither does it represent an allegation of that nature, but with commissions such as Zondo and Mpati running and Ramaphosa at a loss to explain his and his son’s involvement with Bosasa and the CR17, together with his plea of “complete innocence” as vice president of Jacob Zuma and his many intimate cronies’ wrongdoing, an in-depth investigation into his assets, as from pre-1994, is urgently needed. It is not a recommendation, but a must. Official lifestyle audits, going back to the 1990s, are needed on Ramaphosa and Manuel (but the chances are good that they, as Ramaphosa and Manuel did recently with their various interdicts when the air gets hot, will summarily stop any investigation against them).
If the above allegations of Phapano Phasha202 are true, the questions are: Firstly, who did Manual consult for a good and independent consideration in his awarding of the BBBEE deal to Ramaphosa? Secondly, on what merits and grounds did Ramaphosa obtained the deal(s)? Why did Ramaphosa, as a co-ANC cadre and friend of Manuel, obtain such a deal? Why did Ramaphosa not declare it when he accepted the presidency? In this context, there are clear ethical obligations for Ramaphosa as the present chief executive of the Republic of South Africa, other than just an ordinary businessman, that he should immediately fulfil. These ethics clearly prescribe why he could not take on the presidency of South Africa if the BBBEE deal enabling him to obtain his wealth via the PIC, as alleged by Phasha,202 is true. To disregard such ethics, would place him in the same camp as Jacob Zuma. He cannot stay on as president.
It is doubted if Phasha’s202 allegations will easily reach the ears of the Zondo or the Mapti commissions. There is just too much ANC obstruction. The impact of Phasha’s202 reporting in the social media was limited to her article on Google (through the social media the EFF reach 5.8 million people, the ANC 4.9 million people and the DA 4.6 million people). Phasha’s202 allegations seem to be serious, but it is doubted that in the event of a court case she will be in a favourable position to tell Ramaphosa and Manuel (as Malema did with ease in reaction to Manuel’s threat of a court case against him) that they “can go to hell” and “I am not afraid of you.”202,209
Weighing alleged self-enrichment via BBBEE versus the immense poverty of the mass of Blacks outside BBBEE opportunities (it does not matter if the BBBEE deal had been done entire honestly through the PIC) casts a cloud over Ramaphosa’s head.
If Phapano Phasha’s202 article on Ramaphosa’s use of the PIC has some merit, he must come clean on the PIC allegations in the first place. Secondly, he should fully declare his financial setup: his assets, other belongings and trusts, etc., starting before 1994. The origins of Ramaphosa’s wealth must be fully revealed. As president of South Africa it is his responsibility and duty to do it. At this stage he is a witness, not a perpetrator. He is surely not one of the many persons who avoided the various judicial commissions on state capture. Munusamy210 writes210:28: “When former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene returned to the witness stand this week, Zondo asked him why so few former and current cabinet members and senior officials were coming forward to testify, Nene responded that other people might not be dictated by their conscience and could also be worried about the ‘price to pay’.” Indeed, these culprits should be worried, reports Munusamy210:28: “In Nene’s case, the price to pay was very high.” Cyril Ramaphosa must know it beforehand. He avoids without clear reason the Zondo and Mpati Commissions, as well as the public at large.210, 211
3.3.1.1.4.6.3. Role of the Lekota-Zuma-Ramaphosa triumvirate in the Apartheid regime’s spies
Since the December 2017 election of Ramaphosa as the ANC’s leader, there have been rumours about the Ramaphosa group’s alleged spying association with the Apartheid regime. The leaking of information by previous intelligence agents of the NP that the lists of the names of ANC members that had worked under-cover for them were erased created suspicion. Prominent present-day members of the ANC elite could indeed be spies and therefore at risk.
That there were indeed many ANC traitors working with the NP regime as agents and who as ANC VIPs may now fear being unmasked, was confirmed by the bragging of John Vorster23:1-2: “…that the majority of ANC exiles were spies”.
Moalusi212 also refers in this context to the possibly of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have been “spies” and the ANC’s punitive actions in the past against some of them, by specifically citing Jacob Dlamini’s book Askari. On Nelson Mandela’s own view on the possibility of “plentiful” ANC top leaders that may have indeed been “spies”, Moalusi writes212:14: “Nelson Mandela did say if the issue of spies is to be an obsessive point of discussion, then almost everyone in the ANC will be called a spy. Something the apartheid regime wanted to achieve, ultimately.”
Prominent among these wanton rumours is Jacob Zuma’s list of “ANC-spies”. It is alleged by Dr Nel Marais30, a risk analyst who had worked from 1980 to 2000 in the South African national Intelligence structures (National Intelligence, SA Secret Service, Military Information and the SAPS Security Police), that there does not exist a single list of the names of Apartheid agents anymore. The belief is that this makes Zuma’s task of identifying these culprits with concrete evidence, based on the real Apartheid records very difficult. Marais reports that although the National Intelligence destroyed all its records in 1990, the NP regime’s various secret services never worked together and that the records of agents were probably limited to access by certain personnel inside those governmental agencies only. There is thus no indication that all the governmental records were destroyed and thus no assurance for ANC-NP collaborators not to be exposed in the near future.23,30,43-45,213
The main question is why it was so important for the NP regime to erase these ANC culprits’ names from being identified later?23,30,43-45,213
Rumours of a so-called secret list of ANC-NP collaborators started to circulate before Ramaphosa’s appointment as executive political leader of South Africa. This list, alleged to be in the possession of Zuma alone, was referred to as a kind of extorting method by Zuma’s cronies to get Ramaphosa’s people in the ANC NEC to tone down their their anti-Zuma behaviour and campaign. This initiative seems directed at isolating Ramaphosa from the mainstream of the ANC’s voters and supporters. Political analysts see this very wanton allegation as undoubtedly well-planned and inserted into the public mind to sow suspicion so that Ramaphosa may be taken down. Featuring prominently among these rumours is the resurfacing of allegations about Ramaphosa’s relationship and favoured position with the NP regime during Apartheid. This observation was tabled in Parliament by Mr Patrick Lekota recently.25,26,32,35,213
Zuma’s political company know all too well Ramaphosa’s weaknesses and mistakes, originating from pre-1994, and how these may be used to undermine him before the election of 2024. The spying allegations may be one focus.25,26,32,35,213
Although Ramaphosa rejected Lekota’s allegation in Parliament, his defence was not very strong and indeed vague; creating the impression that he tried to further defuse confrontation with Lekota and to get the issue out of the public eye. There has so far also not been any outright rejection by Ramaphosa of the so-called “Zuma list” which is alleged to reflect indirectly on him and his clan.213
There are allegations that the SSA is still delinquent with a footing in the Zuma clan. The Mufamadi report is counted as evidence. The Zuma clan’s political, social and economic power is underestimated: it is still strong enough to topple Ramaphosa even as early as 2020.55,104
There is a clear coordinated fight-back by the pro-Ramaphosa camp to divert the attention from identifying alleged spies in their ranks by propagating that Jacob Zuma was himself in the 1980s an alleged NP spy, without offering the evidence to back it up. The fact that the ANC veterans strongly rally to Zuma’s side in the growing Ramaphosa-Zuma war for the soul of the ANC and are standing on the side of Zuma in his spying allegations against some prominent ANC members, spells the possibility of spies being unmasked in the near future.25,26,28,30,33,34
The MK veterans, as well as Zuma, have publicly fingered Nyanda and Ramatlhodi as alleged spies. Kgosana32 writes, on the response of the leader of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA), Kebby Maphatsoe, as follows32:4:
Maphatsoe said the veterans are not surprised that former ministers Ngoako Raatlhodi and Siphiwe Nyanda have been outed by Zuma as alleged apartheid agents. It now makes sense why the integration of former MK combatants into the new South African National Defence Force, which Nyanda had overseen, disadvantaged many of those who had fought for liberation.
“We are beginning to connect the dots to say under his leadership of the army, during integration, that is why MK members even now are retiring poor.”
Ramatlhodi30 remarked on the allegations of Zuma against him and Nyanda when he said30:8: “Hy [Zuma] wil die grafte heropen en dis nie wat ek wil doen nie”, but this may hide more than the eye can see. For alleged ANC members to escape their past as so-called “reform revolutionaries” there is no place in Zuma’s politics. Indeed, Zuma’s future strategy on Apartheid agents may be life-threatening for some ANC VIPs. Zuma and Lekota’s positions as head of the ANC external and internal security and intelligence undoubtedly provide them with information about many present-day ANC political leaders’ past political activities and the persons who had paid them blood money in exchange for ANC secrets. To write off Zuma or Lekota in favour of Ramaphosa and his neo-ANCs can be a grave error.25,26,30,34,35,46
Many Ramaphosa supporters can be sure that in the next twelve months more so-called “secrets” will be exposed in some way on the alleged traitors in the ANC by Zuma and his group. At this stage Zuma can afford to lift the lid of the story of treason in the ANC: it can make him in the end the winner against all doubts. He can bounce back as the top leader, as Winston Churchill successfully did in WW2.25,26,30,34,35,42,46
It is of the utmost importance that Cyril Ramaphosa address the allegation of Patrick Lekota regarding him as an alleged spy constructively with facts, and not again with libel cases and interdicts to staunch doubts about him.
3.3.1.1.4.6.4. Cyril Ramaphosa in perspective
From the above controversies that reflect on Ramaphosa’s actions, it is clear that the public, even his intimate comrades, know very little about Ramaphosa the person. His plan, similarly to his behaviour, are unpredictable. This spells serious trouble if he stays on in the presidency. In the context of Ramaphosa, the vague political-leader, De Lange60 writes as follows60:13:
Sestien jaar lank – van 1996, toe hy klaar was met die skryf van die Grondwet, tot 2012, toe hy uit die bloute adjunkpresident van die ANC geword het – het Cyril Ramaphosa ‘n baie private loopbaan en lewe in die sakewêreld gelei. Selfs in die vier jaar wat hy adjunkpresident was, het hy ‘n masker gedra wat bra min oor hom verklap het” en: “Die president is byvoorbeeld nie goed met fyner detail nie – dit laat hy aan ander oor; dit vat ook lank voordat hy ‘n besluit neem; niemand weet wat hy dink nie…”
Msimang214 is of the opinion that the positioning, power- and image-building of Ramaphosa go deeper. It seems to be well-anchored in the dark politics of the ANC. Msimang posits214:1-2:
Before that, he was already the embodiment of the grotesque. The rapid and enormous rise in his wealth was largely a result of his position as a lead mediator for the ANC during the negotiations for democracy, where he won the trust of the white businesspeople who controlled the economy in 1994 and continue to do so today.
His role in the events that led to the 2012 Marikana mineworkers’ massacre showed him to be callously out of touch with the interests of workers, and predictable and cruelly supportive of the interests of the mining company on whose board he sat.
3.3.1.1.4.6.5. Results of the Louw Appraisal Checklist on the ability of the ANC to be a government
The activities of the regime and leadership of the ANC have been spread over seven articles. The contents of the seven articles are as follows:
- Article 11 (Introduction);
- Article 12 (Prosperity);
- Article 13 (Violence and crime);
- Article 14 (Accountability)
- Article 15 (Opportunism);
- Article 16 (Outdated ANC);
- Article 17 (ANC’s troubled leadership).
The mark awarded to the ANC and its leadership for the period 1994 to 2019 in terms of the bad-versus-good classification of satisfaction on the Louw Appraisal Checklist to Assess the Leadership Qualities of South Africa’s Executive Political Leaders and Regimes: 1652 to 2018,4 was 23 (26%) out of a possible maximum of 82.
4. Conclusions
4.1. Specific conclusions: Article 17 (ANC’s troubled leadership)
Since 1994, the ANC as a regime and leadership has gradually decayed into looters, serving the dollar-god of power and will do anything for it. These looters are opportunists who only see the ANC and its power since 1994 as a stepladder to enable them to access state power for the express purpose of self-enrichment. They are crooked card-carrying members of the ANC; persons whose inclinations and activities in the ANC are always first and foremost about what they get – fame, fortune, adulation, power, whatever – not what they build, create, and contribute. Their principles, integrity and discipline, together with their cognitions are dominated by utter corruption and criminality. They blatantly rape the fragile societies of their fellow Africans. Corruption has become the norm within the value system of the current ANC. This lack of ethical norms, together with its lack of good leadership, in which the employment of capable people is missing, has led thereto that the ANC as an organization over the years has gradually slipped into mediocrity and is now disappearing.1-3
It just does not seem possible for Ramaphosa to reform the ANC or to better South Africa. He lacks the ability to control the ANC’s politburo. He has so far not a single time shown a strategy to heal the deep fractures in the ANC, to eliminate corruption, to better and to reform governance and to restart the economy. He is not an anointed leader, nor the saviour of South Africans. The ANC cannot be reformed or be revitalised; it is “beyond redemption”.215
Reflecting specifically on the present Number One of South Africa, President Cyril Matamel Ramaphosa, he is as he was in 1994, still wearing a mask and as unpredictable as David Mabuza, Ace Magashule and Jacob Zuma. To say that Ramaphosa is a democratic and non-racial politician or that his politics are outside the Marxist-Leninist ANC box, represents the height of deception. He is an enrolled and loyal member of Mother ANC, from day-one until today. His present and future position as an executive political leader is absolutely dependent on it. He rigidly supports the ANC’s Marxist socialism and his only aim is to promote the ANC.80
It is clear that Whites and many non-Black Africans can expect extreme situations to develop in South Africa under an ANC regime run by Ramaphosa, especially around their capitalist, land-ownership and civil rights. The ANC’s outdated and failed Soviet-communist politics has started to occupy future South African politics in full. The phantom of Robert Magube seems to be moving southwards. It was with good reason that Ramaphosa recently praised him at his funeral: those politicians in the Presentlife must always keep good relations with those in the Afterlife.
The ANC’s troubled leadership cannot be healed72:3: “…it is drunk from the alcohol of corruption”.
4.2. General conclusions: Articles 11 to 17
The awarding of 23 points (out of 82 points) to the ANC as a regime reflects that it lacks the capabilities and integrity as a candidate to be considered a skilled ruler. Indeed, the ANC may be seen as a failed candidate. The pre-May 2019 decision to allow the application of the ANC onto the shortlist to be considered as a possible candidate that may rule South Africa after the 8th May 2019, was a blatant mistake, theoretically speaking. Moreover, it was incorrect and inappropriate to mandate the ANC as a regime for the period 2019, particularly on the strength of 28% votes of the total eligible voters. Secondly, its poor political history as a regime and its crooked leadership, as reflected over 25 years, disqualifies it from being shortlisted as a candidate. It failed the basic test to be ruler of South Africa.
The general evaluation of the ANC and its leaders’ abilities, skills, competence and integrity show that they are as many as 59 points or 74% short of being the ideal candidate to be considered for the appointment as the top candidate for the position of post-May 2019 ruler, able to execute land redistribution. The sub-standard count of 26% also reflects that the ANC over 25 years (five regimes) failed to better themselves. The ANC is a false pretender to the throne. Its political ideology on the economy, land ownership and racism is outdated. Evidence is there that the ANC as a regime is going to run into trouble fast if it wants to fulfil its May 2019 election promises and execute its basic duties to the voters. Under the ANC’s 25 years of rule most South Africans lost out on prosperity, while the lives of its people became saturated with violence and crime. Its political leaders’ lifestyles are characterised by a lack of accountability and extreme opportunism. The ANC is incompetent to do well-planned and balanced land redistribution, with or without compensation. Their intended plan to bring land ownership to the mass of poor and landless Blacks will only create further poverty and anarchy, while a full-scale revolution becomes more and more of a reality.4,72,216
In the next and final Article (18), entitled: “Critical evaluation of the three main political parties’ capability to steer successful land expropriation in post-2019 South Africa: Part 3-The ANC in perspective (18: Conclusions and a Dictum)”, the process and the politics that may bring successful land redistribution will be further evaluated and discussed.
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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.
FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.
UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS
Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.