Pawning Mandela: The visit of PW Botha to Mobutu Sese Seko, ca. 1988. A phantastic history.

Title: Pawning Mandela: The visit of PW Botha to Mobutu Sese Seko, ca. 1988.
A phantastic history.

Afrikaanse titel: Mandela op die koop toe: Die besoek van PW Botha aan Mobutu Sese Seseko, ca 1988. ʼn Vergesogte geskiedenis.

Corresponding Author:

Prof. Dr. Jan Ad Stemmet; MA (UCT), PhD (UFS)

Department of Military History, Faculty of Military Science (Saldanha Military Academy), Stellenbosch University

Email: stemmet@sun.ac.za

Dr Marietjie Oelofse

Department of History, University of the Free State

oelofsem@ufs.ac.za

Ensovoort, volume 43 (2022), number 3: 1

Opsomming

1988: President PW Botha en die minderheidsregering het ‘n sensasionele vonk gekort om te bewys dat hul steeds fut gehad het. ‘n Oudiënsie met Mobutu Sese Seko was dalk vergesog genoeg. Die blote gedagte aan die ‘Groot Krokodil’ en die ‘Luiperdleier’ wat hul samesyn vier, was politieke  fantasie. Die gebeurtenis het nooit deur historici aandag geniet nie, en is as foefie vergeet. Die werklikheid is makaber. Hierdie artikel – gegrond op voorheen onontdekte argivale materiaal, waaronder verbatim-transkripsies – ontsluit die misterie agter die historiese oomblik. ʼn Oomblik waarvan niks gekom het nie, maar Suid-Afrika inherent kon verander het. Die lang, klandestiene, verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en Zaïre se veiligheidsbestelle word belyn, asook die finansiële sake. Mobutu verduidelik aan Suid-Afrika sy diplomatieke ondersteuning en openlike uitreik na Pretoria, en President Botha dring aan op ʼn, openlike, byeenkoms.

Verder word onteenseglik uitgelê hoedat President Botha oorweeg het om Nelson Mandela vry te laat – in die hande van Veldmaarskalk Mobutu Se Sesseko. 

Keywords: PW Botha; Mobutu Sese Seko; Nelson Mandela; Mandungu Bula Nyati; Pik Botha, Magnus Malan, Apartheid; South Africa-Zaire relations; South African Defence Force; SA Military Intelligence

Introduction

It seems as if contemporary South Africa jumps from climax to climax, rather than slowly moving towards a new frontier. Such a summation might be most apt for the last decade of Apartheid. The PW Botha presidency represented a (melo)dramatic roller coaster, with flux being the one constant. One of the biggest surprises was the 1988 visit of President PW Botha to Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko. It was an anti-climax, not because something went wrong, but because apparently nothing went anywhere. A spectacular non-event?

Within South African historiography, there is no discussion of the event. In her 1029-page biography of Pik Botha, Pik Botha and his times, Theresa Papenfus makes no mention of the diplomatic venture. While Pik Botha represented the diplomatic dimension on the trip, General Magnus Malan embodied the defence sphere. In his dense personal memoir, My life with the SA Defence Force, Malan does not even refer to the visit. Brian Pottinger’s, The imperial presidency: PW Botha, the first 10 years, appeared in 1988 and missed the visit. Daan Prinsloo, in Botha’s official 1997 biography, Stem uit die wilderness, also makes no note of it. Considering how he towered over South Africa in the 1980s, astonishingly few academic works have been written on PW Botha and, apart from press clippings, nothing substantial appeared about his Zaire excursion. Even at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs, where Botha’s truly impressive private collection is housed, nothing is to be found in the official index. Volumes have been written on Mobuto, but his day with the infamous Apartheid leader is missing (at least in an English search.) Nonetheless, it was exceptional, if somewhat macabre.

For both anti-Apartheid and anti-Mobutu activists, this must have seemed an obscene get-together. Mobuto was regarded by some as the most corrupt leader on earth; the scope of his regime’s corruption was such that a new term had to be coined for it: a kleptocracy. PW Botha presided over a system of government that was considered by most states as the most immoral in the world. Surely, the two personified the worst Africa had to offer. Moreover, apart from both being feverishly anti-communist, and having a penchant for the draconian, they were diametric opposites. Zaire and South Africa did not even maintain any formal ties. Whatever propelled a meeting between these two figures must have been of overwhelming urgency.

Yet, the diplomatic soiree brought about nothing. It caused a momentary flurry, then was forgotten almost straight away. Hailed as a breakthrough, it was not followed by any tangible rewards. It therefore begs the question: why did it take place at all?

The immediate narrative surrounding the event will first be revisited; thereafter, the cloaked reality will be uncovered: PW Botha was trying to outsource Nelson Mandela’s freedom. Mobuto was very keen.

Botha’s brawn and brouhaha: South Africa in 1988

1988 saw celebrations, and outcries, as the National Party (NP) entered its fortieth year as ruling party, along with Apartheid (by whatever name) as its underlying ideological anchor. PW Botha’s 40th year as a parliamentarian was both commemorated and mourned. South Africa as a country was still in disarray.

For critics, political violence was still the simplest measure of Botha’s reform process, and the overall legitimacy of the NP. 1988 would be the fourth consecutive year that the minority regime mandated a State of Emergency. The extraordinary decrees of the previous year were a success for Pretoria, as popular violence was violently oppressed when most townships were again brought under the control of the authorities. Alternative Structures, created by agitators in the townships to counter government rule, were forcefully wrecked. This delivered a strong blow to the overall strategy of the African National Congress (ANC) in its drive to render the Apartheid state ungovernable.[1] The hope for Pretoria’s imminent fall that had beset anti-Apartheid fighters during 1986 proved to be a pipedream. A sombre realisation had set in: that ‘The Great Crocodile’ (an uncomplimentary nickname for President Botha) and his minority government were much more ruthless and determined than previously believed.[2]

As 1988 dawned, the regime sensationally subdued some powerful adversaries. The colossal United Democratic Front (UDF), as well as the influential Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and Free Mandela Campaign (FMC), were legalistically sedated to an extent where they could only conduct confined and ineffective activities.[3] The security chiefs warned that stability could easily skid away. On 10 June, 1988, President Botha announced a new State of Emergency.[4] New decrees tightened the screws on anti-government organisations and intensified already-stringent media limitations. The powers of the high court were also curtailed. With media limitations enhanced, the regime now exercised near-complete control over the production/flow of information, as well as freedom of association. Botha had now estranged both the reserved mainstream press and leftist alternative press, culminating in public mudslinging between the press and the presidency.[5]

Even though the ANC’s multi-layered strategy of a glorious Uhuru-styled revolution had been all but nullified by the state, this did not imply that all was serene. With chances of an all-enveloping uprising dwindling, its armed wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), executed a frantic spate of bombings, indiscriminately targeting civilians. On average, from January – November 1988, there was at least one bomb attack every day in South Africa. In October 1988 alone, there were 34 terrorist attacks.[6]

Examining the list of anti-Apartheid economic measures enforced by 1988, the economy was bleeding.[7] The main factor that was derailing the Apartheid state’s economy was the annual repayment of Pretoria’s gigantic foreign debt.[8] Apartheid South Africa could forget about wooing foreign financiers as long as the system was in place. The problem here was twofold: South Africans had alarmingly little savings, while at the same time the country could not solicit enough foreign investment. It was thus threatened by a weakening of its capital base and serious limitations on the resources needed for tangible development.[9]

Botha also failed to view and manage his reform campaign inclusively. His administration did not wholly realise (or refused to accept) that most of the problems facing the country were interwoven at their core. Furthermore, the government did not take a hard and realistic enough look at what the vast reform process would cost. PW Botha and his government kept on reforming without making sure that they could indeed afford it. In the process, well-intended financial quagmires were created.[10] As a whole, during the 1980s, the country had a real economic growth rate of only 1,5%.[11] How much political reform would cost was a point of contention. The blows suffered by the corporate community due to the political status quo lead to a permanent estrangement between the presidency and ‘Big Business’.

If the present was stark, the future could always be worse. In an interview with Leadership SA, Chester Crocker (the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) reminded Pretoria that it was not impossible that, during 1988’s presidential elections, Reagan might be succeeded by an administration that was markedly less understanding. Crocker lamented that, despite the NP’s constant complaints about the way Washington dealt with it, Pretoria was quiet in recognising the Oval Office’s bravery in its stance on South Africa.[12] Botha had indeed started to make pronouncements about the US that sounded like those of the Unaligned States. Botha told the Washington Times in 1988 that, “What worries me more than anything is that the US whose symbol is the Statue of Liberty, can act the way it does. But the fact of the matter is that there is a growing perception, all over the world, of a superpower that is playing domestic politics with critically important problems.”[13]

As much as Botha wanted foreigners to abstain from meddling, one issue that had transcended any notion of being an internal matter was Nelson Mandela. Specifically, his future – if he had one. In the winter of 1988, news broke that Nelson Mandela needed heart surgery.[14] PW Botha’s office was flooded with letters calling on his government to immediately release the aging martyr. Even President Reagan sent an urgent message to Botha, stating “It is my earnest hope that […] you will conclude that Mr Mandela’s release would serve the long-term interest of South Africa as a whole.” Botha replied to Reagan, “I hope that he will make it possible for me to act in a humane way and in such a way that we can have peace in South Africa instead of violence.”[15] From London, Thatcher also sent an urgent message that, “[Mandela’s] death in prison would have very damaging consequences.”[16]

PW Botha admitted that he was scared by the thought of Mandela dying in prison, “therefore we took very good care of him.”[17] What if Nelson Mandela was to die in an Apartheid jail? According to the then-Chairperson of the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond, Prof JP de Lange, the answer was self-evident: Armageddon. Sooner or later, he would die. Where was a question that became an increasingly burning topic for the government.[18]

The immediate concern for Pretoria was Mandela’s 70th birthday. The occasion in July, 1988, was met with large celebratory events the world over. His milestone birthday further cemented him as an international newsmaker, and the higher his star rose, the further Botha’s plummeted.

In fact, Botha’s 10th year as head of state brought with it generally scathing assessments of the presidency. Brian Pottinger wrote that, after 10 years at the helm, Botha proved that he possessed the insights to identify crises, but lacked the wisdom to defuse them. Violence was not yet apocalyptic; the economy could make a comeback, but if the status quo was left spiralling, the land would fall on its own petard. Pottinger warned that such an outcome could develop into something much worse.[19]

The Financial Mail published a scathing critique of the Botha presidency during the latter part of 1988. “South African society would not be the loser if there were to be a change of leadership now – and almost any change would do. For Botha’s volatile, even ambivalent disposition is now the greatest impediment to progress and prosperity. The National Party, which is by no means about to be unseated should consider very carefully whether it can continue to afford him.”[20] Tackling the Nationalists’ economic management, it concluded, “What he and his party are telling us is that they are prepared to see this economy reduced to a wasteland if that is what maintaining the status quo entails. Is it that much different from the spirit of Tutu’s […] scorched-earth sanctions policy? The outcome will be the same – impoverishment.”[21] Henry Kenney wrote that the country had grown “heartily sick of PW Botha,” and not only his politics, but his persona too. Even executive Nationalists had had enough of his bombastic dramatics in public, his vicious attacks even on allies, and his growing paranoia.[22] PW Botha urgently needed something with which to electrify both friend and foe. The Apartheid state was the skunk of the world, whose doors were literally shutting on South Africans. A foreign visit by South Africa’s head of state sent glimmers of hope to its people that all was not lost.

During 1988, Botha jetted to Portugal, Switzerland (where, amongst others, he met with West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl) and Gabon, the Central Africa Republic, the Congo, Mozambique, and Malawi. But in this itinerary, Zaire stood out. While Western states blacklisted South Africa due to its handling of Black people, this meeting was with possibly the most important Black African leader at that stage. The President had secured an historic audience with the (infamously) illustrious Mobutu Sese Seko, and the two countries did not even share any official ties.[23]

The macabre Marshal: Mobutu by 1988

Assessing Mobutu in the 1980s, Jean-Claude Willame wrote that a “sense of expectancy” had beset Zaire. After he had seized power in 1965, his relationship with Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu became strained and, in 1967, he abolished the constitution, ushering in one-party rule. In the early 1970s, he had consolidated all executive powers in his hands.[24] The despot’s lone rule was challenged from both within and outside Zaire, by militarists, political powerbrokers, tribalists and foreign moneylenders.[25] While always triumphant, Mobutu nonetheless had to constantly battle against would-be usurpers. In the 1960s and 1970s, he presented himself as the great helmsman. Undertakings like Zaireanization saw the Congo renamed Zaire, and a frenzied drive to change everything reminiscent of its colonial legacy. The ‘Leopard Leader’ lead a drive for Zaireans to change their Belgian-Congo names, so Désiré Mobutu was renamed (or rather rebirthed) Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga – The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake. Not only were people, places and things renamed, but the economy (the foreign-owned parts) was distributed to the people, or at least the elite of the population. With Mobutuism, the Leopard Leader conjured an all-enveloping personality cult. He proved brilliant in creating an air of omnipotence and cementing himself as the only constant in Zaire. Mobutu bestowed power and wealth at will, and just as easily yanked it away. Status was fleeting, and everyone exploited the moment without hesitation, thus cementing a culture of urgency, paranoia and corruption.

Divide-and-rule was very much part of his tactical makeup. He thrived on spreading confusion amongst his deputies; he seldom held meetings with more than a person at a time and encouraged underlings to spy on one another. Subordination and admiration were expected from all. In that regard, the intelligence service, the Civil Information Agency (Agence Nationale de Documentation, or AND), was crucial. Pretoria’s security chiefs would be proud to learn that their training had paid off: the AND stood out as being particularly skilful in assessing intelligence, merciless in flushing out agitators, and had the reputation for being Mobutu sycophants. As Mobutu descended deeper into despotism, he positioned himself above the dull tasks of governance. Politicians, administrators and generals were left to run the country (and were to blame for anything), while the casuist reigned from a more holistic plateau. Abandoning local politics to the locals, Mobutu focused on global diplomacy. Therein, he excelled.[26]

In no way an awe-inspiring philosopher, the despot had a striking aptitude for bamboozling the European halls of power. In 1978, during an uprising localised within the Shaba province, Mobutu received immediate help from China, Saudi Arabia, France, Belgium, Egypt, Gabon, Senegal and Morocco. He was truly legendary at creating lucrative divisions amongst his enemies – and among his allies. To Zaire’s creditors, it was explained that, irrespective of their threats, the country could not simply be cut off without it being somehow detrimental to its financiers. Zaire’s glut for loans was as limitless as the moneylenders’ patience: From 1976 – 1990, the International Monetary Fund oversaw 14 stabilisation programmes for the kleptocracy. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated that 64% of Zaire’s entire budget was earmarked for Mobutu’s “discretionary expenditure.”[27]

Although Zaire as a state was perpetually teetering on the brink of a complete cave-in, the same was not true for Mobutu: Uprisings remained localised, and rebels were ruthlessly deactivated. During the 1980s, a classic revolution was not realistic, as young soldiers were scrutinised (and would-be Young Turks identified), and the old guard was beholden to the durability of the Leopard Leader, who periodically purged the army of possible non-conformists. A substantial military threat would, undoubtedly, be met by pro-Mobutu foreign intervention. Moreover, for the West, Zaire was a vital firewall to the regional spread of radical Islam and Soviet influence.[28] As with the then-debate on Apartheid, Mobutu was unquestionably a disgrace but possibly not as dangerous as his void might be.

President Reagan might have described Mobutu as “a voice of good sense and good will,” but his legacy will always be overshadowed by his personal kleptomania. He needed fortunes to be seen as the sovereign keeper of the purse, and then larger fortunes to be the spreader of prosperity to loyalists. In 1988, when the average Zairean child died before reaching five, Mobutu’s wealth nearly equalled Zaire’s national debt. Gecamines (the state’s copper mining company) and Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), the state’s diamond colossus, were Mobutu’s favourite cash cows. In 1981, Mobutu sold 20 000 tons of copper and personally pocketed $35 million. It was an open secret that chartered freight planes, piled with off-the-books cobalt and diamonds, regularly flew to Europe for discreet trading. In 1988, some $400 million in mineral sales disappeared. Mobutu’s mobsters stole, on average, three million carats in diamonds annually. Mobutu, who in 1981 was given the status of Field Marshal by an adoring people, had absolute control over Zaire’s budget and central bank. In 1981, for example, he simply phoned the central bank and ordered a transfer of $30 million to his Swiss bank accounts. That was small change. During the 1970s, when Mobutu redistributed foreign assets, he grabbed 14 plantations, which he organised into a massive agricultural company. Cultures et Elevages du Zaire [CELZA] employed 25 000 farmhands and was responsible for 23% of Zaire’s cocoa bean production, 26% of its rubber and 15% of its tea. His homes abroad included a 16th century castle in Spain, a 32-bedroom palace in Switzerland, as well as manors in Italy, Portugal, France, Belgium and the Ivory Coast. It was estimated that Mobutu had stolen more than $5 billion (close to R100 billion today), but Mobutu insisted that his Swiss bank accounts carried only $50 million – not disputing their existence.[29]

During the 1970s, Mobutu wanted to put his birth village, Gbodolite, on the map – literally, as the small enclave was not indicated on most diagrams. He felled massive chunks of forest nearly 1000 kilometres north of Kinshasa, and ploughed between $100 million and $250 million into constructing a vainglorious monument to his own largesse. The three-storey palace, on the banks of the Ubangi River, was 15 000m², its front doors were seven metres tall, lined with Italian marble, stuffed with antiques and art, and surrounded by immaculate parks, a zoo and mesmerising fountains. Four hundred servants, behind bullet-proof windows, saw to its upkeep and 300 soldiers (trained by Israeli specialists) guarded the despot’s Neverland. Finding it too big, Mobutu had a second, cosier palace constructed near Kawale, with an Olympic-size swimming pool, 15 000-bottle wine cellar, and a nuclear bunker that could shield 500, as well as a third palace, a sprawling Chinese pagoda. He had the nearby village transformed into a kitsch Beverly Hills: boutique shops opened, a posh school was built, an international airport sprang up with an extended airstrip (Mobutu hired the Concord on a whim, for example to jet in his barber from New York or hairdresser from Paris, or chartered a Boeing to replenish his beloved Laurent Perrier champagne, of which the palaces consumed approximately 10 000 bottles a year), and a grandiose hotel was built to host his guests, including Pope John Paul II.[30] This Versailles of Africa, as Mobutu called it, would be the setting for the talks with the Apartheid leader.

Zaire and South Africa: Perfect strangers?

As the Zaire rendezvous started to materialise, the South African Defence Force (SADF) supplied President Botha with a top-secret brief about the actual relationship between the two countries, authored by Military Intelligence. Entitled “Support and Co-operation: Zaire,” the document shed (official) light on what the genuine relationship was between the two alienated states .[31] Other departments might have had sporadic contact with Kinshasa, but from 1980 onwards, the SADF had strong ties with Zaire’s secret service, the AND. Exchanges took place on the highest level and individual executives met personally with Mobutu. The Angolan war usually dominated those agendas. The AND would supply information, while the SADF supplied technical know-how. The SADF’s relationship with the AND thickened to a point where the South Africans were training AND operatives and overseeing that organisation’s general development. “Interaction became more frequent and grew to an intensive traffic [SADF-AND] of personnel and equipment (the latter mainly in one direction.)”[32]

The actual goal of the SADF’s amicability was eventual “military cooperation agreements in promoting open regional military collaboration”. This was underway while Pretoria was being attacked internationally for its military’s strategy of destabilising states that supported its enemies. Kinshasa demonstrated a sense of “openness” when discussing mutual issues. In fact, “There exists with Pres Mobutu a willingness to promote South Africa’s moderate image abroad by letting Zaire’s discussion forums serve moderate Black South African leaders.” Moreover, the Leopard Leader was willing to sell the minority power’s case to the loose alliance of sub-Saharan countries committed to countering the Apartheid state, also known as the Frontline States. On 28 January, 1988, Mobutu beseeched Pretoria to help with a military build-up and to authorise sales from South Africa’s Arms Corporation [ARMSCOR.] This was “accepted positively by the State President”. The SADF’s high command had endorsed the requests and had already embarked on “Phase 1” of implementing intimate partnerships.[33]

Zaire was not a member of the Frontline States but maintained an energetic presence at their meetings. Mobutu’s representatives always made a point of subtly expressing “appreciation for the complexities” besetting the Apartheid state but, since September 1986, Zaire had come under pressure to radicalise its lukewarm stance. Kinshasa had given support to liberation movements, including the ANC, but had also continuously expanded its business dealings with South Africa. In this regard, Zaire underwrote the United Nation’s array of anti-Apartheid motions but resolutely abstained from endorsing any blanket sanctions. Mobutu nearly single-handedly defused the endorsement of heavyweight anti-Apartheid sanctions during the last day of the 1985 Franco-African Summit in Paris. The despot also openly stated, in 1986, that the White minority regime ought to become a member of the Organization of Black African States. He argued that it would promote dialogue and regional calm. However, his support did not end at lofty notions.

The SADF’s Military Intelligence had “substantial contact” with Kinshasa and there was non-stop traffic of military delegations. Involvement had become so expansive that the SADF was tasked with “the maintenance of the Zairian air force”. Next to this, the report remarks that South Africa’s ever-popular landscape artist, Keith Kirsten, designed and oversaw the vast parks at Mobutu’s palaces; the latter had an admiration for Kirsten and called him “Monsieur le Fleur”. It stands to reason that, by means of that horticultural undertaking, South African intelligence had obtained a very precise picture of Mobutu’s vast and highly protected compound.

On economic levels, Zaire was very reliant on the country it held no official ties with. South Africa was exporting 70 000 tonnes of wheat to Zaire, while 60% of Zaire’s lead, 45% of its copper, and 40% of its cobalt was exported through Durban and East London’s harbours. In fact, 57% of its entire imports ran through South Africa. Imports from Zaire in 1987 amounted to less than R8,5 million, but exports from South Africa to Zaire in 1987 amounted to R199,8 million. The presidential brief referred to the sound relations between Foreign Affairs and key Zairean individuals: A “Mr Kitenge” was a highly placed Zairean diplomat, posted in Europe, who had already visited South Africa in 1985. Dr Degueldre was Mobutu’s private physician, and an intimate, who channelled messages from the despot to Pretoria; Tokwautu Batale Sokolakamo (who died in the same plane crash as Mozambican president Samora Machel) was Mobutu’s ambassador to Mozambique and had surreptitiously visited South Africa twice in 1986. As for cloak-and-dagger diplomacy, there was good news for the despot.[34]

The report noted that, due to standard policy, but “very much the promising relationship that South Africa has with Zaire, the Department does not get involved with opposition parties that want to depose the Mobutu-regime”. For example, in October 1988 the South African embassy in Rome was approached by “a certain Col Fataki”. The Katangese wanted military support from PW Botha to annex Katanga “and ultimately take over the government of Zaire. His request was refused”.[35] It is clear from this confidential brief that South Africa-Zaire relations, although invisible on paper, were flourishing. With controversy always on Zaire’s side, and the Apartheid state’s nightmarish international image, these two notorious regimes were on the brink of making their courtship official.

From ZAR to ZR, and back: Chronological lead-up

According to Botha’s brief, the upcoming meeting was “the consequence of intensive negotiations which took place over the last few years; and represents a political breakthrough for the RSA”. On 24 September 1986, an unidentified executive official of Foreign Affairs met with the Zairean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Mandungu Bula Nyati, in Amsterdam. This was regarded as a forerunner to a meeting between the Zairean and his South African counterpart, Pik Botha. During five days in October 1986, the proposed meeting’s agenda was further explored in Kinshasa.[36]

In April 1987, Kielo Nzau, Zaire’s representative in Maputo, requested talks with Pretoria to establish “formal relations” between the two states. Pik Botha wrote to Nyati about the “possibility of exchanging representatives”. Officials from Foreign Affairs travelled to Kinshasa in August, 1987, for further talks. “Minister Nyati made it clear that Zaire had to endure a lot of criticism over its pragmatic and realistic attitude towards the RSA.” The Zairean stressed that Washington “could bring about the downfall of South Africa and that the release of Mandela is the key to the normalization of relations between South Africa and Africa.”[37] Clearly, Nyati coupled the USA threat with the Mandela spectre. It is not farfetched to assume that Mobutu’s eventual proposition to President Botha was already brewing.

The anonymous Foreign Affairs Deputy Director General for Africa travelled to Kinshasa for a six-day visit in November, 1987, where “(t)he possibility of a meeting between the two state presidents was proposed”. Mobutu sent a request “that he had to be supplied with evidence that reforms was underway in South Africa”. Nyati explained that Sese Seko needed such justification “in the light of expected international criticism” for the meeting. Nyati visited South Africa from 6 to 10 December, 1987, and met with Pik Botha, his Director General and Deputy Director General. His visit “indicated an important milestone in bilateral relations: Nyati was apparently designated to examine the so-called ‘Israel-option,’”, which implied ties with the Apartheid state in defiance of global criticism.

Of all these visits, the single most important is noted without any specifics. It merely stated, “A second visit by Nyati took place from 21-24 February 1988. This time the State President and Minister Magnus Malan was spoken with.”[38] This crucial conversation will be discussed later to illustrate how the bigger, behind-the-scenes meeting — which very few were privy to — actually played out.

The brief omitted a vital consultation, or its composer was unaware of it. In a letter classified “Top Secret”, General Malan personally gave written feedback to President Botha. The Administrator General N`Gbanda[39] (who, as the head of AND, was also Zaire’s executive spymaster) had secretly visited the Apartheid state in May, 1988, to deliver messages to Botha, via his Defence Minister. The powerful Zairean also asked for information concerning south-east Angola. Mobutu had recently returned from an extensive visit of Africa and Europe and “wants to give feedback to the RSA in regard to the talks he held there as well as asking for the views of the RSA about it.” N’Gbanda said that he himself had not been properly briefed but Mobutu “indicated that he is willing to receive a delegation from the RSA to supply us with thorough feedback”.

The spymaster was emphatic that Malan should deliver the following message: Mobutu wants to convey his “heartfelt thanks” to Botha in seeing to it that the Sharpeville Six[40] were not hanged. Mobutu was one of an array of state leaders that had beseeched Botha to use his presidential pardon. “He believes that this ruling by the courts of the RSA, supplies him with the opportunity ‘to continue with his diplomatic offensive.’” Furthermore: “He had given an order to the Zaire press to only report factually about the RSA and not to place any negative commentary or criticism with articles.” No coy sentiment from Mobutu, “N`Gbanda was apparently given the order to see that this directive was effected.”[41]

On 27 August ,1988, amidst great secrecy, a South African delegation (General Malan, Minister Pik Botha and Military Intelligence’s General Major CJ van Tonder) had met with Mobutu personally to clinch the visit. Mobutu told the powerhouse delegation to tell Botha:

  • The USSR may never be trusted, “irrespective of Glasnost”.
  • That he “did not trust the motives of the Angolans and Cubans in the peace talks” with South Africa.
  • Without Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), there could be no peace in Angola.
  • Moscow, Havana and Luanda were obsessed with the American presidential elections, hoping that the liberal Michael Dukakis would win.
  • That co-operation “specifically on military level” between Kinshasa and Pretoria could be greatly expanded.
  • “That he would welcome it if Pres PW Botha would visit him.”[42]

The Great Crocodile in the Leopard’s lair: 1 October, 1988

Africa’s, arguably, most corrupt leader was to meet with the leader of Africa’s — according to critics worldwide — most unethical regime on 1 October, 1988. Mobutu’s hospitality was condemned by Zambia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.[43] Addressing the nation via TV, the despot stressed that he was receiving the South African only “at his request” and that it “fits into the framework of the search for solutions to the problems of peace in Angola, independence in Namibia and apartheid in South Africa”. En route to Gbodolite, the South African entourage’s Boeing 707 landed in Kinshasa to refuel. There were some 200 students protesting the Apartheid leader’s visit to Zaire, but troops quickly dispersed the crowd with machine-gun fire. Mobutu met the South Africans with red carpet treatment, although the South African national anthem was not played, as the states did not recognise each other diplomatically. The President thanked Mobutu for the “impressive welcome.” At a lavish banquet, the Great Crocodile gifted the Leopard Leader with an outstanding hunting rifle and exquisite hand-engraved Krugerrands. The groups then adjourned for closed talks, lasting two hours. Talking to the media afterwards, Mobutu said, “Our relations are on a new path” and that they spoke with candour. Botha said that he was “most impressed” by the despot’s intricate knowledge of the region, adding, “Africa is talking to South Africa”. Needled for specifics, he said sweepingly that they had “discussed peace” in Africa and the Angolan War. Mobutu excitedly announced, correctly, that Botha had invited him to visit the Apartheid state.[44]

Mobutu then declared astonishingly that Botha had made a “solemn promise” to release Nelson Mandela in the very near future. “I obtained from Botha a firm commitment that Mandela will soon be freed, without any conditions, that he will be allowed to return to his home without any constraints.” Refusing to divulge specifics, the despot told The Washington Post that Botha hinted that an historic announcement might be made in the next days.[45]

Mobutu was known as being extravagant with the truth. The notion of Botha making such an historic announcement, never mind promise, to Mobutu seemed outlandish in the extreme. There was nothing in the grapevine to corroborate the statement and the story did not even make headline news; either Mobutu was lying, or the gist got lost in translation.

A “joint” press statement was released. Four points had been discussed at Gbadolite: (1) The Angolan peace talks; (2) Namibian independence; (3) A future region, after the war had ended and Namibia gained independence; (4) Mandela’s “situation”. There was nothing exceptional that would have necessitated the historic meeting. Regarding Mandela, it was noted that the Zaireans asked that he be released, and “President Botha’s flexible approach concerning the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, was a source of encouragement to President Mobutu”. It noted that Botha and Mobutu were “frank and calm” throughout.[46] A South African Foreign Affairs Spokesperson denied that Botha had made any remark about Mandela’s definite release. When Pik Botha was asked about Mobutu’s statements, he refrained from denying it explicitly but remarked that this was “the only agreed version of the discussion concerning Mr Mandela’s release”.[47] The reality is that nobody was lying, or totally truthful.

Missing pieces: 22 February, 1988

Leaving the melodrama behind, this article now moves to explaining the grander game afoot. Pretoria’s move towards Mandela’s freedom started on 3 May, 1982, with a memorandum, at the behest of President Botha, from the Secretariat of the State Security Council. Entitled “MANDELA,” the document asks for “considered strategic advice” whether “Mandela ought to be held ad infinitum, or can his release be considered somewhere in the future”.[48] Burning topics from that request were not only when, but how and where to release him. The president and cabinet would investigate many possibilities of releasing him — including outside South Africa.

As noted above, a meeting took place between a Mobutu official and PW Botha early in 1988. In MI’s brief (outlined above), it is mentioned in passing. The transcript of this conversation is indexed in Botha’s private archival collection, and is the only document in the vast inventory having to do with Zaire. It lies in “Political and General”. Yet, it might lay bare the reason for the Gbodolite summit.

On 22 February, 1988, Mobutu’s Information Minister Nyati (and “Mr Yessou: Chef de Cabinet”) met with President Botha, JWH Meiring, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr Jannie P Roux, the powerful Office of the State President’s Secretary-General.[49] “Zaire is ready to do what it takes in respect of change in the situation in South Africa,” Nyati said to Botha and added that, for Zaire, “you are Africans.” The Apartheid state’s crises were obvious but so too, felt Mobutu, was Botha’s bravery in finding solutions, “and Zaire and our President is ready to help you.” Nyati said that Africa, as such, will not accept Pretoria “as long as the man who has become a symbol, is in gaol”. Botha spoke rather lengthily about Angola and the need for foreign troublemakers, like the US and USSR, to retreat from that conflict. Nyati agreed and subtly steered the conversation back to South Africa’s internal problems. He concurred that Botha must be allowed time to solve the country’s problems, as doing it overnight “is suicide, not only for this country but for the whole of Southern Africa”. Again, Mobutu’s loyalty was pledged, as Zaireans “are with you”. He added, “The difficult problem, which is a psychological problem, is the Mandela problem.”

Few people could raise the Mandela issue with Botha without suffering an eruption, and foreigners especially were to tread lightly. Yet, the Black Zairean solicited no such bombast. The Great Crocodile listened quietly as he relayed Mobutu’s proposal. Nyati said that Mobutu realised how “outside interferences” were frustrating Botha’s endeavours, stating “We in Zaire are ready to help in that case, because if indeed he is to come out of the prison, we are ready in Zaire, with your permission, to take him to Zaire for a while.” He said that, in such a scenario, Botha and Mandela would have time to agree on a schedule for future developments. “If you feel that he had to go to somewhere, Zaire is ready to take him. And we will help.” It was reiterated that Mobutu “is ready to keep Mandela for a while if you want him to be outside so that when you get things to cool down a bit and then come back later on”. The Zaireans accepted that, at the appropriate juncture, Botha would communicate with “some members of the ANC to let them know that they have to try and help themselves if they hope to see the real guarantee, because nobody will readily assist in the collapse of South Africa”. He underlined that Zaire’s economy would be severely hurt if South Africa was wrecked, thus “We cannot do anything against South Africa”.[50]

Botha explained that he could not allow the ANC into South Africa without qualification: it could not be allowed to continue its armed struggle after being unbanned. Botha said, “I will give them amnesty. But then they lay down their arms and we talk around the table.” Nyati asked if Mandela had changed his core beliefs. Botha said that he could not be sure, but Mandela was not prepared to denounce political violence. The Apartheid leader said that he was not completely sure whether Mandela actually wanted to be released as, “He gets five-star treatment.” Botha also said, “I do not know whether the ANC will allow Mandela to live in South Africa. I do not know whether it will suit them.” The Zairean interjected, “Definitely not in South Africa. That is why we are under the impression that you can look at a country like Zaire.” Botha said it ought to be considered, as “I personally think that your President and myself will have to meet personally”. The President went further and said that he really wanted to meet Mobutu, even “without the world knowing”. “That will be considered” replied Nyati, to which Botha reacted, “I can tell you that many African leaders come to South Africa and the world does not know about it.” Nyati said that it was possible. “If you can come here unannounced, why can I not go to Zaire?”[51]

Botha said he wanted to discuss the Mandela proposition with Mobutu, as “There are facets of this problem that we will have to accept joint responsibility”. The president said that if he released Mandela, he needed to obey the Apartheid state’s laws or be arrested again. Hence, Botha wanted him out of the country, circumventing the inevitable: Mandela defying the land’s laws and placing Pretoria in a stalemate.

Botha started to bemoan his personal position as an African leader, that he was not a racist and knew many African leaders intimately, but was still attacked throughout. Nyati quickly drew him away from that melancholic detour, and suggested “we solve this problem first by talking about the release of Mandela in advance”. Botha quickly concurred and restated that it should be highly confidential “in the most respectable way so that we can have a consideration of all the aspects”. Nyati assured Botha, “especially we will emphasize your willingness to free Mandela”, and that the South African and Mobutu must clarify many practicalities before releasing Mandela. Botha once again emphasised his desire to meet with Mobutu. Whereas Botha kept most famed foreigners away from the iconic convict, sweetening the deal, he said, “If your President and I could meet, I would make it possible for him, or a high-ranking delegate, to meet with Mr Mandela.”[52]

A puzzle without corners: Conclusion

On paper, and with a taxed imagination, the idea of releasing Mandela outside of South Africa was understandable from the regime’s point of view. However, the practicalities, and myriad ripple effects attached to it, were simply so profound that it is nearly impossible to imagine it ever having been entertained. On top of that, releasing him into Mobutu’s Sese Seko’s care seems truly fanciful. It is very enticing to play ‘what if’ with this history, but it is nearly too incredible to give the prospect even that bit of credibility. Nonetheless, the record shows that irrespective of disbelief, it was the case.

Mobutu’s role was undefined. Was he to be a mediator? Some kind of chaperone? Was he, in effect, going to keep Mandela hostage in a palace? Pretoria would, undoubtedly, have announced some sort of open-ended time frame for deliberation on the future ahead. Once more, Pretoria’s commitment to negotiations would be questioned, while having rid itself of a crucial restraint (Mandela’s death in prison.) It is not over-reaching to consider that Mandela, having left Zaire’s jungles, would have called for the masses to truly rise against the system, and for both West and East to finally destroy Apartheid and its custodians. Mandela would have arrived at South Africa’s borders, with the exiled ANC in tow, forcing an historic standoff, and/or he would have declared a government in exile, forcing the West and East to make very difficult choices. What these scenarios would have triggered in South Africa is unimaginable: the reaction of the masses, the homelands, the far-right, the security complex and business community is too terrifying to contemplate.

Mobutu was a manipulator of historic proportions, and he undoubtedly would have tried to milk the scenario for all it was worth. However, the idea that Pretoria would have controlled Mandela by proxy through Mobutu was wishful thinking. Neither the former nor the latter was easily influenced, never mind controlled. Mobutu was not scared of the US or the USSR, nor intimidated by institutions such as the IMF. Thus, history suggests that he would not have been daunted by South Africa – irrespective of economic and military relations. But, all things considered, Mandela probably would have rejected the undertaking out of hand.

Instead of the epic plan being unrolled, nothing came out of the meeting. As the article has clearly illustrated, South Africa and Zaire already had extensive relations, albeit secretly. The meeting could have cemented further expansion, but did not imply the start of relations. Furthermore, a public meeting between Botha and Mobutu was not necessary for knotting ties. Following the ostensible diplomatic breakthrough, no mention was made of closer bonds or even of the two nations now officially recognising each other.

There is the possibility that Botha needed a flashy diplomatic distraction with which to beguile. While this is true, it also does not fit perfectly. He did desire face time with Mobutu, but repeatedly emphasised that it could (even ought) to be held in absolute secrecy. He could have pushed hard for an open rendezvous, if it were really all about diplomatic hype, but did not. At what stage it was decided to go public with the pow-wow is uncertain. Certainly, that decision had to have come from the host, Mobutu.

Was the Mandela prospect merely a ruse to get to Mobutu? The fact is that Nyati approached Botha on the Mandela issue, not the other way around. Nyati came to South Africa to deliver a message from Mobutu, which turned out to be the proposal about Mandela’s release, although the president’s calm reaction to Nyati’s proposal suggests that he likely knew of it prior to the meeting.

The actual talks, of course, hold the key. It is not known what was discussed during the actual in camera discussions. The official press release noted four subjects, but did not hint at detail or how much weight each topic carried. Nyati said to Botha that they would emphasise Botha’s willingness to free Mandela. This Mobutu did immediately after the talks, but the very notion was diluted by Pretoria.

Arguably, the true importance of this phantastic history is that it illustrates PW Botha’s anxiousness regarding the Mandela crisis, and it suggests a sense of desperation. Why else would he have entertained such an elaborate scheme? However, Mobutu never visited South Africa, and Botha was ousted in August 1989. Before FW de Klerk freed Mandela, he too jetted to Zaire. Once more, the Angolan War and Namibia were presented as the main motivation for the quick visit, but Mandela’s release was no doubt once again discussed.

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[1]     P. van Niekerk, “Middle ground laid to waste” in New Statesman 114(2941), 7 August 1987, p. 10.

[2]     Ibid.

[3]     D. Oakes (ed.), Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of South Africa – The real story, The Readers Digest Association, p. 488.

[4]     W. du Plessis and N. Olivier, “10 Junie 1988 – derde algemene noodtoestand” in SA Publiekreg 3(2), November 1988, pp. 266-267.

[5]     Ibid.

[6]     C. Cooper, et al., SA race relation survey 1988/89, pp. 110-112.

[7]     “Growing list”, Sanctions: A Leadership SA Publication 1988/1989, p. 39.

[8]     Die Volksblad, 15 August 1987.

[9]     Die Transvaler, 7 December 1988,

[10]    Rapport, 30 April 1989; W. Strong, “Die algemene verkiesing van 1987 en 1989 en die politieke gebeure daartussen”, (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of the Free State, 1993), p. 215.

[11]    Ibid., p. 218.

[12]    N. Lurssen, “No regrets” in Leadership SA 7(2), 1988, p. 36.

[13]    Archive for Contemporary Affairs (ARCA), University of the Free State (UFS), Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. PS 12//106//1/, 1988.

[14]    N. Mandela, Long walk to freedom. The autobiography of Nelson Mandela, p. 530.

[15]    D. Prinsloo, Stem uit die wildernis, pp. 325-326.

[16]    Ibid., p. 312.

[17]    J-A. Stemmet Private Collection: Interview with P.W. Botha, 3 October 2000.

[18]    J-A. Stemmet Private Collection: Interview with J.P. de Lange, 28 June 2000.

[19]    B. Pottinger, The imperial presidency: PW Botha, the first 10 years, pp. 451-452.

[20]    Anon, “Neither honour nor success” in Financial Mail 109(9), 2 September 1988, p. 28.

[21]    Ibid., p. 31.

[22]    H. Kenney, Power, pride and prejudice, pp. 391-393, 395.

[23]    A.J.G. Müller, Die hervormingsinisiatiewe van die Nasionale Party, 1978-1989, en die redes daarvoor, (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of the Free State, 1993), pp. 273-274; Strong, pp. 101-104.

[24]    J-L.P. Ikambana, Mobutu’s totalitarian political system: An Afrocentric analysis, pp. 54-55.

[25]    J-C. Willame, “Political succession in Zaire or back to Machiavelli” in The Journal of Modern African Studies 26(1), March 1988, pp. 31-44.

[26]    Ibid., pp. 31-44; M. Wrong, “The Emperor Mobutu” in Transition (81/82), 2000, pp. 95-96; W. Reno, “Sovereignty and personal rule in Zaire” in Africa Studies Quarterly 1(3), 1997, pp. 42-44.

[27]    Willame, pp. 31-44; Wrong, pp. 95-96; Reno, pp. 42-44.

[28]   Wrong, pp. 95-96; Reno, pp. 42-44; Willame, pp. 31-44.

[29] J. Brook, “Mobutu’s village basks in his glory” in The New York Times, 29 September 1988, p. 12, <www.nytimes.com> (accessed: 20 February 2021); B. Berkeley, “Zaire: An African horror story” in The Atlantic, August 1993, <www.theatlantic.com> (accessed: 15 December 2021); P. Kenyon, Dictatorland. The men who stole Africa, pp. 48-51. See also: A. Russell, Big men, little people: The leaders who defined Africa, pp. 9-44.

[30]    M. Wrong, In the footsteps of Mr Kurtz: Living on the brink of disaster in Mobutu’s Congo, pp. 213-222; T. Sullivan, “Onetime kingdom now a ghost town of excesses past” in Los Angeles Times, 19 August 2001, <www.latimes.com> (accessed: 5 March 2021).

[31]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. “Inset: AMI: Hulpverlening en samewerking: Zaïre”, (Not Indexed).

[32]    Ibid.

[33]    Ibid.

[34]    Ibid.

[35]    Ibid.

[36]    Ibid.

[37]    Ibid.

[38]    Ibid.

[39]   With erstwhile dreams of being a priest, he was nicknamed The Terminator; he and his agents (Owls) were notorious for their merciless brutality in terrorizing Mobuto’s opponents. Wrong, “The Emperor …”, pp. 95-96.

[40]    In 1984 the Deputy Mayor of Sharpeville, Jacob Kuzwayo Dlamini, was viciously murdered in mob violence. The eventual trial caused a fierce international outcry. The Sharpeville Six dramatically received a stay of execution from Pres. P.W. Botha.

[41]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. “Boodskap vanaf President Mobutu, 9 Mei 1988”, (Not Indexed).

[42]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. “Inset: AMI: Hulpverlening en samewerking: Zaïre”, (Not Indexed).

[43]    J. Brooke, “Why Mobutu and Botha might find friendship expedient” in New York Times, 9 October 1988, p. 3, <www.nytimes.com> (accessed: 8 March 2021).

[44]    Anon, “Zaire’s president meets with Botha, agrees to visit South Africa” in Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1989, <www.latimes.com> (accessed: 18 December 2020); R. Weller, “Mobutu agrees to visit South Africa” in AP News, 2 October 1989, <www.apnews.com> (accessed: 18 December 2020); J. Brooke, “Mobutu agrees to visit South Africa” in New York Times, 2 October 1988, <www.nytimes.com> (accessed: 2 March 2021); T. Masland, “Botha predicts gains with Black neighbours” in Chicago Tribune, 3 October 1988, <www.chicagotribune.com> (accessed: 10 February 2021).

[45]    Anon, “Zaire’s president meets with Botha, agrees to visit South Africa” in Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1989, <www.latimes.com> (accessed: 18 December 2020); R. Weller, “Mobutu agrees to visit South Africa” in AP News, 2 October 1989, <www.apnews.com> (accessed: 18 December 2020); J. Brooke, “Mobutu agrees to visit South Africa” in New York Times, 2 October 1988, <www.nytimes.com> (accessed: 2 March 2021); T. Masland, “Botha predicts gains with Black neighbours” in Chicago Tribune, 3 October 1988, <www.chicagotribune.com> (accessed: 10 February 2021).

[46]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. “Joint press release after summit meeting between President Botha and Field Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire”, (Not Indexed).

[47]    Anon, “Botha predicts gains with Black neighbours” in Chicago Tribune, 3 October 1988, <www.chicagotribune.com> (accessed: 10 February 2021).

[48]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. K. Coetsee Private Collection: PV 357. “Secretariat of the State Security Council: Memorandum: Mandela”, 1/ M1/2.

[49]    ARCA, UFS, Bloemfontein. P.W. Botha Private Collection: PV 203. “Discussion between the State President and Minister Nyati of Zaire, 22 February 1988”, PS12/108/1.

[50]    Ibid.

[51]    Ibid.

[52]    Ibid.