South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)

Title: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 2 (19)
Gabriel P Louw
iD orcid.org/0000-0002-6190-8093
Extraordinary Researcher, Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa (Author and Researcher: Healthcare, History and Politics).
Corresponding Author:
Prof. Dr GP Louw; MA (UNISA), PhD (PU for CHE), DPhil (PU for CHE), PhD (NWU)
Email: profgplouw@gmail.com
Keywords: Good, great, high-level, leadership, outdated, pretender, troubled, taker.
Ensovoort, volume 40 (2019), number 12: 2

1. Background

Jonathan Tepperman¹ writes^1:29,220,221:

In real life, even more than in fiction, stories generally follow predictable paths. The good-looking woman gets the guy. The better-funded politician with the thicker head of hair wins the race. The rich get richer, and everyone else gets screwed. Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.^1:29
By emphasizing circumstances, I don’t mean to suggest that fate, not free will and shrewd leadership, proved decisive in any of these episodes. Circumstances played an important role: the extreme conditions cleared away the institutional and political barriers that ordinarily make radical solutions impossible to effect. But governments face serious crises all the time. What separates the best from the rest is how they deal with them.^1:221
The details of the crises varied from place to place, of course. While the specifics  varied, however, in all these episodes the extremity of the moment played a similar role, pushing those in charge to set aside ordinary politics and conventional policymaking and to think big — very big.^1:220

Tepperman concludes^1:25:

Abandoning hope certainly is tempting – especially at a moment when so many things seem to be going wrong with the world.
The problem with despair, however, is that it’s unproductive. And that makes it a dangerous indulgence at times like these.
Fortunately for us. It’s unnecessary. The solution gridlock – is already out there. You just have to know where to look for the answers.

1.1. Introduction (Continued from Article 18)

Central to the South African landownership matter is a political history in which discrimination against Blacks by various White regimes since 1652 played a dominant role. The post-1994 Political Dispensation in which justice, humanity, equality should play a primary role, failed to bring land and better economics to the mass of poor Blacks. Instead of bettering the country’s economics and Apartheid’s mismanagement, discrimination and corruption, the post-1994 ANC-regime went down the same path in committing corruption, mismanagement, turning White-on-Black discrimination into Black-on-Black discrimination. In particular, its elite creates state capture to favour their intimate cronies. BBEEE and cadre deployment brought wealthto the Blacks, but only to a small group of ANCs, mostly corrupt politicians and those in their intimate circles. The intended redistribution of land to the mass of poor and landless Blacks failed to realise. Inside the present collapse of the economy and the ANC elite’s lack of constructive thinking, planning and doing to bring prosperity to the mass of poor Blacks, there is a retreat into blaming such failure on the past wrongdoing by Whites: The main issue is the the Whites’ land, obtained over centuries, which the radical Black politicians now want. What is lacking in this land redistribution, is a qualified ruler able to manage it, something that the ANC regime is lacking. This unfortunate setup makes land redistribution a second priority, and the appointment of an able, trustworthy and skilled ruler to oversee the process, the first priority. Without such a regime with capability, skills and integrity there will never be successful land redistribution and a second state capture will become unavoidable.
Land grabbing is an age-old custom practised by Blacks on Blacks as well as Whites on Blacks for more than three hundred years in South Africa. It is  a custom that should not be restarted again in 2020. A perfect solution to the present imbalance between White and Black landownership must be found fast, without falling back onto the past’s vicious circle of revenge and counter-revenge to erase the manifold injustices done before 1994.
Our country’s political history is far from completion. We must complete it. The implementation of land redistribution will play a key role in the new part of our political history.

1.2. Aims of article 19 (Continue from Article 18)

The primary aim of this study (Article 19: Part 2) is to continue the analysis and discussion on the matter of land redistribution which is facing South Africans, post-2019.  (See the previous article, titled: South Africa’s Troubled Landownership (1652 – 2019): Conclusions and a Dictum – Part 1 (18).  The intention  is to bring final conclusions  on how the process can be addressed and to offer a dictum if land redistribution can successfully be executed by the ANC regime as the present ruler or by another ruler post-2019. 
This is the final article in the series of nineteen articles on the matter of South African landownership. The previous eighteen articles in the series were published in the South African accredited journal Ensovoort [Volume 38 (2018), Number 12:1 to Volume 40 (2019), Number 12:10].

2. Method (Continued from Article 18)

The research has been done by means of a literature review. This method aims to construct a viewpoint from the available evidence as the research develops. This approach has been used in modern political-historical research where there is often not an established body of research, as is the case regarding the abilities of political parties to successfully implement land reform from 2019 onwards. The sources included articles from 2018, books for the period 1944 to 2018 and newspapers for the period 2017 to 2019. These sources were consulted to evaluate and to describe the facts that must guide us in the making of an evaluation on the suitability of the ANC as the ruler of South Africa in effecting successful land reform from 2019.
The research findings are being presented in narrative format.

3. Results and discussion (Continued from Article 18)

3.1. South Africa’s troubled landownership (1652 – 2019)

3.1.1. Introduction

It is true that the 1913 Land Act and the Group Areas Act had dispossessed many black people of their land and livelihood. These injustices and unfairness of Apartheid must be addressed in 2020 to minimise the inequality between White and  Black South Africans. Landownership occupies a central position as a source of serious conflict that is growing. So far there has been immense reluctance from the Whites to address the redistribution of land to the poor and landless Blacks. To effect South Africa’s intended land expropriation (with or without compensation) is not going to be easy. It cannot and must not be a popular political solution. It must bring a righteous and a justified outcome to all South Africans.²

3.1.2. Short  overview of the analysis and discussion of Article 18 (See 3.1.1. to 3.1.2.)

The failed Marxist-Leninist politics of the ANC-regime brought South Africa to the brink of economic and political disaster. Land grabbing is one of the most attractive solutions for the Ramaphosa regime to bring some form of capital and money to the mass of poor people and to restore the ANC regime’s credibility as a revolutionary organisation.
Not one of the political parties in present-day South Africa is capable of effectively running the country, which would include the mandated task of effecting a just and balanced land redistribution.
The troubled landownership is misused by radicals to steer the many dissatisfactions of the mass of poor and landless people into immense unrest and anarchy, even revolution. The unbalanced landownership issue in the country is the single most important reason available to the radicals in the ANC and other political parties to launch a Marxist-Leninist coup. Especially the fact that the ANC can be ousted in the 2024 elections, makes the implementation of a coup a strong possibility in 2020 already. It is thus clear that an acceptable solution to the landownership matter must be found not later than 2020.

3.1.3. Advice and suggestions for a post-2019 effective government

3.1.3.1. ANC-DA intertwining
Political analysts have tried since May 2019 to project what South Africans can be expected in our broader politics from the end of 2019. Suggestions of alliances between parties in an effort to solve the country’s immense problems have been prominent, while the spreading of internal conflicts, to undermine the integrity of political parties even further, have been widely publicised. Regarding alliances, it is argued by some analysts that the ANC’s decisive national majority makes the need for any alliance involving them zero. Other analysts point out the possibility of forming a government of national unity, just like after 1994. They believe such a “coalition” will bring the dissidents in South African politics into the inner circle of the ANC’s politics and promote “nationql unity and consensus” on controversial and conflicting issues such as land expropriation. Political commentators believe that such an outcome will be unacceptable to the hawks in the DA: Although it can be expected that the DA may receive some ministers in the overwhelming ANC cabinet, it will only serve to boost some DA members’  egos and to legitimise the ANC’ s ongoing delinquency (as happened with the FF Plus and Pieter Mulder in the Zuma cabinet). With a partner such as the EFF in a coalition, the ANC’s chaotic pre-1994 politics will prevail.^3-6
For the DA elite to be able to cooperate with the ANC elite, they would want to see dramatic changes in the ANC’s politics, which would include abandoning its Marxist rigidity and ceding some of its extreme power. Bruce⁷ speculates on possible DA prerequisites as follows^7:18: “…insisting it would not be the junior partner in any coalition and that it would not, under any circumstances, form coalitions or make ‘arrangements’ with the hated ANC unless the ANC splits and its ‘reformists’ (dove) wing becomes available as a partner”. But such a possible splitting of the ANC is disregarded by Bruce⁷ as a possibility in the near future when he posits^7:18: “That’s (splitting) not going to happen any time soon.”
Other political analysts⁸ agree with Bruce⁷ and believe that the present-day ANC, notwithstanding its internal conflicts, will not cede power easily. For these analysts the failure of the ANC after May 2019 to make an alliance with the DA spells the same fate as the NP before its fall into obscurity after splitting up.⁸
Other analysts predict the formation of a new political party in which an ANC faction would assume a prominent position, but without dominance. The DA is seemingly prepared for any unexpected political happening. All the parties, such as the EFF, DA and ANC, are undoubtedly in some form of consultation as to their long-term politics. Especially for Ramaphosa, such consultation before the ANC’s 2020 mid-year conference, which can determine whether he remains leader, is very important.⁹
Since 1994 the functioning and structuring of South Africa’s political system in terms of a rigid Black-versus-White division was and is still being questioned by some political analysts. Today this 1994 habit is still seen as being responsible for the compartimentalisation of the two main groups (although the many smaller diverse groups, emanating from pre-1994, are still there): the conservatives and the radicals: the doves and the hawks. Indeed, some analysts foresee a kind of a present as well as a future ANC-DA intertwining. Labuschagne¹⁰ posits as follows^10:6: “Op nasionale vlak verskil die DA en die ANC se beleid op sommige gebiede net in graad, byvoorbeeld oor grondhervorming. Dié verskille kan deur onderhandelinge en kompromie baie na aan mekaar gebring word.” Labuschagne¹⁰ elaborates further when he writes^10:6:

Die aksentuering van waardes in die gematigde middelgrond van die politieke spektrum is die enigste werkbare oplossing vir die toekoms. Indien die gematigde partye in Suid-Afrika en die duiwe in die ANC bymekaar kan kom, kan so ‘n gematigde magsblok ontstaan.
In die ideologiese en politieke spektrum is die gematigde groep (duiwe) in die ANC baie nader aan die DA-beleid as die radikale EFF se beleid.
Die ANC-valke is ideologies nader aan die EFF en die groep kan ná ’n skeuring naas dié party links op die politieke spektrum sy plek inneem.
Die ANC-duiwe sal dan na die sentrum van die politieke spectrum kan beweeg om saam met die DA en ander gematigdes ’n sterk gematigde party te kan vorm wat sterk op maatskaplike demokrasie gegrond is.
Die antwoord en hoop vir Suid-Afrika is die hersamestelling van die politieke spektrum en die vorming van ‘n sterk gematide sentrumparty wat die magsbalans in die land beheer.
In Suid-Afrika is die onlogiese preapartheidskonfigurasie van politieke partye [en rasse] nie volhoiubaar nie. Die ANC se verskillende opponerende groepe, saamgebing deur belange en nie waardes nie, is onrealisties en nie in belang van demokrasie en die land nie.

The above so-called “similarity” between the Cyril Ramaphosa clan  and the DA has enjoyed much emphasis since the middle of 2019 in the so-called “battle” between Cyril Ramaphosa and Ace Magashule. But, as pointed out in the previous Article 17, there is a lot of misunderstanding by political analysts on the so-called “Ramaphosa-Magashule battle” and the so-called “fight” for the soul of the Marxist-Leninist ANC: it is a soul which both Ramaphosa and Magashule respect and propagate and do not want to hurt. The same holds for the “killing” of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Neither Ramaphosa nor Magashule disagrees with it: without a Marxist-Leninist ANC is there no place for Ramaphosa in present South African politics. The Ramaphosa-Magashule battle is  purely a short-term leadership battle in which the ambitions, blown-up egos and revenge of the two leaders occupy centre stage. Munusamy¹¹ states appositely^11:20: “It is well known that the resistance is not even driven by ideology or principle, but rather by vested interests.” The infighting is not influencing the ANC’s corrupt and radical politics in any way to “better” the ANC and thus to make the ANC acceptable for the DA as an alliance partner.¹¹
Herman Mashaba¹², the previous mayor of Johannesburg  writes in the Sunday Times of the 27th Oct. 2019 that he believes that after 25 years South Africans are faced with great inequality, more crime and an education system that has failed the country’s young people, which is a direct result of the monopoly on power enjoyed by the ANC. To combat these negative outcomes, together with the ANC’s state capture, corruption and the plundering of state resources,  Mashaba¹² believes there is only one solution, namely that a coalition government is the best way forward for South Africa. For him is It simply  a case of overseeing by the so-called “regime parties ”of the actions of the other “regime parties” in the governance process. He writes^12:23: “It is through this lens that the members of the multiparty government evaluated proposals, and ultimately built consensus. I view this to be one of the greatest advantages of coalition government. When no single party has a monopoly on ideas, proposals can be evaluated on their merits and their impact on residents.”
For Mashaba¹² there is no deviation by parties in terms of their ideologies and politics. Critically evaluated, the contaminated, crooked values and behaviour of parties left unaddressed and the parties’ identity untouched in a coalition will essentially ripen further, leading to more wrongdoing. In reality it is only a planned and calculated effort by the elite of each party to obtain still a bigger part of the pie (as evidenced by the ANC elite’s immense corruption still continuing today). Mashaba’s¹² misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such coalitions is well confirmed by the perverse outcomes of the ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance and the various failures of the DA-ANC-EFF Alliance. The exclusive party-only coalitions have not worked since 1994 and they opportunistically serve only the various coalition parties’ and their cronies’ own interests, while the residents’ and citizens’ interests are left out in the cold because they lack their own direct representative (non-political) bodies in the government.¹²
What Mashaba¹² propagates is just a repeat of the wrong politics chosen in 1994 by the citizens of South Africa. It will just be the support again of the wrong party and most of all the wrong leaders, all saturated in opportunism and self-enrichment and -empowerment. Politicians such as Mashaba’s foolish statements and opinions must be read in terms of Gumede’s¹³ analysis^13:20: “Some ANC and government leaders appear to think that just issuing a public statement will miraculously translate into the successful implementation of it. Policies are often based on aspirations, wishful thinking and ideology rather than on grinding reality, evidence and reason.
De Groot¹⁴ reflects on these kinds of malcognitive outcomes by quoting the philosopher Daniel Denett^14:20: “Those who fear the facts will forever try to discredit the fact-finder.”  
The tragic outcome of these kinds of politics in South Africa under the ANC elite is well described (and at the same time warned against) by Gumede¹⁵ when he states^15:18:

Many poor, marginalised and desperate black South Africans regularly support leaders and parties  whose policies and behaviour on the face of it run counter to their own interests, only worsening their poverty and marginalisation.
Sadly, the pattern is repeated across post-colonial Africa. This is one of the reasons Africa  has remained overwhelming poor. Nothing will change unless ordinary citizens stop supporting leaders and parties that undermine their own interests.

A dramatic new approach to ruling themselves via self-empowerment is needed not only by the mass of poor Blacks, but by every South African not able to identify with the corrupt political parties.  In addition, it is needed to abandon the positioning of Black versus White and vice versa in the choosing of good leaders, in an improved political system eschewing exclusively Black and White political parties.
To team up the ANC and DA either in an alliance or to form a new party composed of DA and ANC dissendents, is an outright impossibility when taking into account their dissimilar political ideologies, aims, kinds of membership and political histories. In this context of an absolute impossibility to amalgamate in future again only existing political entities in a form of governance in South Africa, we need to shortly reflect on the political entities, the ANC and the DA, in terms of their origins, functioning and aims.

 3.1.3.1.1. The ANC

What firstly stands out, is the founding model of the ANC and its anti-Apartheid ideology, being an inclusive “catch-all” party for all those pre-1994 persons and groups suppressed by the NP (and the Afrikaners/Whites). All types gathered in it:  from hard-core communists, socialists, anti-capitalists, anti-White and anti-Afrikaner, pro-Black, pro-African, democrats and anti-democrats, etc. It was a true hodge-podge of political “bastards” who had seen the ANC as an entrance ticket for their personal gain and to satisfy their ambitions. Its Marxist-Leninist ideology has been part of its foundation and is central to the practice of ANC politics and a presrequisite to become a member.  The absolute rule of the party by its politburo, which is guided by the resolutions of its national conferences and which is implemented via the ANC’s president into policy, forms the core of its politics.^3-6,16,17 
Secondly, another prominent feature of the ANC’s revolutionary mindset, as evidenced by its state capture and the mismanagement of country’s finances and the botched 1994 land-redistribution programme, is the obtention of “compensations, gratifications and bait” through the misuse of BEE and other instruments like cadre deployment, thereby exclusively enriching the ANC’s top brass and their cronies. Such policies and attitudes have led to the constant and illegal “compensation” from the state coffers — master-minded by corruption, theft and bribery — justified as normal actions to benefit the so-called “freedom fighters” and those who had “suffered under Apartheid”. State capture and the exclusive chanelling of funds to the ANC elite has become a handle to keep a certain kind of voter on the ANC’s supporters list by maintaining them in poverty and unemployment on the one hand and to distribute free allowances and rewards to them, making these voters work-shy and absolutely dependent on the ANC’s so-called largesse on the other hand. The ANC was born from a revolutionary mother and revolutionary father who both never accepted democracy, political stability, parental responsibility and the development of their children. These negative internalised values are still being maintained by the Ramaphosa regime today.^3-6,16,17
This ANC mafia has created an in-depth integration of the economics and politics of the party at the local, provincial and national levels of government, the state system as well as the public system. To break this power structure will not be easy.^18,19
Thabo Mokone²⁰, on the above growing gangsterism in the official bodies of the country in which the ANC wields power, writes on 8 December 2019 in the Sunday Times as follows^20:20:

Auditor-general Kimi Makwetu this week presented a frightening report, confirming that our downward spiral is gaining momentum and that the public auditing profession has become a danger zone.
Makwetu detailed how high-ranking and highly paid government officials, among them CFOs and municipal managers, brazenly offered bribes or threatened to hijack and kidnap his auditors. Those officials don’t want committed and ethnical auditors to expose the theft and misuse of public money.
In November, a newspaper cutting of a report on a councillor’s murder was left in th offices that the auditors were using. The auditors were looking into a R21m Nelson Mandela Bay municipal drain-cleaning tender with which the dead councillor just happened to have been involved.
It was clearly a threat: the auditors needed to watch their backs. Since that tender was awarded in 2018, reports indicated that 18 people, including politicians and officials, had been murdered in the municipality as a result of squabbles over proceeds from such manipulated tenders.
If you still refuse to believe that SA has officially become a gangster state, Makwetu provided proof of it this week [December 2019].

Mthombothi¹⁶, in this context of crooked municipalities under the rule of the ANC elite, also enlightens us on the present return of the looters under Ramaphosa when he writes^16:19:

We were convinced that a decade of carefree plunder and looting was behind us and the way was now clear to rediscover our route to the promised land. But a rip-roaring love affair that takes off like a rocket often ends in a crash.
Things have now come to a sticky pass. The national mood has plummeted. This week especially has been brutal [December 2019].
But it is the utter chaos in the big metros that has left people incandescent. Council chambers have been turned into circus. We are the laughing stock of the world. Our politics has long descended into a farce, but we seem to take it in our stride
The ANC’s return to power in Johannesburg this week has filled its residents with distress and trepidation. Their previous stint was marked by eye-popping corruption and incompetence. One has to confess there was nothing to choose between the parties. They’re all part of a bad bunch. But on would have expected the ANC to at least have put forward the least corrupt of its members as candidate for mayor.
Instead, the ANC put forward Geoff Makhubo, a man who apparently comes to the job dragging a caravan of scandals.
Such an appointment is a betrayal of everything that Ramaphosa has been telling us of his administration, and indeed the ANC under his leadership, would be about. Makhubo’s election is confirmation, if any was still required, that talk of a reborn ANC under Ramaphosa is hot air, is that the new dawn is a slogan dreamt up to impress a public hungry for a clean government.
The dancing on the ANC benches must have felt like a stake in the heart to all who want to see a society free of corruption. The looters are back and they won’t let you forget that.

Gumede²¹ writes that the ANC regime has since 1994 squandered almost the equivalent of the post-war financial aid that the US, in the form of the Marshall Plan and other programmes, gave countries in Europe and Asia to rebuild their economies. In value this misuse represents a staggering R2 trillion that went into outright public corruption. Emphasising the ANC elite’s essential financial fraud in dealing with the public’s money, he states^21:22:

Since 1994, close to R1-trillion has been transferred in BEE deals that went to a handful of politically connected politicians, trade unionists and public servants. First, very few of the recipients are entrepreneurs – they were political capitalists.
Not surprisingly very few have added value by creating new industries, opening new economic sectors or developing new technologies. Instead, they have crowded out genuine black entrepreneurs and killed the development of a mass entrepreneurial spirit in black society, because all you need to secure a BEE deal or tender is the right political connections.

On the ANC leadership who have masterminded the defrauding of the state, Gumede²¹ writes^21:22: “We have to honestly face the fact that a predominantly black post-apartheid government has done this. Coming to grips with this painful reality will mean a change in mindset about economic development”; and^21:22:

Currently, the top ranks of the party appear to be bereft of leadership quality, ideas and imagination. The ANC seems to have deliberately elected or appointed the least capable members it can find to senior positions. The small dominant group that controls the ANC and government is just too insular, out of ideas and lacking in imagination to get us out of this crisis.

Mthombothi²¹ continues^21:22:

We need to accept that the ANC will never get us out of this mess. It is the author of our predicament, not its solution. Corruption has become part of its makeup. It courses through its veins. To expect the party to fight corruption is akin to demanding that an incorrigible alcoholic give up booze.

Financially, South Africa has gone down the drain under the ANC’s 25 years of rule. The country’s existing debt of 50.6% of GDP in 2017 has worsened to 61% in 2019, with another increase in debt to 71% of the GDP in 2022, which makes it easily understandable why all the rating agencies, besides Moody’s, have long ago relegated our ability to repay our debt to the “junk” level.^22,23  Bernstein²⁴ reports that the Treasury recently estimated that the country’s debt will rise to 74% of GDP in 2023 and will keep rising thereafter to hit 80% by 2027.
Bruce²² elaborates further on this state debt, quoting Tito Mboweni, writing^22:18: “This year, the national debt exceeded R3-trillion. It is expected to rise to R4.5-trillion in the next three years. To stabilise debt, government will target a primary balance by 2022/23 …we will need to find additional measures in excess of R150bn over the next three years, or about R50bn a year. How will we do this?”
 Bruce²² adds a further comment regarding our mounting debt, as follows^22:18:

A senior Investec economist, Nazmeera Moola, has brilliantly grasped what the government cannot – that our finances are literally out of control, and putting off difficult decisions until “the outer years” is Treasury talk for a three-year policy holiday not going to happen.
Moola tracks how our 10-year sovereign bond yields (the margin required to attract buyers) have grown against emerging market peers. Pre-2015 we were paying about 1.5% more than, say, Mexico or Vietnam, to raise money on the markets. Today we’re paying 3.25%. More than double. It means that since December 2015 the extra interests on our debt has risen by R26.6bn. Over the whole life of the debt it will cost an extra R228bn.

In the context of governance, the ANC is a failed political party and has lacked sound leadership since its founding. Under Cyril Ramaphosa, it has become a confused and terminally ill party, lacking the ability to govern South Africa even on a daily basis. On the present immense chaos and pathology in the greater ANC, Crouse²⁵ writes^25:20: “Instead, by its unquestioned, corrupt primary system and the national party system, the ANC’s base has been skewered. We childhood lovers of the ANC are nailed like a million worms to a party plank that is at once reformist and recidivist, realistic and revanchist, promising and nihilism incarnate. It is maddening.”
Mkokeli²⁶ writes with honesty that Ramaphosa does not have the ability, power and circumstances — as the one-man-band Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India is successfully doing — to hold things together in South Africa, amid growing chaos.
The successful re-election of the ANC in 2019 essentially means maintaining the corrupt networks created by some members of the ANC elite and their cronies under Zuma, which represent a future lifeline and financial empire for those corrupt members of the ANC elite. Kotze¹⁸ posits^18:4:

Die tweede rede is dat die netwerke wat in die Zuma-era gevestig is, sover moontlik beskerm moet word. Dit sluit ook privaat sakebelange in. Met Zuma uit die Uniegebou is dt moeilik om nuwe netweke te vestig, maar dit  is steeds moontlik om bestaande s te prober beskerm.
Die toekoms van baie ondernemings en die lewenstyl van baie mense is hiervan afhanklik.

The failure of the ANC regime is well summed up by the editor²⁷ of the Mail & Guardian when he states^27:32:

While the ANC operated on the moral high ground during the anti-apartheid struggle, since 1994 they have slipped into a sleazy underworld where corruption, nepotism and money squandering are the order of the day, so that South Africa could become a neo-colonial satellite of the American-led neoliberal empire. Although the ANC has been the government of South Africa since 1994, we could allege that it is still not ‘ready to govern’.

Mthombothi²⁸ concurs when he characterises the present-day ANC as follows^28:21:

The fact is the ANC remains the criminal syndicate that found succour and prospered under Jacob Zuma. It is the party of the likes of Magashule, Bongani Bongo and so on, and Ramaphosa doesn’t seem to have even disturbed the furniture. Anybody getting into bed with the cabal cannot escape the stench.

It is to be doubted if the ANC and Ramaphosa would stay in power longer than May/June 2020. The ANC regime’s only hope to survive till 2024 as ruling party, is how successfully the ANC elite can “borrow” from the PIC to provide short-term finance for the country’s collapsing economy. Of course, as a regime it can undertake land redistribution in 2020 but, notwithstanding what the ANC elite do or the outside help they receive, the process is doomed to be a failure if the ANC stays in power until 2024. It will turn into a second round of so-called “state capture”. Poverty and inequality will rise sky-high and the end result spells the rise of revolution.

3.1.3.1.2. The DA

The DA was initially formed as an exclusively White political party, with a political ideology based on a narrow liberalism and exclusive capitalism. Today, it appears to be still hanging on to White supremacy and White interests, as the recent revamping of its leadership confirms. It seems to be at present an inbred verson of the old NP and the Freedom Front, making it a kind of a neo-AWB. It totally failed to handle land redistribution. More than that: it does not seem to have any intention to address the matter in the near future. It cannot be incorporated in any way in a government of unity to solve the land issue.^3-6
Some of the DA’s liberal traditions are just too confrontational for the ANC and together with its racism exclude it from being invited as a partner in ruling South Africa. Lloyd⁴ in this context writes^4:35: “It is not surprising because liberalism has become problematic in South African history, because it is based on colour-blindness, which is not in line with our colonial and apartheid realities.” 
It will be foolish to try to reconcile the so-called ANC doves with the DA liberals, as Labuschagne¹⁰ postulates^10:6 “…wandelgang-diplomasie en ‘n gematigde middelpuntsoekende strategie sou die ANC-duiwe nader aan die DA kon posioneer en sodoende geleidelike middelgrond tussen die partye kon bou” .
Neither would any courting by the DA leadership of Ramaphosa and his clan bring virtue to the country on the land matter. The DA’s testing of the political waters before the May election was foolish when it said^5:4:

Ours is not to fight Cyril, ours is to fight for South Africans. Cyril must do what he needs to do, we must do what we have to do to save SA. We are prioritising the voters we are not prioritising fighting Cyril …We are more concerned about South Africans. Ours is not to fight Cyril Ramaphosa or to sound better than him.

Maimane’s good intention of “blackening” the DA failed. When he said in October 2016 that the DA would diversify its leadership^4:35: “… so that all party structures from branch to national level should set targets for the recruitment and development of exceptional black candidates for public office…”; and^4:35: “If you don’t see that I am black, you are not seeing me”, became empty words for the present-day White DA elite. On the outcome Lloyd⁴ writes^4:35: “This has split the DA into two groups — the one black (social democrats) and the other white (liberals/”liberal core”) — who are engaged in a fierce battle for the soul of the party.” This splitting, whereby the racial Whites remain in charge of the DA, is now in December 2019 greater than ever in the DA. This Whiteness makes any alliance with the ANC impossible. Indeed, the rise of the so-called “Zillenators” spells the end of the DA as a significant political party in post-2020 South Africa.^4,29-33
Indeed, the rise of the “Zillenators” and an exnclusive, racially reversed DA under its old guard, confirms the DA’s dream of White supremacy and “to think for the Blacks”.^34-37
Putting the DA chaos in perspective, Buccuss³⁸ on the 3rd November 2019 In the Sunday Times writes^38:22:

In the recent weeks, large volumes of ink have been split on analysis of the collapse of the DA into a minor ethnic party. In the wake of the party’s capture by the zealots at the Institute of Race Relations, and the return of Helen Zille, very few commentators have sympathy for the party, though some have argued that its collapse is bad for democracy.
But the collapse of the DA’s credibility means that the party is unlikely to be able to play a positive role again.
For years the DA sat on a racial powder keg without an explosion but, sure enough, the explosion eventually came.

Mthombothi³⁹ offers some analysis^39:21:

Ultimately, Maimane was the author of his own downfall. He was meticulous in choosing his assassins. Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee are not disinterested or impartial observers on matters to do with the DA. The party as it stands is their handiwork., their baby.

The DA under Helen Zille, John Steenhuisen, Tony Leon and Ryan Coetzee is at the end of its political life. Indeed, the party was already dying under Maimane, notwithstanding his immense input to grow it and his efforts to keep it standing.^28,35,37-47

3.1.3.1.3. Perspective on a failed ANC and DA

The basis of the failures of the ANC and the DA lies in their pre-1994 histories. Johann Rossouw⁴⁸ writes^48:7: “Die rede hiervoor is dat die meeste politieke partye nog ontstaan het in die stryd teen die Britse kolonialisme en apartheid. Dink mooi daaroor: Nie een nuwe politieke party wat werklik ‘n nuwe toekomsvisie vir alle Suid-Afrikaners verteenwoordig, is al ná 1994 suksesvol gestig en bedryf nie.” 
This characterisation is not only applicable to the “late” NP and the present-day ANC, but also to the DA which is rooted in the old South African Party of Jan Smuts. All these initial aims and intentions of our dominant political parties, which also include their pathology, have never been discarded and new visions adopted, but been maintained in modern South Africa to bring only evil.⁴⁹
Mthombothi²⁸ has not only summarised well the present-day pathology of the ANC but also the failed integrity of the DA (and the EFF) when he posits^28:21:

But none of the other parties seems capable of coming to our rescue. The DA’s inability to attract black voters  will remain its Achilles heel, making its attainment of power almost a bridge too far. The EFF’s stock-in-trade is sowing racial hatred, and its leaders would be wearing overalls of a different colour had the criminal justice system been half-awake.  The other parties are nothing more than spaza shops serving no purpose except as sources of regular income for their leaders and their cronies.

Buccus⁵⁰ gives his perspective on the ANC, DA and EFF and also draws a very negative conclusion as follows^50:22:

But here in SA we have no political party in parliament that stands for a viable, progressive alternative.  The kleptocrats in the EFF and the ANC offer nothing but a vision of horror. The neoliberals in the ANC and the DA offer their own version of a vision of horror, in the form of an economy that condemns millions to poverty.

Buccus’s³⁸ conclusion is final and is stated with integrity^38:22: “It is plain that there is no party in our parliament that has a credible vision for SA.”
On splitting the ANC and DA to bring forward a successful viable and sustainable new party (or parties), the doubt is great. For Mthombothi²⁸ to say to Maimane to ignore the doomsayers and to launch a new party, is irresponsible. The South African political parties’ histories show that the splitting of established parties — notwithstanding that so-called “saviour-leaders” lead them — has seldom been done with success. Mthomboth²⁸, on the possible intention of Maimane to found a new party or to form an alliance with the ANC, writes^28:21:

There are already voices warning against this idea. Look at what happened to COPE, Agang, the UDM and so on, they say. I guess the death or stillbirth of infants should be deployed as an argument against procreation. The better option apparently is for the likes of Maimane to join forces with President Cyril Ramaphosa in the noble struggle to avert national disaster.
People who think this are whistling in the wind. Ramaphosa has been a great disappointment, no two ways about it. In fact, this argument echoes the appeals we heard before the elections for people to hold their noses and vote for the ANC to strengthen Ramaphosa’s hand. The ANC was duly returned to power with the usual thumping majority, and the hyenas are laughing at our naiveté. Mosebenzi Zwane, Faith Muthambi, Bathabile Dlamini, the entire rotten gang, are back in harness under the tutelage of the venal Ace Magashule. It is business as usual. And Ramaphosa remains his wimpish self.

Any alliance between a Maimane faction of old DAs and a Ramaphosa faction of old ANCs will be born in outright political sin — it represents opportunism par excellence; an inclination that will gobble up each faction fast.^51-53
Essentially, both of the main parties are in the process of dying — they cannot bring any success to a post-2019 South Africa: especially not around the land matter.^3-6,54

3.1.3.2. Disregarding the ANC and DA out as future rulers

3.1.3.2.1. The end of political innocence

Firstly, it must be recognised, as the editor⁵⁵ of the Sunday Times emphasises, that the glue which held this country and its people together in the immediate years after 1994, is gone. Secondly, the dream of building a non-racist, non-sexist and prosperous South Africa is also something of the past. The editor⁵⁵ of the Sunday Times on the 28th April 2019 writes^55:18:

The unity we showed the world during that brief post-1994 honeymoon is now fracturing. We are slowly being divided along racial lines. Today, as we reflect on these first 25 years of freedom, we need to find a new common goal that all South Africans can rally around.

Looking critically at the political mess of 2019 in South Africa (emphasised by the fact that 19-million or 51% of the eligible voters cold-shouldered politics by not participating in the May 2019 elections)  and its failed political parties saturated by their masked agendas and their contaminated mindsets, Mthombothi²⁸ rightfully writes^28:21:

So, despite the plethora of parties, many people are still without a political home. Ideology doesn’t seem to be an issue either. The country is simply crying out for decisive leadership, to get things done. There’s therefore space for either another political party or for some political realignment. The more the merrier.

The above words of the editor⁵⁵ of the Sunday Times are visionary. He is formulating a totally new vision and guideline on governing South Africa from 2019: a clear, precise racial and ethnic model, inside a kind of a short-term form of democratic but inclusive government, to serve at last effectively the interests of all South Africans. The false and misleading nature of so-called non-racial and non-ethnic politics of the racial Marxist-Leninist ANC is something of the past: it did not work pre- or post-1994 and will not work in the near future.⁵⁵
Indeed, a totally new political venture is required, entirely excluding the ANC and the DA as the exclusive ruler or rulers of the day. They are fallen angels.^{7,17,25,26,56}
The 1994 Dispensation failed for many obvious reasons, in which the enormous corruption, fraud and theft by the ANC elite, together with the immense rape of the Constitution, stand out, making justified land redistribution a total failure too. Basically, in this confusion there are only three conclusions to be drawen: 1) the faulty belief that democracy is the only good and correct form of government;  2) the ignoring of South Africa’s racial and ethnic diversity as a pre-requisite for effective and justified government; and 3) the reality that the post-1994 BBEEE-policy and cadre deployment, to serve the pre-1994 discriminated-against Blacks, failed because the ANC elite delinquently captured and mismanaged it for their self-enrichment and –empowerment (and because of the outright practice of autocracy masked as democracy).
To expect that the Ramaphosa regime is going to do good in the future is lunacy. Ramaphosa and his regime are the same Marxist-Leninist group formed a century ago to disorganise the greater South African society to exclusively benefit its politburo. The same Cyril Ramaphosa was vice-president to Jacob Zuma during the post-1994 ANC regime’s ongoing state capture, while he was also  the driver behind cadre deployment which is state capture in its purest form. It is correct to describe the present ANC Lite as a crypto-party dictatorship which is intentionally enforcing a false and failed Western democracy and economy (the so-called “dirty” democracy), while a favoured political-economic system for the Marxist-Leninist ANC leaders and its politburo is kept in place.  The ANC’s intention in the past was and is still today to destroy political stability, as well as the rights and assets of the individual. They are more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In contemporary South Africa we are saddled with a corrupt ANC regime that can never be rehabilitated and a racial DA, extremely mismanaged by exclusively White capitalists, that are impossible to heal.

3.1.3.2.2. Time for political renewal

A clear, new broad political impact is needed for the positive renewing of our politics to successfully enact land redistribution. The direct intervention and interference through the use of a policy of comprehensive government directed by the nation, must be the priority. This broad national intervention must be of a duration of between five and ten years. Such a way of government in which the traditionally dominant role of political parties is minimalised, will undoubtedly be labelled by the main parties such as the ANC, DA and the EFF as autocracy because it will tend to phase them out of politics and expose their present politically delinquent activities.This political renewal will bring: 1) a totally new political style of government which is statutorily free from the contaminations and ideologies of the present-day politically delinquent parties and their corrupt leaders, their members and cronies; and 2) a precise racial/ethnic statutory prescription defining proporsional representation of the national body, enabling unhindered effective government and the implementation of balanced and responsible land re-allocation.
Buccus⁵⁷, in forcing this urge for political and government renewal to the foreground, as well as the institution of an applicable governance body (referring specifically to the old UDF) to do it,  writes on the 22nd  September 2019 in the Sunday Times^57:25:

Today, SA is in another kind of crisis. There is mass unemployment, rapid economic decline, a systematic collapse into lawlessness, and anti-democraric forces that are actively working to undermine democratic norms. There is also a global crisis with right-wing authoritarianism flourishing and a profound and urgent climate crisis.
In this situation we require inspired, visionary and decisive leadership. However, our president is largely absent from thje national debate. When Cyril Ramaphosa does speak, he equivocates, gives us insane clichés or fudges the urgent issues. He seems to suffer from a more or less complete inability to deal with the urgent issues confronting us. He is not even willing to acknowledge the seriousness of the crisis that we face, let alone offer us a credible path out of the crisis.
But whatever the reason for Ramaphosa’s inability to lead, we are in the midst of an escalating social, economic and political crisis and he is not able to give leadership. Many of the forces competing to fill the gap are extremely dangerous. These range from the alliance between the pro-Zuma faction of the ANC and the EFF, to the smaller and at times openly violent formations organising attacks on truck drivers  and migrants, and shaking down construction projects.
Increasingly, many in the middle class are abandoning democratic values and demanding dangerously authoritarian responses to the crisis such as the declaration of a state of emergency or the return of the death penalty. This is a very worrying development. If a charismatic authoritarian figure emerged, promising a law and order crackdown and a clean up of corruption, many in the middle  class would, as has happened in India, Brazil and the US, succumb to the authoritarian temptation.
This means that we have to accept that we cannot rely on elected authority to lead us out of the crisis. This does not mean that all is lost. There is another alternative. That alternative is that leadership will have to come from within the society itself.
This is not an entirely new situation. In the 1980s black leadership was largely in exile, in prison, underground or living with extreme harassment. The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 enabled ordinary people to participate in leadership from below, and  the UDF was able to give very significant leadership to society.
The UDF was, broadly speaking, a democratic force that was anti-racist and pro-working class. It wasn’t perfect. Its willingness to dissolve itself after the unbanning of the ANC was a major strategic error. But as imperfect as the UDF was, it organised and mobilised millions of people behind a broadly democratic and progressive vision of society.

It is clear that a renewal of the South African model, replacing the corrupt political parties that beset the voters’ mindsets with ideologies of White or Black supremacy, exclusively White capitalism, Stalininist communism, etc., is immediately needed and indeed possible to activate.

3.1.3.2.2.1. Many similarities between the UDF and the Pact of Mexican political parties

The questions are: 1) can the UDF work again in the 2020 politics of South Africa? and; 2) have such a kind of broad community organisation, inclusive of various political parties and many other non-party associates, worked worldwide so far? Although such outcomes failed to realise in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan at this stage, the outcomes brought by the Pact governance in Rwanda and Mexico have been very positive. Mexico, where the country’s political, social and economic heartbeat was exactly in the same extremely “ill-health” condition as in present-day South Africa — slowed down by crime, corruption, mismanagement, incapable leaders, state capturers etc. — an enormous rehabilitation was launched by a kind of UDF to run the politics there for a while and to do a clean-up of at least the economy. Although Mexico is today still contaminated by the evils of the past, such as the presence of crime and cartels, a major improvement in many areas of governance has been noted. It may be important to refer shortly to the success of  Mexico’s “UDF” (or as they call it there: Pact) to bring governance directly to the citizens by limiting the wrongdoing of the corrupted political parties.¹
The initial approach by the  Mexican leader Peńa Nieto was not to focus on law enforment or the ongoing security problems of Mexico (notwithstanding immense bloodshed by crime cartels in especially drug-dealing), but to go for uplifting the economy. The outright failure of the government in ignoring the action and practice of “open” crime by the criminal cartels — these crime cartels alone are estimated to have killed one hundred thousand people since 2007) — led to widespread protest from 2014 by the ordinary public. To this Nieto reacted constructively by bringing in some measures to fight crime and to take on the immense powerful cartels. Jonathan Tepperman¹, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, writes in his book: The Fix,  on Nieto’s various constructive interventions and interferences in Mexican politics, as follows^1:195:

[Nieto] moved to reform the nation’s police by dissolving local forces and assimilating them into new, state wide agencies; created a nationwide emergency hotline; promised greater transparency in government contracting; and set up special economic zones in Guerrero and other impoverished states. He also introduced constitutional amendments to allow the federal government to take over municipalities infiltrated by organized crime. And in 2015 he oversaw the establishment of a new National Anticorruption System that, among other things, created an independent prosecutor dedicated to fighting corruption and that requires public officials to declare their assets and potential conflicts of interests.

Another very important further step by Nieto to drive and to oversee the above remedial actions, was to gather the various opposition parties into a movement of unity, called the Pact on the 2nd December 2012, to work together and to manage the country constructively. The Pact stayed active until the 20th August 2014. Today, as said, Mexico is still far from an example of good governance, honesty, or even crime-free. Indeed, there are critics that derided Nieto’s measures as too little and too late, while there is scepticism as to the Nieto family’s own integrity because of their alleged involvement in corruption and murder. But at least there there are strong signs of integrity coming from Mexico’s government. It cured in some way the country’s political paralysis and helped to get It to function properly. Furthermore, and though the Pact may be finished, the reforms it had activated as a specifically empowered group in which the parties’ influence was limited, are still making a profound impact on Mexico’s governance and civil life today.¹
Tepperman¹ continues^1:196: “And so for the inevitable question: Can other countries really replicate Mexico’s cure for political paralysis?” 
It is prominent that certain conditions helped Nieto, for instance that all three parties recognised their part in the country’s political mess and thus that they needed to change. This setup indeed forced them in the first place to form the Pact. What made the Pact work was the fact that its leaders shared an unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion, reports Tepperman.^1:196
Mexico’s political system is not unique in most ways, writes Tepperman^1:196-197: “All this suggests that a good many currently deadlocked nations could indeed follow Mexico’s model — one that involved quiet negotiation, painful compromise, political leaders willing to take risks and keep their word, and above all a recognition that zero-sum politics accomplishes nothing.” 
A South African Pact or a New UDF can be realised, but what is clear is that the ANC elite’s dominant and destabilising Marxist-Leninist ideology will never recognise and accept their part in the country’s political mess. They do not want to change because the chaos of present-day politics is planned and steered by the ANC elite. Any  Pact is out for them because it will mean the end of their power and rule.¹
Thankfully the ANC’s political obstruction (together with the other political parties’ rigid ideologies such as the DA’s “White supremacy”)  rules them out from participating in the Pact and the New UDF. To make things work, the leadership of the New UDF must only select leaders who share the unusual ability to recognise reality, face it directly and deal with it in the most responsible fashion. Prominent priorities for the new UDF’s leaders should be to serve society and the interests of individuals.¹

3.1.3.2.2.2. The simultaneous practice of autocracy and democracy inside the South African Constitution

3.1.3.2.2.2.1. Failed South African post-1994 democracy

It is clear that the principle of democracy, as embedded in the Constitution, has not worked post-1994 when a Marxist-Leninist party — the ANC took over control of the state. Indeed, all five of the ANC’s previous administrations were in essence a tidal wave of malfeasance, dishonesty and state capture. Notwithstanding these misdeeds, the ANC was re-elected in May 2019 as the ruler for the sixth administration. This confirms that democracy does not always work to the benefit the total population. This is also evidenced by Africa’s and the world’s many “takers” and failed regimes, as that of Zimbabwe. Although democracy worldwide is still the most sought-after system with 53% of the total number of countries currently qualifying as democracies globally, it has to be noted that since 1994 so much as 75 countries worldwide have moved in the direction of authoritarianism (undoubtedly sometimes for good reasons, at least in the short-term). In 2017 alone 24 countries became autocracies. Hereto are there were in 2019 only 24 countries showing positive aspects in terms of democratisation. Although despots and takers are often central in such autocracies, it also often seems as if the innocent aims and intentions of democracy are inapplicable in the upliftment of the poor or to develop a country in a proper way. South Africa, where the revolutionary ANC misused democracy to exploit the poor, is such an example. It seems as if South Africa would be far better-off if it was initially gradually steered through autocratic economics and politics into a democratic system.^21,58
The question is what must be done to assure successful land redistribution in South Africa post-2019 without disregarding the principles of democracy?
Firstly, our election system must be democratised by radically changing the present Electoral Act, to make it possible for voters to vote directly on national, provincial and local levels for their favoured candidates (independent from their mostly contaminated party-affiliations) in each of the constituencies. Lifestyle audits as a pre-selection requirement should be the first hurdle to cross for those wishing to be elected to Parliament or appointment to the civil service.
Secondly, associated with the above, there must thus be done away with the exclusive party-orientated system through the statutory implementation of a broad national government representing all the individual voters, together with political and economic role-players as the unions, etc.
Thirdly, the creation of “clean” local, provincial and national governments in which not one single member serving at any specific time as a so-called “people-representative” in the present local, provincial and national administrations (or had served in the past) are allowed to do so again. This clean-up can be done by way of a mutual agreement by the role-players involved in the rehabilitation of the parliament and the various  state organs, but the best will be if it is done statutorily by an amendment to the Constitution. Although this démarche undoubtedly will not totally free the new government and its organs from existing corrupt state capture networks and crooks, but this necessary intervention will launch the process of rehabilitation of the South African political landscape and civil service to assure that at least a 70% contingent of clean, trustworthy politicians and civil servants are appointed in future.
The above changes are not part of an autocratic intrusion and is in line with the traditional retirement conditions of persons who for instance have reached the retirement age of 60 or 65 years, or the retrenchment of staff under the retirement age, as traditionally practiced by democratic governments to decrease their employees. Such an intervention will not endanger the Constitution or the rights of the ordinary, good citizen: it will in the long run assure the establishment of true democracy within five to ten years and the kick out the present-day corrupt politicians. The substantial presence of questionable individuals serving as politicians and civil servants was well-illustrated by the various judicial commissions such as the Zondo and Mpati. What is further clear, is that these corrupt politicians and officials identified by means of the investigations led by the commissions mentioned, have all already taken more than their legitimate share in compensation. Also most of them were appointed to highly paid positions for which they really did not qualify. This was made possible by the country’s undemocratic electoral system — others were appointed by the ANC elite’s cadre deployment and BEE model, thus making them unworthy of their positions.
If above short-term statutory rehabilitation of the Parliament is not followed, the ANC elite will introduce a Stalinist regime quite soon to rule outside the Constitution while lording over the country indefinitely, with land grabs without compensation, taking assets from white property owners, making the policy of nationalisation an absolute way of governance. And of course, land grabs will quickly move to a Second State capture.^21,58

3.1.3.2.2.2.2. ANC elite’s fascist leadership

In this rehabilitation the incoming of the New UDF and its replacement of the exclusive political party system by a comprehensive national, provincial and municipal  representative governance model, will become a central development. This approach to stabilise and to repair our failed governance system will undoubtedly be labelled as autocracy and even as despotism and fascism by the so-called neo-liberals and neo-Stalinists (which includes the ANC, DA and EFF).  But is above rehabilitation really autocracy? Here the seasoned South African political philosopher, Professor Tristan Taylor⁵⁹ of the University of Stellenbosch, warns and guides us here clearly into what it would really mean. He writes^59:24: “Liberals and the left are making a terrible mistake when they use fascist as a political insult in this way [by for instance calling the democrat Donald Trump the new Benito Mussolini]. They are blinding themselves to the true nature of fascism, which is something far worse than authoritarianism and ethnic nationalism”; and59:24: “Along with a fair dose of irrationalism and mysticism, fascism revolves around two key concepts: the body national and the leadership principle.” 
Taylor continues^59:24: “In other words, the fascist leader is the embodiment of the nation. The fascist leader’s will is be above written law, is always correct and demand obedience.”  
Looking critically at the above guideline issued by Taylor⁵⁹, the ANC, in terms of the empowerment of its elite and leaders, represent precisely fascism: just revisit the blind empowerment of the ANC regime with Mandela at the helm, and which was eventually transferred to Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, to end with rule of the so-called ANC saviour, namely Cyril Ramaphosa. The UDF’s rise minimized the power grab of the ANC leadership while the individual citizen and voter’s interests and rights were the only focus. This represents democracy in the extreme. Indeed, the whole process proposed taking over control of Parliament, its MPs and MPLs and cleaning up the civil service, ridding it of crooks by the suggested new UDF and its governance plan, which is democracy par excellence.⁵⁹

3.1.3.2.2.2.3. State president’s unqualified powers to misuse the Constitution

To what extent fascism became embedded in the ANC from 1994 onwards as well as in our democracy and openly degraded by it daily, was recently revealed by the previous head of Asset Forfeiture Unit, advocate Willie Hofmeyr⁶⁰, when he said South Africa is at risk of state capture again unless the president’s sweeping powers are cut. Hunter⁶⁰, in the Sunday Times of the 1st December reports that Hofmeyr⁶⁰ sees this errant presidential rule as such a serious matter that he, in an affidavit to the Zondo-commission, recommended that the Constitution be changed. Hofmeyr⁶⁰ states that at present  Ramaphosa (as with Mandela up to Zuma^60:8: “…has unqualified powers to appoint anybody in all positions in the criminal justice system.”
Hofmeyr⁶⁰ notes^60:8: “These powers are what led to the capture of the criminal justice system, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)…”  It means that at present the heads of the SAPS, the Hawks, the NPA and the four deputy directors of public prosecutions and provincial directors of public prosecutions, as well as judges are appointed by the president, serving as it were, at his pleasure.⁶⁰
What is obvious, confirming the lack of any democratic rule followed by the ANC leadership from 1994 onwards and them rather veering off into fascism in the extreme as suggested by in Hofmeyr’s affidavit, is, that already under former president Thabo Mbeki the justice system was abused by the clique in the executive. This means that political skullduggery at the top, on the level of the ANC’s leadership, was not some exclusive process started up by Jacob Zuma, but much earlier in the ANC regime by its corrupt elite. Hofmeyr specifically reflects on this matter^60:8: “I don’t think people must underestimate the damage Mbeki was doing to law enforcement at that time.”
Contradicting further any trace of the presence of a true democracy during the ANC regime’s 25 years of rule [a fact which was basically already erased as by the evidenced in Ramaphosa’s overseeing of cadre deployment (equalling state capture) as vice-president and his absolute passivity as vice-president not to intervene and interfere in Jacob Zuma’s state capture], Hofmeyr⁶⁰ believes the Constitution in its present form ha been disarmed to block bad appointments (by the President) which had in the past, for example by Mbeki and Zuma, led to the decay of the criminal justice system. (The former deputy chief justice Dikgang Moseneke said also in 2014 that too much power rests with the  presidency).⁶⁰
Hofmeyr⁶⁰ further erases the notion of our Constitution as one which exclusively promotes democracy and upholds clean governance, when he posits^60:8:

The thesis I put forward essentially is that individuals don’t capture states, political parties capture states.
To capture a state, you have to capture a political party first and this is what happened here.
…’[the] ANC and corruption go hand’ because of how big a part money plays in party politics.
It’s not right to blame Zuma for all of it. It wasn’t just his people who were stealing. Both sides of the divide were stealing.
I think democracies tend to be built on patronage. Politicians have to deliver something for their constituencies.

The above remarks reflect again not only the ANC’s constant and ongoing failure to respect democracy, the Constitution or the rights of the individual citizen, but also the contaminating role which the present Electoral Act plays in freeing the ANC from their responsibility to the voters as democracy requires and prescribes. It is clear that the South African Constitution has many loopholes, making the presence of an intertwining of autocracy and democracy possible. There is a lifestyle audit missing for each politician on national, provincial and municipal level. There is no place for “freewheeling” candidate election funding and the Ramaphosa debacle of interdicts to maintain the anonymity of his funders and the money his election as leader of the ANC and State President attracted in 2017. Again, our electoral system’s fault to allow the appointment of a State President because a person was elected by only 179 winning votes, brought out by more or less 4 000 ANC delegates at the ANC’s National Conference, is a case in point. Furthermore, our so-called “democracy” and our much-praised “good Constitution” is a mockery, since the fact is that only 28% of the 37 million eligible voters voted in the May 2019 elections for the ANC. The fact that 51% eligible voters stayed away from the voting booth, is undoubtedly not an example of democracy.⁶⁰
The best guide as to why past and  present-day politicians must be banned from official politics in future, is, as already said, solely based on the immense political corruption in which many of them have been directly implicated. Many of these individuals cannot be rehabilitated, as most religious sinners’ failed rehabilitations confirm. To make a clear difference between the so-called “good politician” and the “so-called bad politician”, is impossible. Politicians in South Africa at least, are mostly all in Parliament for opportunistic reasons, even though they try to hide it.  Secondly, all the politicians, either as members of the ruling ANC or the opposition, had the opportunity to make South Africa a better place for the ordinary citizen during their well-paid terms in Parliament. But South Africa is in chaos after 25 years: each politician thus failed in his/her task and duty.

3.1.3.2.2.2.4. The Bible’s guideline applicable on political sinners

To guide us clearly on the right to expel past and present politicians from further engagement in official politics, the Bible’s description of the treatment of sinners is enlightening, including on their sins and the frequent inability of these sinners to reform themselves truly and permanently. Looking carefully at the concepts of “ religious sins” and “political sins”, there is no difference between the wrongdoing and the failure of the two kinds of sinners to follow the path of integrity, honesty and trustworthiness.
Dr RJK Law⁶¹, in his book: Apostasy from the Gospel, gives us a clear guideline how to separate the politician crooks – as  the early Christian leaders did with religious crooks – from the future South African good politics. The many tainted ANCs on their May 2019 election lists, who found at the end the road successfully back to Parliament after the May 2019 elections, are par excellent examples of the immense amount of the ANC’s political sinners safely “staying-on” in the ANC’s own created political heaven.
Law writes61:91:

The early church was careful whom they admitted into fellowship. Every Christian who sinned was only readmitted into fellowship by open repentance.
But where notorious and scandalous sins, such as murder, adultery or idolatry, were committed, no readmission into the fellowship of the church was allowed. This was especially so when a Christian committed idolatry through fear of being martyred for his faith.
The Church of Rome, however, was considered to be very remiss and lax in its discipline. Tertullian accuses Zephyrinus, Bishop of Rome, of admitting adulterers to repentance and readmission into the fellowship of the church.
Novatus and Novatianus opposed this laxity by going to the opposite extreme. They denied all hope of pardon and return to church membership to any person who sinned after baptism. But their followers, horrified at such extreme discipline, left all persons, upon their repentance, to God’s mercy, refusing to readmit only those who had committed notorious and scandalous.

As for Novatus, Novatianus and Tertullian, who were not allowed back into the Christian church as members or as fellow congregants because they had committed notorious and scandalous acts such as murder, adultery and idolatry, there should be no place either in Parliament for politicians who committed any “politically notorious and scandalous acts”, or the political equivalent of “murder, adultery and idolatry”. Many of the ANC’s politicians, notwithstanding their eagerness to repent for their political sins (and sometimes doing so unashamedly), reflect a pattern of their ongoing and constant nefarious activities as a firmly established behavioural patron. The ANC elite (especially their MPs, MPLs and senior  state officials) have been implicated in outright state-capture, BEE and cadre-deployment, and harming millions of people directly in doing so. These are but a few examples of their shocking “politically notorious and scandalous acts” and of “political murder, adultery and idolatry” they committed. As for the religious sinners, there should be for the past and present MP and MPL sinners no longer a comfortable seat in Parliament. If the Church had no mercy on religious deviants, why should Parliament have mercy on political crooks?
Any failure to replace the present-day corrupt, autocratic and despotic ANC governance and to stop its intended land grab by the above-suggested statutory intervention and interference, could activate the crash of the economy, famine and the awaiting deadly revolution, as Gumede⁵⁸ warns^58:18: “Unless land reform is done in ways that will leverage the potential of agriculture to lift growth, secure food security and boost development, it will crash the economy; and^58:18: “Unless land reform is done honestly, transparently and accountably, it will be ensnared in the sort of corruption, rent-seeking and populism that have befallen BEE.” 

3.1.3.3. The ANC-regime’s possible awaiting judiciary and constitutional crisis

When a person becomes bankrupt, insane or mentally disabled, they lose their ability to function as independent citizens, and can no longer make decisions on their own. The first step in this process is to bring the case of such an individual before a court in order to strip them of their privileges since they have become incapable of handling their own affairs. Sometimes this kind of process is done specifically to keep the person from himself of herself, but often also to safe-guard society against an unpredictable, exploitative of a dangerous individual.  A care-taker or curator is appointed specifically by the court, giving the appointee a mandate to act on behalf of the disabled person as long as the court finds it appropriate – especially in the case of persons regarded as non compos mentis or a doli in capax individual. When such an individual commits crime, he/she can be declared insane and not answerable for their deeds. These wrongdoings can vary from murder, theft, corruption, rape, state capture, organised crime, violence, gender-violence as well as xenophobia, etc.
On the other hand, if such a person doing crime, is found to be sane and capable by the court and held responsible and accountable, he/she can be prosecuted by a criminal court and sentenced to a certain punishment.
Although it can be argued that a regime is not a person, and as such cannot be held responsible for its deeds, it is misleading. A regime is run by a certain team, consisting of certain members, who are until they reach the of their lives, responsible for their own as well as the team’s wrongdoings. This fact is confirmed by the prosecution of various Nazi individuals for war-crimes after WW2, specifically for their actions on behalf of the Hitler regime. It is in this context that Mthombothi’s description of the ANC elite’s nefarious acts against all South Africans as well as the country – committed as an ANC’ executive team, as individual members and as part of the same unit from 1994, under Nelson Mandela — should be profiled and analysed – in terms of the concepts non compos mentis, doli incapax and the penalties which common criminals should face. Mthombothi⁶² describes the ANC elite’s bad regime outcomes in the Sunday Times of the 15th December 2019 as  follows^62:21:

Rampant crime is a consequence of the incompetence of the state. The basic responsibility of the state, its raison d’être, is the security or protection of its citizens. The state has all the legal power, including instruments of violence, to carry out such a mandate. But the South African state has continuously failed its people.
One cannot remember a time in this country when crime was either at a manageable level or was not the biggest concern for its people. It is a more pressing issue than, say, unemployment, which is very high. Those leaving the country rarely cite the lack of jobs or greener pastures as reasons. Violent crime is by far the biggest reason for those emigrating.
It’s no exaggeration to say SA has become a major crime scene. The government is failing its people. But for some reason it doesn’t seem to get sufficiently blamed for its numerous failures, be it the faltering economy, lack of jobs or rampant crime rate. Like all governments, it laps up any semblance of success, but would run a mile from its disasters. And the public, whether it’s the result of years of living under an unaccountable  and oppressive government or just sheer ignorance, does not readily lay the blame at the door of the state. Instead, people are often too willing to acknowledge or be thankful for small gestures.

Mthombothi⁶³ further reflects^63:25:

The government’s fault is one of omission, not commission. It had no control over what’s happening in the country.
Ramaphosa’s government is in no position to give any undertaking to anybody, not even to its own citizens, that such maddening violence won’t happen again. It has become a mere spectator to the drama unfolding in the country. It has lost control of the country. The country is on autopilot. The government can’t even protect its own citizens, who are hunted like animals even in their own homes.
The country is literally burning while Cyril and his ANC comrades are busy gazing at their own navels.

It is clear from the above that some members of the ANC elite have become implicated in criminal behaviour and in this context they have often exhibited personal characteristics  similar to that of the common criminal. Furthermore, the ANC elite in their way of governing — specifically regarding their personal traits and certain acts — are mostly associated with the mindsets of people who are non compos mentis and doli incapax. It is clear that the ANC elite’s thinking, planning and activities have become confused and frequently seemingly influenced by hallucinations and illusions, and a glaring lack of awareness. The ANC elite seems indeed, in terms of the test of sanity, often not answerable for their behaviour to the public as required from them as the ruler of the day. Some of the ANC elite, after we analysed their lifestyle audits, seemingly should be already in jails or asylums. The ANC regime’s continuation as the post-2019 ruler needs the attention of the court in order to see if it compos mentis. It seems, looking at the weirdness of the ANC regime over 25 years, that such a request should be processed as soon as possible demanding that the courts be involved to appoint a care-taker to support an interim executive body to rule on behalve of the ANC. Another approach is that the court should be asked to remove the ANC regime and forced a new election.⁶⁴
Above suggestion is not without good reason and the necessary supporting facts. Referring back to the recent court conclusion that the ANC regime failed to manage land redistribution properly as prescribed by the law and the Constitution, forcing the court to appoint a master (caretaker) to see to it that justice be done, the South African courts were thus directly placed to position to be able to decide if the ANC elite is in fact compos mentis to rule or whether it is indeed non compos mentis and doli incapax to properly think, plan and act on behalf of itself or the public and voters.⁶⁴
The court’s intervention⁶⁴ on the land matter shows firstly that the ANC regime could not be trusted in the past to manage land redistribution in a proper way and will never be capable of managing any form of balanced and justified land redistribution in the future. Secondly, the court findings^64:30 reflected on the behaviour of who can be regarded as non compos mentis within the ANC elite^64;30: a lack of accountability and responsibility, the clear, deliberately ignoring the constitutional rights of citizens and for the  empowerment of the judicial institutions, the displaying of an ‘obstinate misapprehension of its statutory duties’, ‘unresponsiveness’, ‘a refusal to account to those dependent on its co-operation’ and a ‘patent incapacity or inability to get the jobs done’ in terms of what the statute and the Constitution require.⁶⁴ An individual, who is constantly transgressing and going beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable with these kinds of above delinquent and deviating characteristics and behaviours, should in his or her private life surely attract the attention of  law-enforcement authorities and the courts about a conclusion on his/her state of mind, but in South Africa such people are deemed fit to be rulers.
The court’s findings and conclusions, as reflected by Fish-Hodgson⁶⁴ confirm the right of the court to monitor any regime’s activities when it deviates, either compos mentis or non compos mentis, from its mandate. It confirms the court’s right to intervene and to interfere when a regime has totally collapsed and failed. On the initial finding of the ANC regime’s failure to do its duty around land redistribution, as prescribed by the Constitution, the court’s finding on the land matter becomes a future legal directive that means intervention and interference in the governance of the ANC elite because their behaviour reflects signs of being non compos mentis or could in fact be classed as doli incapax. On the court’s ruling (and its future legal impact) Fish-Hodgson⁶⁴ reflects that it^64:30: “… leaves the Cabinet with nowhere to hide and no so-called “sell out” constitutional property clause to hide behind”; and^18:30: “…the court warns that, despite its sensitivity towards the need for the department to have a free hand at performing its constitutional mandate without undue interference, systematic failure to perform may justify, and require, muscular intervention by a court. This is of relevance far beyond the facts of this case and the land issue more generally”. Fish-Hodgson⁶⁴ writes further on the ruling set by the court in this context:^64:30: “The court warned that, because the separation of powers does not ‘imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated functional roles’ and ‘the mythical spell must be broken’ to ensure the protection of Mwelase and his co-applicants’ constitutional rights’, court control of the remedial process’ may be warranted”.
Regarding the argument of the state that reads^64:30: “The department told the court that the appointment of a special master, under the auspices of the judiciary, would amount to a usurpation of the powers of the executive in violation of the separation of powers”, but the court nullified this argument of the department’s judicial independence and only being responsible to the ConCourt for its actions, quite quickly and precisely by narrowly following the legal issue by concluding^64:30: “…the court noted that none of those cases it had decided ‘quite match the sustained, large-scale systematic dysfunctionality and obduracy that is evidenced here’.” Fish-Hodgson⁶⁴ points out that the court^64:30: “…describing the situation as a ‘colossal crisis’, the court is warning the government that it must endeavour to ensure that, as the Constitution requires, its obligations are performed diligently and without delay. Failing which, and irrespective of the success of the mooted constitutional amendments of the property clause, courts may begin to act to the embarrassment of a government whose legitimacy is questioned within and outside of its own political ranks”.
The fact that the court had inscribed in its findings and conclusion that the executive must perform its constitutional obligations and accept at all time accountability and responsibility, means that other litigants can^64:30: “…ask for such supervisory remedial action in the face of [its] systematic failures” from the ANC-regime.
The misadventurous and incompetent ANC regime’s actions, and by times their behaviour of being non compos mentis, can be brought directly before a court because of its failure or refusal to be accountable to those dependent on its co-operation – in essence, the electorate that voted for it on national, provincial and local levels. The time is right to launch such an intervention. It seems that the only enterprise able to undertake such an enormous task on behalf of the voters and citizens of South Africa to bring down the ANC regime in 2020 is a New UDF.^64-7

3.1.3.4. Time for a new UDF

The launch of a second UDF as a kind of political party is needed for such a process of political “cleansing”. The economy and governance be addressed with the help of the business sector and the public since the post-1994 rule by die ANC has been a disaster. Professor William Gumede²¹ at Wits guides us^21:22: “There has to be co-governance between the state, business and civil society.” On the economic side (which means the same for the political) Gumede writes: “We will have to plan an evidence-based, realistic and pragmatic national economic turnaround plan”.
Gumede²¹, on the future of such a UDF-kind of governance, posits^21:22:

Whatever development funds are mobilised, and whatever projects are initiated, should be run not by the government or party alone but in tandem with independent business, entrepreneurs and civil society.
Every skill, resource and talent available in the country must be marshalled in a national reconstruction effort. The country cannot afford to marginalise people based on skin colour, ethnicity or ANC affiliation.
Where possible, money lost through corruption should be seized from the guilty.
Corruption should be made a crime against the people. Many lives have been lost because a crooked tender means a hospital had no medicine. Millions continue to live in squalor because the national social housing programme has long ground to a halt.
BEE in its current form should be scrapped, and businesses should divert “BEE” money away from political capitalists and into infrastructure, housing and education.”

Imraan Buccus⁵⁰, a senior associate-researcher at Asri and  research-fellow at UKZN, takes Gumede’s²¹ suggestion of a drastic, comprehensive turnaround plan for post-2019 South Africa further by pinpointing the lack of insight, understanding and willingness in general by political leaders in South Africa to think anew and thus to successfully address such socio-political matters. He writes^50:22:

We do have some very smart people working on alternatives  to neoliberalism in NGOs and universities, but, unlike in the UK, the US and Brazil, there is no political instrument through which our progressive experts can contribute to real change.
Ideas, especially when they represent the interests of the majority against those of the elite, don’t change anything on their own. This is especially so when, as in  SA, there is an overwhelming commitment to now discredited neoliberal ideas among the commentators.
Ideas that have not been taken seriously in most of the world since the financial crisis of 2008 continue to flourish among elites in SA. Commentator after commentator tells us that to advance, we must break the unions, privatise, and commit to fiscal austerity.
These policies have failed everywhere they have been tried and, in a number of countries, led by voters to embrace dangerous forms of right-wing populism.
Public discussion in SA urgently needs to catch up with current developments and to stop pretending that the world has not changed since 2008. But the extraordinary backwardness of our national conversation isn’t just a matter of provincialism, although there is plenty of that. It is also a result of the fact that where we do have progressive intellectuals up to date with current evidence about economics and policy they are not connected to social movements, trade unions or a progressive political party.

Enlightening further Gumede’s²¹ vision of a UDF kind of governance for post-2019, Buccus⁵⁰ clearly points out that the trade unions are in fact part of our present and future politics – and implicated in the direct decision-making thereof – present in broad society, steering the voters and the various political parties fighting for power. This present union power informed Gumede’s notions, that namely it is essential to rehabilitate the country by the involvement of the private sector with governance. It is not only needed in future South African politics, but specifically the urgency to cooperate with the unions as an essential partner, is obvious. Indeed, the immense power of Cosatu forced the ANC not only to cooperate as a partner, but also to toe the line in its behaviour, following Cosatu’s prescriptions. To remove the unions from the South African political scene is more difficult than to remove the ANC from it. On the history and dynamics of the unions in our politics, and their immense power today to be a prime role-player within a kind of UDF regime to rehabilitate the post-2019 economy and politics of the South African state, Buccus⁵⁰ reflects as follows^50:22:

In the 1980s SA was often seen as being at the cutting edge of progressive politics. The UDF and Cosatu worked closely together and drew in hundreds of progressive intellectuals. Of course, all that was lost when the ANC was unbanned, popular struggles demobilised and political debate crushed by the dead hand of the Stalinism of the SACP.
But we do have the largest urban social movement in the world, in the form of Abahlali base Mjondolo, large industrial trade unions like Numsa and other located in Safru that are now independent of the ruling party, and some very good intellectuals in NGOs and universities.
Building a progressive alternative to kleptocracy and neoliberalism requires these three forces – social movements, trade unions and intellectuals – to be united behind a democratic political instrument that can build grassroots support, effectively engage in the battle of ideas and, ultimately, contest for power.

Professor Johann Rossouw⁴⁸, in line with Buccus’ and Mthombothi’s arguing, also takes up the absolute need for the launch of a new UDF to reform South Africa. He, on the chaos in present-day South Africa under the ANC elite and their regime, writes^48:7: “Suid-Afrikaners was laas in die 1980’s so onseker soos nou. Ons redding was toe die burgerlike samelewing wat die politici gelei het om nuwe bondgenootskappe ter wille van die toekoms te smee. En dis presies wat nou moet gebeur.”
Rossouw⁴⁸ identifies doing away with political parties as the drivers, doers and planners on behalf of the interests of South Africans. He is pertinently clear on the path that the post-2019  politics could play in rehabilitating South Africa. He writes^48:775:

Die antwoord lê in die bou van ’n nuwe bondgenootskap buite die party politiek om. Dis ou nuus dat die werklike besluite in SA nie in die parlement geneem word nie. Voorts is die meeste opposiepartye in amper ‘n vrotter toestand as die ANC.
Ons fokus moet dus nie op politieke partye wees nie, maar op burgerlike vennote wat kan saamspan. Aan die hand van ‘n uitstekende ontleding wat Moeletsi Mbeki van die SA maatskaplike struktuur gedoen het, is die volgende groeperinge vandag uitgesluit uit die ANC-geleide bedeling: die sakesektor, die beroepslui, die intelligentsia en, les bes, die arm onderklas van nagenoeg 60% Suid-Afrikaners [a standpoint which is echoed fully by Buccus].

Rossouw⁴⁸, on this civil government in waiting to rescue the country, writes further^48:7: “Daarom, as ons werklik ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap en selfs ‘n nuwe party wil sien, behoort ons deur een enkele ideal gelei te word. Al wat skynbaar vandag in die pad van so ‘n nuwe bondgenootskap staan, is nie ‘n tekort aan bronne, planne of welwillendheid nie, maar eenvoudig die diet van wanhoop waarvan ons leef omdat ons aandag op die mislikte regering en die mislukkende opposisie gerig is.”
Looking critically at the Chief Justice Mogoeng’s under-mentioned utterances, it seems that he, although not saying it directly, also speaks of a kind of UDF approach to solve our present problems. Rooi,⁷⁵ in this context, refers to his speech of 23 November 2019 as follows^75:2:

Hy het bygevoeg ‘n doelbewuste program moet gevolg word om diens-billikheid te bereik, selfs tot op die hoogste vlakke van indiensneming.
Wat ook al die burgerlike samelewing, die arbeid -en private sektor en die regering doen, moet die befhoeftes van armes in ag neem, waaronder hongersnood, siektes en ongeletterdheid.
Mogoeng het gesê enigeen met ‘n funksionele gewete moet sy of haar verantwoordelikheid ontdek soos in die grondwet vervat.
“ As jy in ‘n posisie is wat goed betaal en jy leef gemaklik, en nie omgee vir mense in Diepsloot (‘n township in Johannesburg) nie, is jy ‘n verraaier.”

The implementation of a UDF kind of regime is not easy. Buccus⁵⁷ in this context sets it out thus^57:25:

Achieving organisation and mobilisation on this scale requires real commitment at the level of grassroots community politics. It requires endless meetings, endless discussions and endless work. It is a world apart from the narcissism of “online activism” in which self-promotion usually trumps any commitment to real grassroots work. It is also a world apart from most forms of NGO politics, which are often deeply elitist and generally carried out without any sort of popular mandate or constituency.

On the goodness and honest motivation of persons driving the UDF, Buccus⁵⁷ posits^57:25: “ Most activists don’t want to be activists. They would prefer to spend their time with their families, or developing themselves in interesting ways. There is drudgery in real activism. This is why the bulk of the generation that built the UDF retired from activism when the ANC came to power.”
Kaizer Nyatsumba⁷⁶, the CEO of the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa warns that South Africa is dangerously on the brink of a precipice, but lacks leadership from the ANC elite, which he describes as either somnambulant or deeply in slumberland, besides being arrogant too. On this lack in leadership of the ANC regime and the need by non-politicians to take the task to reform the country, he, as the other propagandists of a new UDF, posits^76:19:

That impose a huge obligation on all South Africans of goodwill, but especially those with any influence in whatever space they find themselves, to make their voices volubly heard. Now that we know the promised “new dawn” has so far proved to be a mirage, civil society and organised business in particular have an inordinate duty to hold this government as accountable between elections as they did the Jacob Zuma administration, and to remind our political mandarins that they are no more than mere servants of our people, who are the real bosses in elections.

To listen further to the rhetoric of  persons such as Mosepe Matlala⁷⁷, the president of the National African Farmers Union of SA (Nafu SA) and the agricultural economist Mandivamba Rukuni⁷⁷ of the University of Zimbabwe, namely that to seize white land will “revive the South African economy”, is to keep the company of fools.  Firstly, Rukuni’s⁷⁷ use of Japan’s land grab from the Japanese landlords after WW2 and giving it to Japanese small farmers to increase production and introduce more players into the market, shows his lack of understanding of how the Japanese system operates and Japan’s good work ethics, integrity and honesty which are in general lacking in Africa.^77,78
On Rukuni’s⁷⁷ memory loss about the fact that Mugabe’s land grab led to today’s famine in Zimbabwe, Gumede⁵⁸ guides us^58:18: “The independence movement governments of Algeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that pursued populist land reform without compensation plunged their countries into mass starvation, crashed their currencies and caused mass foreign and local investor, human  capital and policy flight, with consequences they have been unable to reverse for decades.”
Secondly, Rukuni’s⁷⁷ shocking lack of insight and know-how regarding the aspects of strategy planning, project-management and business planning in the complex South African agricultural economy, together with the complexity of the South African landownership matter – echoes that of the dangerous radical thinking and planning of likes of the elites  of the ANC and the EFF. It is evident when he says^77:8: “You redistribute land in order to create, by my estimation, 500 000 to 700 000 new farmers. These  people… create a new market. Then you will not have the 17 million people on social grants because the people will get land and become farmers, and gain access to markets through public procurement. You convert social grants to real economic participation.”
Thankfully, the peaceful stand on land redistribution by Chief Justice Mogoeng⁷⁵ erases the one-dimensional views of Rukuni⁷⁷, Matlala⁷⁷ and other radicals when he on the 23rd November 2019, in his Nelson Mandela memorial lecture speech proposes a peaceful and satisfactory outcome of the South African land matter, away from land grabs or nationalising of the assets of whites^75:2: “Almal moet saamwerk om te verseker dat die grondvraagstuk en alle ander uitstaande vraagstukke op ‘n manier opgelos word wat tot versoening bydra”.
Gumede⁵⁸ writes that the Ramaphosa regime must make a mature and pragmatist public stance on land reform and differentiate itself from the opportunistic populists within and outside the ANC who call for land expropriation without compensation. What persons such as Rukuni⁷⁷ and Matlala⁷⁷ missed out in their limited knowledge of the South African land matter, is that it is an immensely complicated issue. It is not a one-day solution as some foolish revolutionaries believe without a proper grasp on the matter. On the immense input required to reform the South African agricultural setup before there can be thought of any land redistribution, Gumede⁵⁸ guides us in-depth^58:18:

SA will need to foster a manufacturing sector out of agriculture, focusing on new agricultural products, agricultural processing and beneficiation.
Land reform is a complicated co-ordination and management of market perceptions; it therefore needs a competent public sector to manage it.
The agricultural and rural development government institutions, SOEs and lending institutions must be cleaned up, made more efficient and less corrupt.
Educational, research and technology institutions in the agricultural value chain will also have to be cleaned up, better resourced  aligned to agriculture industrialisation. White individual farmers and agricultural companies will have to be more proactive. They can mentor, partner with and share markets with black farmers.
Private financial institutions should also give easier, cheaper financing and advice to black farmers — and of course to white farmers.

Land redistribution should be done by a sound-minded new UDF and not be done by the corrupted clique as in the ANC-EFF circus. A wise approach and plan is needed. On the absolute need to activate an UDF once again, to manage an orderly and peaceful land redistribution, Buccus⁵⁷ writes^57:25: “But now that we confront a new and severe national crisis, and the ANC is no longer able to give leadership to a progressive vision, there has to be a return to the activist trenches. There is no credible alternative.”

3.1.3.4.1. Role and position of Whites in a new UDF

Clouding the cooperation between black and white to form a comprehensive civil organisation, such as the old UDF, to rule South Africa constructively in the place of the corrupted ANC and its elite, a sector in the ANC and EFF are under the misapprehension that whites are not part of the future of South Africa and as such cannot form part of such a civil organisation. This delusion is totally nullified by Gumede⁷⁹ when he writes^79:20:

Increasingly — and alarmingly — many people have a very narrow perception of who or what is African in SA. They base this on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forebearers or level of suffering.
This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as not African or black enough. For many South Africans this leads to unnecessary trauma, with people questioning their sense of identity and belonging.
An African identity in South Africa context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is the overwhelming character and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror to itself and its face to the world.
However, South African identities are not “gated communities” with fixed borders; they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value. Our modern South Africanness, therefore, cannot but be a layered, plural and inclusive one, based on acceptance of our interconnected differences.
Being born into a particular “community’ should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness. An African and South African identity would be adding parts of all communities to those one was born into, discarding aspects that impinge on the human rights of others.

The whites — as the blacks, the various civil organisations, the unions and the intelligentsia —  are all rightfully members of a new UDF. Whites, as well as blacks, must start to think outside the box on how to construct a better South Africa and to manage an orderly land redistribution with compensation, instead of land grabs without compensation. This means that as much for whites, blacks should not be following their delinquent  leaders blindly and naïvely just because they are of the same race.^58,80,81
Perhaps it is important to emphasise that, although South Africans are often partitioned on the basis of their skin colour while some are scapegoated on the landownership issue as culprits, their bloodlines are frequently less certain. Especially the so-called whites who are viewed as settlers, foreigners or colonists by the ANC and EFF’s radicals. One of the ground-breaking peacemakers (a so-called white) who spent decades mediating SA’s bloody conflicts and who pioneered the successful talks between the Nats and the ANC pre-1994, the late Professor Ampie Muller⁸², was such a mixed-race individual, both black and white. His obituary of the 29th September 2019 in the Sunday Times reads:^82:17

Muller, whose uncle was former South African state president Nico Diederichs, was delighted to discover through DNA testing that he had 5% Nigerian ancestry and was descended in part from Cape slaves.
He said this confirmed his belief that Afrikaners were naturally and historically part of the country’s greater racial mix, and should embrace rather than reject that.

White South Africans have undoubtedly a precise and a legitimate place in the new UDF.

3.1.3.4.2. The steps, paths and process of sound future land redistribution

On the correct process of land redistribution Gumede⁵⁸ states the steps and path to be followed clearly and precisely (which is fully underwritten and supported by the author in this series on land reform) as follows^58:18:

Pragmatic land reform should have multiple strategic pillars. The ANC government must ring-fence commercial agriculture to keep the country food self-sufficient and retain current agriculture jobs, high-grade farming skills and export income.
Commercially viable farms in white hands should not be touched. Redistribution must be pragmatic. Legitimate  farm employees who are active in agriculture could be given shareholder options, profit-sharing and of course be treated with dignity.
Communal land must be immediately transferred to individual households. Communal land, vested under control of traditional leaders, chiefs and kings rather than individual owners, is one of the biggest obstacles to development, industrialisation and economic growth in SA.
In SA and in most African countries, traditional leaders run communal land as if they own it, using it for patronage purpses and to punish those critical of them by depriving them of communal land rights.
State land, whether under the control of SOEs, municipalities or provinces, should be made available to black farmers already active in farming – not given to political farmers.

Undoubtedly the present-day landownership issue is saturated with the wrongs of the past, but to manage land redistribution in terms of the populists’ and radicals’ revenge-seeking modus, will crash the economy. The first stage of land redistribution, without compensation, must be the transfer of communal and state land. The second stage, focussing on the land which belongs to the church, must be the transfer of land accompanied by reasonable compensation. The third stage, namely the transfer of the land of whites, must be activated only with reasonable compensation if there is still land needed after the full completion of stages one and two. The present policy of the ANC that the land redistribution process must be done outright in terms of a race-proportional approach, must be strictly adhered to. The following statistical ratios (calculated out of 100 persons) are applicable: Blacks: 80; Coloureds: 9; Whites: 8 and Indian/Asians/Other: 3. The primary intention must be maintained to bring the present more than 80% of the land in white hands (a group forming only 8% of the total population) gradually down in terms of above race-proportional guideline.^83-88
It must be noted that the “blacks” are not one single group to be served by the intended land reform. This is a reality that the ANC elite has so far successfully kept out of sight and discussions.  The proportional rights on land by the individuals of the various African tribes and sub-tribes must be statutorily described and be recognised. It is unavoidable and an immediate must to address. These black tribal and sub-tribal people have for centuries mostly been living in certain parts of South Africa as majority groups in those areas. This means for instance, that in terms of land allocation through the program of expropriation, the placement of Zulus on traditional Venda land and vice versa could be catastrophic; as were the old “Bantustans” and Apartheid’s other foolishness on who owned which land.  The ratio of 80% of the land to be owned by blacks in general can for instance mean at the end that a ratio of only 8% land for the Zulus, 7% land for the Venda’s, etc. This can bring a totally new dimension to landownership, greed and power grabs, which on its own can lead to the upstart of black ethnic conflicts and struggles (which can usurp the frequently excessive racial attention on white landownership). The impact on the system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and tribal structures could become a hurdle in traditional tribal areas with great swathes of tribal communal land, but Gumede⁸³ clearly defined the setup’s solution^83:22: “The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished, or if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democracy. Harmful African traditions, cultures and customs must be scrapped. Control of communal land must be taken away from traditional leaders and given to individual households.”
Also, there must be taken note of the statutory claims of the so-called “indigenous brown people” (KhoiSan, Griqwa, Namakwa). The allocation of land, obtained through any form of land expropriation from whites, must also favour them proportionally to the fullest extent (See above: Indian/Asians/Other: 3).^83-88

4. Conclusions and Dictum

Comprehensive land redistribution is an immediate must. But it needs vision, statesmanship, and a balanced and  responsible implementation.
South Africa’s main political parties fail the test to be legitimate rulers. Not one of the politicians tasked with it is capable to execute a balanced and justified land redistribution programme.
The ANC as the present-day ruler failed to execute one single project without involving corruption, as its elite’s state capture confirms. Its implemented land redistribution programme was not only saturated by nepotistic ANC elites through cadre deployment and BBEEE, but is par excellence an example of its inability to execute the simplest land redistribution project to uplift the poor and landless blacks. The ANC seems not to know or understand its own “law-bible” and the contents of an act it had itself promulgated in 1996 to effectively manage land redistribution without the need to change Section 25 of the Constitution. The intention to change Section 25 is nothing else than to restart state capture on a grand scale and the intention of the Marxist-Leninist ANC to over-regulate politics in order to stay in power and bring benefits to the exclusive ANC clique.⁶⁹
The ANC-regime is seemingly hellbent on pushing through land redistribution without a structured plan and a much-needed infrastructure. Political opportunism by the dying, but extremist Marxist-Leninist orientated ANC elite to obtain votes from the masses of poor and landless blacks in order to stay in power after 2024, remains the central theme here. If the ANC regime is going to force through land redistribution, the outcome will be a colossal failure and chaos. The chance of igniting a revolution in the process is huge, wherein racial and ethnic conflicts stand central. Rwanda Two is not impossible. It seems that even the Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng⁷⁵, has his doubts and is hesitatant when it comes the alleged, good outcome of the land matter, as Rooi⁷⁵, on Mogoeng’s recent  speech at the Nelson Mandela memorial lecture, reflects^75:2: “Hy het ook sy geloof uitgespreek dat die grondvraagstuk op ‘n vreedsame  wyse opgelos kan word en selfs tot versoening kan bydra.” There is only hope expressed by Mogoeng, and no decisive assurance that the process of a peaceful land redistribution process is a fact or is going to be a fact.
Also, the unfortunate quote by Mogoeng⁷⁵ sadly revisiting much of Apartheid and its evils, such as the mass landownership to which whites were allegedly entitled, does not lend much support to the many struggling and South Africans of goodwill in their efforts to create a new South African Nation. His remarks, as quoted by Rooi⁷⁵ — especially coming from the influencial Chief Justice – is saturated by political ill-will and an incitement to create trouble:² “Hoewel die verlede nie vir alles wat fout is in Suid-Afrika geblameer kan word nie, is ‘die meeste van die probleme wat Suid-Afrika ervaar egter ‘n direkte gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid’.”
South Africa is in immense trouble, not only its economy, but its racial and ethnic relations and brotherhood. As said previously, revolution and civil wars remain possibilities as long as the ANC elite and their regime are in power.
South Africa, as never before in its history coming from 1652, is in great trouble. We need the wisdom of King Solomon. Our salvation is the procedure of proving the doli incapax state of ANC regime in the political sphere: we need a New UDF as the ruler before the end of 2020.
Here the words of Tepperman¹ are very supportive for us^1:29: “Improbable and unexpected victories are exceedingly rare. Yet every once in a while, they do occur… it’s worth considering just what made the happy ending so implausible and, as a consequence, so inspiring.”
Tepperman¹ reflects also that Mexico’s story of rehabilitation and improvement holds for us an immediate and important directive:⁹⁷ “Hope”.  Quoting a Mexican leader, Pardinas, Tepperman¹ writes^1:197: “If you had asked ordinary Mexicans, or even the people who negotiated the Pact, whether, [a few] years ago, they would have thought something like this could happen here, they would have said no. We went through fifteen years of frustration. But our lesson is that the impossible can happen. It happened. Sometimes you really can find water in the middle of the desert.”
The New UDF is more than hope; it could become a reality. It could happen. It is a must to save South Africa from the brink of disaster and to eventually bring democracy and prosperity to the masses of poor and landless blacks. The New UDF is the only organisation that can successfully bring about a peaceful land redistribution process.
You reap what you sow.
Since 1652 South Africans have sowed distilled and reaped chaos. Since the 1994 democracy we have sowed, distilled and reaped chaos and despair. But there is hope: with the right person at the helm, sowing good corn, this confused and devastated country can be saved to live its golden days at last. The landownership matter is central to guarantee such golden days.  
It’s now the duty and obligation of the country’s 37-million eligible voters to appoint the right helmsman.

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PEER REVIEW
Not commissioned; External peer-reviewed.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The author declares that he has no competing interest.
FUNDING
The research was funded by the Focus Area Social Transformation, Faculty of Humanities, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, South Africa.
UNSUITABLE TERMS AND INAPPROPRIATE WORDS
Please note that I, the author, is aware that the words Creole, Bantu, Kaffir, Native, Hottentot and Bushman are no longer suitable terms and are inappropriate (even criminal) for use in general speech and writing in South Africa (Even the words non-White and White are becoming controversial in the South African context). The terms do appear in dated documents and are used or translated as such in this article for the sake of historical accuracy. Their use is unavoidable within this context. It is important to retain their use in this article to reflect the racist thought, speech and writings of as recently as sixty years ago. These names form part of a collection of degrading names commonly used in historical writings during the heyday of apartheid and the British imperial time. In reflecting on the leaders and regimes of the past, it is important to foreground the racism, dehumanization and distancing involved by showing the language used to suppress and oppress. It also helps us to place leaders and their sentiments on a continuum of racism. These negative names do not represent my views and I distance myself from the use of such language for speaking and writing. In my other research on the South African populations and political history, I use Blacks, Whites, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaners, Coloureds, KhoiSan (Bushmen), KhoiKhoi (Hottentots) and Boers as applicable historically descriptive names.